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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > General Chat > The problem of evil is still front and center ... | Forum Quick Jump
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Sahid
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Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 11/3/2009 8:33 AM (GMT -6) |   | J: First of all, to say "Am I right or are they?" is a nonsense question is just false. It may not be answerable, but it's perfectly sensible. We know exactly what it means. It means "Is what I think is true actually true or is what someone else thinks is true actually true?" That's a perfectly sensible question.
Z: It's a nonsense question if we reject the idea of objectively 'right' values. For the question to make sense you have to assume that there is some objective standard of right-ness. But such an objective standard would have to precede (if not temporally, then morally) all subjective persons; but God is personal! Personal subjective God is the ultimate standard for Christians; impersonal objective standards have no room to stand.
J: Second, and more importantly, what does "best for everyone" mean other than that everyone will be better off sentiently?
Z: Better according to whom? You define one value term (best) in terms of another value term (better). Your 'everyone will be better off sentiently' again lacks a clearly defined standard: better according to whom? I'm guessing that you picture an objective, doesn't-depend-on-a-subjective-personal-viewpoint standard to measure this 'better' against. But as Christians our ultimate standard of better and worse is God. He's personal. His subjective personal viewpoint is what we hold ourselves to. There is no place for an objective standard. If an objective standard is what has priority, then God's personal will does not. And we've committed to God's personal will.
J: IOW, "best" gets down to consequentialsim, pure and simple, as far as I can tell.
Z: But people can value the same consequences differently. I can give everyone in the world a snickers bar because I think they are the best things ever invented. Then I find out that a lot of people are allergic to peanuts and that I've caused a lot of misery. So, if you want to say that God defines 'best' in a consequentialist fashion, you need to also say that there is no one universal standard of 'best' that applies uniformly to all. Since what is sentiently satisfying changes from person to person, you are then committed to relativism. It can be more serious than peanut allergies. There might be people who would rather hold onto anger than give into love. There might be people who choose the quick easy way ending in destruction to the longer more disciplined way leading to life. A consequentialism that takes each of these differing valuations into consideration ends up being relativism.
J: Because with absolutely no certainty about what is consequentially best...
Z: Change to: "Because with absolutely no certainty about what standard is universally consequentially best..." It's the universality I object to. | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
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Total Posts : 477
| Posted 11/3/2009 7:07 PM (GMT -6) | | Here is a snippet from a book I'm reading that reminds me of Sahid's dialogue:
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"In postmodern discourse, truth is rejected explicitly and consistency can be a rare phenomenon. Consider the following pairs of claims:
On the one hand, all truth is relative; on the other hand, postmodernism tells it like it really is.
On the one hand, all cultures are equally deserving of respect; on the other hand, Western culture is uniquely destructive and bad.
Values are subjective--- but sexism and racism are really evil.
Technology is bad and destructive---and it is unfair that some people have more technology than others.
Tolerance is good and dominance is bad--- but when postmodernist come to power, political correctness follows.
There is a common pattern here: subjectivism and relativism in one breath, dogmatic absolutism in the next. Postmodernists are well aware of the contradictions--- especially since their opponents relish pointing them out at every opportunity. And of course a postmodernist can respond dismissingly by citing Hegel---"Those are merely Aristotelian logical contradictions"--- but it's one thing to say that and quite another to sustain Hegelian contradictions psychologically."
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I'm finding it increasingly pointless to carry on dialogue with postmodernists. We never mean the same thing by the same words. I follow the foundherentism of Susan Haack, postmodernists have no foundation epistemologically...indeed, truth itself doesn't mean the same thing to us. I believe in objective ethics, postmodernists in subjective ethics---which from my objective standpoint amounts to NO ethics...no, that doesn't mean that I think they are always unethical...it is just that you cannot rely on their ethics, they will change, I will decry the inconsistency, and that declaration is meaningless to them. Postmodernists suffer in the epistemological realm from something akin to multiple personality disorder...and I never know who I'm dealing with. Frustrating! | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/4/2009 10:20 AM (GMT -6) | | | Right. And what is the point in saying, I believe "X," if I'm just going to clarify by adding that I also believe that the infinite set of alternative views contradictory to mine are also no less plausible than mine?
Granted, I can say that by my criteria of plausibility that my view is more plausible. But then I have to add that my criteria of plausibility ITSELF is arbitrarily and a-rationally chosen. Thus, nothing I believe, in that case, has any ACTUAL plausibility. Because it means the same thing for me to say my view is plausible as it does for my opponent to say his/her view is plausible. I.e., it means, I believe it because I want to. There's nothing to argue with in that case. Because if "want" is the ground of truth, beliefs don't need to be grounded intellectually at all. In which case argument is futile.
We could say, but I "WANT" to have grounded arguments. But the minute someone finds that those grounds produce undesirable results, they are free to CHOOSE new grounds to generate conclusions that are desirable. Nothing is fixed. Everything is in flux in obedience to current desire. Because there are no fixed intellectual criteria that just ARE delimiters of what is possible and plausible.
Apart from desire, how can there even be a choice at all? So without fixed intellectual criteria for beliefs, desire seems to be the only conceivable candidate for the grounds of which beliefs are chosen. As I understand it, desire is the ground of the belief that we are designed to apprehend. But it is not the ground of the teleological category itself. There are both natural desires and natural beliefs. And these, then, ground all other beliefs in some sense or another. But a person whose beliefs are ALL chosen can only be concieved as choosing beliefs PURELY on the basis of desire as far as I can tell. Thus, no fundamental truths can ever trump them. Desire prevails over all else.
