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"What DO we do when prophecies are unfulfilled (there are multiple biblical examples of this) or when God sends a lying spirit (1 Kings 22:20-23)?"

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Hmm! I figure God is quite free to send an angel/spirit of His own to mess with Ahab. It's not "evil", it's playing in the same arena with the same rules which God had agreed with unstatedly but clearly implied within the salvation Noatic event. God had Hosea marry a harlot, had the Ark and priests go into war (Book of Joshua), asked Abraham to kill (his son) - things which were against the Law (either written or on the heart).

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Category error Tom. Sin cannot be predicated either positively or negatively of God.

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Isn't that assuming the point of debate?

Pia: Be afriad. Be very afraid [of meeting Modes].

Tom: I've got till Toronto to prepare to meet Modes and plenty of books to read between now and then. But my knees are still knockin. And besides, Fretheim is on my side! Yay!

Tom


Edited by - tgb on 12/03/2001 1:26:54 PM

Edited by - tgb on 12/03/2001 7:35:14 PM

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1. X is that being greater than which none other can be conceived.
2. To exist necessarily is greater than existing contingently.
3. X must exist necessarily, if X exists at all (from 1 and 2).
4. X could only fail to exist if X necessarily does not exist (viz. if the very idea of a greatest conceivable being is a contradiction), for if X only avoids non-existence contingently, then X exist contingently, in which case X is not the greatest conceivable being.
5. X does not necessarily not exist. (A few have tried to argue this, but its really quite futile).
Conclusion: X necessarily exists.

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quote:

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I think the key issue here was raised by TGB: the original skit is predicated on the assumption that to be a person is to instantiate moral contingency. Why think THAT?

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Tom responds: "And he shall reign for-ever and eeeever. And he shall reign, and he shall reign for-ever and...sing it with me...King of kings...."

Tom



Edited by - tgb on 12/04/2001 10:37:50 AM

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Doc wrote:

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I think the key issue here was raised by TGB: the original skit is predicated on the assumption that to be a person is to instantiate moral contingency. Why think THAT?

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Tom responds: "And he shall reign for-ever and eeeever. And he shall reign, and he shall reign for-ever and...sing it with me...King of kings...."

Tom



Edited by - tgb on 12/04/2001 10:37:50 AM

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Ahh, and Tom and the good Doctor seem to imply that to be divine is to instantiate ethical categorical imperatives. Why think that?

"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK

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Ahh, and Tom and the good Doctor seem to imply that to be divine is to instantiate ethical categorical imperatives. Why think that?

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Here's what we should be thinking...

WHERE IS MEPHI?

Should we start up the songs again?

Tom

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Mephi’s skit is predicated on the assumption that “personhood” requires moral contingency. We’re persons. We can (and do) sin. God’s a person. God must be able to sin. But it doesn’t follow that because God is a person she must be like us in this respect.

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Now, suprise, surprise, when Doc returns (by the way...

quote:

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I think the key issue here was raised by TGB: the original skit is predicated on the assumption that to be a person is to instantiate moral contingency. Why think THAT?

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If one reads Trinity and Process, one sees this response coming a mile away. His ontological argument is detailed in that work. (Ain't that right, Doc?) And I'm going to illustrate the problems with it that I had when I first read it. But I'll do this after I say some things.

What is essentially being said here is that GENUINE personhood is possible from necessary ESSENTIAL existence. In other words, one cannot say that personhood is diminished in any way due to a being lacking the ability to choose between good and evil. Now, let's get this perfectly clear. This is NOT saying that a being is so wise and knowledgable as to always know the "good" and choose it, for that could still entail moral responsibility. What this is saying is that any being who is wholly good BY THE VERY NATURE OF ITS CONSTITUTION is still genuinely a "real" person. Everyone following? Good.

What's my issue? Simply this. The question often comes up: Could God have created human beings that could have GENUINE personal love relationships with Him...while creating human beings such that ALL of their moral intuitions and choices would be "good"? And the answer comes just as quickly: NO! Just as Doc says in the first of his 6 theses: Love REQUIRES that there be freedom. That freedom means the ability to choose NOT to love. Then a homie like me stands up and cries foul like crazy...

Wait a cotton-pickin' minute! Didn't YOU just say that genuine personal love relationships NECESSITATE freedom not to love...incurring a choice to be made? Well, doesn't that necessarily mean that the SAME must be true for God?? Can a God who NECESSARILY MUST love genuinely be able to have personal love relationships as they have been previously delineated here?

