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Tom
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| Posted 8/3/2008 1:41 AM (GMT -6) |   | Chapter 1 was a very brief intro. Just three items I saw worth mentioning.
(1) Hasker divides the problem of evil into a philosophical/theological problem of evil and an existential problem of evil. Everybody knows the standard philosophical problem (Hasker quotes Mackie): “God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists.” The assumption is that the existence of evil is incompatible with God’s being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent. The existential (or pastoral) problem of evil (I think D. Z. Philips will later figure into this) says, “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. This might be good to discuss a bit. Hasker disagrees with this of course.
(2) Hasker picked up A. Plantinga’s distinction between a ‘theodicy’ and a ‘defense’. Each demands a different weight of proof. A ‘theodicy’ is a justification of God in the face of the philosophical problem of evil. It attempts to offer a justification for the existence of evil in the world. That’s a stronger claim. A ‘defense’ on the other hand (and Plantinga’s ‘Free Will Defense’ was never intended to be a ‘theodicy’) is simply to demonstrate that Mackie’s triad of props (“God is omnipotent, God is omnibenevolent, and yet evil exists”) is not logically inconsistent. Hasker adds that the ‘defense’ ought to be able at least to offer some possible/supposed scenario that explains the evil in question without claiming to know precisely what the truth behind any particular evil is. In other words, Hasker thinks it’s not enough to just leave things in ‘logical’ terms. We have to offer some sort of explanation, perhaps possible scenarios, for our claim that the triad of props is not inconsistent. We’re not pretending to know which scenario is in fact the explanation for any particular evil, but we can have on hand enough to cover whatever evil might come up. This is more like Greg’s argument for multiple and contrary ‘factors’ at play together with the ambiguity we cannot escape.
(3) Lastly, near the end, Hasker gets around to describing open theism (pages 27-29), and mentions I think three things that make open theism particularly open to criticism: (1) Our claim that God can intervene unilaterally into human affairs to bring about his will, (2) our belief that God doesn’t foreknow how future contingents play out, and (3) our belief in LFW. How the first is understood is hugely important.
Well, that’s Ch. 1 for me. Anything to talk about?
TomPost Edited (Tom) : 8/3/2008 1:55:51 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 8/3/2008 9:02 PM (GMT -6) | |
Tom said...
Chapter 1 was a very brief intro. Just three items I saw worth mentioning.
I like how he stated some things are unknowable. I agree with that.
"Furthermore, the choices of this sort that will be made in the future do not now exist and as such are unknowable for any being, God included." page 29
It doesn't square with your information free 'might/might not', though.
If angels can dance on the head of a pin,
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Laika
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| Posted 8/4/2008 7:17 AM (GMT -6) | |
Tom said...
Unfortunately Hasker takes a very strange position on future contingents. He says there ARE now truths of a "will" and "will not" sort which describe future contingents. That is, their "truth" is eternally fixed and unchanging. But it's just impossible to apprehend those truths. They're "unknowable" (though their truth is "out there" eternally). For Hasker "unknowable" (re: the future) means "the truth about future contingents is eternally settled but unknown because the apprehension of those truths is impossible."
Oh, that wasn't clear from what he said. If that's his view, it is odd.
Tom said...
But..."might" and "might not" aren't "information free." They say something. When I say "Laika might not get his kitchen chairs back from Tom," you apprehend ZERO truth in that? No information at all?
Yep, information free. You have not lowered the measure of uncertainty, thus no information gain.
If you ask any sane person, I know the future regarding this coin toss, it "might" be heads and it "might" be tails, they'd laugh at you. You're not telling them anything beyond the parameters of a coin toss, no information gain about this particular coin toss. What you've said applies to ALL coin tosses, past, present and future.
Go to Vegas and place a bet on next year's Super Bowl winner. Tell them your bet is "it might be Atlanta and it might be Chicago and...." iterating over all the teams in the league. If they take your bet, you will have proved "might and might not" contains information. If they laugh you out of the place, I will have proved that "might and might not" contains NO information.
