Post Edited (MephEternal) : 2/15/2005 10:14:40 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (MephEternal) : 2/15/2005 11:31:49 AM (GMT-6)

Meph,

I just wanted to let you know that I am going to take some time and look over this material in detail.  I understand where you are coming from in all of this, and I know that you are tyrying to work out the intricacies of how all this goes together. I hope to get you some kind of response tonight.

Blessings, Ross

Good post Mephi.

Here’s my gut reaction:

A) The God-shaped vacuum is itself finite. It can be extinguished. This doesn’t mean it isn’t an ontological reality as you say. I agree it is. But not everything that is real in the ontological sense is inextinguishable or permanent. “Ontology” can be finite. It seems to me that saying this God-shaped vacuum is inextinguishable because it an ontological reality is just question begging. Does being ontologically the case entail the logical impossibility of ceasing to be ontologically the case? Not so far as I can tell. If you’re presuming that the “God-shaped vacuum” is inextinguishable because it’s unique or because it involves “God” (who cannot be extinguished), then you’re just assuming the entire point of debate, namely, that the divine image cannot be ultimately, permanently, forfeited by us.

B) It’s at least arguable that the sort of life offered us requires a proportionate loss and that this is a metaphysical requirement God faces just as he must deal with any other metaphysical requirement involved in relating to a finite, morally responsible world. Doc actually argued this at one time and then abandoned it. I’d like to know what reasons there are for abandoning it which are independent of the question of universalism itself. You claim to have “already deconstructed the idea that it the allowance of total self-destruction is a METAPHYSICAL implication of granting genuine freedom.” Well, I can be convinced of this I suppose (though I’m not now), but it wouldn’t fix everything. For even if it’s the case that allowing total self-destruction isn’t a metaphysical implication of having granted libertarian freedom, it does to me appear to be the case that claiming all "will" choose for God is totally incompatible with claiming this ultimate choice remains a libertarian one. So, I'm agreeing that creating a libertarianly free world isn't inconsistent with God's guaranteeing that all will choose him provided that not all who are saved get saved by exericsing libertarian free will, which leads to the next point, (C)

C) There's the whole issue we discussed before about self-determining choices and foreknowledge but never agreed on. It came up a bit when you and I were chatting online. It has to do with the nature of LFW and the ontological grounds for positing in the present a “will” with regard to every human being’s ultimate choice for God. Remember the whole “will,” “will not,” “might and might not” triangle? Future LFW choices have to be “might and might not” choices because they’re libertarian. It’s the definition of future contingency to have a probability of greater than 0 but less than 1 of obtaining, so it’s logically incoherent to attribute to a historically contingent event (which is what all libertarian choices are) a probability of 1 of obtaining. But to claim “all will be saved” AND to claim libertarian free will holds in such choices for God is to claim precisely this. It is to attribute to a historically contingent event (a future libertarian choice) a probability of 1 (“will”) of obtaining. This effectively denies LFW. It locates the determining grounds of the "will obtain" (in this case) relavent to the choice for God in something OTHER than the one making the choice. How can the mere existence of a perosn in the present be the grounds for rendering it NOW determinately the case that a libertarian event (their ulimate choice for God) will certainly obtain? It can't be done. I cannot see how your libertarian universalism consistently maintains LFW to the end. Everything we libertarians argue regarding self-determining free will against compatibilists seems to be essentially denied in adopting a libertarian universalism. Why shouldn’t you just hold with regard to ALL libertarian choices throughout ALL of history what you’re here holding with regard to future libertarian choices, i.e., that God knows precisely what choices “will” with a probability of 1, obtain? If you can grant that God foreknows as settled some future libertarian choices, there’s no reason why you can deny the compatibilist’s (or Molinist’s) claim that God knows ALL future libertarian choices as settled.

So, I’d agree with Doc that “if one accepts [your] concepts for retaining moral autonomy, the metaphysical necessity of eternal self-destruction is REMOVED.” Problem is, I don’t accept your concept in this case for retaining moral autonomy. I don’t agree that you can consistently maintain that all these choices for God in the end are libertarian if it’s now determined with a probability of 1 that they “will” obtain. Sorry, but you just haven’t sewn this one up. By the way, Doc only conceded that “God will lovingly restore whatever CAN be restored, for he loves all, and God will lovingly (and vengefully) annihilate all that cannot be restored.” This is not a concession of universalism.

