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Hilston
Registered Member


Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 103
 
   Posted 3/7/2002 4:12 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hi Greg,

Please forgive the delay. It gets a bit crazy trying to keep up with the various threads I've gotten myself into (not to mention debates I have going on in two other fora). Thanks for sharing your thoughts and comments. I have replies and questions to your last response interspersed below:

Greg writes:
quote:
If an angel's (or humans) character is settled toward God, then in my view they aren't any longer free in a libertarian sense to choose against God.
But then isn't their love less-than-genuine if they are unable to rebel against God of their own free will?

Greg writes:
quote:
As I understand it, the purpose of libertarian freedom is to become compatibilistic freedom.
Isn't that like saying, "The goal of a genuine loving relationship is to become a less-than-genuine love relationship"?

Greg writes:
quote:
The fact that some angels rebelled against God tells me they once had (at least) libertarian freedom, even if they (or at least most) don't have it now. So too, the fact that humans rebelled against God, and the fact that God calls on us to choose to follow him, tells me we have libertarian freedom, ...
Your conclusion is based on preference, not logic. Just because God commands men to repent and believe does not necessarily entail a libertarian freedom to choose or reject. The automoton analogy is a favorite one amongst Open Theists, so I'll use it here. Suppose I program a robot to have emotions and preferences, and if one of those preferences is to willingly and joyfully obey whatever I ask. Let us further suppose that I call upon the robot to choose to follow me. Does that fact logically require that he has libertarian freedom? I submit that your reasoning is non sequitur.

Greg writes:
quote:
... though the goal (which I think can and should be attained in this life) is to become solidified in our choice for God.
Whence comes the solidification? And if my love for God is directly proportional to my libertarian freedom to reject Him, why would anyone want to become "solidified" and no longer able to want to reject Him?

Greg writes:
quote:
When the kingdom comes, I think all believers will be like the holy angels: so free to love God we are unable to do otherwise.
Are they really "free" to love if they can't choose to hate? Doesn't that make them less-than genuine in that love for God if they really cannot choose to hate?

Thanks for your willingness to engage this dialogue.

Domo,
James Hilston
hilston1@aol.com
http://www.icubed.com/~hilston
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GregBoyd
Registered Member


Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
 
   Posted 3/8/2002 2:00 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Yo mistro (Hilston), don't worry about the "delay." I'm still without a computer of my own so I've hardly gotten on the board at all. Go'in through serious withdrawls!

And now I've got exactly 21 minutes before I have to bolt, so this will be brief.

Hilston: isn't their love less-than-genuine if they are unable to rebel against God of their own free will?

Doc: Their love is less-than-genuine if they NEVER WERE able to do otherwise, just like evil is less-than-genuine if the evil acting person or spirit couldn't EVER HAVE BEEN otherwise. The fact that NOW they WON'T do otherwise, because of character solidification, doesn't affect the issue, so far as I can see. A "hardened criminal" who now can't stop committing crimes is still guilty, for he could have,and should have, avoided developing the kind of character that compulsively commits crimes. Conversely, the husband who now can't help but be madly in love with his wife could have, and did, develop the kind of character that compulsively loves, and he's praiseworthy for developing in this direction.

The highest form of love is love that can't do otherwise. The greatest form of evil is an evil that can never be reached with love. But among contingent creatures, who by definition are not necessary, this compatiblistic character must be developed. If it is "installed" at the start, there's no moral dimension to the decision.

Hilston: Isn't that like saying, "The goal of a genuine loving relationship is to become a less-than-genuine love relationship"?

Doc: I don't think so. Its rather like saying, "the goal of contingent love is to become necessary love" -- the kind of love God has (in my view).

Hilston: because God commands men to repent and believe does not necessarily entail a libertarian freedom to choose or reject...Suppose I program a robot to have emotions and preferences, and if one of those preferences is to willingly and joyfully obey whatever I ask. Let us further suppose that I call upon the robot to choose to follow me. Does that fact logically require that he has libertarian freedom? I submit that your reasoning is non sequitur.

