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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/30/2003 2:55 PM (GMT -6) |   | Laika: Are there ever any false might-counterfactuals?
Alan: Yes. "might" and "might not" are logical subcontraries, meaning they can (but need not) both be true, but they cannot both be false. You have a false "might"-counterfactual whenever the corresponding "would not"-counterfactual is true, and you have a false "might not"-counterfactual whenever the corresponding "would"-counterfactual is true because these pairs are logically contradictory. See the thread on the Logic of Neo-Molinism for more info.
God bless,
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Tom
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| Posted 5/30/2003 7:47 PM (GMT -6) | | Allan: The departure of open theism lies in the claim that there are genuine "maybes" that do not follow from true "will be’s".
Tom: We need a conference in St. Paul quick!
My knees shake whenever I disagree with Allan ( ), but Allan is wrong here in my opinion. First, all “maybe’s” are “genuine.” A true might-counterfactual is a genuine might-counterfactual. And a false might-counterfactual is also a genuine might-counterfactual.
Secondly, what do you mean by “follow” in “do not follow”? As I said to Doc, all “will be” props imply “might be” props and visa versa. There are no “maybe” props for which there are no logical implications that follow from “would be” propos. If “x would do y in z” is true, it follows logically that “x might do y in z” and “x might not do y in z” are both false.
quote:
Doc: If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say "x will occur" or "will not occur," even if x ends up occurring.
Allan: Not so. It does not follow from the truth of the "may" or "may not" claim that "will" and "will not" are false. If that were so, then "will" could not imply "may" as you state above. Given the truth of "may" or "may not", the corresponding "will" and "will not" claims are logically indeterminate, i.e., they may be true and the may be false--we just don't have enough information to infer one or other if all we know is "may" or "may not".
But it does follow from the truth of the “may” or “may not” claim that “will” and “will not” are false. Show me one instance where this doesn’t follow. Show me a true “may” which does not entail a false “will.” Can’t be done. As I’ve been trying to show Doc, “will” does NOT imply “may” if you mean ‘shares the same truth-value’ as the “may.” Certainly not. Every true “will” entails a false “might.” What true “will” props DO imply is that their “might be” counterparts were ONCE true but ARE NOW false. So, all “wills” entail “mights” LOGICALLY but “mights” of the opposite, not the same, truth-value. This has to be kept in mind.
Allan:Given the truth of "may" or "may not", the corresponding "will" and "will not" claims are logically indeterminate
Tom: They are logically false. If “x may do y in z” is true, ‘x will do y in z” is false, even if x ends up doing y in z. You’re been led to believe that “will” and “will not” props must have been true if the events they describe do turn out to happen.
Alan: Yes. "might" and "might not" are logical subcontraries, meaning they can (but need not) both be true…
Tom: They must both be true. Can you think of a “might” prop that is true where it’s “might not” is false? I don’t think it can be done. “might” = “might not.” If an event “might” happen, it follows that it “might not” happen. “Might” and “might not” props share the same truth-value.
Allan: …but they cannot both be false.
Tom: ON the contrary, they must both be false if one is false.
Allan: You have a false "might"-counterfactual whenever the corresponding "would not"-counterfactual is true…
Tom: If the “would not” counterfactual is true, both “might” and “might not” are false, since “might not” implies “might.”
Allan: …and you have a false "might not"-counterfactual whenever the corresponding "would"-counterfactual is true
Tom: You also have the false “might” counterfactual. A true “would” counterfactual falsifies both “might” and “might not.” It cannot be that “x would do y in z” and “x might do y in z” are both true.
But of course you could provide an example and falsify ME!
Doc, help me. My knees are shaking!
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 05/31/2003 12:52:36 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 5/30/2003 8:23 PM (GMT -6) | | Notice this:
1. “will” and “will not” possess opposite truth values. If one is true the other is necessarily false.
2. “would” and “would not” possess opposite truth values. If one is true the other is necessarily false.
3. But “might” and “might not” are different. They do not possess opposite truth values. And if bivalence is true, and if two propositions do not possess opposite truth-values, they must possess the same truth-value. If “x might do y in z” is true, then “x might not do y in z” is also true, and visa versa.
