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DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/1/2003 11:51 AM (GMT -6) |   | I picked this out from TWeb. http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=7577
I. What is the root cause of the war?
A. Collective failure of the nations and people in a large area which is predominately Arab and/or Islamic.
B. This has led to rising but unfocused discontent, anger and resentment.
C. Some in the region have tried to take advantage of that for their own purposes.
1. Governments in the region have tried to focus it on external targets to deflect it away from themselves.
a. Israel has been the preferred target.
2. Ambitious leaders have tried to harness it by claiming that they could change it if supported.
a. Khomeinei and the Taliban used it to support revolutions respectively in Iran and Afghanistan.
b. Saddam used it to gain support for creation of a united pan-Arab empire ruled from Baghdad.
II. Why is the US fighting the war? Why were we attacked?
A. American success casts Arab/Islamic failure in sharp contrast. Politically, economically, militarily, technologically and culturally we set the standard and our accomplishments make their failure look particularly bad.
B. America is the largest and most important supporter of Israel. Arab leaders have used Israel as a scapegoat for their own failure, and part of that is to blame us since we refuse to abandon Israel. They have provided enough support to the Palestinians to keep the struggle going, so that their own people have someone outside to hate, which is why Israel is top of their s***list. But that also causes them to hate us for our support of Israel.
C. America is secular. Islamic religious zealots have been preaching that much of Arab/Islamic failure happens because Muslims have not been sufficiently devout. Allah has not been fighting on their side because they were sinners who have turned away from the teachings of the Prophet and a true virtuous life. The zealots claimed that only by embracing extreme forms of Islam could they again gain Allah's favor and begin to succeed. But in the US all religions are tolerated and none dominate, and the government itself is secular. At the same time, in the nations where the extremists actually took power things got even worse. American success thus is heresy; it seems to have the success Arabs/Muslims crave without embracing extremist Islam. In religious terms, the only explanation for that is that America is in league with Satan, and Khomeinei said as much.
D. American culture and American ideas are very popular with many of the people who live in the Arab/Islamic belt in question, particularly among their young people. This is viewed with alarm by traditionalists of all kinds. Their own people were being seduced away from their traditional culture and extreme religious practices.
E. America gained a reputation in much of the world as a nation which was rich, well-armed, but also cowardly; full of bluster but having no guts. Such events as our defeat in Viet Nam, our experiences in Beirut and Somalia, our half-hearted and largely ineffectual responses to the attacks against us in the 1980's and 1990's, and many other episodes contributed to the impression that we would not fight back if attacked, and that there was little risk in denouncing us or in outright attacking us.
Thus al Qaeda committed its fifth successful attack against the US on September 11, 2001, and pulled off the single most destructive terrorist attack in modern history.
If one leaves aside a natural horror at what they did, one has to admit that it was audacious, creative, and extremely well planned. It cannily took advantage of a security blind-spot, which was our presumption from all previous hijackings that the safety of the passengers was the top priority, and that the way to gain their safe release was to not resist the hijackers and thereafter to try to negotiate with them once they presented their demands. It had never occurred to anyone here that control of the jet itself should be top priority, because the jet was a weapon capable of endangering far more people on the ground than were being carried on it.
It also demonstrated that al Qaeda respected no limits at all on its operations; it would use any means at all with the goal of causing as much indiscriminate death, damage and suffering as possible. al Qaeda was large, well financed, and seemingly had the ability to gain adherents willing to sacrifice everything for the organization. Clearly, if left alone al Qaeda would launch further attacks against us. They weren't going to be satisfied with this one, and if they could somehow gain access to any kind of "weapon of mass destruction" there was no reason to believe that they would not use it against us if they could figure out a way of doing so. They used hijacked jets in the 9/11 attack, but if they'd had access to half a ton of VX or a nuke they would certainly have used those and likely killed even more than died on 9/11.
As dangerous as it was revealed to be on 9/11, al Qaeda was the primary symptom of the problem, but not actually the entirety of it. Other similar groups exist elsewhere in the Arab/Muslim world, and other leaders there represent a long term hazard directly or indirectly. Several governments in the region had been providing hundreds of millions of dollars per year to support al Qaeda and many other such groups, as well as providing other kinds of material and political support and turning a blind eye to such support by their own citizens. Some of those governments permitted terrorist groups to use their territory for recruiting and training and stockpiles (most notoriously Syria and Afghanistan); others actively provided weaponry (such as Iran). The Saudi government spends hundreds of millions of dollars per year to spread Wahabbism around the world, including in Europe and the US.
III. Possible responses, small and large
A. Some advocated appeasement. Reduce our military spending, massively increase foreign aid, stop supporting Israel and throw it to the wolves, and apologize, apologize, apologize.
1. Historically, appeasement doesn't work.
2. There was no reason to believe it would work in this case, either; it would have emboldened all the extremists in the region, religious or otherwise, and encouraged further aggression against us.
3. This approach assumed that poverty and American foreign policy missteps were the primary cause of the anger. But there's no reason to believe that this is true. Most of those who died in the attack on 9/11 came from prosperous families, for instance.
4. If the true root cause was anger and resentment caused by Arab shame at lack of Arab accomplishment, massively increased aid would not help. You do not make a man proud by giving him charity.
5. Irrespective of any other arguments against this approach, it wasn't politically possible in the US. The vast majority of Americans were in no mood to accept such a solution. The domestic reaction to those who advocated it was nearly uniformly hostile.
B. The microscopic solution was to respond "proportionally" with a token counter-attack, and then deal with the situation as one of law enforcement, by attempting to find and arrest those who were implicated in the plot and to put them on trial for it after extradition.
