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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > Questions about Christianity > The Liar's Paradox and the Law of Excluded Middle | Forum Quick Jump
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|  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 1/20/2003 4:30 PM (GMT -6) |   | I want to know people's thoughts on how what they call the "Liar's Paradox" relates to the logical Law of Excluded Middle. I had a professor try to use such semantic paradoxes once to demonstrate that Aristotelian logic doesn't apply universally.
Here are some examples of the Liar's Paradox:
1) "This statement is false."
2) One side of an index card reads, "The statement on the other side of this card is true." The other side of the card reads, "The statement on the other side of this card is false."
3) A statement at the top of a page reads, "One statement on this page is false," but every other statement on the page is true.
According to the Law of Excluded Middle, a statement is either true or false, but in the case of these paradoxes, if the statement is true, then it's false, and if it's false then it's true.
Anyone. . .?
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
 |  trosie Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 550 | Posted 1/20/2003 7:52 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: According to the Law of Excluded Middle, a statement is either true or false, but in the case of these paradoxes, if the statement is true, then it's false, and if it's false then it's true.
I love it! I don't know much about the Law of Excluded Middle but I love the logic you've presented -- Of course I like things being BLACK/WHITE and TRUE/FALSE (the EITHER/OR argument). It's when the gray area (the middle) is introduced that I get all frazzled!   
The argument sounds to me like a double-bind! 
trosie
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 |  Chucks3371 Registered Member
 Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 28 | Posted 1/21/2003 8:49 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
I want to know people's thoughts on how what they call the "Liar's Paradox" relates to the logical Law of Excluded Middle. I had a professor try to use such semantic paradoxes once to demonstrate that Aristotelian logic doesn't apply universally.
You and your professor are confusing the Principle of Bivalence with the Law of the Excluded Middle. Aristotle accepted the Law of the Excluded Middle, but rejected the Principle of Bivalence, at least in regards to statements about the future.
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 |  SeanG Registered Member
 Date Joined Dec 2002 Total Posts : 278 | Posted 1/27/2003 1:32 AM (GMT -6) |   | Just a quick definition from a great article:
http://www.apologeticsinfo.org/papers/naturenecessity.html
One of the primary principles of logic is the law of (non-) contradiction. Basically it states that no statement (proposition, assertion, etc.) can be both true and not true--false--(e.g., A can not be non-A) at the same time and in the same sense. For example, it can not both be true and not true (in the same time and sense) that a person is and is not a Christian. All such statements are false. It is a first principle (it is axiomatic or self-evident) of thought or epistemology. (Thus, one cannot not use it. To deny it is like saying "I cannot utter a word in English.") The distinction between true and false is based on this principle.
The second primary law of logic is the principle of excluded middle. The law of (non-)contradiction simply states that A cannot equal or be non-A (or p & non-p). But both could be "quip," that is, neither true or false--simply not both--but not necessarily true or false either. But excluded middle states A or non-A, that is, a proposition is either true or false--it must be one or the other (and not quip!). Thus, a proposition or statement must be true or false. (See, e.g., Matthew 12:30).
The third primary law of logic is called the law of identity. It states that A=A or that "if any statement is true, then it is true."(8) An example would be Christ is Christ and not non-Christ (e.g., the Christ of the Bible is not the "Christ" of the cults or the occult.
The fourth primary law of logic is the law of logical or rational inference. An example of this principle is: if A=B, and B=C, then A=C. It's importance can be seen relevant to all discursive or non-axiomatic knowledge or reasoning. For example, the word trinity is not found in the Bible, but the concept is found in the Bible (see, e.g., Deut. 6:4; Eph. 1:3; John 1:1; 20:28; Acts 5:3-4; and Mark 12:29-30).
SeanG!"Evolution is the substance of fossils hoped for, the evidence of links not seen."
“The problem with creation is not that it has been tried and found wanting, but that it has been found difficult, and left untried.” | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Starkman Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2001 Total Posts : 1747 | Posted 1/27/2003 5:03 AM (GMT -6) |   | Someone please 'splain (to use Desi Arnaz's English)!