Greg: You could call upon the robot to choose, but you couldn't hold it morally responsible for its choice, and you wouldn't judge its "loving behavior" to be real love. You've got a puppet acting towards you as your hand dictates (but the hand is the technology you use to get its response).

Hilston: Whence comes the (character) solidification? And if my love for God is directly proportional to my libertarian freedom to reject Him, why would anyone want to become "solidified" and no longer able to want to reject Him?

Greg: Don't you observe character solidification in life? Is this really that mysterious? It's a piece of ancient wisdom as old (at least) as Aristotle. AS to why someone would WANT solidification, a) a person doesn't have to WANT it: it is just in our nature; and b) people on the path of love WANT solidification in love because its a higher form of love. It's pure devotion. The probationary period comes to an end.

Hilston: Are they (people in the eschatological kingdom) really "free" to love if they can't choose to hate?

Greg: They are MORE free to love because they no longer are capable of hating.

Hilston: Thanks for your willingness to engage this dialogue.

Greg : The pleasure is all mine. And thank you.

Got to run.

Greg

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Hilston
Registered Member


Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 103
 
   Posted 4/18/2002 8:57 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hi Greg,

Nearly 2 months later, I've finally replied to your last post in this thread. See comments/questions below. Thanks.

Doc writes:
quote:
I'm still without a computer of my own so I've hardly gotten on the board at all. Go'in through serious withdrawls!
I can somewhat relate. A week away from home has a similar effect on me. Are you in the market for a computer? I highly recommend the Apple G4. I've had mine since April 2001. At 466 MHz, the G4 processor is still faster than 1+ GB Pentiums. But I digress.

Hilston asked: Isn't their love less-than-genuine if they are unable to rebel against God of their own free will?

Doc writes:
quote:
Their love is less-than-genuine if they NEVER WERE able to do otherwise, ...
I've searched for your definition of love on this forum and in your books, but I've come up empty. Do you have a working definition? Also, while I readily admit that I haven't read both your books completely through yet, from what I recall you repudiate the metaphysical necessity of dualism, right? (Satan & the Problem of Evil, p. 125 paragraph 4). If so, how do you justify the requirement for a dualist ontology with respect to love/hate and good/evil?

Doc writes:
quote:
... just like evil is less-than-genuine if the evil acting person or spirit couldn't EVER HAVE BEEN otherwise.
Whence comes this definition or principle? As a specific example, do you affirm that, between 2 murderers who committed identical crimes, one having been raised in a wholesome and moral environment and the other having been raised in an immoral, violent, and crime-saturated environment, the former person is to be considered more evil than the latter?

Doc writes:
quote:
The fact that NOW they WON'T do otherwise, because of character solidification, doesn't affect the issue, so far as I can see.
But, by your logic, the "quality" of his evil is affected. That is, by your logic the hardened criminal, who is no longer free to choose good, is not as evil as when he had an equal counter-potential.

Doc writes:
quote:
A "hardened criminal" who now can't stop committing crimes is still guilty, for he could have,and should have, avoided developing the kind of character that compulsively commits crimes.
Aren't you equivocating, Doc? It appears you shift from discussing the genuine-ness of evil to the question of culpability. In so doing, you move from the crime itself to his avoidance of the developing good character and morals. This is like a liberal courtroom. "Your honor, we're not as concerned about the fact that Mrs. Yates drowned her five children. We think the real crime will be found in what caused her to do this. It's not a question of guilt regarding these unfortunate deaths, but rather of who failed to give Mrs. Yates the support and encouragement she would have needed to develop the kind of character that would have rather avoided the action she took."

Doc writes:
quote:
Conversely, the husband who now can't help but be madly in love with his wife could have, and did, develop the kind of character that compulsively loves, and he's praiseworthy for developing in this direction.
So, again, by your logic, he is not so much praiseworthy for loving her, but rather for developing the kind of character that compulsively loves. Correct me if I am misunderstanding your reasoning here.

Doc writes:
quote:
... that The highest form of love is love that can't do otherwise.
Don't you mean "the highest form of love is love that can NO LONGER do otherwise"?

Doc writes:
quote:
The greatest form of evil is an evil that can never be reached with love.
Don't you mean "the greatest form of evil is an evil that can NO LONGER be reached with love"?

