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|  rossfadeinout Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 428 | Posted 2/11/2003 5:09 AM (GMT -6) |   | This topic has been on my mind for some time, and as I was reading the Norm Geisler thread Alan said quote: All in all, I do not think this Thomistic-style argument for God's existence is the best one to use. I think the Kalam cosmological argument defended by William Criag and J.P. Moreland is much stronger because it depends on fewer questionable assumptions.
I have read Craigs presentation of this argument in several different settings. (To read his basic argument www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html) I have also read J P Moreland's defense in Scaling the Secular City. I think that the argument that they present is very convincing.
Craig's basics... 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 2. The universe began to exist.
2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist. 2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite. 2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition.
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite. 2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition. 2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
I guess my question is what are some of the counter arguments that critics of the kalam cosmological argument would raise? Specifically I wonder about the philosophical arguments concerning the impossibility of an actual infinite. All the thinking about actual and potential infinites really blow my mind.
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
 |  the_rickster Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 19 | Posted 2/11/2003 5:22 AM (GMT -6) |   | Ross-
Great question. I recently had a discussion about the impossibility of an infinite regress with a friend of mine who thinks it is philosophically possible. Here is what he said. He said there is an actual infinite amount of time. Right now we are experiencing a finite subset of that time. Given our finite perspective in this subset, we experience time as though it is adding onto the series. Yet, that is only our perspective. In reality, tomorrow has already happened. I'd be interested to know what you guys think about this.
rickster
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 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/11/2003 2:03 PM (GMT -6) |   | Rick said:
quote: He said there is an actual infinite amount of time. Right now we are experiencing a finite subset of that time. Given our finite perspective in this subset, we experience time as though it is adding onto the series. Yet, that is only our perspective. In reality, tomorrow has already happened.
Your friend is simply begging the question concerning the possibility of an infinite regress. He hasn't given any reason for thinking the past in infinite, nor has he engaged with any of Craig's of Moreland's arguments for a finite past.
Moreover, he is assuming a tenseless theory of time (also called the B-theory)--the view that temporal passage is not real, but only apparent. This view is highly debatable (cf. Craig's "Time and Eternity"), not to mention counterintuitive. That time appears to pass from our perspective is prima facie a good reason for thinking that time really does pass. The initial burden of proof is on him to justify this departure from common sense.
Ross said:
quote: What are some of the counter arguments that critics of the kalam cosmological argument would raise? Specifically I wonder about the philosophical arguments concerning the impossibility of an actual infinite. All the thinking about actual and potential infinites really blows my mind.
Potential infinites are actually finite. A potential infinite is a finite set that has no upper bound on the size of the set. Actual infinites are not finite. There are different orders of actual infinite, depending on whether they are denumerable (can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers) or nondenumerable.
The set formed by counting 1,2,3,... is potentially infinite because one can keep adding to the set without end, but it will always be finite. The Kalam argument is based on this simple observation that one cannot form an actually infinite set by successive addition. Now if time can be accurately represented as a series of events, then we can number these events. Call the present moment zero (0). Events in the past can then be represented by negative numbers counting down to the present: ...,-3,-2,-1,0. If the past is infinite, then an infinite set has been formed by successive addition (represented by the set of all negative numbers). But infinite sets cannot be so formed. Transversing an infinite past to get to now would be like counting up from negative infinity to zero. You can't even get started because negative infinity plus any finite number is still negative infinity. It's like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Matthew Timothy Short Huh?

Date Joined Apr 2002 Total Posts : 635 | Posted 2/11/2003 3:14 PM (GMT -6) |   |
Just joking here, but wouldn’t the circumference of an infinite circle, look something like that of an eternal straight line, truly not very philosophical, but funny nonetheless, don’t you think? 
God is Love,
Tim
1Jo 2:16…the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father… | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/12/2003 10:35 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: Just joking here, but wouldn’t the circumference of an infinite circle, look something like that of an eternal straight line? ...
Interesting thought. I suppose you're right, Tim, ... but I also wonder if the concept of an infinite circle isn't oxymoronic or maybe even vacuous. What's the difference between an infinite circle and any other infinite closed curve that is piecewise continuous (e.g. an oval)?
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Matthew Timothy Short Huh?

Date Joined Apr 2002 Total Posts : 635 | Posted 2/12/2003 4:40 PM (GMT -6) |   | As cruel kindness goes , the joke is very intentionally bifarious , in that it’s pointing the mind in two opposite directions. Indeed, an infinite is quite a contrary signification, to add to such a word, which means a single curved line with a circumference, where every part is equally distant from a point called the center . It’s all about learning ignorance or to ignore a certain thing, is it not, of which I have got down pat, how bout’ you!
Therefore, every rational being is accountable to the cause that produced the event of their being, a rational maker . What do you think?
God is Love,
Tim
1Jo 2:16…the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father… | | Back to Top | | |
 |  rossfadeinout Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 428 | Posted 2/14/2003 1:15 PM (GMT -6) |   | On the Geisler thread Tom posted something that really sums up my struggle with the concept of the Kalam argument. quote: I confess that I find the arguments for the impossibility of an actual infinite strong, convincing in fact. I also find the arguments for God’s being temporal based on his knowledge of tensed facts and his real relations to a temporal world even more convincing. Put together, these two would appear to support Craig's theory that God is timeless in the absence of creation but temporal since creation. Timelessness and temporality are, thus, contingent attributes of God.
But I also find the unhappy implications which God’s timelessness (in the absence of creation) has for his being “personal” at least as difficult to escape as the impossibility of an actual infinite. In addition (and I don’t know how to argue this), something tells me that an absolutely timeless God would never be able to get off the dime, so to speak, in creating the world and time. Is passing from timeless existence to temporal existence even coherent? If God is timeless in the absence of creation, I don’t see how creation ever happens at all. How does an absolutely timeless being "do" anything? I don't know how to adjuticate the evidence for timelessness and temporality of God in the absence of creation.
Any thoughts?
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Matthew Timothy Short Huh?

Date Joined Apr 2002 Total Posts : 635 | Posted 2/15/2003 4:54 AM (GMT -6) |   | When any thing is proved by as good of an argument, as a thing of that kind is capable of, we ought not in reason to doubt of its existence.
My problem is the ancient one of not always knowing what I am doing or why; ignorance is a convenient name for this experience, and the one I am always having, of being surprised about how things turn out.
Nevertheless, every rational being is accountable to the cause, which produced the event of their being, which is by the means of a maker; man is a rational being; the consequence then must be; that man is accountable to a rational maker, namely God.
God is Love,
Tim
1Jo 2:16…the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father… | | Back to Top | | |
 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 2/16/2003 2:21 AM (GMT -6) |   | The Kalam argument tries to prove the existence of God by the necessary finitude of creation. The necessary finitude of creation is premised on the impossibility of an actual infinity. An implication of the Kalam argument is that God exists in a sequenceless eternity (Craig modifies this and maintains that God is sequenceless ["timeless"] before creation, but in sequence after creation.)
I am not sure that the argument works. I offer three considerations.
First, I suspect the argument confuses a theoretical infinity with an actual infinity. The basic line of argument is that if there were an infinite number of events leading up to the present, we could never arrive at the present, for an infinite distance can never be traversed. It seems to me that problem is in mistaking our theoretical map with the actual territory. We impose on the past a theoretical grid that divides sequences up into units of measurement. Since the number of such units would be infinite if sequences had no beginning, and since we cannot conceive of an infinite number, we conclude that sequences must have had a beginning.