Now, Doc writes, “So, the question of universalism becomes: Has God made every human (and angels and demons?) such that God can ensure that their identities can be assured of being (sooner or later, however many aeons and however much punishment it may take) restored? We can (and I think should) hope for this, but can we KNOW this? Meph has brilliantly shown how such a view is coherent and consistent, even with the open view of the future. But this stops short of KNOWLEDGE.” Now this seems strange to me. Stops short of knowledge? Does he mean 100% certainty? If not, well, Doc hasn’t even claimed 100% certainty for the open view. He certainly seems to claim to “know” much more with respect to “God’s redeeming what CAN be redeemed and annihilating what can’t be redeemed.” But that’s not your view. And I’ve already shown that you can’t consistently, logically, posit libertarian/contingent events as that which “will” with a probability of 1, obtain. So though I agree that you’re brilliant (!), I don’t at all think “libertarian universalism” is a coherent and consistent view. I’m actually surprised Doc thinks it is. It goes against everything he, Alan, and I argue in our paper on the logic of indeterminism.

D) This may be related to (B), but to say that “God ALWAYS leaves Godself a ‘remnant’ of a person...allowing that person to have a ‘rock bottom’ experience of themselves in their sin...and freely begin to turn towards God” is a definition of your position, not a defense of your position. I understand this claim but don’t see why or how it must be true. Secondly, even if it were true, all it would entail is the possibility that all will ultimately be saved. Persons would have the possibility of turning freely towards God, but if this is libertarian freedom, then it’s a “might and might not” and not a “will.” Now, I remember positing precisely this possibility (i.e., the possibility that all will freely turn to God) as a condition of creation back when it all started and was accused of being naively optimistic. How could I actually deny (so went the argument against me), given libertarian free will, that some would eventually choose against God? Now you want to posit as an ending state of affairs for creation what I posited as a beginning state of affairs—the possibility that all we freely choose God. Now, you could argue that the difference is that the conditions of the ending state of affairs (the world of the damned being absolutely stripped bare of all self-deception and illusions--the very thing that was present in the beginning state of affairs and which made it possible for us to choose against God in the first place) will be such that libertarianly choosing against God will not be possible. But to this I say, then neither can choosing for God in this ending state of affairs be possible, for if self-deception and illusion were required THEN for us to make a genuinely free choice for or against God, so must it be required LATER. But if the possibility of illusion and self-deception that ONCE constituted our libertarian freedom to choose for or against God is not required in hell for people to make libertarian choices, then what kind of loving God would have allowed such self-deception and illusion in the first place? And if we can exercise libertarian free will a world stripped of all possible illusion and self-deception, then wouldn’t an all-loving God have begun there?

God does draw ontological boundaries around the exercise of our freedom. That much is clear. That he can draw the particular boundary you’re claiming (e.g., the inability to ultimately reject God) is not at all clear to me because as I see it, it involves the denial of what’s also posited, namely, a libertarian choice.

So, to answer your question, “Is there any reason that anyone can think of why the all-loving, all-good, all-powerful God would allow sentient creatures the ability to UTTERLY destroy themselves via eternal conscious punishment or annihilationism?”, I’d say, “Because creating a libertarian world that didn’t entail this possibility was/is not a metaphysical option.” If it was a possibility, God (as far as my limited understanding tells me) would have taken it. If I can make logically consistent and biblically exegetical sense of the claim that this option is metaphysically possible, I’d adopt it.

In closing, Doc writes: “And so long as our hope stops short of knowledge, it seems to me our attitude must be one of hope and warning. (I know Meph agrees with this). God loves all enough to put them through hell to win them... and there is no certainty there will be anything left when he's finished.” I can, I think, be brought to agree with this. Certainly the first part. I’m less convinced about the second. So, Mephi, even if, as you say, there may be “no metaphysical reason why an eternal state of self-destruction must exist” (which I’m not entirely convinced of) this doesn’t mean it won’t exist. And the biblical/exegetical arguments for such a state of affairs are not shabby and weak. They’re anything but. So perhaps we just don’t know enough about metaphysics to claim assurance on some of this stuff. I don’t know.

I think the best I can do is this: The exegetical case for eternal conscious torment is a strong one but perhaps not iron-clad. There is every reason to believe that God redeems whatever can be redeemed. There is reason enough to believe there will be something left to redeem in those who end up in hell. There reason to hope that what can’t be redeemed will in the process cease to exist. I’m perfectly happy knowing nothing more than this about the destiny of the lost.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/15/2005 12:56:01 PM (GMT-6)

This dang computer keeps kicking me off... I had a great response going, and its all gone.