Doc writes:
quote:
But among contingent creatures, who by definition are not necessary, this compatiblistic character must be developed. If it is "installed" at the start, there's no moral dimension to the decision.
First, I think you need to find a term other than "compatibilistic." You and I do not mean the same thing by it and I think you risk confusing your readers. "Compatibilistic" describes choices made according to the predetermined decrees of God. Certainly that is not what you mean by it, right, since you reject the doctrien of divine predetermination? Second, if you mean, "character that cannot help but love God" must be developed, can you describe what is the difference between loving God here and now, and loving God in heaven? If we do not have the ability to hate God in heaven because of "solidified character", but we did while on earth, what change takes place to effect a "solification" upon reaching heaven? Please cite verses to support his conjecture.

Hilston had written: ... because God commands men to repent and believe does not necessarily entail a libertarian freedom to choose or reject...Suppose I program a robot to have emotions and preferences, and if one of those preferences is to willingly and joyfully obey whatever I ask. Let us further suppose that I call upon the robot to choose to follow me. Does that fact logically require that he has libertarian freedom? I submit that your reasoning is non sequitur.

Greg writes:
quote:
You could call upon the robot to choose, but you couldn't hold it morally responsible for its choice, ...
Sure I could. Why not? If I created a robot, I have every right to hold him morally responsible for his actions, even if I programmed the robot to perform those actions.

Greg writes:
quote:
... and you wouldn't judge its "loving behavior" to be real love.
Why not? Here is where I still need to see a definition. Define "real love."

Greg writes:
quote:
... You've got a puppet acting towards you as your hand dictates (but the hand is the technology you use to get its response).
If technology enabled me to give it cognitive self-awareness and a conscious perception of compatibilistic freedom, the puppet analogy falls apart. My robot does, thinks, and feels according to his programming, but he does so with a limited scope of all that goes into his cogito and decision-making. (Recall the Replicants in "Blade Runner").

Hilston wrote: Whence comes the (character) solidification? And if my love for God is directly proportional to my libertarian freedom to reject Him, why would anyone want to become "solidified" and no longer able to want to reject Him?

Greg writes:
quote:
Don't you observe character solidification in life? Is this really that mysterious?
In my view, "character solidification" is decreed and accomplished by God. It is coherent and not mysterious at all. It is God who works within and upon my will (Php 2:13). Furthermore, I don't have to invent such terminology as "character solidification" to explain the inability of saints to sin in heaven or the sustained faithfulness of the angelic host because God has predetermined such ontological states according to His own good pleasure and decrees.

Greg writes:
quote:
As to why someone would WANT solidification, a) a person doesn't have to WANT it: it is just in our nature; ...
If it is in our nature, how is it that some people, after 60+ years of rebellious and God-hating defiance, yield to the Lord and become saved?

Greg writes:
quote:
... and b) people on the path of love WANT solidification in love because its a higher form of love. It's pure devotion. The probationary period comes to an end.
It appears you're saying there are two different kinds of love, one of which evolves from the other. You seem to suggest there is the dualistic love that cannot genuinely exist without an equal libertarianly free counter-potential to hate. This free dualistic love eventually evolves into a solidified, character-constrained, no longer free, non-dualistic love. But, on your view, it is not love of a lesser quality by definition -- i.e., because you stipulate it thus.

Hilston wrote: Are they (people in the eschatological kingdom) really "free" to love if they can't choose to hate?

Doc writes:
quote:
They are MORE free to love because they no longer are capable of hating.
You again seem to be equivocating the term, Greg. As a libertarian-freedom proponent, do you not view a person as either (a) free or (b) a puppet? It seems to me that the notion of being "more" free, on your thesis, is incoherent. It's like being "more pregnant" or "more dead." It seems to me that the genuineness of one's love for God, given your stipulated definition of "genuine love," is undermined by their inability to choose to hate. Would you rephrase it differently so I can understand your point?

Efcharisto polu',

James Hilston
hilston1@aol.com
www.tgfonline.org

Edited by - Hilston on 04/19/2002 02:05:16 AM
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