But consider, we can impose a theoretical grid that "maps" an infinite number of units on ANY distance. This touches on Zeno’s famous paradox. One way of illustrating this is to observe that before I go (say) to the end of my room, I have to go half way to the end of my room. Once I’m half way to the end of my room, I have to again go half way to the end of my room before I actually reach the end of my room. Once I’m half way through the remaining distance, I again have to go half way to get to the end of my room. And this "halfing" can go on FOREVER. Hence, it seems I can never get to the end of my room! I ALWAYS have to go half way there before I can ever get there, and there’s a theoretically infinite number of "halfs."
Yet, surely I can get to the end of my room. How is this possible? Because the infinity I’m dealing with is a theoretical infinity I impose on the distance between me and the room.
I expect something similar is going on in the Kalam argument. We impose counting units on the past, and then notice that if the past had no beginning, we could never get to the present. Since we apparent ARE at the present, we conclude that there must be a finite number of units leading up to the present. But I’m not sure I have any more reason to accept this conclusion than I do the conclusion that I can never get to the end of my room.
Secondly, I’m aware of all the paradoxes that surround "infinite sets" (e.g. Hilbert’s Hotel which can be full and yet accept an infinite number of new occupants). But I’m not sure this proves there can’t be an actual infinity. If it DOES prove this, are we willing to then say that God is actually FINITE? What it proves is that finite minds can never conceive of an actual infinity (or an infinite hotel). Another way of saying this is that every ACTUAL infinity is for us a theoretical infinity. We can only speak of infinity as being "on the way" (e.g. the infinite set of all even numbers. We can forever be "on the way" to counting it, but can never "arrive" – for ‘arriving" implies finitude). So too, we can never comprehend an infinite past. We can only be "on the way" to understanding it, and the "on the way" counting is premised on the theoretical infinity we impose on the past to innumerate its sequences (see pt. One). But I don’t see that this entails that the past could not be beginningless.
Third, as impossible as it is to conceive of a beginningless past, I don’t see that we’ve improved matters by postulating that it had a beginning. Can anyone honestly say that can conceive of an absolute beginning to sequence – a sequence for which there was no "before." Indeed, is this not self-contradictory? To "begin" suggests there was a moment BEFORE things "began." This is the conceptual difficulty I have with Craig’s idea that God was "timeless" BEFORE creation, but not afterward. To say that God was timeless BEFORE anything suggests he is not timeless (or better, sequenceless). If God IS sequenceless, he’s not BEFORE or AFTER anything. Of course, Craig insists that the "before" here is logical, not temporal. But I for my part can’t get clear on how this helps. (Unless he means something like the creation is logically dependent on God… but I don’t see how this resolves the paradox of a first moment before which there was no moment).
In short, I am with Kant in concluding that NEITHER a beginningless sequence nor an absolute beginning to sequence is conceivable.
Fourth, and closely related to this, it seems the paradox of whether sequence is finite or not is on a par with the paradox of whether space is finite or not. This too comes from Kant. Try to conceive of an absolute outer rim to space. You can’t. Okay, try to conceive of no "outer rim" to space. You can’t do that either. But if we were to use the logic of the Kalam argument, we’d point to the inconceivability of the latter to insist on the former. We’d argue something like this: If space is infinite, then there are an infinite number of spaces between the infinite "rim" and our present location. And since an infinite distance can’t be traversed, we could never get to our present location. Since we are AT our present location, space cannot be infinite. But we haven’t in any way improved matters by arguing in this fashion.
Since neither time (sequence) nor space is conceivable as finite OR infinite, I submit the issue needs to be settled on other grounds. And, on other grounds, I believe that while creation (and thus physical time) is finite, sequence is not. God existed "before" the world, and has had something like the experience of "before" and "after" within his own interpersonal triune life from all eternity. He never BEGAN to interrelate with himself. He just always has.
Can I conceive of this? No. But neither can I conceive of any alternative.
What do you think?
Blessings Doc
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
 |  rossfadeinout Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 428 | Posted 2/17/2003 11:35 AM (GMT -6) |   | Doc, Great thoughts, I'm thinking over the issue alot but unfortunately I'm at work taking insurance payments from angry customers so I haven't had time to process my thoughts. But I was reading some of Bill Craig's papers on God and time over the weekend (my girlfriend broke up with me about a month ago so I didn't have anything to do for Valentine's Day) and... yes, I sorta have a thought about the issue. Of course it will be coming from someone who has never taken a Philosophy class and the only time I have ever studied the issues surrounding time was, well, this weekend. I'll get to my post as soon as I can.
Ross
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/17/2003 12:47 PM (GMT -6) |   | Doc: In short, I am with Kant in concluding that NEITHER a beginningless sequence nor an absolute beginning to sequence is conceivable.
Tom: Beautiful! Now all the answers I had are not answers, and having no answer is the answer. I’m perfectly contented! With an answer that explains everything by affirming nothing that can be disproved, I can’t be challenged by anybody’s lack of an argument for what I haven't affirmed as being my answer to the question.
Infinite thanks and half thanks!
Tom 
Love never ends
Edited by - TGB on 02/17/2003 5:54:09 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/17/2003 4:02 PM (GMT -6) |   | Doc: First, I suspect the argument confuses a theoretical infinity with an actual infinity. The basic line of argument is that if there were an infinite number of events leading up to the present, we could never arrive at the present, for an infinite distance can never be traversed. It seems to me that problem is in mistaking our theoretical map with the actual territory. We impose on the past a theoretical grid that divides sequences up into units of measurement. Since the number of such units would be infinite if sequences had no beginning, and since we cannot conceive of an infinite number, we conclude that sequences must have had a beginning. ... But consider, we can impose a theoretical grid that "maps" an infinite number of units on ANY distance. This touches on Zeno’s famous paradox. ... I expect something similar is going on in the Kalam argument.
Alan: Zeno's "paradox" concerns only potential infinites, not actual infinites. It involves the mental subdividing of a FINITE line segment into parts--a process that can be continued without limit, but will never amount to an actually infinite set of events.
The Kalam argument is based on the impossibility of traversing an actually INFINITE series of events. This is a far different thing than getting across your room. It's like trying to walk an infinite number of miles--something that just can't be done. An actually infinite series of events is not the result of arbitrarily subdividing the past ad infinitum. Rather it is the necessary consequent of having a beginningless temporal past. Time presupposes a before-and-after sequencing of events--no sequencing, no time. If the number of events (however demarcated) is actually finite, then time is finite. To say that time has no beginning is therefore equivalent to positing an actually infinite series of past temporal events.
Doc: Secondly, I’m aware of all the paradoxes that surround "infinite sets" (e.g. Hilbert’s Hotel which can be full and yet accept an infinite number of new occupants). But I’m not sure this proves there can’t be an actual infinity. If it DOES prove this, are we willing to then say that God is actually FINITE? What it proves is that finite minds can never conceive of an actual infinity (or an infinite hotel).
Alan: The argument from Hilbert's Hotel is aimed to show the impossibility of an actually infinite SET of distinct, concretely existing things. This has no relation to the way in which we predicate infinite attributes of God. When we say God is infinitely powerful, for example, we don't mean that God has an actually infinite set of distinct potencies. Rather, we mean that God's potency (singular) is unlimited. The infinitudes that we predicate of God are qualitative, not quantitative.