Then comes Doc's answers (taken largely from ideas in Trinity and Process):

1) Necessary vs Contingent Beings
Because human beings are finite and contingent with respect to their existence, it has to be the case that they develop their moral character. However, this is not the case for a NECESSARY being for a necessary being can ONLY be what it is. For a necessary being X not to be X would mean it's non-existence...whereas a contingent being Y CAN become something other than Y in some respects. In other words, contingent being Y could have been something other than what it is. This is not the case for necessary being X.

2) God's contingency in EXPRESSION of love.
It is true that the necessary being God can ONLY be what God is. If we incorporate the notion of "goodness" or "love" into this mix, this entails that God cannot do anything NOT good or loving. This seems to limit God significantly, giving God seemingly less freedom that human beings have. However, we must take into account that though God's essential existence is necessary, God's expression of God's qualities is contingent. In other words, though God can only do good, loving things, there are a NUMBER of ways that God may choose to display his good, loving nature. God will always work for the best option, but this is NOT to say that many GENUINE options aren't before God for any given expression God wants to decide on.

So this is how I see it. Doc tries to deal with this question by asserting that 1) due to who God is, God CANNOT have the same type of freedom as contingent beings and 2) though God is necessary, he STILL posesses an aspect of CHOICE that makes God personal.

Hopefully, I've tagged Doc's ideas competently here. Now, my problems.

1) Since when do MORAL CATEGORIES have to be ONTOLOGICALLY defined?

Doc, doesn't your Ontological Argument "dovetail" with the other arguments including the Moral Argument where God is seen as providing the moral telos for existence? (My memory on the material is starting to fade and my notes on computer were lost. I've got to get the book. Sell me one cheap, Doc??) I never saw why this same idea couldn't be said WITHOUT making God possess "goodness" as some type of ontological characteristic. See, this is the first problem and from here it mutates a bit. Once someone defines MORAL CHARACTER in terms of ESSENTIAL categories of a being, then the terms "contingent" and "necessary" become significant. Contingency in this case would imply that ability to change one's moral characteristics...which REALLY means changing one's moral CHOICES. (Remember how Doc keeps harping on the behaviour becoming habit, habit becoming character thing? There's a reason for that.) Necessity in this case would imply the INABILITYto change one's moral characteristics...or changing's one's moral choices.

The rest is simple math. God is a necessary being...therefore his MORAL CAPACITY never changes. Humans are contingent...therefore theirs can. It would work out fine if SOMEONE could cogently show me WHY the moral categories have to be dealt with in this manner. I believe that Modes has a problem with this as well. The primary answer that I've received has to deal with the questionable way (in my opinion) that the "God is love" passage is used. This is constantly used to justify defining LOVE in ontological terms. And the "goodness" thing pretty much just tags along, due to all of the scriptures about God's goodness. But I have yet to see any TRULY convincing evidence that this should be the case. Even when Doc attempted to do so in Trinity and Process, it still seemed artificial to me. Are we saying that God cannot set the moral telos of the universe while having significant moral freedom? Someone prove THAT case.

Summing this up, I contest the discussion of moral categories in ONTOLOGICAL terms.

[Digression: Some people who hold to original sin or the universal application of the Adamic "sinful nature" may want to use this as some type of argument for the ontological nature of moral categories. How can people be born "sinners" if the moral categories AREN't in some way ontological? If one holds to this view, then I suppose that one could make an argument for it. But one could just as easily say that what is ontological in this idea is the PREDISPOSITION towards sin. (or perhaps "dispositions" using Edward's term) This would NOT form a STATIC essence of a human being...and would include the theoretical idea that humans could choose AGAINST said predisposition. But because of their surroundings and such, it is certain that sin will occur. (ALL OF THIS WAS DISCUSSED ON THE THREAD ABOUT JESUS SINNING AND "PELAGIANISM" remember???) If one holds to this position (which if I'm not mistaken, a significant amount of people here did) then one need not say that "goodness" can be CATEGORICALLY defined ontologically (ie Bill is "all-good".) One may define an ontological predisposition towards certain moral tendencies.)


Next.....

2) Aren't we slightly being hypocritical here?

Let's try something. Let's take this sentence.

ONLY morally free beings can engender genuine loving personal relationships.

This would be based on the "Love requires Freedom" thesis. Now, if someone disagrees with this using God as a referent, they could disagree based upon what has been said before.

A being who is not morally free can engender genuine loving personal relationships.

But that's not all that would be said...for if it was, then the second sentence would contradict the first by implication. So what would be said is the following:

Any NECESSARILY EXISTENT being can engender genuine loving personal relationships.