To use Alan's rhetoric, debate is about seeing which claim is best or properly grounded. But if there are no fundamental grounds, then debate is not even meaningful in that sense. We can talk about category mistakes, etc. But once we abandon the idea of a HUMAN foundationalism that conditions apprehension, debate is futile.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/4/2009 12:01:43 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/4/2009 11:04 PM (GMT -6) | | I agree with NONE of Asher's statements. I don't know how else to respond. So that's what I remind him of... I never said anything like that.
T: Consequentialism is grounded in God as the summum bono, the highest good...
Z: Good according to what standard? When left unidentified I can only guess you refer to some objective measure of good. But why, as a believer in a subjective God, should we assume that any such objective standard exists. Such an assumption runs contrary to the claim that God (and thus, ultimate reality) is personal.
J: Right. And what is the point in saying, I believe "X," if I'm just going to clarify by adding that I also believe that the infinite set of alternative views contradictory to mine are also no less plausible than mine?
Z: The point is that I've committed to X. Jeff, do you deny that there are alternative views contradictory to yours that are also no less plausible than yours?... Or are those who agree with your beliefs the only logical people in the world? This thread began with you making it clear that ID is not the only consistent viewpoint. Has that changed? Are those who have not accepted ID illogical in your view?
J: Granted, I can say that by my criteria of plausibility that my view is more plausible. But then I have to add that my criteria of plausibility ITSELF is arbitrarily and a-rationally chosen. Thus, nothing I believe, in that case, has any ACTUAL plausibility. Because it means the same thing for me to say my view is plausible as it does for my opponent to say his/her view is plausible.
Z: Yes... So what's the point? You tell me. You are "clarify[ing] by adding that [you] also believe that the infinite set of alternative views contradictory to [yours] are also no less plausible than [yours]." You and I are in the same boat here. We both acknowledge a technical objective equivalence of all internally consistent belief systems; but nevertheless we both commit to one particular belief system. Now, out of all those five-dollar words I tried to string together the word "BOTH" is the one to which I'd like to draw attention. The cheap shots taken at relativism and postmodernism are addressed at BOTH of us.
J: I.e., it means, I believe it because I want to. There's nothing to argue with in that case. Because if "want" is the ground of truth, beliefs don't need to be grounded intellectually at all. In which case argument is futile.
Z: Absolutely, No. Sure, volition is at the heart of belief. And beliefs don't need to be grounded PURELY intellectually. But nothing here implies that argument is futile. Wants can be adjusted in response to intellectual input - argument can affect what we want. I'm still baffled that you would say otherwise.
J: We could say, but I "WANT" to have grounded arguments. But the minute someone finds that those grounds produce undesirable results, they are free to CHOOSE new grounds to generate conclusions that are desirable. Nothing is fixed. Everything is in flux in obedience to current desire. Because there are no fixed intellectual criteria that just ARE delimiters of what is possible and plausible.
Z: Yes. What's the problem with that?
J: Apart from desire, how can there even be a choice at all? So without fixed intellectual criteria for beliefs, desire seems to be the only conceivable candidate for the grounds of which beliefs are chosen. As I understand it, desire is the ground of the belief that we are designed to apprehend.
Z: Agreed. Let that sink in, everybody. I agree.
J: But it is not the ground of the teleological category itself. There are both natural desires and natural beliefs. And these, then, ground all other beliefs in some sense or another.
Z: That's a claim that needs some evidence. If these beliefs and desires are natural, how (if at all) are they expressed in the human embryo? If they aren't present in the embryo, then when do they manifest? At birth? At age 1? Age 2? What I'm getting at is this: If these natural desires and beliefs are not biologically natural (quite a difficult claim to defend), then how can you possibly defend the claim that they are natural at all and not just learned through contact with the outside world? This is even more difficult to do when we look at the evidence: certain ('unnatural' according to you) beliefs are often found in bunches. Atheists, Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims are not scattered evenly across the earth. Parents belonging to these unnatural belief systems tend to have children belonging to the same belief systems. It looks like culture/experience/the outside world is at work in forming first beliefs. We can say the same for Christian families. It's not merely that Christian children are unspoiled by unnatural invading beliefs; it's more accurate to say that Christian children are socialized just like all children. Find a child raised by wolves without any possible cultural contamination, then we can talk about what beliefs are 'natural'.
J: To use Alan's rhetoric, debate is about seeing which claim is best or properly grounded. But if there are no fundamental grounds, then debate is not even meaningful in that sense. We can talk about category mistakes, etc. But once we abandon the idea of a HUMAN foundationalism that conditions apprehension, debate is futile.
Z: Slow down. You are making illogical jumps. If (1)debating is a matter of determining which claims are best grounded, AND if (2)there are no fundamental grounds, then (3)it does NOT follow that debate ceases to be meaningful. In (1) we have the phrase "best grounded," but in (2) we have the phrase "fundamental grounds." You've changed the subject of you argument mid-stream.
This is how it really goes:
(1a) If debating is a matter of determining which claims are best grounded,
and (2a) if there are only non-fundamental grounds,
then (3a) debate can only remain meaningful in determining which claims are best non-fundamentally grounded.
Debate is still meaningful; naively fundamentalist debate is meaningless. Debate that addresses people in their subjectivity still has it's place; debate that (groundlessly) assumes fundamental/universal/natural starting points has lost it's place.Post Edited (Sahid) : 11/4/2009 10:14:12 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 11/5/2009 7:22 AM (GMT -6) | | | Z: That's a claim that needs some evidence
J: By my view, there are self-evident truths. IOW, there are claims that don't need evidence. And the belief that there are self-evident truths is one of the beliefs that doesn't need evidence, as far as I can tell.
