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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > General Chat > The problem of evil is still front and center ... | Forum Quick Jump
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/17/2009 5:59 AM (GMT -6) |   | I've addressed Tom, now Jeff. I'm going to re-arrange your first reply.
J: ...So it has to do with the meaning of "necessary." What I say is, we can't say anything meaningful without the LNC. We can't eliminate the correlativity of being and attribute without rendering all beliefs about beings as arbitrary. We can't eliminate the relation that events are caused without requiring an explanation of WHEN an event is caused. But an "explanation" is just a causal account. So we're right back, in that case, to using the very relation we're trying to account for, which is logical non-sense. It's not possible to abandon these categories without rendering our language/thought meaningless and/or arbitrary. Indeed, I don't see how to un-entangle causality FROM the LNC. For if the LNC is a fundamental relation of thought, it only is so because we are CAUSED to think that way. If we weren't, it wouldn't be apriori at all.
Z: I agree with all this. So don't worry about convincing me of it. I am convinced.
J: The LNC is a relation of thought. If there are no thinkers, there is no such relation of thought....
Z: Here. my claim is that you've got a half-truth. Sure, LNC is a relation of thought which requires thinkers. But that's not all it is. My reply here is essentially the same one I made to Tom. Thinkers do not create THINGS called thoughts. If we are going to talk about reified thoughts, then we are going to be talking about electric pulses over synapses. I agree that if there are no thinkers then thoughts do not occur, but that does not imply that the truth value of those thoughts somehow evaporates. The sky reflects light of a certain frequency that we've named blue; if every person on earth simultaneously was zapped out of existence, this would nevertheless remain true. The light was here before us and it doesn't depend on our thinking for its existence. The proposition concerning the light would remain true even if there were no people left to think it. If anything, reality precedes thought; but thought does not precedes reality. Granted, in a person-less world the proposition "The sky is blue" would never be entertained; however that proposition would nevertheless remain true.
J: IOW, to say God can cease to exist is virtually equivalent to saying God, or anything else, can pop into existence uncaused. But that means all causal claims are arbitrary unless we have some intuitive criteria by which we can distinguish.
Z: Ok.
J: And I've never yet heard these scientists tell me what that criteria would be that doesn't also render science non-tentative. But science is tentative, by definition. There is no way to get around foundationalism and say anything meaningful and/or non-arbitrary.
Z: Fine. But there's a hard foundationalism and a soft. You yourself talk about "intuitive criteria by which we can distinguish." Who is this "we"? Are you making the hopelessly ambitious claim that all "we" humans share this intuition? Or are you making a more modest and credible claim about a more precise "we"? If you mean the latter, then I'm right there with you and your soft foundationalism.
J: What we need are intellectual criteria that can adjudicate the RELATIVE VALUE of different sentient states AND the actions necessary to instantiate them. But that is just another way of saying that we need to know something about causality and beings independent of our feelings to even competently attain the very feelings we want to experience. And that's not possible without foundationalism.
Z: Yeah, but what do you do when you run into someone with a different sort of foundationalism? You can't say your is better, because there are no agreed upon standards of better and worse. To call such an alternate viewpoint 'arbitrary' would be to label your own viewpoint arbitrary since at this level both are equally (un-)grounded. My point is that foundationalism (even as you describe it) rests on no foundation except "sentience"/intuition/feeling. Foundationalism itself is intellectually un-founded. To acknowledge this even concerning one's own beliefs is to hold to a more modest, soft foundationalism - an intellectual nihilism filled with (not rational nor irrational, but) a-rational faith.
J: I think Noah Porter had it right. He said we think causally and teleologically categorically. Thus, the belief that events IN GENERAL are caused and hold relations to final causes is intuitive. But inferring SPECIFIC causes and ends is an aposteriori process done by analogical reasoning.
Z: ...and then along comes Job 38 and quantum mechanics. Sure organized causality is intuitive for many people. That doesn't make it the whole truth.
Z: Such appeal to my heart and mind is not faith, not belief. The "living it out" is faith, is belief.
J: Not by conventional language. Living out is faithfulNESS or fidelity. FaithfulNESS is the consistent living OUT of your faith--i.e., what you believe to be true.
Z: The New Testament knows of no such distinction. I've repeatedly said that I'm using faith/belief/pistis in the biblical sense.
J: How can they believe what hasn't entered their mind?
Z: I don't know. You're the one who brought up this idea of natural belief. That's my point. There is a time, there had to be a time, when one doesn't believe. So how is belief natural? Belief has to do with a response to something external, and when it comes to the gospel its a matter of volition not nature.
J: A weak one. Have you ever knowingly sinned? Some people have. They don't assume that it was NOT sin merely because they did it. Thus, their inappropriate action didn't imply they didn't believe the action was inappropriate. That's why people typically feel huge guilt when they do that. Because they BELIEVE it was wrong.
Z: James doesn't say 'weak.' He says 'dead.' A dead faith. Dogs run and bark. Except when they're dead. When they're dead, they're not quite dogs anymore - they used to be dogs. That's faith without works - it's as much faith as a corpse is a person. Maybe it's just gotten lost in the shuffle, but I've been discussing faith in terms of the New Testament.
J: What is deliberate is the continual attempt to suppress the knowledge of sin so as to eliminate guilt. Romans 1 talks about subjecting the truth in unrighteousness. Subjecting seems to indicate a deliberate attempt to rid the mind of the consciousness of the sin--like what psychologists call denial and such.
Z: I think "suppress" or "hold back" is a better translation. The grammar and context are also important. 'Men' is genitive (roughly possessive). And v. 18 is parallel with v. 17. God's righteousness is uncovered "from faith to faith" - the righteous one shall live by faith; and the God's wrath is uncovered from heaven on all impiety and unrightousness of men who suppress the truth with unrighteousness. Notice the "from faith to faith" juxtaposed with "all impiety and unrighteousness." On the bad side Paul describes the two-fold badness toward God and badness in [consequent] actions. However, when he describes to good side, he has one word for both. New Testament faith includes BOTH intellectual assent AND living it out. Also the "all" is clearly referring to the impiety and unrighteousness, not to men. Paul is not describing all men. Furthermore, this is made clear by the context. On one hand there are the righteous and on the other hand... He is here talking about those men who suppress the truth. He does not make the claim that this is how non-belief always happens. In the wider context of the entire letter we would do best to assume he has in mind certain groups of people in Rome.
I don't deny that some people suppress truth to avoid guilt. That's a common occurrence. But I think discussion of this occurrence needs to be properly understood as one sort on non-belief and not the paradigm for understanding all of it. Belief is not natural and only lost through the denial of nature. You said it yourself: "How can they believe what hasn't entered their mind?" Some people might have had God made evident to them only then to suppress the truth like Paul says, and I don't deny that virtually everyone goes through something like this. But it's not paradigmatic of all non-belief.
J: IOW, to my mind, the volitional aspect of belief has to do with the deliberate attempt to eradicate a belief already naturally formed. That's what the scripture associates with the hardening of the heart, as I understand it.
Z: But hardening the heart does not imply that the heart naturally believes. We talk about solidification in both the positive and negative directions. The habits of mind and action that I associate with heart-hardening can be formed both ways. By this analogy, soft-heartedness is neutral, and positive belief is not natural. If we are talking about gospel faith, Natural belief runs into the same problems as original sin.
I don't want to come of too strong though. Jesus talks about having faith like a child. But I view this faith as something like Ricoeur's second naivete. To use the parable of the Sower, first there is seed, then afterward that ground decides what shape to take. If we take the parable too literally, we get double-predestination. The "ground" of a child is without thorns and rocks and so it resembles the good soil - it IS the good soil. But the adult's good soil, while it IS the same stuff, came about (at least partially) by volition. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/17/2009 9:20 AM (GMT -6) | | T: If God destroyed Creation and committed suicide, there would be a-b-s-o-l-u-t-e-l-y nothing left (no LNC, no truth, no logic, no nuttin).
Z: Why do you say so? Am I wrong to see you imbuing LNC with reality? Are you reifying propositions? Why would you do such a thing?
T: Bro, you and I don't live in the same world, one that shares common intuitions and logic. We just don't. We're utterly strange and alien to each another, as strange as aliens from two different galaxies could be. I'm surprised that ANY communication at all is possible between us. If fact, I'm not sure we even ARE communicating. Of all the words we exchange, I'm guessing we're down around 3 to 5% of shared meaning/communication. So we belong roughly in the same universe--I suppose, because our worlds touch at this tiniest of shared reality. But it's as alien a relationship and conversation as I've ever known.