And this line of thought would, of course, assume the ontological nature of moral character. Here's my problem. Isn't this basically doing the SAME THING that you guys want to lambast the TSE idea for: essential giving God "different rules" to play by JUST BECAUSE God is God?? Just because of who he is? It seems like EXACTLY the same animal to me. Even though Modes and myself are, I believe, are making a good line of reasoning promoting TSE, it's being discounted because of the "different rules" thing. And being quite honest, I think that the TSE idea is far more workable than the artificial "necessary/contingent" attempts at exempting God from significant moral freedom. It's my opinion that a stronger case can be the existence of TSE due to who God is POSITIONALLY than for the necessary omnibenevolence of God ONTOLOGICALLY. Again, just my opinion.


Tom said:

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Mephi’s skit seems to argue something different than TSE. Either God can sin but chooses not to (Mephi’s skit [and probably J. Sanders]) or God can sin and chooses to but in so choosing suspends the ethical, in which case she only seems to be sinning per OUR categories. God doesn’t sin. Why not? Because she exists and acts outside all morality. Oh, I feel better. I can trust God now. (I’m still struggling with this guys.)

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Remember what I said to you before? I said that, to some, this idea would look like a case of God saying "Do as I say, not necessarily what I do." And in some sense it is. And for very good reason. It is very important to realize how SIN is being defined here. If sin is defined in terms of its relationship to God's WILLING, then things are far different than what you have been suggesting here.


Tom said:

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What I’m wondering if this: If God suspends the ethical then must she not remain outside of the ethical. If God is above morality, then he’s above morality, period. If this is so, then is it not true that God may just as easily/possibly created a moral order FOR US to obey which included her rewarding those who murder, lie, rape and lust while eternally tormenting those who defend the innocent, serve others humbly, and give their lives for those they love, a world in which loving would estrange one from God relationally and hating would make one dear to God.

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Do you remember WAAAY back in the day (back when we had poll features) when I asked the question "Could God have created a UNIVERSAL hell?" Uh huh. This is the essence of what I tried to get at. God's moral freedom as Creator. Now, I have some thoughts about this that would make this post even LONGER, so I'll have to defer until next time to get deep into this one. But let this be said: It is very important to understand that our understanding of moral order SIGNIFICANTLY comes from our lives in human bodies. (Sounds like that Lakoff stuff, I know...) More later...


Tom said:

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I cannot believe that God chose to create the moral world she did only because, well, gee, that’s what she wanted (as opposed to the equally possible choice to create the opposite) and not because of the KIND of God she is. I can’t plummet the depths of God, but it seems abundantly evident to me that there exists something about God’s nature which defines morality, which explains why we have a world in which love endears one to God and hatred distances one from God. I don’t think my definition of what is right and wrong defines what’s right and wrong for God (I’m a fallen sinful creature) but I do think our notion OF right and wrong is defined by God, not just her choice, but the kind of God she essentially is.

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Cannot or WILL not, Tom. Don't tell me you need psychological certainty on this, man! On the real, this is coming down to a difference in ways of thinking. You consistently want to say that what a being DOES morally emerges from what said being ESSENTIALLY IS. What I would say is that what a being does morally emerges from the being's FUNDAMENTAL ONGOING CHOICES that are conditioned, though NOT DETERMINED, by one's "dispositions" And guess what, in my view, guess who's the ONLY being who can dictate their OWN dispositions by will? You guessed it. God! (Man, there's so much here that needs to be explained.) I believe that my idea has more potential explanatory power than yours. What I'm still wondering is this: Is the MAIN or ONLY reason that you serve God because you believe God to be all-good?



Tom said:

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bout the atheists. That was a little funny. Perhaps if we tell atheists who object to an all-loving God that God is NOT all-loving they’ll forsake their atheism and join us. Or if we explain to them that God is above morality, that she suspends the ethical from time to time, and that this accounts for all the sin they see God doing in Scripture, they’ll feel better about God and maybe believe in her. Hmmm. I’m not saying we’re not faced with difficult passages. I’m just saying that rather than solving the problem such passages present to us (and sincere atheists), TSE complicates it.

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Now this seems to be a straight up pragmatic argument. Like we need an all-good God to look good to atheists to foster belief. Honestly, if I have to pander some view of God for atheists to believe, I'd rather then NOT believe. I'd rather them believe on their own terms. And let me share this. I do mad dialogue with lots of atheists, some of whom I would consider good friends. From what they tell me, my view seems more CONSISTENT with Scripture without all the explaining away and artificiality than some other attempts that try to sweep the hard passages under the nebulous rug of "mystery" (Please note that I am NOT against "mystery" in theologizing. It is inevitable. However, it CAN be used as a very effective copout at times) The only problems that they've had are some of the MORAL implications that they see in EMULATING God's TSE type actions in directing others. Like I said, the do as I say, not as I do type because I'm God thing.