Some think that a hypothesis, theory or proposition are scientific only if they are falsifiable. 'X will obtain at t', 'Y will not obtain at t' are falsifiable.
'This coin might and might not land on heads' is not falsifiable. You can never be proved wrong.
Tom said...Ha! We're right. Hasker's wrong. I think he knows it too but it's hard to turn the Titanic! You need a lot room and time! 
You're trying to steer the Titanic as it lays on the bottom of the north Atlantic?
Otherwise, I concur with your summary of Chapter one. He also said that, though naturalists would be inconsistent to criticize theists over arguing about good and evil, since it's the theistic system being debated, it's allowable. This seems right as well. Though, I suspect alot of naturalists inconsistently hold to a belief in good and evil.
If angels can dance on the head of a pin,
Don't that tell you something about their skin? Post Edited (Laika) : 8/4/2008 7:40:01 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/4/2008 8:21 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika: Yep, information free. You have not lowered the measure of uncertainty, thus no information gain.
Tom: First, saying a future event is contingent as opposed to causally determined IS to say SOMETHING about the future. Saying "might and might not X five minutes from now" doesn't add any information ON TOP OF saying "indeterminately X five minutes from now," true. But that's because these are one and the same proposition, not because "might and might not" is meaningless or vacuous in terms of truth. It posits the contingency of X's occurring, and that IS information. But secondly, "might and might not X" does add information to somebody who knows nothing about the ontological status of X. One can know that all future events are either causally determined or causally indeterminate but not know WHICH is the case about some proposed event. In this case my telling him, "might and might not X" lowers the measure of his uncertainty, since "might and might not X" = "indeterminately X." He can rule out X's being causally determined.
Laika: If you ask any sane person, I know the future regarding this coin toss, it "might" be heads and it "might" be tails, they'd laugh at you. You're not telling them anything beyond the parameters of a coin toss, no information gain about this particular coin toss.
Tom: Laika, in arguing "might and might not" as the most appropriate way to express the open view, it was never our intention to say we "knew the future regarding a coin toss." It was our intent to say that all the truth there is about the coin toss is available right now in the present, and that the whole truth about the coin toss was that it "might and might not" be heads (or tails). That's all. We were just arguing for what "indeterminately X" means. There's no MORE information about an indeterminate coin toss than just positing the indeterminacy of the outcome. That's all "might and might not" was ever meant to do. Have you been missing that?
But to say the outcome of the coin toss is indeterminate is to say SOMETHING about the future, namely, that the outcome of the coin toss is indeterminate. If people laugh at me for saying this about a coin toss, it's not because my words are meaningless or void of all content. I'm not speaking in tongues to them. They laugh perhaps because they already know the bit of information I'm saying. But again, that assumes that what I'm saying has some information content.
Laika: What you've said applies to ALL coin tosses, past, present and future.
Tom: Exactly. But that's not a vacuous proposition. It has meaning or content.
Laika: I will have proved that "might and might not" contains NO information.
Tom: It doesn't contain NO information. No information means absolutely meaningless. And it's not absolutely meaningless. It posits the indeterminacy of some outcome. And saying some future outcome is indeterminate as opposed to causally determined is most certainly a meaningful bit of information.
Laika: 'This coin might and might not land on heads' is not falsifiable. You can never be proved wrong.
Tom: Dude, "might and might not" just means "indeterminately...." That's all. And any claim to future contingency is certainly falsifiable. One has only to prove the determinacy of the outcome. In the case of coin tosses, one would have to know that the toss was rigged, etc. to falsify the claim that the outcome was genuinely indeterminate.
Doesn't look like you ever got our point about conjoined "might and might not." Oh well. We should start another thread, strip to our Speedos and role around in the mud! We might and might not be able to charge entrance!
I agree with ya about Hasker's first chapter. Is anyone else gonna jump in on Hasker?
TPost Edited (Tom) : 8/4/2008 8:30:06 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 8/4/2008 8:38 AM (GMT -6) | |
Tom said...
Laika: What you've said applies to ALL coin tosses, past, present and future.
Tom: Exactly. But that's not a vacuous proposition. It has meaning or content.