I'm rethinking what human being even is, honestly, wondering whether there can be different species and versions of human being with fundamentally different hardwiring and intuitions. Amazing.
Be that as it may, I'm happy you're happy.
Be blessed, whatever you think that means.
Tom
"Man is a person not by nature but by spirit. By nature he is only an individual." Nicolas BerdyaevPost Edited (Tom) : 10/17/2009 9:26:03 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/17/2009 12:46 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Zach: Logic, meaning, propositions, and yes even the LNC are not things that, strictly speaking, exist even in this world, unless maybe you subscribe to a specific kind of Platonism. What I'm trying to describe is a possible world in which there is no real stuff - and here stuff does not include symbolic organizations such as logic, meaning, propositions, LNC, etc. Such a possible world is in fact possible. It still abides by the logic (specifically LNC) which defines what is possible. Such an empty world is not self-contradictory unless we make the (convenient) assumption that propositions are real (not just true) in the same way that you and I are real.
Jeff: Propositions may not be stuff. A proposition, in one sense, is an accidental attribute of the non-accidental human attribute we call capacity (in this case, the capacity to experience mental states). But still, you can't get to attribute without being if being and attribute are correlative. So you would need to show that being and attribute are not correlative to show that propositions can "exist" without beings.
Tom: I'm rethinking what human being even is, honestly, wondering whether there can be different species and versions of human being with fundamentally different hardwiring and intuitions. Amazing.
Jeff: I still say that people make category mistakes relatively easy. But our higher level beliefs certainly can and do effect our ability to get to the bottom of what is actually categorical. What I think is obvious, though, is that publicly judging people is only warranted, per Christ, in terms of a metaphysic that grounds the coherence and intelligibility of HUMAN apprehension, including HUMAN criteria of plausibility. That doesn't mean that all people will agree on the criteria of plausibility or what categories are. But it does mean that we can't communicate without a substantial degree of agreement on these matters. Once we go the route of arbitrariness (radical skepticism), relativistic judgment is motivationally irrelevant (in any conceivable positive sense) to those being judged. Thus, it is equivalent to groundless insults.
Zach: If we are going to talk about reified thoughts, then we are going to be talking about electric pulses over synapses.
Jeff: I don't see how that follows unless materialism is true. But I agree that thoughts are not beings. I suspect they are abstractions from certain mental states which are accidental attributes of souls. The thinking by and forming of those very same abstractions, then, are themselves aspects or subsets of mental states which are, again, accidental attributes of souls.
Zach: I agree that if there are no thinkers then thoughts do not occur, but that does not imply that the truth value of those thoughts somehow evaporates.
Jeff: It doesn't imply that they don't either. You have to make your own case for your position.
Zach: The sky reflects light of a certain frequency that we've named blue; if every person on earth simultaneously was zapped out of existence, this would nevertheless remain true.
Jeff: I used the word "blue" to refer to a particular sentient state before I ever knew there was such a thing as light or light frequencies. So your argument doesn't wash for my particular use of the word "blue." We can also use the word "blue" to label a frequency, but that is not really particularly helpful, because there are many DIFFERENT frequencies that we would say correspond to shades of blue. Thus, there is no one-to-one correlation of a the word "blue" to a specific frequency. We might could talk about ranges of frequencies that we call "blue" frequencies. But none of this implies that a thought is not an accidental attribute like "blueness." Thus, if attributes are correlative with beings, as I think they are, it's still true that if there are no beings, there are not thoughts/propositions. Therefore, by my view, there can be no LNC without beings. And your analogy doesn't contradict my view.
Zach: The light was here before us and it doesn't depend on our thinking for its existence.
Jeff: I agree, but that doesn't imply that the LNC "exists" independently of beings. Indeed, the word "exist" means to BE. Moreover, there is a reason why the most popular version of QT is called non-realistic. I'm not sure you can square your statement with that version of QT.
Zach: The proposition concerning the light would remain true even if there were no people left to think it.
Jeff: The proper way to say that is that light waves don't depend on human consciousness. But to talk about a proposition "existing" independent of thinkers is to reify a proposition. Moreover, you have not made the case that God's existence is contingent. Thus, until you do that, you haven't eliminated all thinkers anyway.
Zach: If anything, reality precedes thought; but thought does not precedes reality.
Jeff: What reality preceded God's thought? If even His own existence is necessary for thought, it is still the case that God could be temporal in the sense that He has always existed. And thus, as far back as I can look into the infinite past, I will always "see" being and thought correlated even by this very claim of yours. Your claim would only imply that the correlation involves the temporal relation of before and after. It wouldn't eliminate the correlativity of being and thought and, hence, of being and propositions and, hence, of being and the LNC.
Zach: Granted, in a person-less world the proposition "The sky is blue" would never be entertained; however that proposition would nevertheless remain true.
Jeff: God is a person. We might say He is extra-worldly. But it is still conceivable that God's existence is necessary and the sky's existence is contingent upon His existence. You have to show that is not the case to make your case. If you can't, we still have the possible correlativity of thought/propositions/LNC to being.
Zach: Fine. But there's a hard foundationalism and a soft. You yourself talk about "intuitive criteria by which we can distinguish." Who is this "we"? Are you making the hopelessly ambitious claim that all "we" humans share this intuition? Or are you making a more modest and credible claim about a more precise "we"? If you mean the latter, then I'm right there with you and your soft foundationalism.
Jeff: What I'm saying is that it is either hopelessly ambitious to believe we apprehend, or isn't. If it's not, then it's not hopelessly ambitious to believe that all properly-functioning minds have the same categories WHETHER or NOT we can grasp what they are flawlessly. We have to make a guess. Otherwise, we are left with radical skepticism. One doesn't have to be omniscient to be confident of one's beliefs.
Zach: Yeah, but what do you do when you run into someone with a different sort of foundationalism?
Jeff: Just what I said about Dawkins in the previous post where I used him as an example.
Zach: You can't say your is better, because there are no agreed upon standards of better and worse.
Jeff: I know people who do share my standards. And if there were no people that shared any of my standards, can you explain to me why I should ever say they were wrong or sinning? What would be the point? For if all people had diverse criteria for beliefs and/or action, why would I trust anything I believe? For if analogy doesn't hold there, why would I assume it held at all? Why would you, then, make the hopelessly ambitious claim that you have a clue whether Jesus existed or, if he did, what he thought was true?
Zach: To call such an alternate viewpoint 'arbitrary' would be to label your own viewpoint arbitrary since at this level both are equally (un-)grounded.
Jeff: But then why are you arguing with us at all? The very fact that you're arguing with us means you think at least there are grounds for your argument against me that I will recognize and regard. But what would explain that belief other than your own belief that I am analogous to you in intellectual nature as I am in other respects? But then that means you and I DO share a criteria for warranted belief after all. You can't have your cake and eat it too. Either you are right and all belief is arbitrary/a-rational, OR you can prove to me that I am arbitrary, which is what you're attempting here. They can't both be possible if AT LEAST the LNC holds for claims.
Zach: My point is that foundationalism (even as you describe it) rests on no foundation except "sentience"/intuition/feeling.
Jeff: Foundationalism is the belief that there are beliefs which cannot be derived aposteriori in a discursive way. Rather, those beliefs condition the very possibility of aposteriori, discursive reasoning.
Zach: Foundationalism itself is intellectually un-founded.
Jeff: Yes, by definition.
Zach: To acknowledge this even concerning one's own beliefs is to hold to a more modest, soft foundationalism - an intellectual nihilism filled with (not rational nor irrational, but) a-rational faith.
Jeff: I have no idea what you mean by modest and soft unless you mean relativistic. But if your foundationalism only applies to you, then analogy is a false mode of inference. And thus you have no reason to believe I exist. The method is impossible, Zach. Ethical relativism is problematic enough in the sense that no one can speak and live consistently with it. But epistemological relativism is, indeed, a-rational. Which means all your claims are a-plausible pontifications. Thus, neither you nor anyone else (assuming anyone else even exists) need take ANY OF THEM seriously. So if that's your final stand, I'm with Tom; I see no point in going one bit further.
Zach: ...and then along comes Job 38 and quantum mechanics. Sure organized causality is intuitive for many people. That doesn't make it the whole truth.
Jeff: I'll have to read Job 38. But I'm doubting it's going to say that epistemological relativism is true. As for quantum mechanics, the Nobel Prize laureate physicist, Richard Feynman, said "I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possible avoid it, 'But how can it be like that?' because you will go 'down the drain' into a blind alley from which no one has yet escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that." IOW, we can't even understand QT to know what it would or would not imply by the LNC. Which is another way of saying, it is not coherent in the first place. It violates the LNC when fully articulated. Thus, you have to give up even that LNC to even go there. It's pointless.