Alternatively, by your view, no beliefs whatsoever need evidence unless people want them to.
So in either case, I'm fine just where I'm at.
I shouldn't say that non-foundational debate is meaningless. That's not accurate. Rather, it's pointless. I'll try to get to some more of your post later. Gotta get to work.
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Similitude
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| Posted 11/5/2009 7:55 AM (GMT -6) | | | Right. They're all equally plausible. So why should I take any of them seriously.
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/6/2009 4:04 PM (GMT -6) | | J: Alternatively, by your view, no beliefs whatsoever need evidence unless people want them to.
So in either case, I'm fine just where I'm at.
Z: So you just don't care what the evidence is? I do. I choose to care. You don't? Then let's reexamine who is committed to arbitrary beliefs.
T: Nor could there be (on Zach's view) any evidence I could offer to convince you of the truth of any of my beliefs.
Z: I look at evidence. Just because I don't have to (I could accept some rational viewpoint that ignores empirical evidence) doesn't mean I don't. I've addressed this at least three times now. I (and Jeff) understand that overall belief systems can only be chosen in a relativistic manner i.e. there are no objective standards by which to judge standards. HOWEVER (this is the part you have to ignore to continue taking these cheap shots), I AM committed to a particular belief system. Logic doesn't DEMAND that I be committed to this one, but I am (for other reasons) committed to one. This one involves me giving real weight to evidence. Tom, you respond to a distortion of by view; it's not Zach's view you are addressing.
Now, if you want to actually engage with me, what sort of evidence do you have in mind?
J: Right. They're all equally plausible. So why should I take any of them seriously.
Instead of "equally plausible," I should have said "equally a-plausible."
Z: You use terms in ambiguous ways. All (internally consistent) views are equally rational. If you have two or more rational explanations of how to understand the world, then which you choose to believe is more than a question of which is rationally possible. Other factors like volition and desire now have influence.
Every time I make a point I hear a chorus of "You don't get to have an opinion, because everything is relative to you." This is quite simply NOT the position I've articulated. It's either a lie or the words of someone who can't read. I'm made my position clear many times now.Post Edited (Sahid) : 11/6/2009 3:11:28 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/6/2009 8:26 PM (GMT -6) | | | Z: I look at evidence.
J: How, given that you believe all beliefs are chosen, does your claim that you "look at evidence" not amount to:
1) I choose to believe there is such a thing as evidence.
2) What I believe constitutes evidence is what I choose to believe constitutes evidence, for I choose to believe that there is no such thing as an intuitive notion (for me or other entities which I choose to believe are humans) of what constitutes evidence.
3) I choose to believe that people that don't choose to believe BOTH that there is such a thing as evidence AND that it is what I choose to believe it is don't, in fact, use evidence.
This is what it means to choose all beliefs. It results in the essence of pointlessness in a debate. Whatever I believe, I'm fine as far as you can tell. Hold that thought. It'll save you some time. For there is no point in arguing with people who are doing just fine as far as you can tell.
As for shared beliefs, when you see me say something inconsistent with open theism, let me know. It is pointless to say I'm saying something inconsistent with Christianity. Because the words of scriptural texts are subject to diverse but consistent interpretations by fallen creatures like ourselves, as yours and our own history of interpretation has proven. And if you choose to believe in private revelation, it's still private. And we have no shared view of what constitutes plausible textual interpretations. And evidence and plausibility are correlative concepts, as far as I can tell. And that means we don't have the same view of evidence. But we're both fine as far as you can tell, so that's not a problem.
Unfortunately, open theism isn't much to ground meaningful fellowship in. For no particular way of life or view of love/benevolence follows from the mere fact of open theism.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/6/2009 7:45:29 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/7/2009 11:01 AM (GMT -6) | | The evidence that I thought we both took to be significant was that children are impacted by their culture. There has been a lot of dancing around to avoid addressing this. You think there are natural beliefs. The evidence is that billions of people don't have these natural beliefs. By you view they once had the natural beliefs but somehow lost them. By critique is that you have no reason to believe this. I get accused of believing arbitrarily whatever I choose (which is not true and which I NEVER said), but here you are doing exactly what you've accused me of. You hold a grand theory of EVERY human, but refuse to take any empirical human evidence into account.
Check out the irony: You are believing arbitrarily, and you are making it impossible to communicate. I'm not the one blindly holding to arbitrary belief and thus making communication meaningless.
As to your comments, (1) is true. But our understanding of evidence is the same. (2) is not true. (2) deals with definitions, not beliefs properly speaking. Whether or not there is an intuitive notion of evidence is neither here nor there. (3) is flatly untrue. It is a reflection of your own viewpoint. You hold that people who believe differently from you are somehow malfunctioning. I hold to no such claim whether it be in reference to belief or to evidence. That's you, not me.
Shared beliefs? You believe in a personal God, right? That's all the Christianity I was building on. Apparently I cannot take it for granted that you believe God to be personal. What is it for you: God in three impersonal forces? | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted Yesterday 10:03 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Z: The evidence that I thought we both took to be significant was that children are impacted by their culture.