I see that Tom has responded, he probably beat me to everything I was going to say.

Ross

  

Post Edited (JEE) : 2/15/2005 3:04:22 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Starkman) : 2/15/2005 5:06:55 PM (GMT-6)

Thanks for the stuff, Tom.  You obviously took some time with this...and I appreciate it.  Let's keep this moving!

Post Edited (MephEternal) : 2/15/2005 5:56:17 PM (GMT-6)

Hey Meph,

I appreciate the references you gave me, and I've made note of them (I have a Wolterstorff book to read yet and then I'll see if I can't get to your refs).

The argument between annihilation or conscience punishment still fits within the same category of eternal loss: it is permanent. There is never any hint in these passages, despite the two views mentioned, that the punishment is temporary. Indeed, the classic universal passages (e.g., Romans) are, in my opinion, yanked out of the bigger picture. Paul mentions something about "all men," and right away the cry is "See, it’s Universalism!" But elsewhere this dies:

Where did Jesus ever say that the separation of sheep and goats was temporary (would you really argue that the real meaning of Matt 25:46—Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life"—is that those punished are only punished temporarily, and those given life are given non-temporary life)?

Did Jesus mean for us to interpret what those who will say (or have said) to Him "Lord, Lord, did we not cast out demons..." to mean they will only be cast away from Him for a while?

Where did Jesus ever hint in John that those who are of their father the Devil will one day be of the Father, the Creator?

Where does the book of Revelation ever lead anyone to believe that the punishment, conscience or otherwise, of those who reject Him is temporary?

You said, "I figure that if I can see if there are any philosophical or theological hindrances to Christian Universalism, then the exegetical piece will be a no-brainer." This was my point, though; while I appreciate your reasoning for questioning the issue of, or for, Universalism, the "exegetical piece" will not be a no-brainer simply because there are sufficient grounds for doubting Universalism. Rather, the exegetical base for interpreting scripture is to stand on its own without philosophical acceptance or rejection of a presupposition for or against Universalism.

In my opinion, the above references I made to Jesus’ (and the book of Revelation’s) statements leads to a no-brainer conclusion: non-Universalism. It doesn't matter what philosophical grounds one wishes to use when trying to determine an exegetical stance on these kinds of verses and this teaching. That's not what determines the meaning. Yes, it may create a lot of frustration in trying to make sense of "how" eternal banishment can be—by all means, work through that philosophically—but I think it's out of line with the clear message of these constant and consistent passages to philosophize (or seek to see if there is a way to philosophize) out of the issue of eternal banishment from God when scripture is clear in the over-all big picture. I simply no of know scriptural exegetical reason to Justify saying, "Jesus' death happened in order to complete the destiny of every soul into heaven." Where is this the entire teaching of scripture? Here are the questions I tend to ask in regard to the subject:

 What did the writers say in regard to people's eternal destinies? Did they say something clear and concise, and were they consistent?

Is there a call to consider the writers’s cultural milue as an influence toward interpreting their approach to the destiny of all men and women? (And does this cultural influence within their writings display a weighed universalims side in it?)

Do those passages that seem to lead toward an interpretation for Universalism actually stand on their own and within the bigger picture as demonstrating Universalism as truth?

I simply cannot see the support exegetically for saying, "Jesus died so that everyone will (all having been predestined to) go to heaven. I have to appeal again to the common base of language without the need to philosophize through the obvious. Unless it can clearly be shown that those many passages that speak of banishment are really not speaking (exegetically) for the everlasting, then I stay my position.

Again, I will read some of the works you gave me, Meph, if I can get them through the Inter-library loan system.

Thanks,

Starkman

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/16/2005 9:13:44 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (MephEternal) : 2/16/2005 9:59:52 PM (GMT-6)

I got your five points and they’re accounted for. They don’t make any difference to the points I wanna make regarding the essential scenario. Before I make those points of mine let me just interact a bit on your five points:

Mephi: 1) Each moment that a person in hell spends in the "suffering room", they are suffering IRRETRIEVABLE (therefore ETERNAL) loss, with respect to their potential personal synthesis of God's reality. Thus their good or evil decisions in both on earth and in hell affect their ETERNAL states. Thus moral autonomy and the significance of sentient free choice is preserved.