It is vacuous. Because it's not about this coin toss specifically. It's a property about coin tosses in general. All coin tosses 'might and might not' land heads, 'might and might not' land tails.
Who won the oscar for best performance by an actor last evening?
Vacuous answer: someone did (not specific)
Vacuous answer: Tom Hanks might and might not have (not specific)
Informational answer: David Hasselhoff did (specific)
Tom:
We should start another thread, strip to our Speedos and role around in the mud! We might and might not be able to charge entrance!
Right, not on this thread.
If angels can dance on the head of a pin,
Don't that tell you something about their skin? Post Edited (Laika) : 8/4/2008 8:43:58 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/4/2008 9:06 AM (GMT -6) | | Oh brother!
Well, let's first solve the problem of evil. ;o)
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BBBCanada
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| Posted 8/5/2008 7:06 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Tom: “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. This might be good to discuss a bit.”
And
“Hasker thinks it’s not enough to just leave things in ‘logical’ terms. We have to offer some sort of explanation, perhaps possible scenarios, for our claim that the triad of props is not inconsistent.”
Brandon: First, I think you meant to say that we have to offer some sort of explanation for our claim that the triad of props IS inconsistent. That is you want to show that, "“God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. This is a contradiction." is inconsistent.
Second, guys like Mackie, agree that, in terms of strict logic, Plantinga can’t be refuted. To save theism from the charge of contradiction one can simply posit that all natural evil (as opposed to that made by free-will agents) is due to the activity of the devil. However, the problem, they say, is that it is thoroughly implausible to argue that all natural evil is due to the devil such that Plantinga is insensitive to the problem you raise above and that his primary concern is to save theism from inconsistency no matter how strange the consequences may be. It seems that underlying that state in the first paragraph is the desire to know if there are any good reasons for such beliefs. Simply to hide behind a logical possibility may look as if there is an evasion of the issue in which one may appear to be dishonest or insincere.
However, all Plantinga’s argument defense is about is “the logical possibility” of the co-existence of God and evil and he has satisfactorily shown that. He has shown that a “real solution” exists (contra Mackie) and that the strangeness of consequences is not an acceptable reason to reject Plantinga’s defense because the only claim that Plantinga makes is that theism and evil are logically consistent--which Mackie and other atheists accept.
Think of it like this. One can say, “Hey, I’ve shown the logical possibility of cows jumping over the moon!” but that doesn’t seem to help much because one wants to know if there are rational grounds for believing that any ACTUAL cows do jump over the moon. Thus, one will want to know whether it is rational or not to believe in the actual existence of a wholly good and omnipotent being.
Brandon
It is the purpose that makes strong the vow, but vows to every purpose must not hold.--A friend.
To love without love is slavery--Mother Teresa
Post Edited (BBBCanada) : 8/5/2008 7:13:44 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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BBBCanada
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| Posted 8/5/2008 7:22 AM (GMT -6) | | Coming back to Mackie's argument. Nope, you had it right. You want to show that it is not inconsistent. What you want to show as inconsistent is, "God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. This is a contradiction." Same diff. My bad.
Brandon
It is the purpose that makes strong the vow, but vows to every purpose must not hold.--A friend.
To love without love is slavery--Mother Teresa
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Similitude
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| Posted 8/5/2008 5:09 PM (GMT -6) | | I'm just getting started in Chapter 2. I see that he is going to try to move away from a strict consequentialism. I don't think that's possible. If any of you do, how would you define love such that it is a desirable thing apart from consequentialism?
Zach, from the other thread, which seems related, you say you don't like the idea of sentient states being the bottom line of choices. You said something about God being Lord. But what does it mean to be lord? Jesus said "why call ye me lord and do not the things I say?" But why would we do what he said if the consequence was, say, eternal torment whereas disobeying him only meant death? There is no way to make sense of rational deliberation about choices independent of consequential sentient states, to my mind. Even Jesus argues this way. He talks about the consequences of actions over and over as being the grounds for choices. Even Christ supposedly deliberated based on sentient states. He asked for the cup to pass from him if it were possible. He considered the joy set before him, just as we are told to do.