Nor are you correct in saying that the argument shows that we cannot CONCEIVE of an actually infinite set--we can, mathematicians talk about them all the time (e.g., the set of natural numbers), and they have well-defined properties. Craig does not argue that we can't THINK of actually infinite sets; rather, he argues that actually infinite sets cannot EXIST. The natural numbers cannot be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the set of existing things--if they did that would generate intolerable paradoxes.
Doc: Third, as impossible as it is to conceive of a beginningless past, I don’t see that we’ve improved matters by postulating that it had a beginning. Can anyone honestly say that can conceive of an absolute beginning to a sequence – a sequence for which there was no "before." Indeed, is this not self-contradictory? To "begin" suggests there was a moment BEFORE things "began." This is the conceptual difficulty I have with Craig’s idea that God was "timeless" BEFORE creation, but not afterward. To say that God was timeless BEFORE anything suggests he is not timeless (or better, sequenceless). If God IS sequenceless, he’s not BEFORE or AFTER anything. ... In short, I am with Kant in concluding that NEITHER a beginningless sequence nor an absolute beginning to sequence is conceivable.
Alan: You (along with Kant, so you're in good company ) are conflating CONCEIVING with IMAGINING. We can CONCEIVE of a absolute beginning--that's no problem; what we can't do is IMAGINE an absolute beginning. Imagining has to do with how we represent an idea or object to ourselves. It always draws on images, objects, sensory qualities, etc., that we are familiar with. Conceiving, while rooted in imagination, is not bound by imagination. For example, we can conceive of 4-, 5-, and n-dimensional space (there are well-developed mathematical models of such geometries that allow us to predict their properties) but we cannot imagine anything above a 3-dimensional world. When we try to imagine an absolute beginning we invariably represent it to ourselves by using the only images we have available, images that depict relative beginnings. But even while imagining it thus our concept of an absolute beginning corrects this misrepresentation by telling us not to take the "before" part of the image seriously. To "begin" does not imply a "before" unless we assume that the beginning is not absolute. All of Kant's so-called "Antinomies" trade on a similar conflation of imagination with conception. They are not the same thing.
Doc: Fourth, and closely related to this, it seems the paradox of whether sequence is finite or not is on a par with the paradox of whether space is finite or not. This too comes from Kant. Try to conceive of an absolute outer rim to space. You can’t. Okay, try to conceive of no "outer rim" to space. You can’t do that either.
Alan: Again, I beg to differ. The impossibility of imagining space as either determinately finite or as actually infinite implies nothing as to the conceivability of those notions. In fact we can conceive of space either way. Look at the two dominant cosmologies of the 20th centuries: steady state (space is infinite), Big Bang (space is finite but unbounded). Theoretical models based on each of these ideas can be and have been developed and experimentally tested. There's no inherent contradiction in either assumption. The only way to generate the "antinomy" here is to conflate imagination with conception.
Doc: Since neither time (sequence) nor space is conceivable as finite OR infinite, I submit the issue needs to be settled on other grounds.
Alan: If you are right that we literally cannot conceive of these notions, then there is nothing for us to settle. The questions cannot be meaningfully formulated if we have no conception of what were asking. The fact that the question "Does time have a beginning?" makes sense to us, shows that we can conceive of different ways of answering that question.
Doc: I believe that while creation (and thus physical time) is finite, sequence is not. God existed "before" the world, and has had something like the experience of "before" and "after" within his own interpersonal triune life from all eternity. He never BEGAN to interrelate with himself. He just always has. ... Can I conceive of this? No. But neither can I conceive of any alternative.
Alan: I submit that you can conceive of alternatives. Why can't we say that sans creation God's mental life consists of one event--the simultaneous grasp of all that is and all that could be, and of the fullness of His own Trinitarian being? Why think that God's mode of being sans creation must be discursive like ours? I see no incoherence in that notion, and thus I think Craig's theory that God is atemporal sans creation perfectly intelligible. Even with creation I think it is a mistake to think of God's mental life as discursive in the same way as ours. Given His infinite intelligence, He is never surprised by anything. From eternity He is already prepared for any and all contingencies. It is not like God ever finds Himself confronted with the unexpected and must NOW decide how to deal with it. The flow of time changes the truth values of propositions that God has already contemplated; it settles which of the contingencies that God has already prepared for come to pass. But at no point would an infinitely intelligent God ever have to "rethink" matters. For an infinitely intelligent God all the "thinking" and "deciding" can be done in a single atemporal event sans creation. There is no need, even given open theism, to suppose that God has a discursive mental life.
All in all, I find the Kalam argument much more intuitively compelling than any of the arguments bearing on God's relationship to time.
Yours in Christ, Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 02/17/2003 9:08:20 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/18/2003 1:59 AM (GMT -6) |   | Alan-
Very interesting. I follow you on actual vs. potential infinities, and the distinction between conceiving and imagining was helpful too. Before reading your post the score was Doc-2 to Alan-1. Now it’s tied! 
A few questions and comments…
Alan: But at no point would an infinitely intelligent God ever have to "rethink" matters.
Tom: What do you make of God’s “regretting” his own decisions? Is this a sort of “rethinking”?
Alan: For an infinitely intelligent God all the "thinking" and "deciding" can be done in a single atemporal event sans creation.
Tom: Infinite intelligence certainly requires that God eternally have in hand all the possible story lines. And if God is timeless sans creation as Craig argues, then this is in hand timelessly. But something tells me (you all will have to help me here because I’m not gonna explain this well) that there is something of God’s freedom sacrificed if we take infinite intelligence to also mean all God’s “thinking” and “deciding” are done sans creation. Perhaps among the possibilities known to God is something like this: “In situation y, I [God] may decide to respond with x or with z. I’ll make my mind up then.” It’s like getting up in the morning. I lay there awake at 7:20 AM and know that by 7:30 I have to be in the shower. I face the possibilities of getting out of bed at 7:21, 7:22, 7:23, etc. up to 7:29. I can of course determine at 7:20 that I’ll get out of bed at 7:25, but I’m no less knowledgeable or less in control of things if I just decide in a moment’s notice, say at 7:27, to get out of bed. I determine the choice at the time just because.
My reasoning isn’t very sophisticated, I know. But I think you know what I’m trying to say. I don’t see that infinite intelligence entails a sort of perfection that means all God’s “thinking” and “decisions” must be made atemporally sans creation. I wouldn’t say this is an impossible view, but I wonder if something of the personal (once again, my pet peeve!) nature of God’s interaction with us and his own freedom isn’t called into question if we go this route. It seems to me that there is something that takes place in an interpersonal exchange which, though it can be said to have been foreknown as a possibility, the persons involved must experience first-hand before deciding on what they’ll do. What that “something” is I don’t know. Perhaps it includes the emotional interaction of interpersonal relations which informs God’s decisions. And though God is infinitely intelligent, he cannot know atemporally san creation what it is to experience this interaction, and since the emotional interaction influence the decision, God must wait to decide some things.
I’m just thinking out loud.
Clear as mud, eh?
Tom 
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 |  rossfadeinout Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 428 | Posted 2/18/2003 7:53 AM (GMT -6) |   | Again, I'm at work so I don't have much time cos I'm working.