Zach: The New Testament knows of no such distinction. I've repeatedly said that I'm using faith/belief/pistis in the biblical sense.
Jeff: I know of no greek scholar who agrees with you. So I can't take you too seriously here.
Zach: Belief has to do with a response to something external, and when it comes to the gospel its a matter of volition not nature.
Jeff: I realize that's your belief. But it's an a-rational belief by your own admission. So it's of no avail in a rational argument.
Zach: James doesn't say 'weak.' He says 'dead.' A dead faith. Dogs run and bark. Except when they're dead. When they're dead, they're not quite dogs anymore - they used to be dogs. That's faith without works - it's as much faith as a corpse is a person. Maybe it's just gotten lost in the shuffle, but I've been discussing faith in terms of the New Testament.
Jeff: None of this means that when they live contrary to their beliefs that they CEASE to believe while acting unfaithful TO the belief. Sometimes they do, but not always.
Zach: New Testament faith includes BOTH intellectual assent AND living it out.
Jeff: That's because, like greek scholars say, the greek word for faith can mean belief or fidelity/faithfulness. All languages consist of words with different meanings determined by context.
Zach: I don't deny that some people suppress truth to avoid guilt. That's a common occurrence. But I think discussion of this occurrence needs to be properly understood as one sort on non-belief and not the paradigm for understanding all of it.
Jeff: Fair enough. But you haven't made a plausible case for your view. Indeed, your beliefs are a-rational by your own admission and, hence, a-plausible by definition.
Zach: Belief is not natural and only lost through the denial of nature. You said it yourself: "How can they believe what hasn't entered their mind?"
Jeff: The quote of mine doesn't even address how beliefs are lost.
Zach: But hardening the heart does not imply that the heart naturally believes.
Jeff: It doesn't imply the mind DOESN'T naturally believe, either. You've made no case. You've only made a-plausible assertions and non-argued denials after admitting that my explanation does in fact make sense for some cases. I can't argue with that. I need to know WHY you think your view is correct in terms of some shared experience we have of the world to know what specifically to argue against. Otherwise, your claims are just bald pontifications. As far as I'm concerned, that's enough to render them irrelevant to rational discussion. You've already admitted that the gospel "rang true" to you. I have no idea what it means for something to "ring true" volitionally any more than I know what it means to volitionally believe I'm looking at a computer screen. I would have to choose to NOT believe I'm looking at a computer screen. And since I have no natural motivation to believe I'm not loooking at a monitor screen, I can't choose that disbelief at all.
It's like I've said a hundred times by now. If your beliefs are arbitrary or relativistically-originated, they're irrelevant to the rest of us. If they are private revelation, they're irrelevant to the rest of us. I need something about what you believe that is grounded in analogical, shared experience. Otherwise, there's nothing to argue against, just as there is nothing for me to argue against Richard Dawkins once he insists, after my attempts at arguments to the contrary, that he is having non-stop illusions.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 10/18/2009 7:41:33 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 10/17/2009 5:05 PM (GMT -6) | | | In the beginning was the Logic, and the Logic was with God, and the Logic was God. | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/20/2009 5:37 PM (GMT -6) | | Zach: The proposition concerning the light would remain true even if there were no people left to think it.
Jeff: The proper way to say that is that light waves don't depend on human consciousness. But to talk about a proposition "existing" independent of thinkers is to reify a proposition.
Z: Read carefully Jeff. I'm not saying propositions "exist." I'm saying the exact opposite. I said the proposition remains true, not existent.
Propositions don't exist in the same way that people or objects exist. Stuff exists, abstractions don't. And since what is usually meant by 'being' or 'existence' doesn't apply to propositions, it's best to be clear and stop using these words in such a strange way. Propositions don't exist, therefore their existence doesn't rest on anything - they have no existence in the first place!
Nor are propositions attributes as you've said. They are claims that may or may not be accurate. Thoughts depend on thinkers for their occurrence (or 'existence' if we are twisting words). But the propositions contained within those thoughts don't occur or exist in the first place. Considered the proposition: "An asteroid that will kill off all the dinosaurs is slamming into the earth." This proposition was true at the time without anyone around to think it. "But," one might say, "God was around to think it." Fine. But it's not God's thinking it that assigned it its truth value. Its truth value is determined not by anyone's thoughts but by its accurate description of reality.
So, no thinker makes a proposition exist (because propositions don't exist in the first place (you might say thoughts exist but propositions don't)). And, no thinker assigns a proposition its truth value.
Jeff: What reality preceded God's thought?
Z: Which one?
Jeff: God is a person. We might say He is extra-worldly. But it is still conceivable that God's existence is necessary and the sky's existence is contingent upon His existence. You have to show that is not the case to make your case.
Z: Then you don't understand my case. Before I ever got here, Christians have been borrowing and tweaking Aristotle's proof that the necessary (not to mention, pagan) God exists. My case is that none of these proofs hold water. As for positive claims, I claim that a world consisting of no persons is conceivable. Note what I'm NOT claiming. I'm not claiming that within this no-person-world any thoughts are conceived. I am merely claiming that a no-person-world is/was a possible world - it's conceivable and internally consistent. If we accept that claim, then it follows that a personal God cannot be necessary, because his existence "could have been otherwise."
Now look at what you said. "It is still conceivable that God's existence is necessary and the sky's existence is contingent upon His existence." I disagree. For it to be "conceivable that God's existence is necessary" it would have to be inconceivable for there to be a no-person-world. But, in fact, an empty world is about the easiest thing to conceive of. I put it to you like I put it to Tom: Give me a proposition. Any proposition. I'll then tell you it's truth value in this empty world, thus showing that the LNC holds in the empty world for any proposition you can come up with. The empty world is possible/logically consistent. Therefore God existence is not necessary.
Jeff: What I'm saying is that it is either hopelessly ambitious to believe we apprehend, or isn't. If it's not, then it's not hopelessly ambitious to believe that all properly-functioning minds have the same categories WHETHER or NOT we can grasp what they are flawlessly. We have to make a guess. Otherwise, we are left with radical skepticism. One doesn't have to be omniscient to be confident of one's beliefs.
Z: So "we" = "properly functioning minds"? What do you mean by 'properly'? Who gets to decide whose mind functions properly? If you define everyone who uses different categories (whatever that means) as sub-human or malfunctioning, then you can get away with quite a bit. Those millions of Buddhists who think that this world is an illusion are malfunctioning minds that need not be taken into account. Anyone who you label a "radical skeptic" can be safely ignored as a malfunctioning mind. That seems sketchy. It's the weirdos, the malfunctioning, that we ought to challenge ourselves with.
J: And if there were no people that shared any of my standards...
Z: Wait!! Who said anything about there being NO people who shared standards? Not me!! Diversity does not imply total isolation!!
J: The very fact that you're arguing with us means you think at least there are grounds for your argument against me that I will recognize and regard.
Z: Yep. A point I've made over and over again. You'll notice I'm not the one saying that we can't even have a conversation. We do share common ground. I'm not the one denying that! I'm not the one condescendingly saying that the other is too alien to even talk to.
J: But what would explain that belief other than your own belief that I am analogous to you in intellectual nature as I am in other respects?
Z: It's very simple. You think belief is natural. I think belief is chosen (what you call 'natural,' I'd call 'socialized'). Whichever is actually the case, we both hold quite a few of these beliefs in common. So, we can communicate. No surprise.
J: But then that means you and I DO share a criteria for warranted belief after all.
Z: Yes, we do.
J: You can't have your cake and eat it too.
Z: I don't want to.
J: Either you are right and all belief is arbitrary/a-rational, OR you can prove to me that I am arbitrary, which is what you're attempting here.
Z: How is it an either/or? All belief is a-rational. Yours included. Mine included. That's what 'all' means.
J: I have no idea what you mean by modest and soft unless you mean relativistic. But if your foundationalism only applies to you,
Z: 'Relativistic' does not mean it only applies to me. You are again mistaking diversity for isolation.
J: But epistemological relativism is, indeed, a-rational. Which means all your claims are a-plausible pontifications.
Z: These sort of descriptions are not what I'm advocating. There is an inner and an outer. On the outside: Which overall way of thinking will I embrace? I'll choose to deny radical skepticism! Radical skepticism remains possibly true - it works intellectually, but I'm choosing against it! On the inside/as a result of such a relativistic choice: Now that my rational standards are set (albeit in an a-rational manner) I can distinguish between what is believable and what is not. Also, I can communicate meaningfully with those who happen to share my standards.