TOM: “Hasker thinks it’s not enough to just leave things in ‘logical’ terms. We have to offer some sort of explanation, perhaps possible scenarios, for our claim that the triad of props is not inconsistent.”
Jeff: I think "logical" terms will be sufficient for some. But others will want more. So to the extent that we can think of a specific, logically-consistent scenario, we need to do that. In that sense, I agree with Hasker.
I've got to say that reading Hasker is a real joy. He is a rigorous logician and yet quite the gentleman.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/5/2008 7:06:07 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2008 8:28 AM (GMT -6) | | I’ll try to work up a summary of Ch. 2 over the weekend and have it ready to post by Monday or Tuesday. In the meantime, we can agree from Ch. 1 on a couple of things (already noted) and perhaps discuss on more thing.
We agree on the unique OT issues that get carried into the discussion:
1) Our claim that God can intervene unilaterally into human affairs to bring about his will,
2) Our belief that God doesn’t foreknow how future contingents play out
3) Our belief in LFW.
And Jeff added:
4) It is not always necessary to say that specific evils are necessary to attain some specific good.
We’ll see how these each play their part in Chs. 2f. I’d like to discuss how (4) might/might not be the case though. I can imagine situations in which somebody could have reason for believing evil is necessary for some specific good, like Iraq. Doesn’t Greg’s argument that ‘now that we screwed up and got into this mess, the best option is itself an evil that could have been avoided by not coming to Iraq but which now cannot be avoided’. But if that’s debatable, then what about the crucifixion being an example contradicting (4)? Our salvation (a specific good) couldn’t be had apart from the crucifixion (the murder of God’s Son by evil men).
Maybe we should discuss (4). I think we’re all OK on 1 through 3.
I’d also like to discuss Hasker’s No. 1 above—the difference between the philosophical and pastoral problem s of evil and whether the latter negates the former. “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. Kinda has some bite to it. Yet something seems wrong. Any comments?
And then a question for Jeff for my sake re: consequentialism. It’s usually understood in contrast to deontological ethics, right? In the latter, a choice or act gets its rightness/wrongness from the quality/character of the choice/act itself (say, from the motivation and intentions of the chooser) rather than from the outcomes or consequences of the choice. I like a lot about consequentialism, Jeff, but how do you account for Paul’s comments in 1Cor 13? If I give all I have to the poor but am not motivated by love, I do not do a loving, virtuous act. f I give all I have to the poor and love as well, I do a virtuous, loving thing. My giving all I have in each case, Paul says, gets it moral character not from the consequences of my giving (which are the same for the poor in each case), but merely from the unseen character of the giver, the motivation for giving, etc. How do consequentialists agree with Paul that motivation may disqualify an act on the basis of the unseen motivation/intention regardless of the consequences?
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2008 10:03 AM (GMT -6) | | I'm good with all that, D. I'm wondering what consequentialists do with it. How does a consequentialist--who defines the morality of an act based on its consequences--agree with Paul that an act having the same consequences can be morally 'good' or loving OR non-loving and worthless (so far as the person making the choice is concerned) based not on the consequences but solely on the unseen motivation of the heart?
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2008 2:38 PM (GMT -6) | | Let's see what the consequentialist Jeff says.
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JET
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| Posted 8/7/2008 7:14 PM (GMT -6) | | TGB: “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. Kinda has some bite to it. Yet something seems wrong. Any comments?
JET: I'm not sure I could think of any propositional statement, even obviously true statements that are unrelated to theodicy, that would be appropriate to say in the presence of burning children. The only type of utterance that would seem appropriate would be a "speech act", such as an imperative ("put out that fire!" ), an expressive statement ("Oh my god, no!" ), or a prayer, etc. But it would seem that being an inappropriate utterance in the presence of burning children should not count against the truth of a propositional statement, theological or otherwise, or else no statement could be true. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/8/2008 12:18 AM (GMT -6) | | D: Maybe all the Christian consequentialist has to do is to say this: "Any consequence of any particular morally culpable action is morally improper to the degree that it does not issue from, sustain itself in, and teminate as complete love of God and love of neighbor as self."