But here is what I saw in one of Craig's papers. From God, Time, and Eternity www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/eternity.html#text31 Craig writes quote: Thus, on a relational view of time God would exist timelessly and independently 'prior' to creation; at creation, which he has willed from eternity to appear temporally, time begins, and God subjects himself to time by being related to changing things. On the other hand, the Newtonian would say God exists in absolute time changelessly and independently prior to creation and that creation simply marks the first event in time.{31} NOTE #31 {31} This serves effectively to rebut the objection of Julian Wolfe to the kalam cosmological argument 'Infinite Regress and the Cosmological Argument', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion II (1971), 246-9. The crucial premiss is, in Wolfe's opinion, that an infinite time cannot elapse. He argues that this is incorrect because prior to causing the first effect, the uncaused cause existed for infinite time. Since the first event did not occur, then an infinite time must have elapsed. But in the first place, Wolfe's formulation of the argument is defective, for the contention is that an infinite number of events cannot elapse, not that an infinite time cannot elapse. Because the argument concerns events, not time, Wolfe's analysis is inapplicable, since prior to creation there were no events at all. Second, if the relationalist is correct, then an infinite time does not elapse prior to creation, because time begins at creation. God is simply timeless before the first event
I guess what I'm pointing out is even if you believe that time did not begin with the creation of the universe, Craig is saying that his argument would still be valid because his argument shows that an infinite number of events could not elapse, whether you believe that time began at creation (Craig's view) or that time is eternal. I wish I had time to write out more of what I'm thinking, but instead I'll be content to sit back and observe the exchange of thoughts.
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Starkman Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2001 Total Posts : 1747 | Posted 2/18/2003 10:23 AM (GMT -6) |   | . . . even if you believe that time did not begin with the creation of the universe, Craig is saying that his argument would still be valid because his argument shows that an infinite number of events could not elapse, whether you believe that time began at creation (Craig's view) or that time is eternal.
Perhaps this would be true if it weren't for the idea that sequence still existed before 'time'. And if this is true, than it's no longer an issue of God trying to 'catch up' to an infinite number of events ahead of Him, or to have escaped from an infinite number of events behnd Him; He simply is where He is, sequencing, and in the midsts of this sequencing creation occurs.
Starkman
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 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/18/2003 3:10 PM (GMT -6) |   | Tom: What do you make of God’s “regretting” his own decisions? Is this a sort of “rethinking”?
Alan: I take such passages to mean that God made some risky decision in the anticipation that some result would obtain, and that result did not obtain--somewhat like how if we have made a difficult decision that doesn't turn out too well we might say, "If only I had tried the other alternative." But I don't think God ever regrets in the sense of kicking himself saying, "Boy, that was a stupid thing to do." I sometimes regret my decisions in that way , but an infinitely intelligent God will never do anything stupid. If he regrets it can only be because things did not turn out as he had hoped and now it's too late to go back and try another course of action.
Tom: Something tells me ... that there is something of God’s freedom sacrificed if we take infinite intelligence to also mean all God’s “thinking” and “deciding” are done sans creation. Perhaps among the possibilities known to God is something like this: “In situation y, I [God] may decide to respond with x or with z. I’ll make my mind up then.” It’s like getting up in the morning. ...
Alan: I understand what you're saying, but I don't think your situation in the morning is analogous to God's situation. Time consists of a before-after sequencing of events. The necessary and sufficient conditions for an event is that some change take place. Time only passes when things are changing. When you lie in bed in the morning trying to make up your mind when to get up, time is passing--your heart is pounding, the sun is rising, your stomach is churning, etc.--things are changing all around you in numerous ways that directly impact you. For God sans creation this is not so. Sans creation all that exists is himself, so there is no passage of time until God does something new. And he doesn't NEED to do anything. He already and perfectly knows all that can be known. There are no new decisions he has to make. Given his infinite intelligence he can instantaneously anticipate all possibilities and "pre-respond" by deciding what he will do IF those possibilities obtain.
Could God create a world and only then decide how to respond, I suppose, but why? Pre-responding costs God no effort. And as far as I can tell there is no difference in God's deliberative situation whether he pre-responds or decides later. I just don't see how God's waiting to decide in that way would make him any more responsive or any more personal than if he pre-responded to every possible scenario.
Tom: It seems to me that there is something that takes place in an interpersonal exchange which, though it can be said to have been foreknown as a possibility, the persons involved must experience first-hand before deciding on what they’ll do. What that “something” is I don’t know. Perhaps it includes the emotional interaction of interpersonal relations which informs God’s decisions. And though God is infinitely intelligent, he cannot know atemporally sans creation what it is to experience this interaction, and since the emotional interaction influence the decision, God must wait to decide some things.
Alan: I beg to differ with you here, Tom. I think God can know sans creation what it is to experience any possible interaction. As I see it, God's knowledge of all possibilities is not a purely propositional knowledge. For God, unlike us, imagining and conceiving always go together. If God can conceive of a possibility then he can imagine it perfectly, and with as much vividness as if he were directly experiencing it.
Please understand me, I am not suggesting that God does not feel emotions or is impassible or that he is altogether atemporal. I think God hurts even contemplating the possibility that his creatures might rebel against him. I think that our decisions do make a real difference to God, specifically in terms of which of God's contingent resolutions will be actualized. And because it is not eternally settled which of God's contingent resolutions will be actualized--for that depends on what decisions we make--God is not atemporal. He is continually doing new things in our world in response to what we do. But his decision to respond in the manner that he does is something that he has already made sans creation.
For God to be personal does not mean that his psychology has to work the same way as ours. He is a profoundly different kind of being than us, in spite of the fact that we are made in his image. His transcendence of creation and his infinite intelligence guarantee that he does not have to relate to the world in the same fly-by-the-pants, drawn-out-deliberation, and decide-as-you-go manner that we do in order to be personal or free.
God bless you, Tom. Hope that settles some of your doubts about my position.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 2/21/2003 7:07 AM (GMT -6) |   | Thanks for the thoughtful feedback Alan. It’s helpful. I would like to get clear on my thinking on this. Here’s my responses to your responses.
Alan: The Kalam argument is based on the impossibility of traversing an actually INFINITE series of events. This is a far different thing than getting across your room. It's like trying to walk an infinite number of miles--something that just can't be done. An actually infinite series of events is not the result of arbitrarily subdividing the past ad infinitum. Rather it is the necessary consequent of having a beginningless temporal past. Time presupposes a before-and-after sequencing of events--no sequencing, no time. If the number of events (however demarcated) is actually finite, then time is finite. To say that time has no beginning is therefore equivalent to positing an actually infinite series of past temporal events.
Doc: My point, Alan, is that for finite beings infinity is always a theoretical/ potential. I was attempting (perhaps unsuccessfully) to draw an analogy between Zeno’s paradox and the Kalam argument to show this point. I was suggesting that we can never mentally traverse an infinity of prior moments for the same reason we can never mentally traverse the infinite half’s between two distances.
Alan: When we say God is infinitely powerful, for example, we don't mean that God has an actually infinite set of distinct potencies. Rather, we mean that God's potency (singular) is unlimited. The infinitudes that we predicate of God are qualitative, not quantitative.
Doc: Would you not say that the CONTENT of God’s knowledge is infinite, in a quantitative sense? And when we say that God’s presence is not delimited, are we not saying that God’s presence is infinite in a qualitative sense? Would you say that God is in every quantitative way FINITE? Or would you say that quantitative categories, unlike qualitative catagories, don’t apply to God? Is this conceivable? Is there any analogy that can ground our meaningful discourse about a being for whom quantitative categories don’t apply?
Alan: Nor are you correct in saying that the argument shows that we cannot CONCEIVE of an actually infinite set--we can, mathematicians talk about them all the time (e.g., the set of natural numbers), and they have well-defined properties. Craig does not argue that we can't THINK of actually infinite sets; rather, he argues that actually infinite sets cannot EXIST. The natural numbers cannot be placed in one-to-one correspondence with the set of existing things--if they did that would generate intolerable paradoxes.