J: I assume you mean that there IS evidence that children are impacted by their culture. And I assume that by "impacted" you mean that they non-volitionally become different than they would have become in a different culture. If that's what you mean, I agree with you. But by my view of evidence, that very fact implies that people have similar categories of thought. For both inferences are based on the validity of analogical reasoning. Consequently, I don't even know yet what you mean by evidence since you reject all natural beliefs like categories of thought.
Z: The evidence is that billions of people don't have these natural beliefs. By you view they once had the natural beliefs but somehow lost them. By critique is that you have no reason to believe this.
J: Define your notion of evidence and then maybe I'll understand that. By my view of evidence, the evidence is overwhelming.
Z: I get accused of believing arbitrarily whatever I choose (which is not true and which I NEVER said),
J: By "arbitrarily," I mean intellectually arbitrary. I don't think it's absolutely arbitrary because that's not possible IMO. Indeed, IMO, your view entails an infinite regress that seems to me to be clearly impossible for humans. What I mean is that you have only sentience to ground your beliefs since not even ONE belief is natural by your view. What else could possibly be involved in a choice other than a natural belief about what the choices ARE and/or a belief about how the choice will make you feel? In either case, it seems like a natural belief is literally entailed in a choice. I see no way around it. Otherwise, there is an infinite regress.
Z: but here you are doing exactly what you've accused me of. You hold a grand theory of EVERY human, but refuse to take any empirical human evidence into account.
J: No, by my view of evidence, the fact that other beings can be lumped in to the category "HUMAN" MEANS that they are similar in enough respects to make that work. Analogical reasoning, per my acceptance of the validity of logical induction, warrants holding the most analogical view until a contradiction arises. What would possibly constitute a contradiction to my view? That you claim you have no natural beliefs? That proves nothing. For you haven't even explained how a choice can even be MADE with ZERO BELIEFS about ANYTHING. Presumably when you make a choice you are conscious of what you BELIEVE are ACTUALLY objects of CHOICE. Beliefs are literally ENTAILED in choices. Thus, there is no way ALL beliefs can be chosen. Explain to me how it could be otherwise?
Z: I'm not the one blindly holding to arbitrary belief and thus making communication meaningless.
J: How can your beliefs be anything but blind if they are neither self-evident/inevitable nor grounded in self-evident/inevitable beliefs by self-evident/inevitable grounding relations? Articulate to me another logical possibility. I can't think of one.
Z: You hold that people who believe differently from you are somehow malfunctioning. I hold to no such claim whether it be in reference to belief or to evidence.
J: So by your view, I'm not malfunctioning. So why do you keep arguing with me? I'm not malfunctioning. So lay off me (levity here). By my view, you are indeed malfunctioning. But that implies no problem for me per the relativism you're arguing for. So what possible difference does it make to you that I should be concerned about? Remember, per your relativism, you only criticize others in terms of some incoherence within their own views (and even then only if they claim to belief the LNC)--not in terms of yours. Or that's what you said a few posts up, anyway. So how am I being inconsistent with my own view?
Z: Shared beliefs? You believe in a personal God, right? That's all the Christianity I was building on. Apparently I cannot take it for granted that you believe God to be personal. What is it for you: God in three impersonal forces?
J: I don't know how you define personal, but to me, Satan is personal. So, by your view and my definition of "personal," God could be personal like Satan in His relational interactions with other persons and still be the creator of the world. So where does that get us with respect to shared beliefs that amount to a hill of beans? It's like open theism. The idea that God is personal is consistent with so many mutually-exclusive and radically diverse interpretations that it's virutally worthless with respect to implying any specific shared beliefs that have any practical implications.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/8/2009 9:43:29 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted Today 1:47 AM (GMT -6) | | Define evidence and personal? I'm really not trying to be cryptic. I've been clear. I was specific when I talked about evidence. I'm not using some exotic definition of evidence; I'm just saying there is empirical stuff out there that needs to be taken into account. You seem to arbitrarily choose nature over nurture. Perhaps it's your nature that makes you prefer the idea of nature and ignore nurture. Or perhaps the culture you find yourself in, your choices, the choices of others, and maybe some other factors I've forgotten are more determinative. Either way, shouldn't you examine both possibilities?
(And BTW, you still haven't answered my question about your view of nature? When do these "natural" beliefs show up? When does God upload these beliefs into the mind? At conception? At birth? On Columbus Day of the person's eighth year? Does it vary from person to person? And whenever it does happen, are all other previous influences upon belief deleted by divine fiat?)
As to God being personal, if God is a subjective being, then any claimed objective values/morals are incompatible with the idea that God is ultimately sovereign i.e. if there is objective good then a personal/subjective God is subordinate to it. I'm not being clever. We both know what personal and subjective mean. Look them up if you must. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted Today 7:20 AM (GMT -6) | | | Z: And BTW, you still haven't answered my question about your view of nature? When do these "natural" beliefs show up? When does God upload these beliefs into the mind? At conception? At birth? On Columbus Day of the person's eighth year? Does it vary from person to person? And whenever it does happen, are all other previous influences upon belief deleted by divine fiat?
J: The fact that neither you nor I can answer any of these questions for me if what I call categorical beliefs were chosen proves that these questions are completely irrelevent to the question at hand. IOW, I could ask you the first time you thought in terms of "before" or "after" and you wouldn't know. How could that possibly prove those beliefs were chosen? It has nothing to do with it.
What makes me think categories are natural is that I know of no one that can consistently (in the temporal sense) think apart from them.
Z: I'm just saying there is empirical stuff out there that needs to be taken into account. You seem to arbitrarily choose nature over nurture.