Tom: Jeff can tell me if I'm wrong, but when speaking of the relationship between a choice/action and its consequences, the consequences are said to determine the morality OF THE CHOICE/ACTION, not their own morality as consequences. It's the ACT of giving all you have to the poor, THAT act, which is under scrutiny. A consequentialist says, "That's a morally virtuous act because of its consequences for the poor." But given Paul's comments, the morality of that act stands or falls upon the motivation of the act (loving or not), and not upon the consequences of the act (poor people fed). Heck, you might even have poor people come to faith because of a "Christian" man's gifts but the act itself, because of its selfish motivation, disqualified in God's eyes as worthless in terms of what ultimately matters--love.
And then you have Paul (supposedly consistently?) applying this in Philippians to those who preach the gospel from impure motivation--just to add to his pain in prison--and Paul "rejoices that the gospel is preached" whether in love or not, whether from a pure heart or not. It's worthless in terms of what ultimately matters, but he still rejoices in it because people are hearing the gospel? What Paul rails against in 1Cor (improperly motivated actions) he rejoinces in in Philippians; a different point to make perhaps, granted. But that's just the problem. Will the ethic underneath 1Cor permit such a point?
Perhaps we should reconsider what one or the other of these passages really means. Does Paul really mean that the act of preaching from impure motives is worthless if Paul himself extracts some value from such preaching (i.e., an opportunity for the lost to hear the gospel), so much so that he rejoices? How consistent is that? In other words, Paul seems a consequentialist in Philippians. But he's definitely NOT one in 1Cor. 13.
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One Love
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| Posted 8/8/2008 1:43 AM (GMT -6) | | I think about it this way: To the extent that a person is not "abiding" in love of God and neighbor, apperception of reality (and corresponding deletion, distortion, or misrepresentation of potential consequences) WILL be in effect, skewing the bases of the choices/evaluations being made. The observing evaluator of the consequences cannot be abstracted from the consequences observed...not in God's World.
It would be like having a digital scale that you KNEW had a built in computer glitch such that it was always "off" when you tried to weigh anything. No matter what you'd measured, you'd be defeating the true purpose of having the digital scale in the first place: accuracy of measurement corresponding to reality.
To the extent, one doesn't "live in love", that one cannot see reality straight (maintain the necessary perspective) enough to evaluate consequences properly enough. Perhaps the only true consequentialists can be who have the knowledge of God's love in God's World.
If the whole point is unity with God in love (and God is love), then this makes total sense.
See what great love the Father has lavished on us, that we should be called children of God! And that is what we are! The reason the world does not know us is that it did not know him. Dear friends, now we are children of God, and what we will be has not yet been made known. But we know that when Christ appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. All who have this hope in him purify themselves, just as he is pure.
Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Post Edited (Love's Child) : 8/8/2008 1:51:55 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 8/8/2008 1:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom:
TGB: “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. Kinda has some bite to it. Yet something seems wrong. Any comments?
Possible statement.
"God knows something about this we don't know...and is working right here, even now."
Affirming the truth of God's Redeeming Presence in the existential lived moment. Reality.
Just a thought.
See what great love the Father has lavished on us, that we should be called children of God! And that is what we are! The reason the world does not know us is that it did not know him. Dear friends, now we are children of God, and what we will be has not yet been made known. But we know that when Christ appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. All who have this hope in him purify themselves, just as he is pure.
Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Post Edited (Love's Child) : 8/8/2008 2:02:26 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 8/8/2008 7:30 PM (GMT -6) | | | D: To the extent, one doesn't "live in love", that one cannot see reality straight (maintain the necessary perspective) enough to evaluate consequences properly enough.
J: That's it in a nutshell. A person that gives their body to burned without love (1 Cor. 13) has their reward in this life only as did the Pharisees. But such a trade-off is, as Paul says, profitless, for all practical purposes. But Paul is not arguing against consequentialism in principle, for his own statements about the ressurection in chapter 15 imply otherwise. Even Christ considered the joy set before him when mustering the self-discipline to endure the shame.