Doc: Given the definition of "conceive" and "imagine" you offer, I grant your point. I was using "conceive" in the sense of "comprehend." You and Craig are saying we can’t "conceive" of an actual infinity, and are using this as an argument that there can’t BE an actual infinity. I am granting that we can’t conceive of an actual infinity, but am not yet willing to grant that this means it can’t exist. We can THINK ABOUT (viz. delineate the properties) of infinite sets, but can’t comprehend them. But I think this is simply what one should expect from finite beings. So, while I grant that I can’t comprehend or imagine or conceive of a beginningless past, I’m not willing to grant that it couldn’t exist.
Alan: You (along with Kant, so you're in good company ) are conflating CONCEIVING with IMAGINING. We can CONCEIVE of a absolute beginning--that's no problem; what we can't do is IMAGINE an absolute beginning.
Doc: I can’t conceive OR imagine an absolute beginning. Nor can I conceive or imagine the absence of one.
Alan: To "begin" does not imply a "before" unless we assume that the beginning is not absolute. All of Kant's so-called "Antinomies" trade on a similar conflation of imagination with conception. They are not the same thing.
Doc: Again, I just can’t conceive or imagine of a beginning without a before. I can use the WORDS, but I can’t give them meaning. Is there something wrong we me!?
Alan: The fact that the question "Does time have a beginning?" makes sense to us, shows that we can conceive of different ways of answering that question.
Doc: Why can’t the question be meaningful (since we know what a sequence is and what a beginning is) but the answer NOT?
Alan: Why can't we say that sans creation God's mental life consists of one event--the simultaneous grasp of all that is and all that could be, and of the fullness of His own Trinitarian being? Why think that God's mode of being sans creation must be discursive like ours? …From eternity He is already prepared for any and all contingencies.
Doc: If "from all eternity" God is timelessly prepared for all possible contingencies, the his timeless conception is BEFORE the contingencies occur. Hence, while God’s conception of all possibilities is timeless (which I grant), HE is not altogether timeless. He exists BEFORE the actualization of the contingencies he’s prepared for! THIS is my problem with Craig’s proposal.
Alan: The flow of time changes the truth values of propositions that God has already contemplated; it settles which of the contingencies that God has already prepared for come to pass.
Doc: Agree absolutely. But again, this all presupposes that God’s conception of possibilities is BEFORE their actualization.
Alan: For an infinitely intelligent God all the "thinking" and "deciding" can be done in a single atemporal event sans creation. There is no need, even given open theism, to suppose that God has a discursive mental life.
Doc: If God KNOWS the actualization of a possibility AFTER his conception of that possibility (which you as an Open Theist have to grant), then God’s mental life IS discursive, or at least sequential (depending on how much you pack into the term "discursive"). Now, could God’s mental life sans creation be non-sequential? Vis-à-vis his conception of all possibilities, YES. He presumably wouldn’t have to think his way into his knowledge of this. But a) if God’s knowledge of possibilities is BEFORE his knowledge of their actualization, we must say that his non-sequential knowledge of possibilities IS sequentially related (hence the Kalam argument fails);
b) If God’s non-sequential knowledge of possibilities sans creation is BEFORE his knowledge of their actualization in creation, must we not grant that God existed BEFORE the world. Hence, while the world has an absolute beginning, God does not.
c) if God’s mental life is sequentially related TO creation and WITHIN creation, why think it’s not sequential within God’s own being sans creation… especially given that we hold that God is personally interrelated sans creation, and we have no conception/ comprehension/imagination of what a non-sequential personal relationship would look like?
Really enjoy your interaction Alan.
Blessings
Greg
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/21/2003 3:03 PM (GMT -6) |   | Appreciate your interaction, Greg.
Doc: My point, Alan, is that for finite beings infinity is always a theoretical/potential.
Alan: I would disagree here. I think the notion of an actually infinite set is perfectly coherent. We use the concept in meaningful ways. For example, when we say that the set of natural numbers is infinite, we mean that it is actually infinite, not just potentially so. Such actual infinities are "theoretical" but not real--that is they do not exist outside of the abstract world of mathematical thought. Theoretical and potential do not mean the same thing in this context.
Doc: I was suggesting that we can never mentally traverse an infinity of prior moments for the same reason we can never mentally traverse the infinite half’s between two distances.
Alan: I agree with you here, but this observation in no way undercuts the Kalam.
Doc: Would you not say that the CONTENT of God’s knowledge is infinite, in a quantitative sense?
Alan: No, I wouldn't say that because I think it conveys the misleading idea that God's knowledge consists of infinitely many distinct propositions. That is problematic because we have no general way of individuating propositions. Sure, we could analyze God's knowledge into an actually infinite number of propositions (e.g., 1+1=2, 1+2=3, 1+3=4, etc.), but we could just as easily conjoin all of these into ONE proposition (viz., "1+1=2 AND 1+2=3 AND 1+3=4 ...") and say that God knows that. For God to possess an infinite quantity of knowledge, there has to be some way of quantifying it, but there doesn't seem to be to be any way to do that given that we have no principle of individuation for propositions.
Doc: And when we say that God’s presence is not delimited, are we not saying that God’s presence is infinite in a qualitative sense?
Alan: Did you mean "quantitative"? Again I would say no. I think God is immediately present to all of his creation, but I don't think his mode of presence is spatial. Though he can manifest himself in space, God, on my view, is not a spatial being. Anyway, how could one quantify God's presence? Does the idea even make sense?
Doc: Would you say that God is in every quantitative way FINITE? Or would you say that quantitative categories, unlike qualitative catagories, don’t apply to God? Is this conceivable? Is there any analogy that can ground our meaningful discourse about a being for whom quantitative categories don’t apply?
Alan: I would say that quantitative categories, for the most part, do not apply to God. We can, of course, say that God is one (being). And we can say that he is three (persons). But in general I don't think it is helpful to think of God's perfection attributes (omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience, etc.) as quantitative in anything but a figurative sense.
Doc: Given the definition of "conceive" and "imagine" you offer, I grant your point. I was using "conceive" in the sense of "comprehend."
Alan: I need you to clarify for me what you mean by "comprehend". How is it different from "imagining" and from "conceiving", as I use the term?
Doc: You and Craig are saying we can’t "conceive" of an actual infinity, and are using this as an argument that there can’t BE an actual infinity.
Alan: No. I argue that we CAN conceive of an actual infinity, but that nevertheless there is strong reason to think that infinite sets cannot exist (i.e., have extramental being). The reason is simply that if that they did, it would land us in intolerable paradoxes. Isn't that a good reason for thinking they can't exist?
Alan: My point is that if we can't conceive of something, then we have no idea what we're talking about when we refer to it.
Doc: But I think this is simply what one should expect from finite beings. So, while I grant that I can’t comprehend or imagine or conceive of a beginningless past, I’m not willing to grant that it couldn’t exist.
Alan: First, you can't "grant" that we can't conceive of a beginningless past. That begs the question since I have argued that we can. Second, my point was that if you are right that we can't conceive of a beginningless past, then the statement "we can't conceive of a beginningless past" has no more meaning than "we can't conceive of xifnekt". The fact that the notion of a beginningless past is a meaningful one--we can, after all, delineate its properties--shows that we have a conception of it.