(Translation: would someone please explaing first what the Principle of Bivalence is and how this causes confusion with the Law of the Excluded Middle?)
Thanks,
Starkman
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 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 2/7/2003 6:07 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: You and your professor are confusing the Principle of Bivalence with the Law of the Excluded Middle. Aristotle accepted the Law of the Excluded Middle, but rejected the Principle of Bivalence, at least in regards to statements about the future.
Chuck (or anyone else for that matter), can you explain how the two principles do differ. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy goes into probability to demonstrate the point, but I'm not sure I follow it. It concludes its entry on bivalence by noting that not all philosophers accept the distinction between bivalence and excluded middle. I can see why. If it's there, it's a pretty fine line.
Can anyone throw me some clarity? 
Anyone's comments on how they would explain these paradoxes would make for some good conversation as well.
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/7/2003 11:14 AM (GMT -6) |   | CH, As I understand it,
The principle of bivalence says: For any proposition A, either A is true or A is false.
The Law of Excluded Middle says: For any proposition A, either A is true or not-A is true.
It is easy to confuse these two because bivalence implies excluded middle: if A is false, then not-A is true; if not-A is false, then A is true. Either way, excluded middle follows. BUT excluded middle does not imply bivalence b/c one can DENY bivalence and still affirm excluded middle. For example, in multi-valued logics there are three truth values: true, false, and indeterminate. Bivalence is denied in favor of trivalence. But excluded middle still holds: If A is false, then not-A is true; if not-A is false, then A is true. The difference that denying bivalence makes is that IF A is NOT TRUE then we cannot infer that A is false (it could be indeterminate). To say that A is false is not the same thing as saying that not-A is true, unless we assume bivalence.
Make sense? Alan
If A is true, | | Back to Top | | |
 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 2/7/2003 2:52 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: in multi-valued logics there are three truth values: true, false, and indeterminate. Bivalence is denied in favor of trivalence. But excluded middle still holds: If A is false, then not-A is true; if not-A is false, then A is true. The difference that denying bivalence makes is that IF A is NOT TRUE then we cannot infer that A is false (it could be indeterminate). To say that A is false is not the same thing as saying that not-A is true, unless we assume bivalence
I appreciate your response, Alan. I feel I'm getting closer. Tell me about this indeterminance, though. Is it simply due to our ignorance in a particular situation regarding a particular subject or what?
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Chucks3371 Registered Member
 Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 28 | Posted 2/13/2003 9:29 AM (GMT -6) |   | As SeanG pointed out, there are only a few axioms of logic (However, either he or the web site referenced yet again confuses bivalence with excluded middle)
Just as there are multiple geometries, there can be multiple systems of logic. For example, relational database design uses three-valued logic. That works just fine in real-world applications. Fuzzy logic is another system that works well for applications where systems based on the principle of bivalance don't. Since coherent logical systems can be build without the P of BiV, it shows that BiV is not an axiom.
When you claim that a statement is "false" or "indeterminate", then you are outside the realm of logic proper and into epistemology, a much different topic.
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 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/13/2003 4:36 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: Tell me about this indeterminance, though. Is it simply due to our ignorance in a particular situation regarding a particular subject or what?
With respect to denials of bivalence, "indeterminate" stands for a truth-value that is neither true nor false. On a correspondence theory of truth, the truth-value of a proposition depends on whether and to what extent is corresponds to or agrees with reality. A proposition is "true" when it agrees with reality, "false" when it doesn't, and "indeterminate" when it neither agrees nor disagrees. This is an objective matter and does not depend on our perspective or state of knowledge. Perspective only comes in when we try to assign truth-values to propositions--it doesn't affect the actual truth or falsity of the proposition.