Tom, I just got alternative internet access. You can post what I emailed you to your email address. It explains how I think love seeks not its own and still remains consequentialist.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/8/2008 7:27:57 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/9/2008 2:01 AM (GMT -6) | | Sorry, not seeing it. If I give all my money to the poor, you're telling me consequentialism doesn't evaluate the morality of my action based on the actual consequences my gift has FOR THE POOR?
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Tom
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| Posted 8/9/2008 3:01 AM (GMT -6) | | Here's Jeff note he wasn't able to post:
TOM: And Jeff added: 4) It is not always necessary to say that specific evils are necessary to attain some specific good.
We’ll see how these each play their part in Chs. 2f. I’d like to discuss how (4) might/might not be the case though. I can imagine situations in which somebody could have reason for believing evil is necessary for some specific good, like Iraq. Doesn’t Greg’s argument that ‘now that we screwed up and got into this mess, the best option is itself an evil that could have been avoided by not coming to Iraq but which now cannot be avoided’. But if that’s debatable, then what about the crucifixion being an example contradicting (4)? Our salvation (a specific good) couldn’t be had apart from the crucifixion (the murder of God’s Son by evil men).
Maybe we should discuss (4). I think we’re all OK on 1 through 3.
JEFF: The keyword in (4) is "always." If God values free, loving choices, He can be for the condition of choice without being for any particular bad choice. When Greg says staying in Iraq is an evil, is he saying that it is a moral evil? I was understanding him to be saying that it would be immoral for a christian to be involved in that activity, but not that it would be intrinsically immoral for unbelievers to be.
TOM: I’d also like to discuss Hasker’s No. 1 above—the difference between the philosophical and pastoral problem s of evil and whether the latter negates the former. “No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of burning children.” If you can't or wouldn't say it in the presence of the most unimaginably painful suffering, then it’s not worth saying anywhere. Kinda has some bite to it. Yet something seems wrong. Any comments?
JEFF: I think Hasker is right that there are times to weep with those who weep and times to rejoice with those that rejoice. If someone asks our opinion in a situation like that, that's one thing. But to suppose we should offer our opinion unsolicited is another.
TOM: And then a question for Jeff for my sake re: consequentialism. It’s usually understood in contrast to deontological ethics, right? In the latter, a choice or act gets its rightness/wrongness from the quality/character of the choice/act itself (say, from the motivation and intentions of the chooser) rather than from the outcomes or consequences of the choice. I like a lot about consequentialism, Jeff, but how do you account for Paul’s comments in 1Cor 13? If I give all I have to the poor but am not motivated by love, I do not do a loving, virtuous act. f I give all I have to the poor and love as well, I do a virtuous, loving thing. My giving all I have in each case, Paul says, gets it moral character not from the consequences of my giving (which are the same for the poor in each case), but merely from the unseen character of the giver, the motivation for giving, etc. How do consequentialists agree with Paul that motivation may disqualify an act on the basis of the unseen motivation/intention regardless of the consequences?
JEFF: I suspect that Paul is using slight hyperbole in 1 Cor 13. A person wouldn't give their body to be burned unless they got some amount of satisfaction from making that sacrifice, even if lovelessly. But once the body is burned, there is no way to enjoy that satisfaction any more. So it seems that Paul is saying what Christ said of the Pharisees--namely, they HAVE their reward for their actions IN THIS LIFE. So a person who gives their body to be burned will profit practically nothing by that criteria even if there was no pain from the burning itself. Hence, there is no argument against consequentialism here so much as it is an argument for the view that love is ironically the most profitable for the lover and the beloved since LOVE (i.e., God) is omnicompetent and faithful to prevail on our behalf.