J: Without analogy, empiricism can't even get you to a meaningful uniformity of nature. For all I know from mere empiricism, you don't even exist. Analogy is what makes me think there is a human called Zach that is writing posts to this forum in that name--not empiricism alone. So again, apart from analogy, there is no such thing as what I call evidence. Indeed, there is no such thing as empiricism apart from analogy. There's these things called illusions that everyone believes in. Illusions are false beliefs that conscious experience corresponds to sense data when it really doesn't.
Nothing but analogy can ground our distinction between illusory and non-illusory.
Z: Perhaps it's your nature that makes you prefer the idea of nature and ignore nurture
J: First of all, I specifically SAID I believe in nurture. Second, I thought you said there is no such thing as a nature of a person. I thought you once said that's why you rule out the possibility that God can have a benevolent NATURE.
Z: As to God being personal, if God is a subjective being, then any claimed objective values/morals are incompatible with the idea that God is ultimately sovereign i.e. if there is objective good then a personal/subjective God is subordinate to it.
J: All that is necessary for their to be objective values is for persons and God to have certain natures. If God is benevolent by nature, and if humans are both free and designed for moral ends, then there can be objective values. But if you're right that God has no nature, then there can be no objective values. But then the NT is as worthless as any other myth as far as I can tell. For then all claims about what God is could be as plausibly false as true. So let's just stick to you judging me in terms of consistency with my own views.
Moreover, I don't assume that humans have a fixed nature in all respects. I just don't think people can consistently cease to think and communicate in terms of causality, teleology, time, space, etc. You talk as if anyone could just choose to stop doing that at any moment. Even those like Dawkins admit that they can't cease to think teleologically EVEN THOUGH HE THINKS IT'S ILLUSORY to do so, and even though he WANTS TO STOP IT!! If that's not natural, what is it? I'm not saying people can't say counter-categorical things one at a time. We can all do that. But we can't do it consistently (in the temporal sense) even if we tried.
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Sahid
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| Posted 11/10/2009 12:56 AM (GMT -6) | | J: The fact that neither you nor I can answer any of these questions for me if what I call categorical beliefs were chosen proves that these questions are completely irrelevent to the question at hand. IOW, I could ask you the first time you thought in terms of "before" or "after" and you wouldn't know. How could that possibly prove those beliefs were chosen? It has nothing to do with it.
Z: I didn't say it proves beliefs are chosen. You've staked your claim; I'm trying to get to the consequences of that claim. You are committed to nature, so develop that idea. If you believe all people naturally think in certain ways, then when do you believe this started happening. Was this nature thrust upon us all yesterday? At birth? At conception? It had to be some time, right? Conception is ruled out, because thought isn't taking place in the zygote (unless we entertain some dead end, not to mention post hoc, ideas). So after conception, but before today. So when? Give me a time - any time - and I'll list all the environmental influences that are just as plausible determiners of thought patterns.
IOW - universality of certain thought patterns does not imply that these thought pattern are natural. You seem to be arguing for universality, while consistently misspelling it N-A-T-U-R-E. Everyone on the planet has breathed in particles from Chernobyl; that attribute's universality doesn't make it a part of human nature. Even if you could demonstrate that all humans think teleologically (you can't), this does not imply that this characteristic is natural. It could be that we all learned it by contact with our social and physical environments. I don't see why that's such an unacceptable hypothesis. Why immediately disregard it in favor of nature?
J: Without analogy, empiricism can't even get you to a meaningful uniformity of nature.
Z: When did I renounce analogy? You say "Humans are naturally X." I say, "What about these hundreds of millions of people over there?" You say... well... I'm not sure what you say. You keep stalling. For some reason you don't want to apply your ideas of human nature to actual humans. You talk of analogy and empiricism, but for some reason you wont talk about how your views apply to people in different cultures. How do you see your conception of nature playing out in a Buddhist family - or any social group that centers itself of skepticism of what you take to be natural? And why do you so diligently avoid answering this question?
J: First of all, I specifically SAID I believe in nurture.
Z: Sorry I missed that. So is it both? Do you believe that our natural categories are also learned categories? How do you reconcile that? I was under the impression that the two are mutually exclusive. If we must learn to think teleologically, then it's not natural. I remember you talking about natural categories being lost and having to be re-learned, but I'm talking about the original holding of the thought category. Is it originally acquired with or without the aid of external environment? As I understand it, if it's 'with' then it's nurture, if it's 'without' then it's nature, and it's either one or the other.
J: Second, I thought you said there is no such thing as a nature of a person. I thought you once said that's why you rule out the possibility that God can have a benevolent NATURE.
Z: Yeah, I said 'perhaps.'
J: All that is necessary for their to be objective values is for persons and God to have certain natures. If God is benevolent by nature...
Z: If God is benevolent by nature, then a force of nature is the origin of God's benevolence. I want to say that God himself -the person - is the source of his benevolence. It's beneVOLENCE after all - it's good WILL - not benenatura. To make God's goodness the product of nature is to make God's goodness NOT a product of his will. It's the same old compatiblism. You can't say that God's love is both predetermined by his nature and freely willed. We must be committed to God's free will (for a variety of reasons), but to chalk God's goodness up to his nature - to the what God is rather than the who God is - commits us to making it a matter of unavoidable determinism. A God who is "naturally benevolent" simply belongs to a species that can't help but be good - like a mother bear can't help but care for its cubs. There is something beautiful about it, but isn't the sort of benevolence that leaves no room for the -volence. Take the will away and what are you left with? Not a person - not a personal God. At best you can say God is still personal but not with respect to anything that touches upon his goodness. That seems an unacceptable position to me. I worship three good willed Persons and not a force of nature that forces them to be good at the expense of their free will and personhood.