Multivalued logics are motivated to a large extent by the need to deal with vagueness--a pervasive feature of our languange whereby terms have indefinite extension (i.e., the range of applicability of the term is "fuzzy", imprecise). For example, remember Fuzzy Wuzzy, the bear who had no hair? If we start adding hairs one-by-one to Fuzzy Wuzzy, how many hairs will it take to make him "fuzzy"? It's not real clear. There are clear cases in which the proposition "Fuzzy Wuzzy is fuzzy" is false (e.g., less than 100 hairs), and clear cases where it is true (e.g., 50 million hairs), and a large middle range where it just isn't clear. To handle those types of situations some logicians developed multi-valued logics that introduced a third truth-value "indeterminate".
While multi-valued logics certainly have their uses, a more natural way to deal with vagueness--though less convenient for logicians, who thrive on precision--is to realize that the term "truth" itself is vague. A proposition can be more-or-less true depending on how closely it corresponds to reality. To use an obvious case, "Pi = 3.1415926536" is truer than "Pi = 3.14", but neither is completely true. By treating the concept of truth as elastic, we can deal with Fuzzy Wuzzy-type cases without introducing a third fundamental truth-value; instead we can just say that our proposition is "somewhat true" or "partially true".
Hope that helps, Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 2/14/2003 5:15 AM (GMT -6) |   | Yeah, that definitely helps--especially when I put your last two posts together. Thanks. So on what basis or bases do some philosophers deny the distinction between bivalence and excluded middle 
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Matthew Timothy Short Huh?

Date Joined Apr 2002 Total Posts : 635 | Posted 2/15/2003 4:11 AM (GMT -6) |   | Parent: (generic kibitz about eating)
Kid: (attempt to evade issue by some remark about not wanting to clean up room)
Parent: That is irrelevant!
Kid: What does `irrelevant' mean?
Parent: hmmm. The sliding glass door over there needs to be cleaned.
Parent: There. I just made an irrelevant remark. `Irrelevant' means not germane to the conversation.
Other parent: So! Your statement, being irrelevant, provided an example of the concept of irrelevance, which was the topic of the conversation, and hence it was actually relevant.
Parent: hmmm. being relevant, it did not illustrate the topic of the conversation. So, it was irrelevant.
Other parent: There! You see? It was irrelevant, and so it was in fact relevant to the topic of conversation, irrelevance!
Parent: (etc.)
Other parent: (etc.)
Kids: (exchange glances, give thumbs up signs, don't eat)
Conclusion: If the statement was irrelevant, it was relevant. Also, if it was relevant, it was irrelevant.
God is Love,
Tim
1Jo 2:16…the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father… | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/17/2003 4:14 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: So on what basis or bases do some philosophers deny the distinction between bivalence and excluded middle 
I explained this in an earlier post, but I'll try to state it more clearly. Bivalence and excluded middle are NOT equivalent. Those philosophers who say they are equivalent are simply mistaken.
Bivalence says: For any proposition A, either A is true or A is false.
Excluded middle says: For any proposition A, either A is true or A is not-true.
These are not equivalent because FALSE need not be the same as NOT-TRUE. Suppose we deny bivalence in favor a trivalent multi-valued logic with the truth values TRUE, FALSE, and INDETERMINATE. In that case, NOT-TRUE is not FALSE but "Either FALSE or INDETERMINATE".
Bivalence implies excluded middle, but excluded middle does not imply bivalence. Therefore, they are not equivalent.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 2/18/2003 7:04 AM (GMT -6) |   | I'm sorry. I didn't make my question clear. I understand what you've said. I took the Cambridge Dictionary's comment on some philosophers rejecting the distinction to mean that these philosophers understand it but reject it for some reason anyway. I was just wondering if they have arguments for rejecting the distinction or if they simply reject it because they don't understand it.
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Chucks3371 Registered Member
 Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 28 | Posted 2/24/2003 10:21 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
I'm sorry. I didn't make my question clear. I understand what you've said. I took the Cambridge Dictionary's comment on some philosophers rejecting the distinction to mean that these philosophers understand it but reject it for some reason anyway. I was just wondering if they have arguments for rejecting the distinction or if they simply reject it because they don't understand it.
If they reject the distinction, it is for philosophical, and not logical, reasons. To repeat: it is perfectly logical to deny the PB, but to reject the LEM is the end of logic.