Tom: Moral autonomy isn’t preserved by just stipulating consequences. It’s preserved by defining the exercise of the will itself, namely, it’s libertarian, or self-determining power to the contrary. Since you’re claiming the person in hell does possess LFW (with the exception that she cannot so exercise her will as to irrevocably dispose herself against God), we’re cool. OK.

So the longer a person stays in hell, they keep suffering irretrievable loss of personal-relational potential with respect to the enjoyment and thus fulfillment (since “enjoyment of God’s glory” is God’s purpose for us, as you say in (2)) of God’s purpose. Question—since you’re drawing a line beyond which the person cannot go, I’m assuming there’s also a line around the loss of personal-relational potential which they cannot forfeit. So long as entering heaven is possible, SOME enjoyment of God’s purposes remains possible. So if a person is in heaven for a million million years, they don’t lose ALL potential, even if they dispose themselves against God right up to the ontological wall of limitation so to speak and stay there rejecting God for a million years. They can’t empty their potential for enjoyment. When they ultimately make it to heaven, they get the bare minimum of enjoyment of God. Mother Teresa gets the maximum. Right?

Mephi: 2) God's ultimate goal is the enjoyment of God's own glory via the "trinification" of Creation. What God REALLY WANTS is for all sentient creatures to enjoy God and reflect God's glory forever. God's ultimate reason for bringing forth creation in the first place is the LOVE...and this goal would be represented and reflection in the trinification of Creation. Love, NOT FREEDOM, is the primary telos. For God to allow removal of "the door" even as an ACCEPTABLE RISK would be for God to unnecessarily endanger the complete fulfillment of God's ultimate telos!

Tom: I got this figured in. OK. Of course, freedom never was the primary telos. It’s not for me either. It always was only the necessary means for reaching the primary telos, which is love. Just a minor point.

Mephi: 3) The drive for God's making "door removal" impossible for sentient creatures is TELEOLOGICAL and VOLITIONAL (God's willing), not metaphysical (either by violating the laws of logic or God's essential existence).

Tom: OK, gotcha. You previous relied on God’s being “love” as the reason why God wouldn’t remove the door or annihilate people, so I assumed you were arguing God ‘couldn’t’ do such a thing. But OK. So it’s purely volitional given his purposes.

Mephi: Conceptually speaking, the door IS removable, in that it is logically possible for a sentient being to be able self-solidify unto self-destruction. There's no logical contradiction in positing a contingent being's eternal self-destruction. It's just that God, given God's own telos, desire to have it fulfilled, and genuine ability to fulfill that desire, has rendered things such that it's not HISTORICALLY possible that the door will be removed, either by God or by his creatures...even though it's LOGICALLY possible.

Tom: I’ll come back to this later when I can post again. It’s important.

Mephi: 4) The person in the "suffering room" CANNOT stay in the room forever. One could try to say that a person could have the door AVAILABLE to them...but never actually go through it. Maybe they move toward it and then move back...over and over again. This would be analogous to a state of perpetual unsolidification. However, God has created the person such that movement towards some form solidification is INHERENT in who we are as beings. Sentient beings are CHARACTER BUILDING beings of habituation. As Doc and C.S. Lewis say, freedom must end sometime! Because they are unable to "remove the door" the only other ultimate option is to walk thru it. The person is free to determine HOW LONG it takes to solidify towards God, but not WHETHER OR NOT they will solidify towards God.

Tom: This is huge, and it’s where my biggest difficulties lie. This is what destroys the libertarian nature of the choice. You don't see this, but it's quite plain. In your view an agent is free to determine only “how long it takes for them to choose” but not “whether or not they choose.” Freedom inherently solidifies for good or evil. God removes one option (solidification towards evil), which leaves us only one metaphysical possibility which we must by creative design choose. The design determines the choice. Ultimately, we must solidify towards God. That's it's only option. This cannot be a libertarian choice and the resulting relationship cannot be a personal and loving one, thus, God’s telos cannot be fulfilled in the person’s life. Saying it’s logically possible but historically possible doesn’t help. These possibilities really do overlap some, especially where they’re brought to bare upon a single life (don't wanna get into that here). I was wondering in what were you grounding the determination of the "will" in "agent x 'will' choose God." Now it's plain. It's not grounded in the free exercise of will. It's grounded in the determining influence the person's nature as created by God. God's designed those in hell to solidify towards God by nature. Yes the choose their way into solidification. But you must see that this choice is itself determined by the agents nature and the nature of the options (there's only ONE!). It's all there. They MUST solidify themselves by choice. They CANNOT solidify against God. The only other option is solidifying towards God. These three point 'determine' the agent's choice and render it by defintion as other than libertarian. There's no power to the contrary because you've removed everything contrary. So I'll stop here for a spell. I was gonna post some other points, but as it is, the "universalism" in view here requires the denial of LFW. And in my view, once that goes, all enjoyment of God's love (his telos) goes with it.