J: But if you're right that God has no nature, then there can be no objective values. But then the NT is as worthless as any other myth as far as I can tell.
Z; How do subjective values as opposed to objective values make the NT worthless like any other myth. That's a pretty huge leap to give no justification for.
J: For then all claims about what God is could be as plausibly false as true.
Z: And that makes the NT worthless? Hardly. If that's the only reason you find worth in the New Testament, then you're missing out on quite a lot - quite a lot that greatly exceeds the worth of "any other myth."
J: So let's just stick to you judging me in terms of consistency with my own views.
Z: That's what I was doing. Are you committed to a sovereign personal God? Then you can't also consistently be committed to objective moral standards. The two contradict. You can believe in a Greek, objective thing of a God or you can believe in a personal God, but not both. I've seen many try to keep both at once, but you end up with the unanswerable: Is it good because God wills it, or does God will it because it's good? I side with the former, and contend that you can't have it both ways.
J: Moreover, I don't assume that humans have a fixed nature in all respects.
Z: I know.
J: I just don't think people can consistently cease to think and communicate in terms of causality, teleology, time, space, etc. You talk as if anyone could just choose to stop doing that at any moment.
Z: When!?! When did I talk that way? You're making that up. I've repeatedly talked about many factors influencing belief. If you caricature my viewpoint it really does look stupid.
J: Even those like Dawkins admit that they can't cease to think teleologically EVEN THOUGH HE THINKS IT'S ILLUSORY to do so, and even though he WANTS TO STOP IT!!
Z: That's no surprise. We both think Dawkins is "malfunctioning." Plus he is thoroughly a product of the Enlightenment. I wouldn't expect him to think much outside the box.
J: If that's not natural, what is it?
Z: There it is again. You misspelled universal. 'Natural' and 'universal' are not equivalent terms. And the fact that both Dawkins and all of the people you know think in a certain way is NOT evidence of that way's universality (much less it's naturalness). Even if you checked the dipstick on every human soul in existence, you would at best only prove universality and not the necessary/definitional universality that is nature.
J: I'm not saying people can't say counter-categorical things one at a time. We can all do that. But we can't do it consistently (in the temporal sense)...
Z: Says you and Dawkins. The Buddha (and millions if not billions of his followers) says otherwise. Not everyone is a product of the Enlightenment, thus not everyone will simply take your (and Dawkins) word for it. That the diligent efforts of both you and Dawkins sitting under the Bodhi tree have proved fruitless does not mean that everyone else is similarly fated to fail at this undertaking. Now, I'm not Buddhist, nor have I done more than take the Bodhi tree out for more than a short test drive, but why should I rule out the possibility of someone adjusting their categories of thought consistently, after merely listening to the testimony of Richard Dawkins and yourself? For every person you find who says it can't be done there two more who say it can be done.
J: ...even if we tried.
Z: You haven't tried? So we don't even have your testimony? It's just Dawkins vs. Southeast Asia? How do you know it can't be done if you haven't even tried?Post Edited (Sahid) : 11/10/2009 12:08:25 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/10/2009 10:14 PM (GMT -6) | | | Z: I didn't say it proves beliefs are chosen. You've staked your claim; I'm trying to get to the consequences of that claim. You are committed to nature, so develop that idea. If you believe all people naturally think in certain ways, then when do you believe this started happening. Was this nature thrust upon us all yesterday? At birth? At conception? It had to be some time, right? Conception is ruled out, because thought isn't taking place in the zygote (unless we entertain some dead end, not to mention post hoc, ideas). So after conception, but before today. So when? Give me a time - any time - and I'll list all the environmental influences that are just as plausible determiners of thought patterns.
J: I don't have to know when my categories of time, space, causality, teleology, LNC, etc. first kicked in to be coherent in saying I can't think without them. Just like you don't have to know when you CHOSE those beliefs, supposedly, to be coherent in claiming you chose them. What I say you are not coherent in is the idea that ALL beliefs are chosen. You have yet to explain how a choice can even be made without a belief. And best I can tell, it's impossible. And that's why I think you're incoherent. Timing has nothing to do with it.
Z: IOW - universality of certain thought patterns does not imply that these thought pattern are natural.
J: Right. Just like the fact that there are posts here in the my name doesn't imply there is a person called Jeff creating them. You would be perfectly consistent in saying I don't exist. But people don't go by mere consistency, Zach. They go by plausibility/analogy. And I do it naturally, so by analogy, I assume other people do too.
Z: Even if you could demonstrate that all humans think teleologically (you can't), this does not imply that this characteristic is natural.
J: Just like nothing you say implies that people choose all their beliefs. I really have no idea why you think this fact is remotely relevant to anything. Per your relativism, I only have to consistent with my own views. After that, you have nothing to criticize me about. And yet you keep doing it with arguments that are utterly irrelevant to the coherence of my view. That alone suggests to me that even you can't consistently be a relativist. I've never known one person that can do it. And you're proving you can't either by bringing up utterly irrelevant arguments to criticize me with.
Z: It could be that we all learned it by contact with our social and physical environments. I don't see why that's such an unacceptable hypothesis. Why immediately disregard it in favor of nature?
J: Because, as I've said before, evidential means analogical. I know I can't choose to cease to think in terms of temporal and spatial relations. By analogy, I suppose the same is the case for other humans. Can I prove even one analogical belief? No, I can't. That's why logicians say no inductive arguments ever prove anything absolutely. They only prove things to us in the sense that and to the extent that we think analogy is a ground for plausible inference.