1. That's what we did in the 1980's and 1990's, and it failed. bin Laden was already under indictment for previous attacks against us, and all diplomatic efforts to gain control of his person for trial over a period of several years had failed.
2. Doing this would have further reinforced our reputation as being cowardly. It would have raised the reputation of all terrorist groups by showing that terrorism was a valid (and successful!) way of striking back.
3. Such a response would have encouraged further attacks against us which potentially might have been far more devastating, if the terrorists had managed to gain access to some sort of extreme weapon.
C. The small solution was to assume that al Qaeda was the entire problem, and to eradicate al Qaeda and all others who could be shown to be directly involved in the attack in September of 2001.
1. If we had concentrated exclusively on al Qaeda it would have left intact other similar movements, equally dangerous but not directly implicated in the attack against us. al Qaeda launched the attack against us but were not the only ones who had the ability or will to do so, and other groups had been and had every intention of continuing to launch such attacks against other targets (e.g. Bali, Israel, the Philippines, Kashmir).
2. This would have been a case of treating the symptom, not the disease.
D. The large solution is to reform the Arab/Muslim world. This is the path we have chosen.
1. The true root cause of the war is their failure and their resentment and frustration and shame caused by that failure.
2. They fail because they are crippled by political, cultural and religious chains which their extremists refuse to give up.
3. If their governments can be reformed, and their people freed of the chains which bind them and cripple them, they will begin to achieve, and to become proud of their accomplishments. This will reduce and eventually eliminate their resentment.
4. Their governments would then cease needing scapegoats.
5. Their extremists would no longer have fertile ground for recruitment.
6. This is a huge and unprecedented undertaking; it will require decades, but ultimately it is the only way to really eliminate the danger to us short of the "foot-and-mouth" solution (which is to say, nuclear genocide).
IV. Short term strategy
A. al Qaeda had to be eliminated.
B. In order to reduce the short term hazard we faced, we had to change the perception that we were cowards who could be attacked with impunity. In the short term, it was not possible for us to make the "Arab Street" actually love us, but we could convert its contempt into fear. That is not ideal but it has the dual merit of being feasible and effective.
C. The international web of finance which supported these groups was vulnerable; their resources needed to be trimmed as much as possible.
D. The purpose of all of this was to give us breathing room, to stabilize the situation for a few years so that we could carry out longer-term and more effective strategies.
V. Stage 1: Afghanistan
A. The primary concentration of power of al Qaeda, including most of its top leadership and the vast majority of its members, was Afghanistan. It had operated there with impunity for years, protected by the Taliban.
B. Even after the 9/11 attack, the Taliban refused to cooperate with us and continued to protect al Qaeda. We now know that this is because al Qaeda controlled the Taliban. Omar was the nominal head of government but bin Laden pulled the strings.
C. Thus the Afghan war, fought by us mainly with air strikes, special forces and bribery.
D. The goal was to drastically reduce al Qaeda's ability to use Afghanistan as a base of operations and eliminate the government that had been protecting it. Thus "nation building" was not an essential part of the operation there, except to the extent needed to make sure that it did not again become a large al Qaeda stronghold in the short run. "Nation building" in Afghanistan beyond that modest level would provide little tangible strategic benefit for us.
VI. Stage 2: Iraq
A. Goal of Stage 2: we had to conquer one of the big Arab nations and take control of it. Afghanistan would not serve; it had to be a major antagonistic nation in the Gulf region.
1. To reduce support for terrorist groups.
2. To "nation build"; to create a secularized, liberated, cosmopolitan society in a core Arab nation. To create a place where Arabs were free and safe and unafraid and happy and successful and not ruled by corrupt monarchs or brutal dictators. This would demonstrate to the other people in the Arab/Muslim world that they can succeed, but only if they abandon those political/cultural/religious chains that are holding them back. (I've been referring to this as being the pilot project for "Arab Civilization 2.0".)
3. To prove to the "Arab Street" that we were willing to fight, and that our reputation for cowardice was undeserved.
4. To prove to the "Arab Street", and to zealots everywhere, that we were extraordinarily dangerous when we did fight, and that it is extremely unwise to provoke us.
5. To place us in a physical and logistical position to be able to apply substantial pressure on the major governments of the region so as to force them to stop supporting terrorists and to implement domestic reforms.
6. To convince the governments and other leaders of the region that it was no longer fashionable to blame us for their failure, so that they will stop using us as scapegoats.
7. To make clear to everyone in the world that reform is coming, whether they like it or not, and that the old policy of stability-for-the-sake-of-stability is dead. To make clear to local leaders that they may only choose between reforming voluntarily or having reform forced on them.
8. To defeat the spirit of the "Arab Street". To force them to face their own failure, so that they would accept the idea that reform was the only way to begin to succeed. No one can solve a problem until they acknowledge that they have a problem, and until now the "Arab Street" has been hiding from theirs, in part aided by government propaganda eager to blame others elsewhere (especially the Jews).
B. Why Iraq?
1. Iraq is centrally located with borders on Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It has major ports through which supplies and troops can move. If we occupied Iraq, it would be ideal as a potential base of military operations against any of those other nations, and they all know it. This would make diplomatic threats against them far more effective.
2. Among the major nations of the region, Iraq had been relatively mercantile, relatively secular, and had originally had a relatively well-educated and cosmopolitan population. Reform was more likely to be successful there.
3. A casus belli existed that could be leveraged to justify conquest in certain fora.
4. The existing sanctions process against Iraq (including patrols over the "no fly" zones) was a failure and was unsustainable. One way or another the status quo had to be ended. Lifting the sanctions and ceasing to enforce the "no fly" zones without removing Saddam from power was too risky.