Mephi: 5) "Hell", as we are talking about it here, is a state where post-mortem, post-judgement penitence takes place. This is NOT the same thing as saying that it's "designed" to make a person come face to face with the God-shaped vacuum. A person may begin choosing towards God BEFORE reaching the "rock bottom" experience. The "God-shaped vacuum" aspect of creaturely disposition is a LAST BASTION, as it were.

Tom: OK, I see that.

Come back Bro. Let's keep talking. I'm really surprised you don't see that your #4 entails the denial of LFW. You do see this don't you?

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/17/2005 6:22:58 AM (GMT-6)

JET: We choose either:

1. To freely accept reconciliation with God prior to the “rock bottom” experience.

OR:

2. To freely reject God to the end (in which case we will push our freedom to its limit and face all the consequences of that – including the “rock bottom” experience and the "eternal loss" that Meph describes).

Both options result in ultimate reconciliation, but they are different choices with different consequences.

Tom: Explain (2) to me more. If we libertarianly reject God to the end and face the “rock-bottom” experience, would the rock-bottom choice we THEN make be a libertarian one?

And just what is “eternally lost” by such people who end up in heaven enjoying God’s presence? If God will not tolerate his telos’s not being ultimately fulfilled in a person’s life, then his purpose must be fulfilled in post-rockers who choose God, right? So what’s eternally lost by post-rockers if God’s highest and most lofty purpose for them is fulfilled? If God's telos for them is NOT fulfilled, then why insist on universalism? If it is fulfilled, then what can be "eternally lost" by those who fulfill it?

Mephi: Does Tom really think God will get LESS ENJOYMENT from post "rock-bottom" lovers of God than from the ETERNAL SELF-DESTRUCTION of those being? and if so, on what basis does he say this?

Tom: The problem is I don’t see that post rock-bottom lovers of God are at all capable of “loving.” The rock-bottom experience issued a non-libertarian choice. Love requires LFW for us. Is the rock-bottom choice a libertarian one? I don’t see how you can possibly say it is. If it’s not, then it can’t result in a personal and loving relationship with IS God's telos. So to answer your question, I’d say God would get the same amount of enjoyment from post rockers as he would from eternally self-destroyed folks, and that’s ZERO enjoyment.

I'm really not trying to be hardheaded here ya'll. I just won't budge on the definition of LFW (which has to with the "exercise" of the will and not itself with whether or not the object of choice is a 'final state'; I'm not insisting that all libertarian choices must have eternal states as their objects, I'm arguing that libertarian choices must have real, historically possible, choices as options) and it's being an absolute requirement for personal, loving relationships. If such relationships are what God's telos is, then for the life of me I cannot see how God can be a universalist. He risks the loss of telos. Does God's not getting his telos bother us?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/17/2005 8:37:15 AM (GMT-6)

Didn't read your last post there yet. I'll try to get to it.

Mephi: 1. God IS love. Not God is "loving" God IS love.
2. God is completely omnipotent. God can accomplish whatever God wants to accomplish that doesn't a) violate the laws of logic and b) does not go against God's necessary essential existence.
3. God REALLY wants display His glorious nature to something OTHER THAN God and have it represented back to God by that something. In words, God requires relative ontological distinction.
4. God REALLY wants those "others" to participate significantly in their OWN moral existence. In other word, the relative ontological distinction facilitates moral autonomy and responsibility.
5. God REALLY wants all sentient beings in Creation to embody and reflect God's glorious nature to God and each other forever...extending the "dance of the Trinity"
6. God REALLY DOESN'T WANT any sentient being to experience eternal destruction. Not only because it's bad for the sentient beings...but because that would TAKE AWAY from God's own aesthetic experience of contingent reality.
7. If there is ANY POSSIBLE WAY that God can actualize God's own divine disposition and intentions, God will do so.