Z: When did I renounce analogy? You say "Humans are naturally X." I say, "What about these hundreds of millions of people over there?" You say... well... I'm not sure what you say. You keep stalling. For some reason you don't want to apply your ideas of human nature to actual humans. You talk of analogy and empiricism, but for some reason you wont talk about how your views apply to people in different cultures.
J: WHy do you waste posts, Zach? Instead of just saying I'm wrong, give me an ACTUAL example of a culture that doesn't think in terms of spatial and temporal relations. And tell me how you know they don't other than by just choosing to believe they don't. Otherwise, you're just blowing in the wind.
Z: How do you see your conception of nature playing out in a Buddhist family - or any social group that centers itself of skepticism of what you take to be natural? And why do you so diligently avoid answering this question?
J: I don't know any Buddhists that don't think in terms of spatial and temporal relationships, Zach. Give me one as an example so I'll have an inkling of a clue what you're even talking about. For you to even know what a Buddhist claims to believe, you have to interpret his language in terms of a conventional language. But if they're communicating by conventional language, then presumably they MEAN to use a temporal tense in their verbs if they're communicating English. So are you getting your info about Buddhists from another language that has tenseless verbs that also don't have contextually implied tense, like Hebrew supposedly does?
Z: Sorry I missed that. So is it both?
J: Yes, it's both. That's what every philosopher I've ever read believes, too.
Z: Do you believe that our natural categories are also learned categories?
J: If by learned you mean attained by discursive reasoning, no.
Z: I remember you talking about natural categories being lost and having to be re-learned, but I'm talking about the original holding of the thought category.
J: I'm not familiar with what you're talking about. I have no idea how I could lose my categories of time and space and then relearn them.
Z: Is it originally acquired with or without the aid of external environment? As I understand it, if it's 'with' then it's nurture, if it's 'without' then it's nature, and it's either one or the other.
J: I would say that without experience, categories are never occasioned in the mind. It's simultaneous IMO. We don't experience raw sense data and then derive the notion of "past" or "cause" from that. I don't know how that's even possible.
Z: If God is benevolent by nature, then a force of nature is the origin of God's benevolence. I want to say that God himself -the person - is the source of his benevolence. It's beneVOLENCE after all - it's good WILL - not benenatura. To make God's goodness the product of nature is to make God's goodness NOT a product of his will. It's the same old compatiblism.
J: God's benevolence is volitional to the extent that His benevolent acts are volitional. I think I can do benevolent things by pure habit just like millions of other people believe. But a choice is a choice of natural impulses. If there are only benevolent impulses, then the choice will be benevolent no matter what is chosen. This is what I say about creation. To not create would have been benevolent and to create would have been benevolent.
Z: You can't say that God's love is both predetermined by his nature and freely willed.
J: Yes, if all of God's natural impulses are benevolent, then no matter which He chooses will be benevolent. It's that simple.
Z: We must be committed to God's free will (for a variety of reasons), but to chalk God's goodness up to his nature - to the what God is rather than the who God is - commits us to making it a matter of unavoidable determinism. A God who is "naturally benevolent" simply belongs to a species that can't help but be good - like a mother bear can't help but care for its cubs. There is something beautiful about it, but isn't the sort of benevolence that leaves no room for the -volence. Take the will away and what are you left with? Not a person - not a personal God. At best you can say God is still personal but not with respect to anything that touches upon his goodness. That seems an unacceptable position to me. I worship three good willed Persons and not a force of nature that forces them to be good at the expense of their free will and personhood.
J: If God's impulses are all benevolent because He is perfectly competent and sympathetic, then His goodness is not at the expense of His free will.
J: For then all claims about what God is could be as plausibly false as true.
Z: And that makes the NT worthless? Hardly. If that's the only reason you find worth in the New Testament, then you're missing out on quite a lot - quite a lot that greatly exceeds the worth of "any other myth."
J: What precisely am I missing?
Z: That's what I was doing. Are you committed to a sovereign personal God? Then you can't also consistently be committed to objective moral standards. The two contradict. You can believe in a Greek, objective thing of a God or you can believe in a personal God, but not both. I've seen many try to keep both at once, but you end up with the unanswerable: Is it good because God wills it, or does God will it because it's good? I side with the former, and contend that you can't have it both ways.
J: If an action is good because God wills it independent of our sentient states, then you are saying that if God willed all His creatures to be tormented for the sheer fun of it that such a SOFA would be good. To me, "good" means sentiently good--i.e., pleasurable or, at bare minimum, the absence of suffering. You define "good" in such a way that has nothing to do with sentient satisfaction. Therefore, I have no idea what you mean by it.
J: I just don't think people can consistently cease to think and communicate in terms of causality, teleology, time, space, etc. You talk as if anyone could just choose to stop doing that at any moment.
Z: When!?! When did I talk that way? You're making that up. I've repeatedly talked about many factors influencing belief. If you caricature my viewpoint it really does look stupid.
J: What else does it mean to say that all your beliefs are chosen? Are you saying that once you choose to believe a claim then you can't choose to DISbelieve that same claim? That makes no sense to me. If you can choose to believe a claim or NOT, then you can "consistently cease to think and communicate in terms of causality, teleology, time, space, etc" any time you choose to do so.
J: Even those like Dawkins admit that they can't cease to think teleologically EVEN THOUGH HE THINKS IT'S ILLUSORY to do so, and even though he WANTS TO STOP IT!!