5. Saddam represented a substantial long-term threat. He had demonstrated utter ruthlessness and viciousness in two external wars and uncountable internal repressions. He showed no sign of abandoning his ambition to develop nuclear weapons irrespective of how long it might take or how much it might cost.
6. Saddam had been providing immense support for terrorist groups, both monetarily and in other ways. There were known training bases in Iraq and he had been providing money and arms. (It is not clear that much or any of that support went to al Qaeda; most of it went to various Palestinian groups.)
7. Saddam had developed and used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and on Iraqi civilians. Left to himself there was a non-trivial chance of his giving such weapons to terrorists. After the war in 1991 and 12 years of Anglo-American enforcement of sanctions, Saddam had a grudge against the US, and the chance of him surreptitiously aiding terrorist attacks against us was too great to ignore. It's a matter of record that he attempted to have the senior President Bush assassinated.
8. Revolution in Iraq was impossible; reform there could only be imposed from outside by military force.
9. There had been substantial support by American voters since 1991 for military operations to remove Saddam from power. There was far less support for invasion of Iran and no support at all for conquest of any other nation in the region.
10. Iraq's oil wealth could be used to offset much of the cost of rebuilding after the war, as well as making the nation economically viable and prosperous and helping to finance diversification of its economy.
11. Saddam had become a symbol for the "Arab Street". He was thought of as a strong Arab leader who was standing up to the West, and was viewed as a hero. Though he'd had his ass kicked in 1991, he survived it and this actually enhanced his reputation. He hadn't won against us, but at least he'd tried, which was better than anyone else seemed to be doing. The "Arab Street" were proud of him for making the attempt. (It ceased to matter that the war in 1991 started because Saddam had invaded fellow Arab nation Kuwait, nor that several divisions of Arab troops had been part of the coalition that defeated him. 1991 had symbolically become Saddam fighting against the US.)
12. The leaders of Kuwait feared Saddam and owed us a big favor from 1991, so Kuwait could be used as a base from which to launch an invasion of Iraq.
13. Iraq's military had the reputation of being the largest, best armed and most dangerous of any in the region; if it was decisively crushed it would be psychologically devastating.
14. We owed the southern Shiites a moral debt for not supporting their attempted revolution in 1991, and for our failure to make any attempt to prevent the retaliatory slaughter inflicted on them by Saddam afterwards. (I consider this the most important and most shameful lapse by the US since the end of the Cold War.)
15. The Kurds had prospered under the umbrella of the northern "no fly" zone, but if we'd given up and stopped enforcing that zone without eliminating Saddam, and if the sanctions had been lifted, the Kurds would then have been crushed by a reinvigorated Saddam. It would have been another betrayal similar to 1991 for the Shiites.
C. Preparing for war
1. Development of a "coalition of the willing". NATO was a hopeless waste of time, especially since some NATO members sided with Saddam and tried to use the mechanisms of NATO to prevent our attack. But the British and Australians openly sided with us, and other nations were more covert in offering aid and assistance for a wide variety of reasons. The British in particular were both able and willing to provide substantial help, militarily and diplomatically.
2. We required a formal Congressional authorization for war. The one passed in September of 2001 could not plausibly be interpreted as authorizing war in Iraq unless the Bush administration tried to contend that Saddam's government was directly implicated in the 9/11 attack, and no such evidence existed. (There's no reason to believe that Saddam was directly involved.)
3. We had to deal with the UN.
A. Tony Blair required UN approval (or an "unreasonable veto") for domestic political reasons. In the British system, a decision for war is made by the cabinet, but if Blair had done that without any attempt to gain UN approval it would have led to a party revolt.
B. It was clear that the UNSC would never actually grant permission for armed invasion, so it was vital that when Congress passed an authorization for war that it not include a requirement for UNSC approval. There was a distinct chance of such a requirement being included, and such a clause would grant France the power to veto war, which the French would clearly use. By going to the UN in September, it had become abundantly clear by October that the UN wasn't going to cooperate, so Congress did not include such a requirement in its authorization.
C. Wrangling with the UN ended up covering the primary period of troop deployment in Kuwait and restraining Saddam from a preemptive attack against us before we were ready. (Not yet known if this was deliberate or fortunate side effect.)
4. Dealing with the UN required making a case in terms of previous UNSC resolutions, based on the aftermath of 1991 and Saddam's less-than-stellar cooperation with the inspections process. No one in the UN process actually thought that this was about WMDs, but that was the level on which it had to be argued, and all of the UN debate amounted to double-think. What everyone talked about was Iraqi disarmament; what they were really debating was whether they feared America more than they feared Iraq.
A. Consent was gotten for new "last chance" inspections, with hard deadlines and major requirement for cooperation from Iraq, but only after the double-blow of Congressional authorization for war without requirement for UN approval and subsequent Republican victory in November elections, gaining full control of Congress along with Presidency. The election was widely viewed as a vote of confidence in Bush for his conduct of the war. After that, European nations opposing war were chastened and at least temporarily stopped resisting. Res 1441 passed.
B. To no one's surprise, the new inspections were a joke.
C. The final attempt at another UNSC resolution continued to be based on the diplomatic fiction that war should be authorized because Saddam had not fully cooperated with the process of elimination of his WMDs.
D. To that end, Bush and other top American and British officials attempted to make a case for attacking Iraq and eliminating Saddam, part of which was a list of Iraqi actions which seemed to show that even recently Saddam was continuing to try to acquire equipment and material needed to develop fissionables. However, many other broad issues were also raised.