Tom: I complete, totally, and happily affirm every one of these points with you. But they don’t entail universalism. They only entail God’s doing everything he can to get what he wants, which I agree he does. But from my point of view, God’s wanting LOVE from us entails the risk that he might not get love from us and THIS risk MUST continue so long as we exist and are capable of choosing love.

Mephi: Ok. There is a logically possible way that God could not only have sentient beings with...
1. relative ontological autonomy (promising ontological distinction)
2. moral autonomy [Note for Tom: To say that a subject's PRE-solidification choices effect said subject's eternal POST-solidification existence is ALL THAT IS NEEDED to assert significant moral autonomy. The exercise of will with respect to this aspect IS libertarian. My ideas do that.]

Tom: I'm not following you at all on moral autonomy. Precisely what do you think rock-bottomers eternally forfeit by virtue of having pushed themselves to their ontological limits? Spell it out for me. What is heaven for rock-bottomers? I don't think this works, since everybody in heaven, even the rock-bottomers who suffer eternal loss (of whatever sort), don’t suffer the eternal loss of enjoying God’s love and relating to him personally. That’s what heaven IS for goodness’ sake. So rock-bottomers in heaven experience and enjoy God’s love at some level and return it at some level. The point is, whatever they lose by being rock-bottomers, it remains the fact that they don’t lose what only LFW can get them to (and what you're claiming to do get to without such freedom): mutually personal and loving relationship—God’s telos. Remember you don’t want to admit that God’s telos is not fulfilled in anybody’s life, even the rock-bottomers. Right? You either have to concede that LFW is metaphysicall necessary to the fulfillment of that telos or not. Which is it?

Mepih: 3. the ability to self-determine unto complete total realization and DAMN NEAR total destruction
4. the assurance that EVERY BEING who comes to God participates in their own salvation, such that there is NO SENSE of monergism or denial of relative ontological autonomy.

Tom: How do rock-bottomers participate in the choice for God? Is it libertarian participation? That’s what I want to know. If it is, then in what sense is it power to the contrary? What are the historically contrary options?

Mephi: When this possible way is actualized, there ends up being three categories of people...

1. People who completely self-solidify towards God in this life.
2. People who completely self-solidify in God post-mortem, post-judgment, and PRE-"rock bottom"
3. People who completely self-solidify in God post-mortem, post-judgement, and post-"rock bottom"
The only class of people for whom the LFW is removed, with respect to end solidification state, is #3.

Tom: OK, there it is. Rock-bottomers don’t exercise LFW. This is what I’ve been trying to point out. THIS part of your approach denies LFW. So you agree.

Now, the point is, what must this mean for rock-bottomers? This is where I think you’re being inconsistent. Here’s what I’m thinking:

P1 God’s telos for creation includes (if it doesn’t amount to) every individual’s enjoying personal loving relationship with God

P2 Love requires LFW

P3 Rock-bottomers do not exercise LFW in choosing God

Conclusion: Therefore, rock-bottomers cannot be said to have a personal and loving relationship with God.

Take rock-bottomers to heaven through a predetermined ontological “trip” mechanism if you want, but what sort of existence will they have there? Whatever it is, it can’t be a personal and loving existence. THAT can only be had by us through the exercise of LFW. But you admit that rock-bottomers don’t exercise LFW. When a person exercises every ounce of LFW they have in choosing against God, you have God waving his hand and making the choice for them by virtue of having hardwired personal and loving relationships into us as a rock-bottom, last ditch, unavoidable disposition. If rock-bottomers don’t enjoy a personal and loving relationship with God in heaven, then in what sense is God’s telos (personal loving relationships) fulfilled in them? I’m saying (and it’s TNT#1) that love, for us, requires LFW everywhere and at all times. God cannot hardwire THIS into us. If God wants to hardwire the inability to irrevocably self-dispose against God (let’s grant that this is the case), then the BEST you can do is HOPE that all in hell will turn to God. It has to remain a real, historically possible, option that we spend eternity beating our heads against the wall, in which case the door is forever open to us (thus we have right to HOPE) but we can forever refuse to walk through it (thus the door remains a doorway into ‘personal and loving relationship’ and not some sub-par existence in heaven BUT one cannot be assured of universal salvation). I’m not saying this is what I believe. But it’s all you can get to if you accept that God’s telos involves personal and loving relationships.