We both have seen the Matrix I presume. We both could have chosen to believe that's the way it really is! But we BOTH rejected radical skepticism. We BOTH found our way through that 'relativistic' choice. To accept the Matrix as true would be a consistent worldview. There's no proof it's not true. You wouldn't be sub-human or malfunctioning to accept it. However, we BOTH rejected it. And now we can BOTH communicate based on this common (relativistically chosen) ground.
Jeff: I'll have to read Job 38. But I'm doubting it's going to say that epistemological relativism is true.
Z: It will say stop pretending you know so much! Stop pretending that you, Job, can understand why things happen! The world is wild! You expect God to make things right because he's got the whole world in his hands and everything is perfectly organized. Well the world God made is wild. It's unpredictable. God made it that way. Sure, God brought order from the chaos, but it wasn't John Calvin's order. It wasn't even Greg Boyd's order. The world is still plenty wild.
Jeff: I know of no greek scholar who agrees with you. So I can't take you too seriously here.
Z: Who have you asked? Go to all of them and ask them again, "In the New Testament, does pistis mean intellectual assent independent of works." Because I have asked a few. They are the ones that first introduced me to this interpretation. Everyone one of my seminary professors would tell you that pistis separated from works runs contrary to the scriptures.
Jeff: I realize that's your belief. But it's an a-rational belief by your own admission. So it's of no avail in a rational argument.
Z: By my own admission? No. Beliefs pertaining to overall worldviews are a-rational - they are choices between equally plausible alternatives. But when discussing the translation of a particular phrase in the bible, I'm not just picking one out of a hat. There are standards that I share will almost everyone who can read both Greek and English. I'm the one sticking to those standards. If you are questioning them, then who's the radical skeptic? But honestly, you don't need any training in Greek to see it. Faith without works is dead. You belief in God; so do the demons. The sort of belief that the New Testament advocates is more than intellectual assent.
Jeff: None of this means that when they live contrary to their beliefs that they CEASE to believe while acting unfaithful TO the belief. Sometimes they do, but not always.
Z: Yes it does! When people screw up, what does Jesus say?!? He says where is your faith? Oh, unbelieving people! Their actions are a matter of faith! If they had faith, they could do it, and when they screw up, it's a lack of faith! Jesus falls into this pattern so often, it's a wonder Christians can even conceive of this faith/works dichotomy.
J: That's because, like greek scholars say, the greek word for faith can mean belief or fidelity/faithfulness. All languages consist of words with different meanings determined by context.
Z: No. Pistis can be translated 'faithfulness.' But whenever your NIV says 'faithfulness' you can know that this word connotes something different than the English. Just because 'faithfulness' is the best English word they could come up with doesn't mean the author intend all that 'faithfulness' connotes for Americans living in 2009. I'm all for examining the context. Where do you see the context making pistis mean 'faithfulness independent of works'?
Zach: Belief is not natural and only lost through the denial of nature. You said it yourself: "How can they believe what hasn't entered their mind?"
Jeff: The quote of mine doesn't even address how beliefs are lost.
Z: But it does address the beginning of belief. The belief must begin as a thought entering the mind. For a person to remain in their NATURAL state of having to beliefs pertaining to the gospel having entered his mind, we would say that this person cannot be considered a believer. As you say, "How can they believe what hasn't entered their mind?" Such a person, in such a NATURAL state, prior to the thought having entered his mind, cannot be said to be a believer. Thus the natural state is one independent of belief. The fetus does not believe, nor does the infant, but what the New Testament calls belief comes about (or doesn't) in and through the volitional choice. Jesus made children the models of belief. And when cared for they are. But a child who has been messed with as many are... And which is "natural"? Which child is more 'natural'? The one abandoned to nature or the one constantly surrounded by the influences of socialized adults. I claim that whatever we are, whatever beliefs we feel as though we started with, these beliefs are not natural. We have all be subjected to influences, and no one is properly 'natural'.
Jeff: It doesn't imply the mind DOESN'T naturally believe, either. You've made no case.
Z: Yes I have. Many times. I've made the case that mystical nature is not the cause, but instead the workings of human will is. That's the case I've made for months. You say nature. I say other people's choices and our own choices. That's my case.
J: I need to know WHY you think your view is correct in terms of some shared experience we have of the world to know what specifically to argue against.
Z: Fine. Baby 1 is loved and provided for. He grows up to be well-adjusted and wonderful. Baby 2 is addicted to crack in the womb and traded around from foster home to foster home. Baby 2 gets into lots of trouble and deals with dark inner turmoil. Why the difference? Is it their different natures? Is Baby 2 naturally born with a malfunctioning mind? Sure, you could say that, but more to the point, it's the environments that are different. Nature is not really the issue. Choices are at work.
Now add it Baby 3. Born in the Himalayas, loved and cared for by those who believe that reality is an illusion. Surprise, he grows to believe the same things! Is it because Asians have a different nature? Or is it because the people around them made different choices. | | Back to Top | | |
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Daniel M
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2009
Total Posts : 263
| Posted 10/20/2009 6:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Sahid,
I got one question. If God is not a necessary being, what is he contingent upon? Can a contingent being be everlasting and the source of everything?
I believe I understand your approach, but how does God fit into it? | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/21/2009 11:02 AM (GMT -6) | | Daniel: I got one question. If God is not a necessary being, what is he contingent upon? Can a contingent being be everlasting and the source of everything?
Jeff: Zach is saying we can't know that God can't pop out of existence. That means He wouldn't be everlasting. He's also saying we can't know that God didn't pop into existence. That, too, means God wouldn't be everlasting. Thus, per Zach, He could still be the source of everything else, and we could still all pop out of existence next week, for all we know. Zach's view is that we choose not to believe that.
Personally, it would have never entered my mind that a-causal events (like popping into existence from absolute nothingness) are possible until I read that people believed that. And having read those people, I still have no idea how you would know an event is uncaused without denying the tentativeness of science. And I have no idea what kind of enterprise science even is if it's not tentative. Thus, I see that whole approach as incoherent.
Zach: So "we" = "properly functioning minds"? What do you mean by 'properly'? Who gets to decide whose mind functions properly? If you define everyone who uses different categories (whatever that means) as sub-human or malfunctioning, then you can get away with quite a bit.
Jeff: I don't think there is any such thing as different categories. I think people make category MISTAKES. IOW, they think certain categorical beliefs are aposteriori ones, etc. You are denying there are categories, because you think what most people call apriori beliefs are chosen. I know no way to account for that. It involves an infinite regress to my understanding of a choice. And that's not possible per my understanding of human capacities. I know for sure I can't do it. Nor am I conscious of choosing beliefs all the time or having chosen my intuitions. What I choose to do is to strategically allocate my consciousness to different mental objects or subject matters. But I think in terms of my categories and analogy when I think about different subject matters. At no point am I renewing my intuitive beliefs in the relations of causality, teleology, space, time, substance-attribute correlativity, etc, VOLITIONALLY. I'm just volitionally allocating my conscious attention to different "subject matter."
Moreover, it is pointless to say "Who gets to decide whose mind function properly?" For you turn right around and say "Baby 1 is loved and provided for. He grows up to be well-adjusted and wonderful." By your view, you don't get to decide what "WELL"-adjusted is. So you're being inconsistent. And therefore, that whole bit about Baby 1 and Baby 2 is meaningless given your own inability to define "WELL"-adjusted without being just as arbitrary as you claim I am in trying to define "proper." Non-relativistic normative criteria is either knowable for humans, or it is not.
Zach: Those millions of Buddhists who think that this world is an illusion are malfunctioning minds that need not be taken into account. Anyone who you label a "radical skeptic" can be safely ignored as a malfunctioning mind. That seems sketchy. It's the weirdos, the malfunctioning, that we ought to challenge ourselves with.
Jeff: No, I gave the example of how I would argue with Dawkins. But once Buddhists, or even you, insist upon a different foundationalism than I do, what's the point in continuing to argue? What possible good could come of that? Even if it helps you, it seems clear to me that continuing to argue once there is an acknowledged disagreement on fundamentals ONLY irritates most people. And irritation doesn't lead to benevolent behavior most of the time, best I can tell.
Zach: Who have you asked? Go to all of them and ask them again, "In the New Testament, does pistis mean intellectual assent independent of works." Because I have asked a few. They are the ones that first introduced me to this interpretation. Everyone one of my seminary professors would tell you that pistis separated from works runs contrary to the scriptures.