Doc: I can’t conceive OR imagine an absolute beginning. Nor can I conceive or imagine the absence of one.
Alan: Hmmm. I still want to say that I can conceive of an absolute beginning. I don't think there is any substantial cognitive disparity between you and I, so I suspect that you haven't fully grasped my distinction between imagining and conceiving. Imagining requires forming some kind of mental "image" of what we're thinking about. I agree with you that we cannot imagine an absolute beginning. But conceiving, as I use the term, while it usually takes place in conjunction with imagining, is not an imaginitive act. I can conceive of things (e.g., a 4th spatial dimension) that I cannot imagine.
Doc: Why can’t the question ["Does time have a beginning?"] be meaningful (since we know what a sequence is and what a beginning is) but the answer NOT?
Alan: Can you describe for me a situation in which that is the case? I can't think of any. With respect to time having a beginning I think both "No" and "Yes" are perfectly coherent answers. Do you want to claim that both "Time does have a beginning" and "Time does not have a beginning" are meaningless? They sure seem meaningful to me.
Have to run. I'll respond the rest of your comments as soon as I get a chance.
God bless, Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 2/21/2003 10:32 PM (GMT -6) |   | OK, Doc, I'm back. Here's Part II of my response to your response.
Doc: If "from all eternity" God is timelessly prepared for all possible contingencies, then his timeless conception is BEFORE the contingencies occur.
Alan: I agree, but that doesn't mean that there is a "before" before that. It takes two distinct states of affairs to define an event because an event just is a transition between two distinct states of affairs. God's eternal knowledge of possible contingencies is one state of affairs. The act of creation brings about another. Hence, that transition defines the first event and the beginning of time.
Doc: Hence, while God’s conception of all possibilities is timeless (which I grant), HE is not altogether timeless. He exists BEFORE the actualization of the contingencies he’s prepared for! THIS is my problem with Craig’s proposal.
Alan: How is this a problem for Craig's proposal? Sure God exists before the actualization of those contingencies, but that BEFORE presupposes an AFTER. It comes into being as a result of creation. There is no before sans creation. It is the act of creating that initiates the before-after sequencing of time by defining the first event. Thus God is timeless sans creation but "in time" as a result of creation. This is just Craig's view.
From my previous post: Alan: For an infinitely intelligent God all the "thinking" and "deciding" can be done in a single atemporal event sans creation. There is no need, even given open theism, to suppose that God has a discursive mental life.
New comment: I am willing to grant that the distinction between God's contemplating of all possibilities and his forming contingent resolutions based on those possibilities can be seen to constitute an "event" as I have defined the term. If so, then time begins with God's decision-making. Contra Craig, I don't think the relationship between God's knowledge of possibilities and his formation of categorical and contingent resolutions is merely "logical". There is a real distinction here between two distinct states of affairs--God's knowing what he could do, and God's having chosen what he will do (or will do IF). On the other hand, I think God's formation of resolutions is a single, nondecomposable event--he does it all "at once". Moreover, I think this event is identical with the initial act of creation. It isn't as though God decides what to do and then (subsequently) does it; rather, for him to decide categorically to create is to create. No time elapses between God's decision to create and his creating.
Doc: a) if God’s knowledge of possibilities is BEFORE his knowledge of their actualization, we must say that his non-sequential knowledge of possibilities IS sequentially related (hence the Kalam argument fails);
Alan: What do you mean by "his non-sequential knowledge of possibilities is sequentially related"? What exactly is related to what? I grant you that there is before-after relationship between God's knowledge of possibilities and their actualization--as I have argued this transition defines the first event and thus the beginning of time. But how does this count against the Kalam? The Kalam only fails if every BEFORE requires a BEFORE. Your argument only shows that AFTER requires a BEFORE, which I grant and which is perfectly consistent with the Kalam.
Doc: b) If God’s non-sequential knowledge of possibilities sans creation is BEFORE his knowledge of their actualization in creation, must we not grant that God existed BEFORE the world. Hence, while the world has an absolute beginning, God does not.
Alan: Of course, but God can't exist BEFORE something until the AFTER is there. The state-of-affairs of God's existing sans creation is not, just by itself, a temporal state. Without a transition between states-of-affairs there are no events, and thus no time.
Doc: c) if God’s mental life is sequentially related TO creation and WITHIN creation, why think it’s not sequential within God’s own being sans creation… especially given that we hold that God is personally interrelated sans creation, and we have no conception/ comprehension/imagination of what a non-sequential personal relationship would look like?
Alan: I don't concede that we have no conception of non-sequential personhood since I don't think that any of the standard criteria for personhood (viz., being self-aware, being able to make decisions, etc.) presuppose sequentiality. Temporal passage requires a transition between two different states-of-affairs. Can you describe for me what two different states-of-affairs might be for God sans creation? As far as I can see, there couldn't be any. He always already knows all possibilities and all actualities. In the fulness of the Trinitarian relationship, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are always already in full communion. They have always already expressed in full giving of self their mutual love. Until God decides to do something new (like create) there is no differentiation between states-of-affairs, and thus no temporal passage. The best metaphor that comes to mind is the embrace of two lovers. Imagine that at one instant they are each completely known and loved by the other, and then freeze that image. God isn't frozen, of course, he is just COMPLETE.
Look forward to your response, Alan
Anyone who wants to drag in the irrational where the lucidity and acuity of reason still must rule by right merely shows that he is afraid to face the mystery at its legitimate place. --Karl Mannheim | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Marc Registered Member
 Date Joined Mar 2003 Total Posts : 11 | Posted 3/9/2003 4:44 AM (GMT -6) |   | I recently read a debate on Dr. Craigs website between He and athiest philosopher Quentin Smith. (The Craig-Smith Debate:Does God Exit?-Southern Methodist Univesity, Dallas Texas 1996) for those interested in the referance. In the debate, Dr. Smith argued that: (i) If the notion that God caused the universe cannot be anaylzed in terms of extant definition of causality, He cannot have been the cause.
(ii) God as a cause cannot be anylized in terms of extant definitions of causalty.
(iii) Therefore God cannot be considerred the cause of our universe.
In support of his second premise Smith argues that all of our definitions of causality have in common the idea that a cause need only be a sufficient condition, not a logically necessary one (as would be the case with an omnipotent being such as God). I may have disorted his argument some but not intentionally, this was a best I could understand it. At any rate I'd really appreciate some feed back on this. I am not as vesed in the relevant literature of causal relations and I wondered if perhaps somone here might be able to help.
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 |  SeanG Registered Member
 Date Joined Dec 2002 Total Posts : 278 | Posted 3/10/2003 4:16 AM (GMT -6) |   | I am coming in late, but I have already had much of this conversation before... much of this is Moreland and Craig
Let us consider an actual infinite… (someone from an earlier debate) said that “the surface of a sphere is infinite, integers are infinite, real numbers are infinite, even the 'numerical space' between two integers is infinite....” By definition an infinite cannot be expanded upon, there is no room for growth, however, much like our spherical universe that is expanding there is room for growth. The big bang theorists tell us the universe is shaped like a balloon and that the galaxies are on the skin of the balloon. If it were possible do so, traveling in a straight line would bring us right back to earth. This is not an infinite amount of space, and it is known to be expanding. Take note that I will be using letters to represent otherwise commonly accepted formula representations (i.e., aleph nought is Xo).