E. In run-up to the final UN debate, there was world-wide consensus, among both those governments favoring war and those opposing it, as well as the UN bureaucracy itself (IAEA and UNSCOM) that Saddam still retained at least some chemical weapons and specific materials which he was not permitted to have under previous UNSC resolutions. When the inspections had ended in 1998, some were still known to exist and had not yet been destroyed.
F. The government of Iraq claimed that it no longer had any such thing, but no one – even including governments opposing the war – took those claims seriously. All political rhetoric was over how to enforce the final disarmament; it was never about whether disarmament was even needed. Opposition rhetoric to war was based on giving the inspections more time to work etc.
G. While making the case that Saddam had not yet given up his ambition to develop chemical, biological and in particular nuclear weapons, many American and British leaders made speeches which included specific lists of known violations and indications. Colin Powell made a long speech to the UNSC and provided many such allegations.
H. One of the many claims which appeared at one time or another was that Iraq had attempted to acquire large amounts of uranium ore from sources in Africa.
5. Chirac had managed to create a situation in the UN via diplomatic maneuvering where there was no chance of passage of a new UNSC resolution which would authorize war. But he overplayed his hand, and provided a political opportunity for the US and UK to walk away from the UN, blame it all on France, and launch the war anyway. Despite the setback of Turkish non-cooperation (due to another French political maneuver) logistical buildup was complete and CENTCOM told Bush that it had sufficient force in place and was ready to go.
D. The attack was launched, and we won.
E. Afterwards, it was no longer necessary to pretend that WMDs were the primary reason for the invasion. A search was launched, which surprised nearly everyone by finding essentially nothing. (That mystery has yet to be explained.) However, primary emphasis since victory has been on carrying out the long term goals of the invasion.
F. Results. No battle or war is ever 100% effective in accomplishing the goals set for it, but this one was very good. To review:
1. We do now control the territory of Iraq, and have been applying substantial pressure to Syria, Saudi Arabia and indirectly to Iran. Syria and Saudi Arabia appear to grudgingly accept the new situation. The situation in Iran is very fluid and difficult to predict.
2. Headlines notwithstanding, in most of Iraq the rebuilding process is actually going moderately well. There have been mistakes and progress has not been as fast as many would like, but most of the resistance has been in a small region of Iraq which is dominated by those groups and tribes who were the top-dogs under Saddam. The armed resistance remains a concern and will continue to be a problem for months, but in the nation as a whole progress has been satisfactory. Most of the people of the nation are glad we're there, and their main fear is that we'll leave too soon.
3. When Baghdad fell in just a couple of days, with very few American casualties, Arabs elsewhere were totally disillusioned and deflated, in part because the tissue of lies presented to them by their government news services about the war collapsed. They had been told that resistance was strong and that the US was paying a stiff price; the speed of the final collapse was completely incongruous. This therefore also brought the question of their own government propaganda into stark relief. They are now actually debating reform.
4. Anti-American rhetoric is rapidly going out of style in the region. It's no longer fashionable to advocate picking a fight with us.
5. Irrespective of whether Saddam actually had physical possession of any kind of WMD, it remains the case that he had not abandoned his ambitions to develop such things. Now that he has been deposed, that is no longer really possible, even if he is still alive. It would be nice if he were captured or killed, but removing him from power was the primary goal.
6. With his defeat, substantial support for external terrorist groups has been cut off, and it's already beginning to have effects on them.
VII. Stage 3 and beyond
A. Pacification and nation building in Iraq must continue. This is a gradual process which will go on for at least the next year and probably for several years at a reduced level. I expect us to have at least some military presence in Iraq for the next 30 years.
B. A new Iraqi army, modest in size but far higher quality compared to the old one, will be trained over the next year and will eventually take responsibility for most internal security.
C. The process of creating Iraqi self-government got off to the wrong start with the wrong concept (top-down) but is now moving in the right direction (bottom up). Most of the cities and towns in Iraq now have ruling councils, and local elections will become the norm. A national council is in place but has little real power, but in perhaps a year there will be the beginnings of a process to write a new constitution and to hold real elections, after which most power will be turned over to it. Then, for a period of a few years, there will be "democracy on training wheels" where some of our troops remain but largely don't interfere unless they screw up royally.
D. There's going to be low level armed resistance in Iraq for years, and that means a trickle of casualties. This isn't a problem which can be solved in weeks.
E. Diplomatic pressure will continue on other nations in the region to cut support for terrorist groups and to implement domestic reforms, and that will be far more effective. Also, as Iraq gets back on its feet, the new-found freedom there will serve as both a challenge and an inspiration for others in the region who will demand the same for themselves. Soon the "Arab Street" is going to start asking their governments why they can't have the same thing.
F. It is not yet known if any more significant military operations will be needed in this multi-decade war to bring about fundamental reform in the Arab/Muslim region. There's no way to predict that. No new wars will happen there in the immediate future (the next three years), but invasions of Iran or Syria or even Saudi Arabia are conceivable sometime in the next 20 years if their leaders refuse to cooperate in reforming. And punitive or preventive bombing, especially of Iran's nuclear facilities, are entirely possible.
G. The shadow war against terrorist group finances and against the cells of those groups will continue, occasionally popping into the public view when there's a high-profile success – or a high-profile failure.