Jeff: There is a correlation of fidelity to faith. No doubt about it. But it is not absolute. The demons believe and tremble, and yet do no volitional works to alleviate the trembling. Seemingly, humans, unlike demons, have a tendency to cease to intellectually believe a proposition that entails a duty when they consistently refuse to act consistently with it. This is called the hardening of the heart. Apparently, demons are not that way. So the correlation is not absolute--not even amongst humans. But virtually all people realize there is a correlation. Thus, there is no difference in modern American language and the greek language in that regard.
By implication, James is saying that mere intellectual belief or lip service to a belief is as dead as the belief of demons if we don't act consistently with our beliefs any better than they do. But that doesn't imply, necessarily, that every single act of disobedience to a belief implies the non-existence of intellectual belief at the time of the disobedient act. Language is often less than absolute because of context, and the bit about demons makes the contextual case. What it implies is that some beliefs, to be lived out, require considerable amounts of self-discipline to strategically allocate our conscious attention to those facts that will motivate us to overcome those kinds of temptations. And therefore, we are exhorted to take our faith seriously enough to focus accordingly.
But is there a diminishing of faith during such acts of disobedience? No doubt about it. In that sense, there is. But that doesn't imply absolute DISbelief in the sense of being persuaded of the FALSENESS of the belief. One can disobey God knowing full well that the act of disobedience is wrong. What humans don't seem to be able to do, unlike demons, is to consciously disobey continually without hardening their own heart and, therefore, eradicating their heart belief ALTOGETHER. But the distinction between demons and humans, alone, proves that there is no absolute correlation of intellectual unbelief to lack of volitional works, even when we're talking about "ought" beliefs rather than "is" beliefs.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 10/21/2009 1:20:48 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/25/2009 5:44 AM (GMT -6) | | Daniel: I got one question. If God is not a necessary being, what is he contingent upon? Can a contingent being be everlasting and the source of everything?
Jeff: Zach is saying we can't know that God can't pop out of existence. That means He wouldn't be everlasting. He's also saying we can't know that God didn't pop into existence. That, too, means God wouldn't be everlasting.
Z: That's not quite it. Some claim that God exists necessarily, i.e. God could not not exist in any possible world. I say that any such claim cannot be supported. And my counter-example is a hypothetical void world. Jeff seems to think that a void world is not a possible world or that it is a possible world but one that breaks the rules of logic somehow and so is to be ignored. But to answer your question: nothing. I don't think God's existence is contingent UPON anything. God simply is. Despite what Jeff thinks, that does not mean that God is not everlasting. There is nothing contradictory about God existing contingently in all past times and for all future times. I think God can sin and cease to exist. But similarly this doesn't mean that God does sin or cease to exist, nor does it make God somehow less than perfect if we understand him to exercise self-restraint rather than understanding him to be controlled by necessity.
So, 'nothing' to the first question, and 'yes' to the second. I believe God has always existed and always will exist. I don't technically 'know' it - it could possibly be otherwise (and Jeff will call me a relativist for saying so) - but I believe it. Basically, necessity and contingency are in exclusive disjunction, but the words' connotations muddy things. Necessity and contingency often connote eternality and impermanence, but technically they don't denote such things. Necessity implies eternality. And necessity stands in exclusive disjunction with contingency. Nevertheless, contingency does NOT imply non-eternality.
Where we do run into problems is when we suppose that God's existence is necessary. This is to say that his non-existence is a logical impossibility, and that ends up making God a simple principal of logic. You get the Greek perfectly simple, unchanging, unmoving, unitary, non-personal God. Anything personal about God is unnecessary and therefore contingent. Look at how the classic provers of God approach things: they are on a fool's errand, but they know enough not to attempt proving any particulars. They'll try to prove GOD, but they don't bother proving the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. What they attempt to prove is essentially a force of nature: an unmoved mover, an uncaused cause. Not only do the 'proofs' fail to achieve their goal, but their goal is at odds with Christian faith. We believe in a God who elects people, who makes plans, who is Incarnate, who exists as three persons. These things are not addressed by the ontological argument. These things are contingent. So even if you were to prove the necessary existence of God, you'd be left with the troubling question of what to do with the Trinity. The Trinity is not simple, unchanging, unmoving, unitary, or non-personal. The Trinity is not the God proven to be necessary.
Also you run into problems of freedom. To say God exists necessarily is to say God is unable to stop existing. He exists as a slave to his nature. Most take this further and say that God is necessarily benevolent. There are at least two problems with this. First, to say benevolence is necessary is to say its opposite is logically impossible. But anyone who is so inclined can imagine a logically consistent world in which God is not benevolent, thus the claim of necessity is hasty. Second, the good will of a necessarily benevolent being is not bene-VOLENT at all. Volition/will is taken out of the picture. Goodness doesn't get a chance to be chosen by a necessarily benevolent being. The goodness is necessary - like a circle is necessarily round. Maybe a necessarily benevolent being can exercise will but not when having anything to do with good or evil - that is determined ahead of time. To be precise, it is self-contradictory to speak of necessary benevolence or necessary good will; 'necessity' and 'will' oppose one another and cannot apply to the same thing. God's goodness cannot be the consequence of both determinism and free will.
Since, 'necessity' boils down to 'provable' and since God isn't, strictly speaking, provable, I have to say that God's existence is not-necessary. And not-necessary = contingent. In my experience there are surprisingly few consequences to this, except the avoidance of all the nonsense that goes along with necessity. In fact I take it a step further and criticize the concept of necessity itself. Any claim of necessity is just the reciting of a definition. To say "circles are necessarily round" is equivalent to saying "a circle is defined as belonging to the set of things which are round." Show me a necessary truth or an a priori truth claim, and I'll show you a definition. Any attempt to make any headway by means of necessity or a priori truth is semantic smoke and mirrors.
Jeff: I don't think there is any such thing as different categories. I think people make category MISTAKES.
Z: Say it however you like. You are still acting as if your mind is the normal one, and anyone who is different is not just different but mistaken. Who's to say your categories aren't the mistaken ones?
Jeff: By your view, you don't get to decide what "WELL"-adjusted is. So you're being inconsistent.
Z: You compare apples and oranges. I've addressed this over and over, but you don't respond to me when I do. So this is probably the last time. You can continue to bring up this critique, but if you won't hear my response then I'll quit trying.
A big point I'm trying to make is that I DO get to make value judgments like what I'll consider to be 'well-adjusted.' The problem is you've already labeled me a relativist and you've applied all your relativist-preconceptions to me, so your not open to hearing what I'm actually saying. So, here it is again: I claim that I/We DO get to make value judgments!! Furthermore, this is nothing new. I've been saying it for some time now.
Here it is from my last post:
I said...
These sort of descriptions are not what I'm advocating. There is an inner and an outer. On the outside: Which overall way of thinking will I embrace? I'll choose to deny radical skepticism! Radical skepticism remains possibly true - it works intellectually, but I'm choosing against it! On the inside/as a result of such a relativistic choice: Now that my rational standards are set (albeit in an a-rational manner) I can distinguish between what is believable and what is not. Also, I can communicate meaningfully with those who happen to share my standards.
We both have seen the Matrix I presume. We both could have chosen to believe that's the way it really is! But we BOTH rejected radical skepticism. We BOTH found our way through that 'relativistic' choice. To accept the Matrix as true would be a consistent worldview. There's no proof it's not true. You wouldn't be sub-human or malfunctioning to accept it. However, we BOTH rejected it. And now we can BOTH communicate based on this common (relativistically chosen) ground.
I'm only inconsistent insofar as I am caricatured.
J: Non-relativistic normative criteria is either knowable for humans, or it is not.
Z: It's 'knowability' is not the issue! In order for us to 'know' it, it must be established non-relativistically. But it aint. Value judgments (which is what we're talking about here) are decided by the person making them. To declare something good or bad is to declare my personal, subjective, and relative feelings toward it. I'm not a Platonist. I don't think the Idea of Good is a thing sitting on a pedestal in heaven somewhere. But what else do you mean when you talk about 'knowing' it? The only way we can meaningfully talk about 'knowing' what is good (apart from Platonism) is to say we know someone else's feelings on how things are to be evaluated. For Christians that someone is God. But it's still not 'non-relativistic.' We don't worship the Idea of Goodness. We worship three people - People not Ideas. Our standards of good and bad are aligned with Subjective People not Objective Ideas. The desire to resort to a necessary God and objective values is contrary to worship of a personal and relational Trinity.
