 |
| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > Questions about Christianity > Need help developing argument | Forum Quick Jump
|
| 
the_rickster
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 19
| Posted 2/11/2003 2:50 PM (GMT -6) |   |
Alan-
If an atheist posits the laws of logic as basic constituents of reality, why does that mean they lead to truth? It seems that the laws would still be products of the unintelligent or irrational processes or causes. However our minds developed, whether logis is a priori or not, what would be the basis for the way the mind works being able to know what is true. Maybe I'm really dense or really stubborn, but I don't think that positing logic as first principles is sufficient without a reason to trust first principles.
Rickster
| | Back to Top | | |
 |
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/11/2003 3:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Theists can ground the laws of logic and morality in the nature of God. Atheists have to find some other way to do it if their worldview is to be defensible and liveable. Now I'll grant that there doesn't seem to be any very plausible way for the atheist to do this. Atheists can posit the laws of logic and of morality as basic constituents of reality, but such a move seems like a very ad hoc way of trying to shore up fundamental weaknesses in their worldview. My only point in saying that atheists could posit such things was to argue that atheism isn't obviously self-refuting. Not being self-refuting, however, is still a far cry from being plausible.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
CalvinnHobbes
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 88
| Posted 2/13/2003 3:18 PM (GMT -6) | | IF Atheism [more precisely Naturalism], THEN:
(1) "Everything is random and without reason ('irrational')." OR
(2) "Everything is an effect that has flowed from prior, natural, irrational causes." OR
(3) Both (1) and (2)
For clarification's sake. . .(1) and (2) both describe blind or non-intensional universes. Does the "random"ness of the first mean that there is NO causal order in the universe or that there IS, albeit blind/unguided? If it means the latter, I must be missing the distinction between (1) and (2). Maybe I'm just thinking too hard.
quote:
The goal of the argument isn't to say atheism isn't true. The goal is to say that an atheist who is being consistent can't say atheism is true. It's trying to show that atheism takes away the basis for rationality or saying thoughts apply to reality and are true.--rickster
quote:
One last point. If the argument works, what it shows is not that naturalism is logically contradictory but rather that belief in naturalism is PERFORMATIVELY self-defeating. What I mean is, it does not show that the THESIS of naturalism is incoherent, but rather that one's COMMITMENT to that thesis gives one a defeater that undermines all of one's commitments, including the commitment to naturalism. . . . .The argument Rick is trying to develop says that IF naturalism is true, THEN there is no good reason to trust the deliverances of our cognitive faculties. --Alan Rhoda
Alan makes a good point here about the naturalist truth-claim being an example of performative inconsistency. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., in his essay, "Self-referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity, and Metaphysical Argumentation," (Journal of Metaphilosophy, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1972) attempts to demonstrate the validity of arguments which criticize positions for their self-referential inconsistency. He discusses how the inconsistency lies between what a sentence expresses and "one of the factors operative in its concrete use in discussion or inquiry" or a "state of affairs that falsifies it."
He notes that performative inconsistency is only one form of self-reference, and so need not be addressed in the same way other forms of self-reference can be addressed. He demonstrates how performatively inconsistent statements (sometimes termed "actually unaffirmable" or "existentially unaffirmable") are different from:
1) Statements which falsify themselves by rendering themselves logically meaningless. (i.e. "I am a married bachelor.") PI's communicate an intelligible idea, or "articulate genuine possibilities." When Joe says, "All knowledge is the product of irrational forces," he is making a meaningful statement. It looks like Alan was pointing to this.
2) Statements which create an endless cycle of self-reference and search for meaning by referring to themselves precisely as referring. (i.e. Liar's paradoxes like "This sentence is false.") PI statements can make clear, and definitively meaningful, the referents or objects to which they are referring, as in number 1.
3) Statements which can be reinterpreted or restated in such a way as to avoid the inconsistency. (i.e. "We can't know anything."---->"Well, I mean I can't know anything with the exception of my own cognitive faculties.") Any reinterpretation or restatement of the kind of PI statements that Boyle is referring to can only yield yet another PI. A naturalist's attempt to reinterpret his absolute claim about knowledge will yield either another absolute claim concerning knowledge or a concession that revokes the absoluteness and alters his/her whole position.
4) Statements merely indicating the proponent's commitment to subject to which he is referring. (i.e. the naturalist's commitment to naturalism as such) This personal commitment does not cause the problem. Now, Boyle recognizes that there IS a problem commitment involved in PI. "The naturalist's commitment to give a completely general account of all knowledge gives rise to the self-referential instance whose statement is performatively inconsistent."