H. The chance of new and devastating attacks against the US and UK now appears to be substantially reduced. The terrorists now seem to be operating inside the Arab world itself (except for the Palestinians, of course). That's doubly good, because it's motivating the governments there to help us more than they have been. However, if we relax and stop prosecuting the overall war, old terrorist groups will eventually be reinvigorated and new ones will pop up, and the chance of attacks against us will rise again. In the long run, the only way to eliminate the danger is to eliminate the root cause, which is Arab frustration at Arab failure caused by Arab religious/cultural/political pathologies. Only when the Arab/Muslim world has been reformed, and the people there see real opportunity and make real accomplishments, will they cease to feel frustration and resentment and cease to support extremists who wish to direct their resentment against us.
Niebuhr thought that sustained moral energy in politics depended on religion's power to mobilize reason along with self-transcending love. The prophetic tradition, meanwhile, gave Jews and Christians some protection against the temptation to identify their social causes with God's will. Lincoln's second inaugural address expressed the prophetic insight, "The almighty has His own purposes." | | Back to Top | | |
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honorman
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 1137
| Posted 8/1/2003 2:28 PM (GMT -6) | | Silly me. I thought it was much simplier than that. | | Back to Top | | |
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DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/2/2003 1:15 PM (GMT -6) | | Condensed version:This theory provides a systematic explanation for why 9-11 occurred and how the US has responded since then, even in deceiving the US public into thinking that the real reason for the war was Weapons of Mass Destruction.
It is well thought out, though definitely partisan. For example, no mention is made of how pushing for a reduction in the dependency of the US on foreign oil could also serve to undermine the corrupt leadership driving Arab frustration that is driving the anti-USAmericanism.
It certainly fits a lot of the pieces together and forecasts that we can expect maintaining a military presence in the Middle East for some time. It glosses over some of the "difficulties" we sustained in nation-building in Iraq and condones the shoddy job we did of nation-building in Afghanistan.
The goal here is inspiring fear in the Arab Street and then envy when Iraq is successful with a secular gov't so as to induce similar reforms elsewhere.
It dismisses off humanitarian aid as secondary to the acheivement of institutional change in the Arab countries. It also dismisses reconciliation with the Arab Street.
Instead, we seem to be going to recreate the Arab natioons in our own image and expect it to work because of the persuasiveness of material success. As such, it is the lack or evidence of material success(and its corollary military strength) that drives everything in the above theory. I am not sure that Islam can be undermined by material success, like how the USSR's communism was undermined by the Capitalism's material success. It is not an inherently materialistic ideology like Communism was, although the view taken by the article was that its current form was driven by the lack of material success and the need for scapegoats to pin the blame on.
So how do we as Christians make of this? Where is the Love? Where is the need for Reconciliation between Muslims and Christians? How might we send our own signals to the Arab Street of the importance of Democracy and the Autonomy of Mosque/Church and State? How might we check the greed that certainly is still present in the US's targeting of Iraq and control of its oil, omitting the idea of striking at the root of the problem by reducing our own dependency on oil?
I think those are important questions for the years ahead.
(Of course, given a day or two, I'm sure Honordude would have come up with the same.  ).
dlw
Niebuhr thought that sustained moral energy in politics depended on religion's power to mobilize reason along with self-transcending love. The prophetic tradition, meanwhile, gave Jews and Christians some protection against the temptation to identify their social causes with God's will. Lincoln's second inaugural address expressed the prophetic insight, "The almighty has His own purposes." | | Back to Top | | |
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Blood Washed Heretic
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 167
| Posted 8/2/2003 4:27 PM (GMT -6) | | So THAT'S why we did that...
I actually believe you're right on DLW, but believe it or not, that doesn't change my view that this is all very unnecessary and yes, contrary to God's will for geopolitical development, if He even has a will in that area.
OK, I've got enough fodder for the flamers now. Come on, honorperson, gimme one of your pat labels you seem to be so fond of.
P. S. DLW, it isn't just the "Arab Street" we're targeting. One of America's top military strategists has some insight on where else we might be headed in the years to come. Check this out...
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/default.htm
That's part of it. I'll get you the more in-depth analysis if you're interested based on this.
Peace brothers and sisters <><
In essentials, unity; In matters of opinion, liberty; In all things, love. | | Back to Top | | |
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DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/3/2003 9:48 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Blood Washed Heretic
I actually believe you're right on DLW, but believe it or not, that doesn't change my view that this is all very unnecessary and yes, contrary to God's will for geopolitical development, if He even has a will in that area.
Well, it it was God's will apparently it wasn't done on earth and its not like we're going to hand it back to Saddam now. As such, considerations of right conduct have to take our current situation into account.
quote:
P. S. DLW, it isn't just the "Arab Street" we're targeting. One of America's top military strategists has some insight on where else we might be headed in the years to come. Check this out...
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/default.htm
That's part of it. I'll get you the more in-depth analysis if you're interested based on this.
I'll get back to you soon. Let me be obvious and state that the outcome of the next election is going to be quite important for the future of the US and the world.
dlw
Niebuhr thought that sustained moral energy in politics depended on religion's power to mobilize reason along with self-transcending love. The prophetic tradition, meanwhile, gave Jews and Christians some protection against the temptation to identify their social causes with God's will. Lincoln's second inaugural address expressed the prophetic insight, "The almighty has His own purposes." | | Back to Top | | |
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DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/4/2003 9:39 AM (GMT -6) | | This is an important development.
dlw
State Dept. Changes Seen if Bush Reelected
Powell and Armitage Intend to Step Down
National security adviser Condoleezza Rice is seen as a possible replacement for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell if President Bush is reelected. (J. Scott Applewhite - AP)
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, August 4, 2003; 1:26 PM
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, have signaled to the White House that they intend to step down even if President Bush is reelected, setting the stage for a substantial reshaping of the administration's national security team that has remained unchanged through the September 2001 terrorist attacks, two wars and numerous other crises.
