Listening to Craig debate Ayala on ID. Ayala says intelligent design can't apply to biological organisms because if it did, it would imply that God loves squids more than humans since squids have more optimally designed eyes than do humans. So Ayala solves the problem of evil by saying eyes aren't for seeing in any teleological sense. But if my eyes aren't for seeing, then I have no reason to believe my mind is FOR apprehending in any teleological sense, do I? Hasn't he proven too much? By removing teleology right where it is most intuitive to human beings? I literally can not see the difference in the practical implications of his view and those of atheism. Because he renders God so nebulous as to be utterly mystical. If I'm not teleologically designed to apprehend, then apprehension must be explicable by chance. Plantinga has shown that to be impossible. Recently, an atheist philosopher, Raymond Tallis, has argued for the very problematic nature of the SOFA that Plantinga deduces his conclusions from (http://www.uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/atheist-admits-human-mind-cannot-be-explained-by-darwinian-mechanisms/):

 

 

IOW, as Lewis argued, once it's not self-evident that we are designed to apprehend, we have to PROVE that we apprehend. But, he reminds us, we can't prove there are proofs, and we can't prove there are no proofs. That we apprehend is either obvious/apriori or aposteriori FROM and BY the obvious/apriori. Or as Lewis said elsewhere, "if nothing is obvious, nothing can be proved." By proved, he meant derived in an aposteriori fashion. The a-teleologist (even those like Ayala who want to rule out teleology for biology) can't say that it is obvious that we apprehend. And we certainly can't prove it from a-teleological premises. The claim that we apprehend, then, is a bald pontification per a-teleological premises, as Tallis has argued. But then, what is a-teleological science at all, but blind pontifications?