But the lover can not SEEK (i.e., be zealous for) his/her own. This means that one living out true love can not be so concentrated on intellectually calculating one's interest in each proposed action that he/she fails to apprehend reality with that sensitive attentiveness to those events which would elicit the very sympathetic and compassionate emotions that would impel to truly loving action. For such a concentrated seeking of one's own interest will actually distract us from those observations that arouse those very emotions. We've all known such calculating people. Superficially, they can appear to be disinterested in their own satisfaction though at times it becomes obvious that the superficial appearances are not truly indicative of disinterestedness at all. Rather, those actions are often carefully chosen for calculated, self-interested effect. The pharisees prayed to be seen of men, and so on.
As we have agreed, heretofore, perfect love is love characterized by perfect perspective. One with perfect perspective knows perfectly well that the moral order is not irrational (that our highest good and joy is a consequence of being LIKE God, despite temporary appearances to the contrary) and, hence, is zealous for good works, being sensitively and intellectually attuned to opportunities for the same. The true lover deems it a REASONABLE service to give his/her body as a living sacrifice to Him from whose love we can not be separated. The true lover knows there is no risk in loving and that, therefore, they can quit calculating to the point of distraction. A similar point is made by Paul when he tells both married and unmarried to quit being anxious about serving the Lord, but to attend to him without distraction. The same language was used by Christ of Mary who was anxious about many things in her service to him. Christ implies to her that had she not been distracted by anxieties thus, she would have chosen the better part of listening to him. She missed the better opportunity because of her anxiety, though she was trying to do service, nonetheless.
The point is, being a consequentialist does not mean that one must live in a constant state of calculation. For to maximize our joy, we have to do just the opposite. As I see it, the Father seeks (i.e., is zealous for) NOT His own. This doesn't mean that the Father doesn't know full well that all He does will gratify Him in some way, but, rather, as one who is perfectly sympathetic, He is gratified BY bringing satisfaction to others. It's just that He is constrained in this pursuit by those logical parameters He has designed into the created order that serve as conditions for the maximization of the satisfaction of the Son, for whom creation exists. What this means is that some means are better fitted to that end than others. And we would say that libertarian freedom is one of those means. And, yet, libertarian freedom renders inevitable the possibility of unintended suffering. Somehow, God will satisfy the Son more by having borne, with longsuffering, this unintended suffering than if He had intervened to stop it. And one way this could be is that God's longsuffering, combined with Christ's redemption, results in more people who will ultimately be resurrected TO honor and adore the Son. Obviously, universalism fits that bill. It is a win-win for all concerned. What else would love's objective be? | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/9/2008 3:07 AM (GMT -6) | | A rich person gives away money to poor people. The money really does significantly help the poor. But the rich man only gives the money because he wants his name in the newspaper, the tax benefit from charitable giving, etc. That's the 'sentient satisfaction' he's aiming at. He doesn't REALLY give a rip about the poor at all. But his gifts nevertheless affect the poor.
D and Jeff, you're both consequentialits. Do me a favor. Point out to me what are the consequences in this scenario that a consequentialist would argue are that upon which the morality of the rich man's actions is based. Consequentialism argues that it's the 'consequences' of an action that determine its rightness/wrongness. So what are the consequences in this scenario which, for a consequentialist, determine the rightness/wrongness of the man's actions? You have two options: (1) The consequent sense of satisfaction the rich man gets from getting praised by the public for being so generous, and (2) the improved standard of living which the poor people come to enjoy. Which 'determines' the morality of the man's choice?
If you say the latter (which is what a consequentialist would have to say are that upon which the rightness/wrongness of the act is based; a proponent of virtue ethics would argue the first determines morality) then you come into conflict with Paul, who disagrees that the effect upon the poor is that which MAKES the man's action a 'good' action. Paul says no to that. It's the man's own unseen motivation that MAKES his act a good or bad act. So Paul seems clearly to be arguing a virtue ethic in 1Cor. 13.
On the other hand, D, you never commented on comparing 1Cor 13 (which isn't just hyperbole, a least not each of its examples) to Philippians where Paul basically says, "The gospel is being preached from horrible motivations? Who cares? As long as its being preached, that's what matters and I rejoice." Here Paul seems to be arguing consequentialism pure and simple.
Nobody sees any conflict here?
TPost Edited (Tom) : 8/9/2008 3:17:59 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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