Boyle argues that, "The rejections of performative inconsistencies are certainties." "The factors that falsify performatively inconsistent statements are unavoidable; the falsification of these statements is necessary. A statement convicted of performative inconsistency is simply and definitively false."
If Boyle is correct, I think what it means for this discussion is that the naturalist's contention that his/her universal account of all knowledge is valid, describes a factual state of affairs which serves to falsify the very claim itself. If this naturalistic assessment of knowledge (as a universal assessment anyway) corresponds to reality, then the naturalistic position on knowledge cannot be known to correspond to reality. Boyle's points seem pretty solid to me.
For whatever any of that may contribute anyway. . . . .
quote:
I think an atheist might say, What is meant by truth? So what if natural selection doesn't prove what is true? If one is an atheist, he might say that the only measure of "truth" is the scientific method: testability and falsifiablity. . . . .Inductive reasoning is used because it works (in many domains familiar to us). It's not just some random assumption that is continually made without any evidence supporting its use. . . .I think everyone agrees what the color red is. But how can we if we can't trust our cognitive faculties, that's what you're saying? I'd say, b/c we all remember the same color as red, we have observed it through our eyes, we have no reason to mistrust our eyes, if it is in fact that the vast majority of people see the same thing we see.--Reasonable Doubt
What is truth? Truth is that which corresponds to reality. Any attempt to deny this definition of truth will, in the very process, assume and affirm it. Any critic would be trying to give an alternate definition of truth which they believe correctly corresponds to reality. Contrary to pragmatic theories, truth is not what "works." Truth may work for this or that purpose, but it's true independent of that usefulness or lack thereof. Just because it may have worked in some fashion or another for some to believe that the earth is flat or that it is the center of the universe, this fact doesn't necessarily tell us anything about whether the beliefs correspond to the way reality really is.
Now truth about what??? The scientific method may work in describing those things within its scope (the natural world), but it should be no surprise that it doesn't work for the supernatural (which, if there, is by definition beyond the natural). Supernatural being and processes are not empirically verifiable (although their effects may be, hence the debate). So the METHODS of science won't be effective, even if the supernatural IS there. What about the GOALS of the scientific method--prediction and control. If the supernatural IS there, are we going to be able to predict or control its activity? No, especially if the supernatural ends up being a person who does what he wants when he wants. So neither the methods NOR the goals of the scientific enterprise have anything on the supernatural, even if it is there.
The atheist who says that the scientific method is the only method of attaining knowledge or truth is begging the question by trying to DEFINE what may constitute "knowledge" according to the method of attaining that form of knowledge (a la early positivism). If you accept someone's assumed definitions as starting points (which act somewhat like inital premises), they can often lead you wherever they want to lead you.
Newcomb highlights the difficulty that the proponent of "scientism" faces. . . "The statement that 'only things proved by experimentation are true' is not something that has been proved by experimentation. In fact, it is a philosophical statement about science that excludes itself from being true, and, of course, if it is not true, it should not be believed."
Regarding trusting our cognitive faculties (particularly in the empirical realm), using our perception of colors as an example has some problems. Can I trust that the redness is objectively in the object? No. Reflected wavelengths of light are converted BY MY COGNITIVE FACULTY into the sensation that I call "red." I can trust that I'm sensing red, but I cannot necessarily trust that that redness is itself in the object (or that it CORRESPONDS to the object). The "redness" I'm talking about corresponds to my own mind's activity moreso than the object of which I predicate that redness.
(P.S. Alan, can you clarify "indeterminance" for me on my excluded middle vs. bivalence thread?)
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
|
kerygma
Registered Member
Date Joined Aug 2002
Total Posts : 45
| Posted 2/20/2003 7:02 PM (GMT -6) | | I loved discovering the following: To those who claim there are no absolute truths, they've just defeated themselves.
Of course, Christians hold some truths as absolute. One is the existence of God. And, a good definition of truth, by the way, is a transcendent fundamental or spiritual reality. But I digress...
If you believe all truth is relative to the individual, and state that there is no absolute truth, you've just made a statement of....absolute truth. Oops!
So, I can disavow your statement, since it has to be relative to you, given you assert there is no absolute truth.
When people get hit with this that are not expecting it....the silence is deafening!
In his peace,
Scott
But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed. Isaiah 53:5
| | Back to Top | | |
| 29 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : 1 2 |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 11:19 AM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|