Actual Infinite So what’s the difference between an actual and a potential infinite, lets find out by studying some properties of infinite sets. According to Charles C. Pinter in Set Theory, “a finite set is one which ‘has n elements,’ where n is a natural number [one of the integers 1, 2, 3, …..], and an infinite set is one which is not finite” (p. 138, from Moreland). A finite set has a definite number of elements which can be specified by counting the number of members in the set and assigning the appropriate number to that set. Thus, our set A had n = 2 elements, and B had n = 5.
An infinite set is very different from this. in order to see this, I should define two notions: denumerability and one-to-one correspondence (see Set Theory, by Charles C. Pinter [Addison-Wesley: 1971]; Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order Logic, by Geoffrey Hunter [University of California Press: 1971]; and Abstract Set Theory, by Abraham Frankel [North-Holland Pub: 1961]). There is a one-to-one correspondence between two sets, A and B, if and only if the members of A can be paired with the members of B such that each member of A is paired with exactly one member of B and each member of B is paired with exactly one member of A. In other words, A and B have the same number of members. This is called having the same cardinal number.
Now assume one could form the set of all the natural numbers (e.g., 1, 2, 3, …..). A set is denumerable if and only if it can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of all the natural numbers. The set of all the natural numbers and all other denumerable sets (those with the same number of members as the set of natural numbers) is what I am calling and actual infinite. The set of natural members is usually given the name w, and the cardinality of this set – the number of members in it – is called Xo (aleph nought).
An actual infinite is a set considered as a complete totality with an actual infinite number of members. Among the most prominent of the definitions for an actual infinite set A are these two:
· A is actually infinite if A has a denumerable subset. · A is actually infinite if A can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset of itself.
Consider two sets, E and F. E is the set of all the natural numbers. F is the set of all the even numbers. Which set has more members? You might be inclined to say that E has twice as many members as F. But according to infinite set theory, both sets have the same number of members, Xo. This can be seen by putting the two sets into one-to-one correspondence with another:
· E = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 … · F = 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 …
F is part of the whole, E. But since F and E are actual infinites, they are equal. From this discussion, several properties of actual infinites emerge. First, an actual infinite is a timeless totality, which neither increases nor decreases in the number of members it contains. Second, a proper subset or part of an actual infinite can be put into one-to-one correspondence with (be made equal to) that actual infinite, as seen in E and F. In finite sets, the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts.
Third, the following theorems could be proved of actually infinite sets:
Xo – 1 = Xo, Xo + 1 = Xo, Xo – n = Xo, Xo + n = Xo, and (where n is any natural number), Xo * Xo = Xo.
In addition, one can add or subtract denumerably many members from an actual infinite set and not change the number of members in the set! One interesting implication of these theorems has been stated by Geoffrey Hunter: “The number of points in infinite space of Xo dimensions is the same as the number of points on a line a billionth of an inch” (Hunter, Metalogic, p. 41).
Potential Infinite In contrast to an actual infinite stands the notion of a potential infinite. The idea of a potential infinite is not a set theoreti8cal idea at all, but occurs, among other places, in discussions about infinitesimal calculus. Perhaps you have seen this statement:
lim1\n = 0 . n > 8 [infinity]
As mathematician Abraham Frankel puts it, this statement “asserts nothing about [actual] infinity (as the ominous sign seems to suggest) but is just an abbreviation for the sentence: 1n can be made to approach zero as closely as desired by sufficiently increasing the positive integer n” (Frankel, Abstract Set Theory, p. 6).
A potential infinite has three important properties relevant to this discussion. First, a potential infinite increases its number through time by adding new members to the series. Second, a potential infinite is always finite. A potential infinite can increase forever and it will never become an actual infinite. Adding one more member to a finite set, no matter how often this is done, will simply result in a larger finite set. Third, since a potential infinite is always finite, at no time will the finite set formed from the members of the series traversed at that moment be equal to one of its proper subjects. OUCH! In a debate between Dr. Phil Fernandez and philosopher Michael Martin, Dr. Fernandez agreed with the above by stating:
“It should also be noted that if it is possible for an actual infinite set to exist outside of a mind, contradictions and absurdities would be generated. To illustrate this point, let us look at two infinite sets. Set A consists of all numbers, both odd and even. Set B contains only all the odd numbers. Set A and Set B are equal since they both have an infinite number of members. Still, Set A has twice the number of members as Set B since Set A contains both odd and even numbers, while Set B contains only odd numbers. It is a clear contradiction to say that Set A and Set B have an equal amount of members, while Set A has twice as many members as Set B. Therefore, actual infinite sets cannot exist outside the mind. Actual sets existing outside the mind can only be potentially infinite, not actually infinite. These sets can be added to indefinitely; still we will never reach an actual infinite by successive addition. Therefore, the universe cannot have an infinite number of events in the past. The universe had a beginning.”
Some puzzles stated with actual infinites, this first being from William Lane Craig found used at http://www.michaelhorner.com/articles/doesGodexist/
An Absurd Library To see the absurdity and contradictions of an actual infinite number of things in the real world imagine or hypothesize your campus library having an infinite number of black books and an infinite number of green books, alternating colors on the shelves and numbered consecutively on the spines. Does it make any sense to say that there are as many black books as there are black plus green books together? But that is what you would have to say if you want to claim the infinite is possible in the real world.
Suppose you withdrew all the green books. How many books are there left in the library? There would still be an infinite number of books in the library even though we just withdrew an infinite number and found a way to get them home! Suppose you withdrew the books numbered 4,5,6...and so on. Now how many books are left? THREE! Something surely is wrong here! One time we subtract an infinite number of books and we're left with an infinite number; the next time we subtract an infinite number and we're left with three — a clear logical contradiction. Since our hypothesis leads to a contradiction, the hypothesis must be false — a library with an infinite number of books cannot exist.
While we can avoid these contradictions in the mathematical realm by making up rules like you can't subtract or divide when using infinity, we cannot in the real world prevent people from taking books out of libraries. Therefore, since a beginningless past would be an actual infinite number of things (events) and since an infinite number of things cannot exist in the real world, it follows logically that the past is not infinite. The universe had a beginning.
Furthermore, an infinite past is impossible because an actual infinite cannot be formed by adding one member after another. It's like counting to infinity — you just never get there. Just like we can never finish counting to infinity, we can never begin to count down to a negative infinity. There is no first term. As the great skeptical philosopher David Hume admitted, “An infinite number of real parts of time passing in succession... appears so evident a contradiction that no man whose judgment is not corrupted... would ever be able to admit of it.” (David Hume, Enquiry. xii. II 125.)
"The infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought.... The role that remains for the infinite to play is solely that of an idea...." ("On the Infinite," in Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964], page 151).
Dr. J. P. Moreland states that it is impossible to travel and actual infinite (as opposed to a potential infinite), this can be found at http://members.iomartdsl.com/~rodba.../moreland01.htm
First the philosophical argument. It is impossible to traverse or cross an actual infinite number of events by successive addition. An actual infinite, what mathematicians call aleph-null, is a set of distinct things whose number is actually infinite. Infinity, plus or minus any number including infinity, is still infinity. This contrasts with a potential infinite, which can increase forever without limit but is always finite.
By contrast, an actual infinite has no room for growth and is non- finite; that is, one of its subsets can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set itself. The impossibility of crossing an actual infinite has sometimes been put by saying that one cannot count to infinity no matter how long he counts. For he will always be at some specific number which could be increased by one to generate another specific number; and that is true even if one counted forever.