Z: That's no surprise. We both think Dawkins is "malfunctioning." Plus he is thoroughly a product of the Enlightenment. I wouldn't expect him to think much outside the box.
J: I thought you said you didn't say that people malfunction unless they are contradicting theirself while holding to the LNC? You confuse me over and over.
J: If that's not natural, what is it?
Z: There it is again. You misspelled universal. 'Natural' and 'universal' are not equivalent terms. And the fact that both Dawkins and all of the people you know think in a certain way is NOT evidence of that way's universality (much less it's naturalness). Even if you checked the dipstick on every human soul in existence, you would at best only prove universality and not the necessary/definitional universality that is nature.
J: Just like it wouldn't prove all their belefs were chosen. So again, I'm consistent, so you have no beef against me if you really believe that you are only arguing against my coherence.
J: I'm not saying people can't say counter-categorical things one at a time. We can all do that. But we can't do it consistently (in the temporal sense)...
Z: Says you and Dawkins. The Buddha (and millions if not billions of his followers) says otherwise.
J: First of all, what have the Buddhists claimed? Second of all, when have they ceased to think in terms of time and space for long periods of time volitionally? I literally have no idea what you're even talking about.
Z: I'm not Buddhist, nor have I done more than take the Bodhi tree out for more than a short test drive, but why should I rule out the possibility of someone adjusting their categories of thought consistently, after merely listening to the testimony of Richard Dawkins and yourself? For every person you find who says it can't be done there two more who say it can be done.
J: I've never heard anyone claim to even try. So again, I have no idea what you're talking about. Provide some specific facts so this exchange can be relevant to the discussion at hand. But the very fact that you're claiming you know something about what Buddhists can and can't do is, on your claimed view, just your choosing to believe that. So what possible difference could your beliefs have for my epistemological perspective?
There are plenty of people that claim all kinds of things. Schizophrenics claim they're experiencing things most people don't believe they're experiencing, because most people believe there are such things as illusions. Mere claims are not proof of anything. Psychologists have to use analogy to determine what to believe with respect to mere claims. Because the LNC prevents us from being able to believe all claims by people. Someone has to be wrong if the LNC is valid.
J: ...even if we tried.
Z: You haven't tried? So we don't even have your testimony? It's just Dawkins vs. Southeast Asia? How do you know it can't be done if you haven't even tried?
J: I exhaust even thinking about trying to say/think sentences with verbs without actually thinking the meaning of the tense of the verbs. Dude, if you can do that for days at a time, you should join the circus.<!-- Edit -->
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/10/2009 9:59:36 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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might-be-don
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 830
| Posted 11/11/2009 12:55 PM (GMT -6) | | | An interesting read that might have some implications for this conversation...
Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought
By George Lakoff, Mark Johnson
A Google book search will get you much of it online.
I would try to abstract it , but I'm afraid that it is mostly beyond me.
peace, don
The world's perfect, wouldn't change a thing.
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/11/2009 5:48 PM (GMT -6) | | | Is there any expressed thought from non-Westerners which, when translated in English, doesn't use the same words we use to express temporal, spatial, causal, teleological relations, etc? If not, what difference does it make? Language is conventional. If they use that language, I can only assume it corresponds to their thought. So I see no reason to read a whole book unless we know something that implies Easterners don't think in terms of those kinds of relations. Somehow I think it would have made the headlines if it were known that we Westerners are aliens intellectually. How could we have ever communicated with Easterners at all if they didn't have the same categories of thought?
It makes no difference what people claim they believe if they don't live in a way where those beliefs are manifested in action/communication. There are people who say time is an illusion. But they turn right around and use tenses in their verbs when they describe their experience. They talk about memories (of the past) and plans (for the future). There are people that say the world is an illusion. But they run to get out of the street when cars are coming. There are people who say there is no right or wrong. But they get indignant when you intentionally cause them suffering. People can be and often are inconsistent. Every time science overturns a previous theory, many people have to break mental habits of thought. And that means that they are inconsistent for some time frame. All inconsistency is not even ethically problematic. It's just epistemologically problematic. Which is why people do try to overcome habits of thought they no longer accept as valid for various reasons.
Let's take causality. If there is no causality, then I can't cause anything. If I can't cause anything, then what does it even mean to say "where much is given, much is required?" I mean, how can God require anything of me if I can't cause anything? But if causality is not apriori, then how is it chosen? How is it presented to me as a menu item in my consciousness? Or how is it derived discursively? If someone could help me, that would be great.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 11/11/2009 6:51:16 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 13888
| Posted 11/11/2009 6:00 PM (GMT -6) | | Why, YES, Tom. I DO love that book. For lots of reasons. One thing it shows is how the very nature of embodiment, it's wiring, and the emergent "metaphors" that we have leads to possibility for self-reference and self-transcendence.
Didn't YOU see the Imago Dei represented in the "Self" part a little bit? Specifically, look at page 269-270.
Wanna see something funny, Tom? Think about the Subject, Self, Subject/Self Relationship aspects of personality...in contrast to your description of a " human spirit", inseparable from the human intelligible/sensible relational unity? Does it mesh well?
"Creation is allowed in intimate love to speak to the Creator as if to a lover. As the Creator loves the creation, so the creation loves the Creator. The whole world has been embraced by this kiss."
Hildegard of Bingen
Know me, Eternal Lover...and help me to know You... Post Edited (One Love) : 11/12/2009 3:00:21 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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