Jeff: No, I gave the example of how I would argue with Dawkins. But once Buddhists, or even you, insist upon a different foundationalism than I do, what's the point in continuing to argue? What possible good could come of that? Even if it helps you, it seems clear to me that continuing to argue once there is an acknowledged disagreement on fundamentals ONLY irritates most people. And irritation doesn't lead to benevolent behavior most of the time, best I can tell.
Z: Sure, I can see that SOMETIMES being the case. But lets be clear: I'm not "insist[ing] upon a different foundationalism than [you] do." You (and especially Tom) keep accusing me of that, but it's simply not the case. The foundations upon which we base our beliefs are, for the most part, the same! I'm accepting your foundations. Calling me a relativist doesn't change that. I want to say that over and over, because I don't think it's been heard. Where we differ is in examining those foundations (which we both accept). Let's simply it and say you accept foundation A and someone else accepts radically different foundation B. I'm with you! I accept A also. The difference between you and me is that you say that this other person has a malfunctioning mind which is fundamentally mistaken. I, on the other hand, simply call the other person different. From your (and my) perspective the other person likely has bad values. However, I am willing to admit that within his foundation B his values are 'correct,' while you seem reluctant or unwilling to admit as much.
How about this: Last week I was visiting friends and they wanted to play croquet. I hit my friends ball. I put mine next to his, stepped on mine, and knocked his ball away. He tells me I cheated. According to him, stepping on the ball is against the rules. Turns out, he's got his own house rules - that's just how he plays. We define right and wrong differently. Whose rules are objectively better? No one's! 'Better' makes no sense in the context of 'objectivity.' 'Better' is a value judgment made my 'subjective' people. Maybe we could research it and find out whose way on playing is closer to the original rules or which way is most popular. But originality and popularity are not measures of objectivity. We can objectively keep to a set of rules i.e. we can say that one player is "better AT" sticking to the rules, but choosing the rules in the first place is a subjective process. We can't decide whose rules are objectively better, because 'objective better-ness' is nonsense. We ended up working out a way of playing together.
You and I, Jeff - we play by the SAME croquet rules. I'm not insisting on a different rulebook than you do. But, you say my friend is mistaken and has a malfunctioning mind. I say he's simply different. You refuse to play with him and wont even talk to him about the game. I think that's a bit of an over-reaction.
Jeff: By implication, James is saying that mere intellectual belief or lip service to a belief is as dead as the belief of demons if we don't act consistently with our beliefs any better than they do. But that doesn't imply, necessarily, that every single act of disobedience to a belief implies the non-existence of intellectual belief at the time of the disobedient act.
Z: Yes it does! "Faith without works is dead." How much more bluntly can he put it? Every failure to work out ones supposed faith is evidence that this supposed faith is dead! James doesn't say, "Faith without works is sometimes dead," or "faith without works might be dead," or "faith without works is asleep or forgotten." His whole point runs contrary to yours. Faith without works is not really faith - it's dead - it's counterfeit. The theme runs through the whole letter: Not hearing or doing, but both together. Not faith or works, but both together. He firmly opposes double-speak. Anyone who claims work-less faith doesn't actually posses true faith. Now I understand the distinction. I was raised on the distinction. But the distinction is non-biblical. That's not to say the New Testament authors didn't talk about intellectual faith independent of works. But look at how they describe it, and you'll see that they all oppose it. The sort of faith that can live without works is not Christian faith. Yes, James mentions demons believing. But it's an example of how pure intellectual belief is 'useless.' James is not giving the demons as an example of how to believe. They are an example of false belief, counterfeit belief, dead belief!
Jeff: But that doesn't imply absolute DISbelief in the sense of being persuaded of the FALSENESS of the belief. One can disobey God knowing full well that the act of disobedience is wrong.
Z: And there it is again. "Knowing full well that the act of disobedience is wrong." It's not a question of knowing. It's not a question of truth or falseness of belief. In the context of values there is no truth or falseness except in accurately describing another's values. The only sort of faith endorsed by the New Testament is the faith that unites intellectual assent and action. So, if we use properly Christian conceptions of faith, then a person always acts out of his beliefs. It's definitionally true. If someone sins, it can be accurately said (if we are using the conceptual framework of the Apostles) that that person believes that sinning is good/right/appropriate.
If you really believe in the bungee cord, then you'll have no problem jumping. If you hesitate, you lack faith - you don't really believe. When the day is done, you can tell who believed in their bungee cord my recalling who actually jumped. Frank over there says he has perfect, unshakable faith in bungee cords, but Frank didn't jump. We all have a good laugh at Frank's joke. Because faith without works is a joke.Post Edited (Sahid) : 10/25/2009 5:54:10 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Daniel M
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2009
Total Posts : 263
| Posted 10/26/2009 11:47 AM (GMT -6) | | Hey Sahid,
Daniel: If God is not a necessary being, what is he contingent upon?
Jeff: Zach is saying we can't know that God can't pop out of existence. That means He wouldn't be everlasting. He's also saying we can't know that God didn't pop into existence. That, too, means God wouldn't be everlasting.
Z: That's not quite it. Some claim that God exists necessarily, i.e. God could not not exist in any possible world. I say that any such claim cannot be supported.
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There are two things someone might mean when they claim "God exists necessarily." (1)First, God could not not exist in any possible world. (2)Second, if God exists, God could not cease to exist. His existence is contingent upon nothing. He has existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity. Therefore he could not poof out of existence.
(2) does not require (1) to be true. Do you reject both (1) and (2)?
You said, "There is nothing contradictory about God existing contingently in all past times and for all future times." But you also said, "So, 'nothing' to the first question."
That's contradictory. If God exists contingently, his existence is contingent upon something. I don't think we can say that God exists contingently upon himself, and that he could make himself nonexistent. Because then he would of had to make himself exist in the first place. But how can something that doesn't exist will itself to exist? The only option I see is that His existence is contingent upon something outside of himself, which would make God subordinate to whatever that something is.
I actually like a lot of what you're saying, but I don't think it requires a rejection of (2). | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/27/2009 5:29 PM (GMT -6) | | I hear you. First let's get (1) out of the way. God could not exist in a possible world. I proposed the simplest of possible worlds: A completely void world, a world with no persons. Those examples are enough to rule out God's necessary existence in terms of (1). They are possible, and they do not have God.
Now (2). Here's how I see it. First, God's self-annihilation. Why wouldn't he be able to do this? Maybe the consequences would be catastrophic, but that's no reason to conclude that it is beyond God's abilities. But your critique lay elsewhere.
Daniel: I don't think we can say that God exists contingently upon himself, and that he could make himself nonexistent. Because then he would of had to make himself exist in the first place.
Zach: I'm not convinced one follows from the other. The ability of God to self-annihilate (to take kenosis all the way) does not entail his needing to make himself in the first place. Why should we say: That which has the ability to self-annihilate could not have existed for all eternity past?
This is where my disagreement with Jeff's ontology comes into play. He puts a lot of stock in cause and effect - even to the point of refusing to entertain certain ideas about QT. A very well organized world is imagined. I'm not so sure. There is some connection between (1) and (2). According to (1), God just happens to exist; it could have been otherwise. And if it could have been otherwise, then what tipped the scales in the direction of his existing? Nothing! There is nothing around to do the tipping (and if there was, then we are no longer talking about the before-everything-else God).
So, if you follow me on (1), then I only see two choices. First, you can stop believing in God. That solves the problem. The other choice is to take up a more open ontology - to ditch the tip-the-scales, deterministic model in the first place. This is where QT and free will give us a glimpse of the other possibilities. In a world that looks so Newtonian, so deterministic, so shot-through with cause and effect... some things just happen. When the statistics seem to point entirely in one direction, one particle jumps the wrong way, one man stands in front of a tank, one man rises from the dead. Some things just don't make casuistic sense. These exceptions to the supposed rule should make us re-examine the rule.
So, bringing it back home, maybe God can simply be and always have simply been - without logic demanding it - with logic forcing us to admit that it could have been otherwise.
Daniel: The only option I see is that His existence is contingent upon something outside of himself, which would make God subordinate to whatever that something is.
Zach: Yes, but only within a casuistic framework. If we stop thinking of cause and effect as a law and instead consider it a 'tendency' or 'common occurrence,' then we are not bound to this one alternative. In fact, I'd argue that if God did exist necessarily(1), then we ought to be worshiping the true power behind the power: the logic and the law of cause and effect itself to which God is subordinate.Post Edited (Sahid) : 10/28/2009 4:13:10 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 10/27/2009 5:52 PM (GMT -6) | | In the beginning was the Logic, and the Logic was with God, and the Logic was God.