Mephi: Now, I looked at all this. Really hard. And I was like...

WOULD this situation be acceptable to God, given everything that I believe about God? It was a no-brainer. HELL, YES. If it came down between having a class of people who choose for him only after "rock bottom" experience...and those SAME people experiencing eternal self-destruction, of course, God would accept the former option! What I hear you saying, Tom, is that this is NOT true. That, despite God's intentions and proper abilities: God WILL NOT enjoy the love of God's self-solidified creations UNLESS there has been absolutely NOTHING effectually removing the possibility of eternal self-destruction.

Tom: No, that’s not where I’m coming from. I wouldn’t say the possibility of eternal self-destruction is what enables God to enjoy our love. I’m saying it’s what enables us to choose to love God (though in truth the enternality of it isn’t the real point; the point is real options, power to the contrary). I’m not really interested in insisting upon the possibility of eternal self-destruction for its own sake. I’m not into that. What I’m into is insisting on the metaphysically necessary conditions for OUR being able to make a choice that moves us into personal and loving relationship. LFW is that metaphysical requirement (this is simple, TNT1—Love requires freedom). Remove LFW and you remove the possibility of choice that results in love.

Mephi: This is the only thing that it makes sense to say, given your position. But what I CANNOT grasp...for the life of me...is God actually preferring the eternal destruction of sentient beings to having them SYNERGISTICALLY move towards God, after a "failsafe" measure has been "tripped" (ie the rock bottom effect).

Tom: What synergism is there, Mephi? You’ve just admitted that rock-bottomers DO NOT exercise LFW. There’s no synergism without LFW. What are you thinking?

Mephi: I need for you or anyone else to explain this to me, Tom. What POSSIBLE reason would God having eternal self-destruction of sentient creatures as an acceptable risk, if all of my thoughts about God and God's purposes are correct?

Tom: Not all your thoughts are correct. The rock-bottom scenario you posit denies LFW. So, again, I ask: What does heaven amount to for these? It can’t include ANY personal and loving relational existence whatsoever. No way. They spent every last drop of their freedom (libertarian), the only sort of freedom that could possibly move them into such an existence, rejecting such relational existence. God cannot get us to such relational existence by having the choice for such existence kick into gear once LFW has run out. So, you keep saying God would prefer enjoying the love of rock-bottomers who synergistically move towards God over their eternal destruction. If it's real synergism (libertarian), then I'd agree. But you deny that LFW holds in the case of rock-bottomers. So I’m saying you’re fanaticizing. There is no such movement. There is no “synergistically moving towards God” after LFW expires. There’s simply no ontological line God can draw within us which when crossed would have such an effect. This is what we claim when we claim TNT1: Love requires Freedom.

Mephi: The only way this can make any sense to me at all is for me to postulate that God values the EXERCISE OF LIBERTARIAN FREEDOM UNTO ETERNAL LIFE OR ETERNAL DESTRUCTION more than God values the full actualization of God's purposes…

Tom: I love ya bro; and freely too! Look, you’re missing the point. It’s not that God values the exercise of freedom unto eternal life or eternal destruction more than God values the full actualization of his purposes in us. It’s that God’s being love and valuing love means God must live with the metaphysics of love for finite creatures such as ourselves. So in a sense, God values what love requires. Valuing what love requires is a secondary value. Love is first. But the latter is unavoidable. God can’t get around it. Thus: God’s purpose for us, being “the mutual divine-human enjoyment of loving personhood” entails a metaphysical limit that not even God can get around—LOVE REQUIRES FREEDOM and FREEDOM ENTAILS RISK.” I’m not saying the risk HAS to be IRREVOCABLE self-destruction. Heck, it might just be spending as long as it takes in hell to make the choice. It would mean LFW persists so long as we persist in rejecting God. The only way to bring LFW to an end would be in self-solidifcation FOR God. But it can’t ever mean that LFW is a ticking clock that's running out, and if we don't exercise it in favor of God when the bell rings, then God makes the choice for us (which he does in your view, sorry; your “rock-bottom hardwired synergy” is a self-contradictory notion--there's nothing synergistic about it if LFW is gone). The only synergy that leads to loving personhood (for us) is libertarian synergy. Heck man: As far as our part is concerned, relational and moral synergy IS libertarian free will. They're the same thing.

Does any of this help?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/17/2005 12:27:04 PM (GMT-6)