Armitage recently told national security adviser Condoleezza Rice that he and Powell will leave on Jan. 21, 2005, the day after the next presidential inauguration, sources familiar with the conversation said. Powell has indicated to associates that a commitment made to his wife, rather than any dismay at the administration's foreign policy, is a key factor in his desire to limit his tenure to one presidential term.
Rice and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz are the leading candidates to replace Powell, according to sources inside and outside the administration. Rice appears to have an edge because of her closeness to the president, though it is unclear whether she would be interested in running the State Department's vast bureaucracy.
With 18 months left in Bush's current term, many officials said talk of a new foreign policy team is highly premature -- particularly because Bush's reelection is not assured. No one inside or outside the administration agreed to be quoted by name or affiliation in discussing possible Cabinet choices. But on the eve of the country's first post-Sept. 11, 2001, presidential campaign, in which foreign affairs will play a prominent role, the national security lineup for a second Bush term is already a major topic of conversation, at least among those who make and analyze U.S. foreign policy.
Indeed, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet is already the third-longest serving CIA chief and is expected to depart, perhaps before the current term ends. Tenet's role in the Iraq weapons' controversy has led to calls on Capitol Hill for his dismissal, fueling speculation he will quit soon.
The current administration has been characterized by fierce policy disputes, often between Powell and more hawkish members, and a reshuffling likely would significantly change the tenor and character of the foreign policy team.
Although Bush appears to value the range of opinions he has received from his chief national security advisers, he may feel free during a second term to realign his foreign policy more closely to the harder-edged, conservative view exemplified by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser.
Powell has staffed key positions in the State Department with close associates, and many of those officials also are expected to leave at the beginning of a second Bush term, giving the new secretary of state the opportunity to substantially re-staff the department.
Some observers have speculated that Powell, who made an extensive presentation before the United Nations in February on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction before the war, has been embarrassed by the failure to find much evidence of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs. But Powell, both publicly and privately, has said he has no regrets about his comments to the Security Council, arguing that they hold up well if read carefully.
Powell has declined to answer questions about his plans. "I serve at the pleasure of the president," he said last month. "That's the only answer I've ever given to that question, no matter what form it comes in."
Bush recently named Rice as his personal representative on the Middle East conflict, a move that some State Department officials view as an audition for secretary of state. Republican political operatives have also touted Rice as a possible candidate in the 2006 race for California governor. But Rice's image has been tarnished by the fallout over the administration's use of intelligence about Iraq's weapons, raising questions about her scrutiny of the materials and the veracity of her public statements.
Rice "is an honest, fabulous person, and America is lucky to have her service, period," Bush said at a news conference before departing for his August vacation.
Wolfowitz, the administration's foreign policy intellectual and prime advocate of a confrontation with Iraq, would be a more daring and controversial choice. A senior Senate Democrat said Wolfowitz would have little trouble winning confirmation in a Republican-controlled Senate. But others said that because Wolfowitz is considered more of a strategic thinker than a manager, he could be tapped as Rice's replacement as national security adviser if she became secretary of state or entered politics.
Long-shot candidates for secretary would include Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), the centrist chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who is a strong supporter of Powell. Lugar is so respected by Democrats that his name was also floated during the Clinton administration.
Another dark horse is former House speaker Newt Gingrich. The Georgia Republican appears to be openly campaigning for the job, arguing in speeches and in a recent Foreign Policy magazine article that the State Department under Powell has failed to adequately support Bush's policies.
Among other key members of the foreign policy team, Rumsfeld is deeply involved in modernizing the military, as well as in the Pentagon's ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and appears willing to stay on beyond the start of a second term, officials said.
If Rice became secretary of state, that would open up another key slot -- national security adviser. Although Wolfowitz is considered a strong possibility, Rice's deputy, Stephen J. Hadley, could move up, much like Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger did when President Bill Clinton won a second term.
Officials also said another strong candidate is I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Cheney's chief of staff and already a principal foreign policy adviser inside the White House.
A dark-horse candidate for national security adviser is Steve Biegun, chief foreign affairs aide to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), who is said to have impressed Bush when he served as executive secretary of the National Security Council early on in the administration.
There appear to be few obvious choices for a new CIA director. Armitage, known as a sharp manager willing to tackle tough projects, is viewed by some officials as the ideal replacement for Tenet. But Armitage has insisted to others that he will leave the administration on the same day as Powell, one of his closest friends.
Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a former CIA case officer, is considered a strong possibility, as is Wolfowitz if he is not tapped for secretary of state or national security adviser.
Two mid-level administration officials who could move up are Stephen A. Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, and Richard L. Haver, assistant to Rumsfeld on intelligence (and to Cheney when he was defense secretary in the administration of President George H.W. Bush). Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, head of the National Security Agency, and retired Adm. William O. Studeman, a former NSA director and former CIA deputy director, are regarded as highly qualified for the job.
Two retired senators who served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.) and Fred D. Thompson (R-Tenn.) -- are considered long-shot candidates for CIA director. But Thompson, a sometime actor who now appears in the television series "Law and Order," has one unusual attribute: He already played the CIA director in the 1987 Kevin Costner movie "No Way Out."
[The White House announced Monday that Powell and Armitage will visit Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Tex., on Tuesday and Wednesday, Washington Post staff writer Mike Allen reported. Press secretary Scott McClellan said the visit had been "in the works" for some time. The two will have dinner with Bush on Tuesday, and hold a meeting and eat lunch with him on Wednesday.]