Mistake to separate logic from God and place it prior to Him. He is Logic. | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/27/2009 6:11 PM (GMT -6) | | I don't know what your driving at Asher. I think I agree with you though (if we agree that logos does not directly translate to formal logic). It's a mistake to say that there is some Law that forces God to be the way he is.
The necessary God is specifically determined by the force of logic.
The contingent God is free to be and act as he wills. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/28/2009 6:53 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff1: By your view, you don't get to decide what "WELL"-adjusted is. So you're being inconsistent.
Zach1: You compare apples and oranges. I've addressed this over and over, but you don't respond to me when I do. So this is probably the last time. You can continue to bring up this critique, but if you won't hear my response then I'll quit trying.
A big point I'm trying to make is that I DO get to make value judgments like what I'll consider to be 'well-adjusted.' The problem is you've already labeled me a relativist and you've applied all your relativist-preconceptions to me, so your not open to hearing what I'm actually saying. So, here it is again: I claim that I/We DO get to make value judgments!! Furthermore, this is nothing new. I've been saying it for some time now.
Zach2: But, you say my friend is mistaken and has a malfunctioning mind. I say he's simply different. You refuse to play with him and wont even talk to him about the game. I think that's a bit of an over-reaction.
Jeff2: I'm still confused. On the one hand, you say you make value judgments about people in the sense that you say they were not "well" -adjusted, or what not. Then you turn around and say you just say people are different. I don't see how that's consistent. Different doesn't mean not "well" adjusted. Different doesn't mean "wrong." So I say you are the one over-reacting for moving beyond the belief that people are merely different to making criticisms of them. Because for you to do that, you have to choose that irrespective of any natural, God-given belief that grounds such criticisms. Why would you choose to be negatively critical of people as opposed to just stopping at saying they're just different, given the a-rationality of your approach? Is it a desire? What, exactly?
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 10/30/2009 10:24 PM (GMT -6) | | I cannot say that my way of playing croquet is better than my friend's way. But, after we decide what rules we will play by, I can say if we are following them well. Outside/inside.
Similarly...
I cannot say that my overall worldview is better than that of anyone else. But, having settled on Christianity, I can say if I or others are following that worldview well.
So, I do make value judgments. I have values. I just don't assume that universal human nature forces all the same values on all of us. Some people have different values. Those people are not bound to my standards. But for those people who do share values, value judgments make sense. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/31/2009 7:12 AM (GMT -6) | | Zach: I cannot say that my overall worldview is better than that of anyone else. But, having settled on Christianity, I can say if I or others are following that worldview well.
Jeff: Fair enough. But that's exactly what philosophers mean by relativism. So it's pointless to keep acting like I'm out of line to recognize that. Moreover, per relativism, it's pointless to expect me to be like you. I've been very clear that I haven't "settled on" the same Christianity that you have. Thus, for all you know, I'm following my chosen worldview WELL.
So what I would say is, you're consistent here. But when you talk about being "well-adjusted" (or whatever the normative term you used was), as you did in a previous post, I still don't see how that is consistent with your view of things. Per your view as stated here, you can't consistently say Hitler was well-adjusted or not. You would need to go further and say well-adjusted TO "X."
But what is "X?" And once you define "X" and then turn around and say that Hitler's "X" is no better or worse than your "Y," what possible difference could it make to anyone whether Hitler was well-adjusted to "X?" For in that case, analogy has no relevance as a ground for ethical thought for HUMANS. Ethics, then, ceases to be a human subject matter and, instead, becomes a purely individual subject matter. And in that case, the golden rule is worthless. Because, if analogy is no guide to what other people are like, then for me to treat a person based on how I want to be treated, as Jesus tells me to, may not be to their benefit. And if we're saying that loving our neighbors means doing that which is not beneficial to them simply because it would have been beneficial to me had it been done to me, then I don't even see how we could distinguish love from hate. Help me out on that.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 10/31/2009 7:32:26 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/1/2009 9:18 AM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: Fair enough. But that's exactly what philosophers mean by relativism. So it's pointless to keep acting like I'm out of line to recognize that.
Z: My problem is not that you call me a relativist. I'm fine with that label. My problem is that you've in the past taken my relativism further than I have. You act as though my relativism keeps me isolated from everyone else - as though there is no inside, just outside. Call me a relativist, but don't speak to me as though I'm a value-less, ambivalent-towards-Christianity relativist. My relativism does not mean I am without foundations. And the foundations I have can be shared...
J: I've been very clear that I haven't "settled on" the same Christianity that you have. Thus, for all you know, I'm following my chosen worldview WELL.
Z: We don't agree on every detail, but we are both Christians. We have a lot in common. You act as though my relativism makes all our common ground insignificant. And, by the way, I never said you weren't following your chosen worldview well. In fact I argued the exact opposite: everyone always act consistently with their beliefs.
J: So what I would say is, you're consistent here. But when you talk about being "well-adjusted" (or whatever the normative term you used was), as you did in a previous post, I still don't see how that is consistent with your view of things. Per your view as stated here, you can't consistently say Hitler was well-adjusted or not. You would need to go further and say well-adjusted TO "X."
Z: But my point still stands. We, while possibly disagreeing on some marginal cases, understand each other when we say 'well-adjusted.' We have that, and much more, in common. My relativism doesn't negate the bulk of foundational beliefs we hold in common.
J: But what is "X?" And once you define "X" and then turn around and say that Hitler's "X" is no better or worse than your "Y," what possible difference could it make to anyone whether Hitler was well-adjusted to "X?"
Z: Well since I was talking to you, "X" are the foundational beliefs we share in common. We disagree with Hitler roughly equally. Our reasons for that are essentially the same. You speak as though my beliefs are entirely alien to yours.
J: For in that case, analogy has no relevance as a ground for ethical thought for HUMANS. Ethics, then, ceases to be a human subject matter and, instead, becomes a purely individual subject matter.
Z: This is precisely where you are wrong. Beliefs can and are shared! How is that up for debate? The claim that beliefs are chosen from equally consistent/believable options does not imply that each person is alone in his or her beliefs. That's an irrational jump that makes no sense. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/1/2009 10:33 AM (GMT -6) | | | Z: But my point still stands. We, while possibly disagreeing on some marginal cases, understand each other when we say 'well-adjusted.' We have that, and much more, in common. My relativism doesn't negate the bulk of foundational beliefs we hold in common.
J: But it does mean that all your beliefs are relativistic, while mine are not. Because I have no consciousness of choosing to believe the LNC, causality, teleology, spatial and temporal relationality, etc.
Yes, we do share beliefs. But there's a big difference in sharing beliefs where parties agree that foundationalism is natural as opposed to volitional. To my mind, a volitional foundationalism isn't even what most philosophers mean by foundationalism.
When we share beliefs that I think are plausible in terms of a self-evident criteria whereas you merely choose, a highly relevant epistemological element is missing. Because by my view, relativism is false. By yours, it's true. I've never met anyone that can seem to consistently talk as if relativism is true. It requires way too many qualifications for anyone to articulate it. They will always resort to non-relativistic-sounding rhetoric. And since most people ARE non-relativists, they will misconstrue the language to mean something it doesn't.
It's kind of like a naturalist using the same language as a teleologist. There will be cases where the same language can't possibly mean the same thing to both parties. When there are fundamental differences in metaphysics/epistemology, this is inevitable since we have only one language with which to communicate. So since most people are teleologists and non-relativists, the phrase "he went to the store to get milk" will imply teleology to most people and the phrase "he ought not be so harsh on his children" will be taken in a non-relativistic way by most people. Qualifications are expected from those who use language in terms of a minority metaphysic/epistemology.
Z: In fact I argued the exact opposite: everyone always act consistently with their beliefs.
J: I just disagree. Jesus said "forgive them for they know not what they do." Peter later claimed, accordingly, that they IGNORANTLY killed their Messiah. They didn't BELIEVE in killing their Messiah. But they did it. People can be quite inconsistent, not in only in their thoughts, but in their actions. Indeed, they can be inconsistent in their actions BECAUSE they're inconsistent in their thoughts. Because in that case, you can act consistently with one belief while contradicting the other belief, which is what killing their Messiah amounted to.
We could say that they would have believed in killing the Messiah had they known Jesus was the Messiah. But then they would have had to reject their own scriptures. People can't do major intellectual overhauls overnight. It takes time. Inconsistency is inevitable in those kinds of cases.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/1/2009 11:14:03 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/2/2009 8:22 AM (GMT -6) | | J: But it does mean that all your beliefs are relativistic, while mine are not. Because I have no consciousness of choosing to believe the LNC, causality, teleology, spatial and temporal relationality, etc.