Tom said:

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First, God’s emotions. She hates evil, rejoices in truth, has compassion, is grieved by sin, etc. What might this say about the likelihood of God’s nature/essence being above morality? I’m gonna do a bad job of sketching this ‘cause it’s still hazy in my own mind, but the basic gist of it regards how it is possible for a God who is above morality to genuinely feel anger over injustice, or joy in the truth, or compassion for the needy. If the definition of evil and good don’t emanate from God’s own nature/essence, then whence the emotional responses God gives to various behavior? God’s emotions become mere attributes of her will. Her will alone dictates what God feels or doesn’t feel on any one occasion. Hmmm.

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Two comments. You seem to be linking the exercise of emotion with a ESSENTIALIST idea. Kind of like a "I just can't HELP but be loving cause it's my nature" type thought. Like saying that God couldn't help grieving over sin EVEN IF HE WANTED TO. Could it be that you are relying far too much on HUMAN experience of emotions and projecting them onto God? Just a thought. Next, may I suggest that you could be confusing God's willing being central with general INDIFFERENCE. Like pressing the TSE idea would make God like some staid Dr. Spock or something. I really don't see how this necessarily follows.



Tom said:

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The other question was this: If God is above good and evil, then our becoming increasing good and holy, becoming “conformed to Christ’s image,” neither makes us more nor less like God. It only means we’ve been obedient to what she has told us to do. But this obedience cannot lead to a genuine conformity to the God’s likeness, for God is amoral. Something’s awry here. Modes, if God is above good and evil, then morality cannot be part of the image of God. Of what does this image consist?

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This is what I'm getting. If God isn't "really" like Christ in the first place (meaning ESSENTIALLY), then how does becoming more like Christ make us more godly? To me, this is entirely the wrong question to be asking in the first place. WHY have we inferred that God isn't "really" like Christ but what is being said here? It seems to me that it is STILL based on your idea of "sin" with respect to God.

_____________________________________

Now, for Doc...

Doc talks about the ontological argument...and I've tried to deal with it a little above. So let me show something. He said:

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However you conceive of X -- just do the best you can -- you must conceive of X as necessarily existing, and necessarily possessing the attributes of virtue which you -- in your limited capacity -- ascribe to God.

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Do you see what I see, boys and girls? Isn't Doc doing EXACTLY what Modes was talking about?:

quote:

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if "X" is a human concept (love, good, perfection, whatever) then "X" times infinity is also a concept, just a much less useful one. Whatever flaws there are in attributing our understanding of God as "X" get multiplied times infinity right along with the rest of "X".

One cannot get to God by yelling "MAN" in a very loud voice.

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It seems that that's all that Doc is doing. And he's doing it with MORAL CATEGORIES! Why?? This goes back to what I said way above. Why does Doc and others choose to make goodness and love ontologically defined characteristics? Because of Jesus' sinlessness? Because of the idea of the human sin nature I mentioned before? I don't know. But I still haven't gotten any real argumentation that shows this necessary. So, here's what I reject:

I reject that OMNIBENEVOLENCE (as it is being conceived here) is to be used as a NECESSARY attribute in the ontological argument!

Once someone disputes this, Doc, then it is NOT just a matter of "married bachelors" or "round triangles" And I think you know this, right? Oh, and you say that you can conceive of a God "better" than one who is not omnibenevolent. Hmmm. Let me guess. It's one that CANNOT NOT be omnibenevolent. Whohoo. Word of knowledge. Now, come on, y'all. HOW subjective is THAT? How is this not what Freud was hinting at when he indicated that God was little more than us giving our moral archetypes infinitude? I don't think that this is ever really been argued for well, Doc. What I say in Trinity and Process didn't convince me either.
So, what's up?

______________________________

Finally, to my man Modes, He COMPLETELY bats it OUT OF THE PARK with his last post! How many atheists do YOU know that have said that the entire notion of the Cross is IMMORAL and UNFAIR at best? I know PLENTY. What best explains this? God has the right to actualize God's willing. Pure and simple. No formulations and REformulations of some abstract principle. See what I'm saying? Way to go, Modes. Keep it up.



This took a LONG friggin time to do. I've got to get MY computer fixed. I can't handle this. Sheesh!

Bringing The Heat,


Love God. Love People. Love Truth. Dedicate your all to that which you love.