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
Niebuhr thought that sustained moral energy in politics depended on religion's power to mobilize reason along with self-transcending love. The prophetic tradition, meanwhile, gave Jews and Christians some protection against the temptation to identify their social causes with God's will. Lincoln's second inaugural address expressed the prophetic insight, "The almighty has His own purposes." | | Back to Top | | |
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DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/9/2003 6:51 AM (GMT -6) | | Taken from yesterday's NewHour. Commnetary on the US's long-term generational commitment to Iraq/Middle East.
MARGARET WARNER: Is America ready, or equipped, for this kind of commitment? To explore that, we're joined by: Samuel Berger, national security adviser during the second Clinton term; Richard Haass, incoming president of the Council on Foreign Relations-- he served on the NSC in the first Bush administration and at the State Department in the current one; and Philip Zelikow, a history professor and director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, an NSC staffer in the first Bush administration, he co-authored a book on German unification with Condoleezza Rice. Welcome to you all, gentlemen.
Sandy Berger, what do you make of this basic premise, this idea that the U.S. has to make now a generational commitment to transform the Middle East the way it did for Europe after the Second World War?
The call for a long-term commitment
SAMUEL BERGER: I think it's an appropriately ambitious and conservative vision both at the same time. It's ambitious in the sense that it recognizes that the stagnant status quo in the greater Middle East is not only corrosive for the people living there but ultimately dangerous for us.
But it's also conservative in the sense that it says this is a long-term enterprise. This is going to take sustained engagement. This is not something we are going to accomplish by the mighty swift sword. And in that sense, it's quite different than the views of some others in the administration.
MARGARET WARNER: How did you see it?
RICHARD HAASS: I thought it was exactly on target. We've got to do this. One of the lessons of 9/11 I would suggest, is that if you have societies where young men in particular feel alienated politically, have no opportunity economically, these are the sort of people who are going to be tempted by radicalism. We need to promote democracy in this part of the world because it's the right thing but again it's also an example of self-interest. I simply say, though, picking up on something Sandy said, we are right to be conservative here in situations such as this, we are wise to obey the Hippocratic Oath. First do no harm. These are difficult questions; it's very ambitious. We have got to do it right. We can make a bad situation worse if we are not careful.
MARGARET WARNER: Phil Zelikow, were you startled to hear her say generational commitment? I mean, here people on the Hill we in the press are pushing the administration to say, are we talking about one year or two-years or how much we are going to spend in the next six months and she is talking about a generational commitment.
PHILIP ZELIKOW: It is very reminiscent of the situation after World War World II -- in 1945 and '46 -- most of the American people and most of the U.S. Congress thought, now we go home. We have a little bit of cleaning up to do, but we are going to leave. And what happens in '47 and '48 and into the early '50s is an awakening to the fact that actually not only are we going to need to stay, we are going to need to recommit first money and then long-term presence of troops in the case of Europe for an indefinite venture.
And right after the war was over, for years, most Americans didn't see that. And then they had to figure out how that would work and why they should do it. And this is, in a way, a much faster summons. I mean, here we are, we're there. We are in the Middle East, just as we already found ourselves in Europe in 1945. And then the question is, all right, now, what are you going to do? Are you going to leave? Are you going to go forward? What's the next step look like? And the administration is rapidly trying to articulate really a whole comprehensive new agenda for years and years to come.
Parallels to the Marshall plan
MARGARET WARNER: Okay, Sandy Berger, let's look now at the analogy, though, between the Middle East and post-war Europe. I mean, how apt is that analogy in terms of how receptive it is to American reshaping or transformation?
SAMUEL BERGER: I think it's apt in the sense of a time frame. But I think there are some fundamental differences we have to take into account. Number one, at the end of the War World II, we faced a destroyed and decimated Europe that even in defeat was grateful for our support. There is a wide chasm between the United States and most of the people of the Arab world today who are going to be very suspicious that this is seen as an American crusade for democracy.
Second of all, we have to see whether or not we have what Fouad Ajami has called a sense of righteous mission in America today as we did for rebuilding Europe. We had lost a great deal of blood and treasure in Europe. This has been a relatively, relatively, costless war. And I think that's where the real decisive difference here is going to be patient and persistent presidential leadership. Here the president has to be not only commander in chief; he has to be educator in chief to bring the American people along to understand the fundamental basis for this kind of a sustained commitment.
MARGARET WARNER: Do you see the same thing, some significant differences, Richard Haass, between both the two regions and also where the two countries, that is where the United States is politically?
RICHARD HAASS: Alas I do. As difficult as it was to rebuild Europe --this is orders of magnitude potentially more difficult. In part, we are not going to have the luxury of staying; in places in Europe, American troops weren't shot at. They were welcomed. We are not going to have a situation where we can stay for five or ten years and be welcome.
MARGARET WARNER: Militarily.
RICHARD HAASS: Militarily. So we're not going to be able to have the same context. More important, if one looks at where European societies were in 1945 and where Arab societies are in 2003, there are some fundamental differences. And at the risk of being politically incorrect, let me simply suggest that European societies were far more developed. They had far more of the prerequisites of democracy in terms of media, in terms of quote civil society, independent institutions free of the government, in terms of constitutions, of governmental systems in which political authority was distributed. None of these things, not one of them, exists in today's Middle East. So the raw materials of democracy building simply aren't there. As a result, I'm not saying it is impossible, I'm not saying don't do it, but I am saying far, far, far more difficult.
MARGARET WARNER: Very different raw material, Phil Zelikow, to work with?