Z: Good, we agree on this.
J: Yes, we do share beliefs. But there's a big difference in sharing beliefs where parties agree that foundationalism is natural as opposed to volitional. To my mind, a volitional foundationalism isn't even what most philosophers mean by foundationalism.
Z: This too.
J: When we share beliefs that I think are plausible in terms of a self-evident criteria whereas you merely choose, a highly relevant epistemological element is missing.
Z: From what?
J: Because by my view, relativism is false. By yours, it's true. I've never met anyone that can seem to consistently talk as if relativism is true.
Z: Are you here claiming that I am still being inconsistent? I thought I answered that charge.
J: It requires way too many qualifications for anyone to articulate it.
Z: I thought I articulated my qualifications clearly.
J: They will always resort to non-relativistic-sounding rhetoric. And since most people ARE non-relativists, they will misconstrue the language to mean something it doesn't.
Z: False. Sometimes, people can talk over their differences and come to understand each other. It really does happen - even in my case.
J: It's kind of like a naturalist using the same language as a teleologist. There will be cases where the same language can't possibly mean the same thing to both parties. When there are fundamental differences in metaphysics/epistemology, this is inevitable since we have only one language with which to communicate. So since most people are teleologists and non-relativists, the phrase "he went to the store to get milk" will imply teleology to most people and the phrase "he ought not be so harsh on his children" will be taken in a non-relativistic way by most people. Qualifications are expected from those who use language in terms of a minority metaphysic/epistemology.
Z: What your examples miss is that people can communicate about their communication. We can work things out and talk things over. It's not impossible.
Z: In fact I argued the exact opposite: everyone always act consistently with their beliefs.
J: I just disagree. Jesus said "forgive them for they know not what they do." Peter later claimed, accordingly, that they IGNORANTLY killed their Messiah. They didn't BELIEVE in killing their Messiah. But they did it. People can be quite inconsistent, not in only in their thoughts, but in their actions. Indeed, they can be inconsistent in their actions BECAUSE they're inconsistent in their thoughts. Because in that case, you can act consistently with one belief while contradicting the other belief, which is what killing their Messiah amounted to.
Z: None of this addresses my claim. I did NOT say that everyone always acts KNOWLEDGEABLY. Ignorance is not at issue in the claim I made. You continue to make 'belief' into a matter of head-knowledge. That is precisely where I (and the New Testament) take exception. Head-knowledge faith is dead.
J: We could say that they would have believed in killing the Messiah had they known Jesus was the Messiah. But then they would have had to reject their own scriptures. People can't do major intellectual overhauls overnight. It takes time. Inconsistency is inevitable in those kinds of cases.
Z: Same as above. I'm not talking about intellectual overhauls; I'm talking about faith/belief/pistis - in the New Testament sense - not the Lutheran sense. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/2/2009 8:04 PM (GMT -6) | | Z: What your examples miss is that people can communicate about their communication. We can work things out and talk things over. It's not impossible.
J: Exactly. And now that we agree on what we mean by a relativist and that you are one and most people aren't, much else will be clearer now. More later when I get time. But you are right. We are now clear. No further qualifications are needed. I will know how to interpret your language.
But Jesus didn't make those qualifications to my knowledge. And Jesus surely knew that most people are non-relativists. Thus, his language was BOUND to be taken that way by most people. So if he really meant us to read in the relativistic qualifications that were never articulated, I don't know what to make of his communication style and, hence, what Christianity even is. For language that isn't expressly qualified doesn't mean the same thing it means when it IS qualified.
Granted, sometimes qualifications are derivable from other statements/texts. We've discussed such cases many times. But I know of absolutely no text that implies that God's will for humans may not be what is best for them. And in that case, I don't know what divine benevolence even means, unless your saying that God's will for some people may be to do what would be sin for christians. Is that what you're saying?
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/2/2009 7:12:30 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/3/2009 12:58 AM (GMT -6) | | J: And Jesus surely knew that most people are non-relativists.
Z: How do you know that "most people are non-relativists"? Maybe most red-state Americans, but there are a lot of Hindus out there that might very well qualify as relativists. There was a pretty wide spectrum of belief in Jesus' time too.
J: Thus, his language was BOUND to be taken that way by most people. So if he really meant us to read in the relativistic qualifications that were never articulated, I don't know what to make of his communication style and, hence, what Christianity even is. For language that isn't expressly qualified doesn't mean the same thing it means when it IS qualified.
Z: What language are you talking about? Specifically? What words of Jesus take on or apply to the relativism/non-relativism debate? As to what Christianity even is: well it's following Jesus. I think you can do that and be a relativist or a non-relativist. I happen to think there are good reasons for accepting my kind of relativism, and I think these reasons flow naturally out of Christianity. But I don't see how you get from the relativism question to such a 'what-Christianity-even-is' crisis.
J: But I know of absolutely no text that implies that God's will for humans may not be what is best for them.
Z: Me neither. (But whose definition of 'best' are we using? 'Best' is one of those value words, i.e. it refers not to a hypothetical objective good but to God's subjective good.)
J: And in that case, I don't know what divine benevolence even means, unless your saying that God's will for some people may be to do what would be sin for christians. Is that what you're saying?
Z: No. God's will is loving, relational communion in Christ through the Spirit. I imagine our visions of God's will are quite similar. But you seem to speak of 'good,' 'bad,' 'best,' 'worst,' 'better,' and 'worse' as objective standards. To me this seems an old pre-Christian Platonic conception that loses a lot of its force now that we have the revelation of Christ. Rather than the Greek God/force of nature/logos we have the Christian God/person/logos-made-flesh. We no longer have to balance our subjective desires against a hypothetical objective form-of-the-good. Instead we worship a God who is personal community i.e. Trinity. Instead of measuring us against some objective standard, we are invited in to the community of God. The standards we are measured against are the standards of the covenant we subjectively accept.
So, I hold that the will of God is the personal will of God and not the objective, universal form of the good. God made us and knows us. He designed us for relationship with him. It is his will that we accept this relationship. He doesn't will that anyone would (do what for a Christian would be) sin. He wills UR.
Where our wires get crossed (I think) is that your idea of what is 'best' is really an idea about what is objectively, universally best for everyone. On the other hand, I take 'best' to be defined conditionally. Best for what/whom? I think it's best for everyone to accept Christ, but not everyone agrees. Am I right or are they? I don't have an answer/there is no answer to such a nonsense question. I have no objective standard of 'right-ness' to judge against. The closest thing I have to an objective standard is God, but God is a subject, a person. I try to make God's standards my own, but they are still God's personal (subjective, not objective) values. Since God has endowed these others with personhood too, they have the ability to set their own values and standards.Post Edited (Sahid) : 11/3/2009 12:17:55 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/3/2009 1:13 AM (GMT -6) | | | I think it's ok to talk in unqualified non-relativistic terms. But as soon as we start talking to people outside the church, we have to abandon the pretense of strict foundationalism or rationalism. Our foundation and logic are not necessarily superior. Instead the apologetic task should be to show the logical acceptability of Christianity, not it's supposed logical superiority. And even more important we ought to testify. In a sea of equally logical alternatives testimony is powerful. When Paul goes to Mars Hill, he doesn't give a proof for the necessarily existence of a non-personal, first mover/greatest possible being. Instead, he gives testimony; he tells them about things that happened. All an ontological argument can do is make deists; testimony (+ Spirit) makes disciples. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 11/3/2009 6:49 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Z: I think it's best for everyone to accept Christ, but not everyone agrees. Am I right or are they? I don't have an answer/there is no answer to such a nonsense question.
J: First of all, to say "Am I right or are they?" is a nonsense question is just false. It may not be answerable, but it's perfectly sensible. We know exactly what it means. It means "Is what I think is true actually true or is what someone else thinks is true actually true?" That's a perfectly sensible question.
Second, and more importantly, what does "best for everyone" mean other than that everyone will be better off sentiently? If it means something else, I have no idea WHAT it means. IOW, "best" gets down to consequentialsim, pure and simple, as far as I can tell. Thus, if you have no idea if your own beliefs are better consequentially for you or anyone else, what is the point of saying that living any particular way is right or not?
Because with absolutely no certainty about what is consequentially best, any contradictory position is just as epistemologically valid as our own position. In which case all conversation about oughts is a waste of time--unless you just get off on talking about things merely to be talking about them. I have no interest in that. I have other interests that would consequentially trump a pointless discussion every single time.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/3/2009 6:31:31 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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