Perhaps they accept the correspondence theory of truth -- which has its own rather large set of difficulties -- and wish to affirm that every proposition is either true or false. That is, they may claim that every proposition either corresponds to reality or not, even if we don't know which is the case.
Then they could claim that "x will happen next year" either corresponds to reality or it does not; i.e., it is either true or false, so an omniscient being would know which.
Of course, an OT could counter that there is no reality for that proposition to correspond to, although it may correspond to a possibility. An omniscient being would know whether or not it corresponds to a possible world. They could furthermore say that the proposition is neither true nor false because it is simply meaningless to assert that it either does or does not correspond to reality, and is not an indication of ignorance.
BOTTOM LINE: Most people start with conclusions, and work backwards to see what sort of presuppositions will then "prove" the conclusion.
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 |  SeaKayaker Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2002 Total Posts : 21 | Posted 2/24/2003 11:56 AM (GMT -6) |   | This is a very interesting discussion... My logic text, possibly seeking to avoid having to face this issue, possibly legitimately, simply responded that statements such as “this statement is false” are not propositions. By simply qualifying them as nonsense, they no longer have a truth-value. Just as questions do not have truth-values (“what color is my desk?” is neither true nor false), nonsense has no truth-value. That may be a semantic method of avoiding the question, but it is a slightly different approach from what others have posted.
Soli Deo Gloria, Chris | | Back to Top | | |
 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 2/25/2003 8:47 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: My logic text, possibly seeking to avoid having to face this issue, possibly legitimately, simply responded that statements such as “this statement is false” are not propositions. --SeaKayaker
One philosopher I was recently reading basically says the same thing from another angle. He describes the statements as sentences that refer to themselves "precisely as referring" and create an "endless search for meaning."
quote: Perhaps they accept the correspondence theory of truth -- which has its own rather large set of difficulties -- and wish to affirm that every proposition is either true or false. That is, they may claim that every proposition either corresponds to reality or not, even if we don't know which is the case. --Chucks
INTERESTING! I've never seen a critique of correspondence from that angle or given thought to its relation as a theory to bivalence. Are you arguing for a theory of truth? If so, would you consider it a form of coherentism, or something else? How do you respond to the question, "Does your theory of truth, whatever it is, correspond to reality?" Can one advocate correspondence while still accepting the qualifications indeterminance and bivalence bring to the issue?
I'm getting the impression that you might consider the correspondence/coherence issue as a whole to be neglecting the conditional nature of things in some way. And I suppose my questions open up the floodgates of truth-conditionals and counter-factuals and all that good stuff.
I appreciate your comments! I'd love more of your thoughts on this stuff. You might even direct me to other threads on this site if you've come across any that demonstrate the significance of or bring clarity to this topic.
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams
Edited by - CalvinnHobbes on 02/25/2003 2:13:05 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Chucks3371 Registered Member
 Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 28 | Posted 2/27/2003 9:57 AM (GMT -6) |   | Let's look at some propositions and see how they correspond to reality. For example, consider the statement 'It is raining outside' and it's truth value. We would say:
The statement 'it is raining outside' is true, if in fact it is raining outside. So I could peak out the window and assign a truth value to the statement.
What reality does the statement 'this statement is false' correspond to? Analagously we would say: 'This statement is false' is true if this statement is false. It is difficult for me to even see what it should correspond to, so I would consider it meaningless.
How about the future? 'It will rain next Tuesday'. So by correspondence we write: The statement 'it will rain next Tuesday' is true it it will rain next Tuesday. I sure don't know what reality that corresponds to. Those who claim they do must then assume the future already exists, but then, that is hardly the definition of "future", is it?
Now next Wednesday we can determine the truth value of 'It rained yesterday'. But the statements 'it rained yesterday' and 'it will rain next tuesday', though they seem to be referring to the same event, are quite different. To my mind, the prediction about the future will never have a determinate truth value -- by its very nature, not out of ignorance. OTOH, the statement about the past always has a determinate truth value, although we may not know it out of ignorance.
For you guys with logic books, check out Tarski, though I don't recall if he addresses propositions about the future.
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