PHILIP ZELIKOW: Very different, look the analogy really only works at the level of trying to give people the visceral sense of the scope of the task involved, and that this is going to be very hard reminding them that, in fact, the solutions in Europe took years to develop and were very hard. But as far as all the specifics are concerned, the analogy doesn't work. In fact in some ways the scope is even broader than she described in the speech because I don't think the agenda is for the Middle East. The agenda -- and its politically inconvenient to use this term, is for the Muslim world.
It is not just for the Middle East. It extends to Pakistan; it extends to Indonesia and Malaysia. But on the plus side, since we are all being very downbeat about this, let's just notice that in late 1940s, we were competing against a major ideology that had taken power in much of Eurasia, was about to seize power in all of China and had enormous appeal in large parts of the world. Here we are in a struggle of ideas against the foe who says their goal is to recreate a caliphate through blood and fire. If that's the battle of ideas, I think that we are in a good position to win that.
MARGARET WARNER: But, Sandy Berger, did the fact of the Cold War, the fact of the Soviet threat right outside Western Europe, in some ways make our job easier, too?
SAMUEL BERGER: Certainly the act of rebuilding Europe, the Marshall Plan was not only magnanimous, it was both sold and seen as rebuilding Europe against a new threat, a Soviet threat. But we have a threat today, a terrorism threat, which is very palpable to the American people. National security has become personal security for most Americans. And it is certainly true that that has to be fought on offense, going after those who seek to destroy us; on defense with homeland security far more than we've done; and in the battle of ideas. And I think it is in that third battle that we have the most challenging undertaking.
Let me just say one thing. There are winds of change that are blowing, perhaps not torrents of change in the region, in places like Qatar and Jordan and Morocco and Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates; there is beginning to be some voices of modernity and some efforts to reconcile tradition and the future, reconcile the past and the future. And I think we have to align ourselves with that internal dynamic rather than trying to impose our own dynamic on the region.
Supporting advocates for change in the region
MARGARET WARNER: All right. And that's exactly what Condi Rice said, that we have to support those in the region who may even be afraid to talk like this. But how do you do that in practical terms?
RICHARD HAASS: You do it first of all using all the tools of American foreign policy, not principally the military ones. This is where old-fashioned things like economic aid come in handy, exchange programs where we send people over, judges, journalists who tell people how we do it, how independent institutions and free individuals work in society. We invite people here. We show them how things work here. American foundations have to get involved, American universities, trade unions. What we need to do is encourage counterpart organizations to take hold and gain traction in these other societies.
MARGARET WARNER: But what do you do about the fact that the hostility to that may come, does come in many of these countries, the hostility to that kind of openness or freedom or civil society from regimes and governments that, in fact, we still consider our allies? I mean, how do you handle that?
RICHARD HAASS: One thing you have to start doing is put this issue on the agenda; every administration, quite honestly, Democratic and Republican for years and years, has not emphasized this issue.
MARGARET WARNER: Human rights, civil rights.
RICHARD HAASS: It's much more fundamental than human rights. It's civil rights, it's political change; it's economic reform. What happens is when the President of the United States meets with some Arab leader, inevitably you talk about the Israel-Palestine problem and in the past you talked about Saddam. Now you talk about Iran, you talk about oil and energy.
We have got to make this a priority. Privately we've got to start talking so when we see President Mubarak of Egypt or we see the crowned prince in Saudi Arabia, we have to start talking because it's not just their futures at stake, but in this global world, our future is at stake, too. We have to start talking about it privately. We have to start talking about it publicly. We really have to make this issue common and acceptable for the first time.
MARGARET WARNER: Do you agree with that, Phil Zelikow, that we are talking about more than money in a big way?
PHILIP ZELIKOW: We are talking about more than money, but also what we are talking about is not teaching them how to imitate America, bringing our professors over there or bringing their professors over here.
What we have to help them do is to discover their pathway. And here I think it's important to notice there is a difference between freedom and democracy. Democracy is a form of political choice. It's very, very important. But what these societies need first is they just need basic respect for human dignity; for tolerance, for freedom from arbitrary violence, for some rule of law. Let them work through the kind of political processes that guarantee freedom that make sense in their societies. That's where local leaders are going to be able to get a footing that they can stand on.
MARGARET WARNER: Final thought. Do you think the American public is ready for this commitment?
SAMUEL BERGER: I think it's going to take a good deal of presidential leadership, but I would say one quick thing, Margaret. This is a very distinct vision from that of some others in the administration, and outside the administration who believe this change comes from much more radical regime change. Iraq is essentially an American aircraft carrier now in the Middle East from which we promote regime change from Iran to Syria. This is very much a long-term undertaking that Dr. Rice is talking about.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. We have to leave it there. Thank you all three.
Niebuhr thought that sustained moral energy in politics depended on religion's power to mobilize reason along with self-transcending love. The prophetic tradition, meanwhile, gave Jews and Christians some protection against the temptation to identify their social causes with God's will. Lincoln's second inaugural address expressed the prophetic insight, "The almighty has His own purposes." | | Back to Top | | |
|
DLW
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 2457
| Posted 8/25/2003 8:35 AM (GMT -6) | | A turkish friend of mine wrote the following response to the theory of war...
Dear David,
I have read the "theory of war" thoughts. I am afraid that I will not acknowledge any part of those thoughts. These are one-sided, simple, partisan (pure neo-conservative) and non-humanitarian (as you have mentioned truly), and ill-structered thoughts. It is failing to analyze the historical and political root causes of the "invasion"-not the "war" and the terorist movements. It is also failing to analyze what should be done next. It is wellcoming the hegomonic rule of the US over the institutions and the nations of the world. And it can be seen that things are getting worse in the region.
oktay | | Back to Top | | |
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