Now if one cannot cross an actual infinite, then the past must have been finite. If it were infinite, then to come to the present moment, one would have had to have traversed an actual infinite to get here, which is impossible. Without a first event, there could be no second, third, or any specifiable number of events including the present one. To get to the present moment by crossing an actual infinite would be like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit. Not only could one never complete the jump, one could never even get started; for to reach any point in the series, one must already have crossed an infinite number of points to get to that point, as Zeno's puzzles clearly showed.
Put differently, suppose you go back through the events of the past in your mind. You will either come to a beginning, or you will not. If you come to a beginning, then the past is finite and my argument is settled. That would be the first event. If you had never come to a beginning, then the past is actually infinite; and as you go back in your mind, you never in principle could exhaust the events of the past. It would be impossible to traverse the past going backward in your mind.
Since time doesn't go backward but forward, and the number of events traversed is not a function of the direction of movement, this amounts to saying that the present could never be realized. But since it has been realized-after all, here we are-there must have been a first event, and this event must have been spontaneously generated by a situation that was immutable, unchanging, timeless, and free.
Now most of the experiences we have in life where an event is spontaneously generated without sufficient conditions prior to it occur by means of agent causation, or what we would call agent causes. That is, you and I act everyday; we raise our arms; we do things. It seems reasonable, based upon agent causation, therefore, to say that the first event was spontaneously caused to be by a personal agent of some kind. The major alternative is that the first event popped into existence out of nothing without a cause, and that doesn't seem reasonable to me.
One more example is in order and can be found at http://www.str.org/free/commentarie...cs/eternity.htm
How can that be? Think about numbers for a moment. Are numbers potentially infinite? Yes, sure they are. They can potentially go on forever and ever. Potentially, the quantity of numbers is infinitely large. There's no end to them.
Now, how do you ever get from a potential infinity to an infinity when it comes to numbers? Well, you can start counting--one, two, three, four, five, billion one, billion two, a zillion one, two, a quintillion one, a quintillion two. Keep going. Do you realize that at any particular point in time as you keep adding one number to another – a procedure which potentially could go on forever – that you haven't really accomplished that feat? You haven't really gone on forever, have you? The number gets bigger and bigger, of course. But at every particular point you happen to be counting at, your count describes a finite number. Will you ever get to eternity by counting, adding one number onto another? The answer is no, you won't.
That's why I can say that you will never live for an eternity. You started – you came into existence--at some point in time. That's when your clock started running and the moments began to add up, one event upon another. But as you go forward into eternity, if you make an assessment at any particular point, your cosmic clock will show a finite age, counting from the time you started to the time you're at. Now, you can keep going on forever and ever, but no matter how long you continue going on you will still have a particular age identifying the length of time of your existence. That particular age will never be an infinite amount. Do you see how that works? This is why you can never count to infinity, because infinity is not a particular number; by definition it's an innumerable amount. At every stage along the counting process you are always describing a finite number, even though that number gets larger and larger as you count. In the same way, you will never live to eternity even though you live forever and ever, even though you never cease to exist, because at any given point in the process you will still have an age, even though the age is getting larger and larger as you move deeper and deeper into eternity.
Bibliography J. P. Moreland, Scaling the secular City: A Defense of Christianity; Dean L. Overman, A Case Against Accident and Self-Organization; Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics; William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism and the Big Bang Cosmology; Norman Geisler & Peter Bocchino, Unshakeable Foundations: Contemporary Answers to Crucial Questions About the Christian Faith; Fred Heeren, Show Me God: What the Message from Space Is Telling Us About God; William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics.
SeanG!"I quote others only the better to express myself."[/list]Michel de Montaigne
Edited by - SeanG on 03/10/2003 09:20:34 AM
Edited by - SeanG on 03/10/2003 11:40:18 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 3/11/2003 2:54 PM (GMT -6) |   | Thanks Sean for the clear distinctions between actual infinity and potential infinity.
Alan, for the first time I think I get what Craig is saying. Thanks!Q He is not denying that God existed or thought BEFORE he created the world. I always thought he (and Kalam?) WERE saying just this. I think their talk of "timelessness" jilted me into reading assumptions they apparently don't have. He's simply saying that God didn't exist "before" until he decided to create the 'after."
So, I'm now willing to grant the coherence of saying God was timeless before creation, though not after. In other words, I'm willing to grant the coherence of an absolute beginning to sequence. I never thought I'd say this. But I'm not yet willing to buy the store.
You said that you think a beginningless past IS conceivable (viz. you can delineate its properties, though you can't image it. Got it). When you say that, however, you can't be granting (I don't think) that a sequential beginningless past is conceivable, for this would entail granting an non-mental actual infinity, which is what you have been arguing against. So are you saying that a non-sequential past is concievable -- viz. such as you and Craig hold God's existence to be. He always was, but without sequence UNTIL his first decision?
If I'm tracking with you so far, I have this question: what is incoherent about saying there was no "first" decision? No first thought. No first affection. etc...? I'm still not willing to concede that the idea of a beginningless sequential being is incoherent. We can delineate its characteristics... it is conceivable, though not imaginable.
You're response, I suspect, would be, "because of all the paradoxes actual infinities generate." But isn't this just another way of saying actual infinities are not imaginable?
Enjoying the exchange,
Greg
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 3/13/2003 4:37 PM (GMT -6) |   | Doc: You said that you think a beginningless past IS conceivable (viz. you can delineate its properties, though you can't image it. Got it). When you say that, however, you can't be granting (I don't think) that a sequential beginningless past is conceivable, for this would entail granting an non-mental actual infinity, which is what you have been arguing against. So are you saying that a non-sequential past is conceivable -- viz. such as you and Craig hold God's existence to be. He always was, but without sequence UNTIL his first decision?
Alan: Yes, that's what I want to say--a non-sequential past is conceivable; there's no contradiction in the notion. What would we contradictory is for the past to be non-sequential AND temporal, since temporality implies sequence. With Craig, I think that God's exists sans creation before the universe comes to be (therefore, God's existing sans creation is in the past). But I also think that God's existing sans creation is non-sequential. The creation event defines the first moment of time.
Doc: If I'm tracking with you so far, I have this question: what is incoherent about saying there was no "first" decision? No first thought. No first affection. etc...? I'm still not willing to concede that the idea of a beginningless sequential being is incoherent. We can delineate its characteristics... it is conceivable, though not imaginable. ... You're response, I suspect, would be, "because of all the paradoxes actual infinities generate." But isn't this just another way of saying actual infinities are not imaginable?
Alan: I think the idea of a beginningless sequence is conceivable (i.e., logically possible) but not instantiable (i.e., metaphysically possible). Here's a beginningless sequence: ..., -3, -2, -1, 0. A beginningless sequence is conceivable, however, only as a potential infinite--we can keep moving further and further back in the sequence, while always remaining a finite distance from our starting point. Instantiation of a beginningless sequence results in an actual infinite because ALL of the prior events have to be in place in order for the current event in the sequence to be where it is. And this means that, somehow, this actually infinite set must have been actually traversed in stepwise fashion through each member of the sequence. The problem with instantiation of an actually infinite sequence is that it generates lots of nasty paradoxes. And these paradoxes aren't just problems for our imagination, they amount to logical contradictions--like saying that something that cannot be traversed has been traversed.
At any rate, even if you don't accept that these paradoxes amount to logical contradictions, still paradox is not something to be embraced without a really good reason. And I just don't see that there is any particularly strong reason to think that God's existence is a beginningless sequence, certainly not a reason strong enough to outweigh the intuitive force of the paradoxes.
God bless, Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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