Open Theism Discussion Board

Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > Questions about Christianity > (No Subject)

Forum Quick Jump

[ << Previous Thread | Next Thread >> | Show Newest Post First ]

Lethonomia
Registered Member

Date Joined Aug 2001
Total Posts : 3

Posted 8/17/2001 5:29 PM (GMT -6)

I have a question for anyone who has read Michael Martin's Atheism:A Philosophical Justification. I'd appreciate any input. In Chapter Two of his book Martin argues that it is likely that the sentence "God exists." is neither true nor false but then in Part Two of his book he goes on to argue that it is in fact false. Many people have claimed that this is inconsistent and Martin has defended his position in an essay on the Secular Web.

Martin characterizes his position in the form of the following argument:

1. Either "God exists" is factually meaningless or "God exists" is factually meaningful.

2. If "God exists" is factually meaningless, then it is neither true nor false; hence belief in God is unjustified.

3. If "God exists" is factually meaningful, then it is either true or false; but (given the arguments in Parts I and II of my book) one is justified in disbelieving that God does not exist.

Therefore,

4. Either belief in God is unjustified or disbelief in God is justified.

Therefore, given the definitions of negative and positive atheism,

5. Either negative atheism or positive atheism is justified.
Therefore,

6. Atheism is justified.

Martin then goes on to make a distinction between 3 different statements where p="God does not exist":

(a) p is neither true nor false.
(b) p is true.
(c) If p is either true or false, then p is true

He claims that (a) and (b) cannot be consistently held but that (a) and (c) can be consistently held.

My question is:

If one admits that a proposition COULD be true or false (as Martin does in his first premise) then isn't that an admission that it IS true or false?

GregBoyd
Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818

Posted 8/18/2001 5:26 PM (GMT -6)

Welcome aboard Lithonomia! Glad to have you.

I read Martin's book when it first came out, so I'm rusty, especially on the early chapters. (I reviewed the later chapters two years ago in preparation for this book I have coming out soon, Satan and the PRoblem of Evil. In later chapters Martin raises many good objections to theism which, I maintain, can best be, or can only be, answered by holding to what I call a trinitarian warfare theodicy. He also raises objections that affect my theodicy, so I try to answer them.

In any case, onto your question. As I recall, I took Martin to be arguing in this fashion.

1. I argue that the concept of God is meaningless, hence neither true nor false.

2. But even if you don't accept this argument and maintain that the concept of God is meaningful, there are still good arguments that he doesn't exist.

3. Hence, the belief in God unjustified at best, meaningless at worst.

Martin argues in the fashion frequently. It's an effective strategy, going from maximal to minumal claims (there's a latin name for it, but I can't recall it).

For example, in his Case Against Christianity, he first argues that Jesus never existed (a really really BAD argument, I might say. He basically borrows Well's argument, thereby revealing he isn't a trained historian). He then goes on to argue that EVEN IF Jesus DID exist, we have no good reason for thinking he did miracles, rose from the dead, made divine claims and CERTAINLY not that he was God incarnate.

Thanks for the input. Jump in on other threads as they interest you.

Doc

"Free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having." C.S.Lewis

Lethonomia
Registered Member

Date Joined Aug 2001
Total Posts : 3

Posted 8/19/2001 7:01 AM (GMT -6)

Thanks for your response, Dr Boyd.

You outlined Martin's argument in basically the same way he did. The problem I am having with it is its first premise. I don't see how one can say a statement is POSSIBLY true or false and then say it's NOT true or false.

Martin gives an example using the sentence "The graduates will wear their gowns." (or something similar) and argues that we might not know if the sentence is a command or a prediction. The former is neither true nor false but the latter can be. He claims he can argue that he is inclined to believe it is a command but can treat it as a prediction for the sake of argument. My problem with his example is that it is entirely a matter of what the speaker means and if they mean it to be a prediction it will be true or false. So if the theist means for his sentence to be a factual claim does it follow that it is?

I don't think that his strategy of arguing for a stronger claim and falling back on a weaker claim works in this instance.

Thanks again.

GregBoyd
Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818

Posted 8/19/2001 12:12 PM (GMT -6)

In Martin's view (I'm supposing) the claim "God exists" is possibility equivalent to the claim "John is a married bachelor." To say "John is a married bachlelor" is neither true or false, for it asserts nothing. Martin thinks it possible that the very notion of a necessary being is of this variety.

Make sense?

Doc

"Three is the magic number, oh yes it is, it's the Magic Number" - De La Soul

Lethonomia
Registered Member

Date Joined Aug 2001
Total Posts : 3

Posted 8/22/2001 10:59 AM (GMT -6)

On pages 43 and 44 Martin spells out what he means by incoherence and meaninglessness.

He says "In order to avoid ambiguity here I use the term 'incoherent' to refer only to sentences expressing statements that entail a contradiction; I do not call meaningless sentences incoherent." (p.44)

He also uses the same example you use:

"(1) Jones is a married bachelor." (p.44)

and explicity states "However, (1) expresses a statement that is necessarily false." (p.44)

He does go on to argue that several divine attributes are incoherent in Chapter 12 and it seems he intends something quite different in that chapter than what he is attempting with his "meaninglessness claim".

It just seems to me that Martin is trying to have his cake and eat it too. I don't know how he can grant that it is POSSIBLE that either (A or Not-A) but deny that it is either. Consider his example of the graduation gowns again. He must admit that it is possible that the speaker intends the statement as a prediction since he claims that he isn't certain that it is a command. Once he has admitted that it is possibly true or false how is that any different than saying it could be true or false? And to him the latter just IS factual meaningfulness.

I think it's like being pregnant. Either you are or you are not. He must argue that it must be a command not simply that it is likely to be. Once he's granted that it is only LIKELY a command he's granted that it COULD be a prediction and therefore COULD be true or false. And the fact that it COULD be true or false JUST IS factual meaningfulness.

I don't know if that is as clear as it could be but thanks again for your time.

Lastly, I look forward to reading your book on the problem of evil since I've found your work on open-theism very forceful and I believe that Martin's arguments dealing with evil are vulnerable at quite a few points.

GregBoyd
Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818

Posted 8/22/2001 4:34 PM (GMT -6)

I see your point Lethonomia. Martin may indeed be inconsistent here. It's just that the point seems too obvious for a philosopher of his caliber to miss. Then again....

Hope you enjoy Satan and the Problem of Evil.

Greg

"Three is the magic number, oh yes it is, it's the Magic Number" - De La Soul

Forum Information

Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 2:10 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads

Need Support? | Forum Help Manual