It might be true on the square that the logical route, the least one needs, to falsify a “would” counterfactual is a “might not” counterfactual. OK. But this says nothing about the shared truth-value of “might/might not” counterfactuals or the logical implications a false "would" counterfactual has for other propositions on the square besides the prop which is the least required prop to falsify it's "would" claim.
In terms of “might’s” and “might not’s” there is essentially, that is in terms of truth-value, only ONE counterfactual, not two.
“will” and “will not” are (let’s see if I got the square right) contraries, right? They cannot share the same truth-value. “would” and “would not” are contraries too. They cannot share the same truth-value. But…though “might” and “might not” are logically ‘contrary’ on the square, they possess the same truth-value. Am I loco or what?
Allan, give me an example (a real one from everyday life, not with x’s and y’s) of our believing an event MIGHT happen but not believing it MIGHT NOT happen.
Tom 
Edited by - TGB on 05/31/2003 01:27:43 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/30/2003 9:24 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: The departure of open theism lies in the claim that there are genuine "maybes" that do not follow from true "will be’s".
Tom: First, all “maybe’s” are “genuine.” A true might-counterfactual is a genuine might-counterfactual. And a false might-counterfactual is also a genuine might-counterfactual.
Alan: Agreed. Though my use of the word "genuine" in my original statement was actually superfluous. I didn't intend to imply a distinction between genuine and non-genuine "maybes". The distinction I want to draw is between "maybes" that follow from (i.e., are entailed by) true "will be's" and "maybes" that don't.
Tom: Secondly, what do you mean by “follow” in “do not follow”?
Alan: Logical entailment.
Tom: If “x would do y in z” is true, it follows logically that “x might do y in z” and “x might not do y in z” are both false.
Alan: Remember the counterfactual square of opposition? (www.pcigrp.com/Alan/square.pdf) In accordance with that square I am claiming that "x would do y in z" implies the TRUTH of "x might do y in z" and the FALSITY of "x might not do y in z". The second implication is pretty obvious, as "x would do y in z" and "x might not do y in z" are contradictory. The first may not be quite so obvious, but it is true nonetheless. Suppose "George would choose cookies if offered" is true. Could it then be false that "George might choose cookies if offered"? Suppose it is false. If it is not the case that George might choose cookies if offered then this logically implies "George would not choose the cookies if offered" (since this is the contradictory of "George might choose cookies if offered"). But then we have a problem because we are committed to simultaneously affirming both "George will choose cookies if offered" and "George will not choose cookies if offered". But George can't both choose and not choose cookies! If we interpret "woulds" and "mights" as you suggest, then we have to scrap the square of opposition.
Here's a parallel that might help. "might" does not entail "might not" for the same reason that "some are" does not entail "some are not". For example, if I tell you "Some grass is green", I do not imply that "Some grass is not green". You might draw that implication from my statement, but it follows only if you read me as saying "Some and ONLY some (i.e., not all) grass is green." But that's reading more into my statement than I said. By the same token, if I say to you "George might choose cookies if offered" I do not imply "George might not choose cookies if offered". You might draw that implication from my statement, but it follows only if you read me as saying "George might and ONLY might (i.e., not will) choose cookies if offered". But again that's reading more into the claim than I said.
Here's another way of looking at it that may help. When I say "George MIGHT choose cookies if offered" I mean that it is really POSSIBLE for George to choose the cookies if offered. And when I say "George WOULD choose cookies if offered" I mean that it is really NECESSARY that George chooses the cookies under those conditions. But necessity implies possibility. After all, if it is not possible for George to choose the cookies, then it can't be necessary for him to choose them--instead, it must be necessary that he NOT eat them. So if it is necessary that he choose the cookies then it must be possible for him to eat the cookies. Similarly, if it is true that George would choose cookies if offered then it must be true that he might choose cookies if offered. For if it is not the case that he might choose them, then it must be true that he would NOT choose them.
Clear as transparent mud?
Alan
PS: I really appreciate your feedback, Tom. It's always fun interacting with you.
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 05/31/2003 02:29:48 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 5/30/2003 10:00 PM (GMT -6) | | Allan: Here's a parallel that might help. "might" does not entail "might not" for the same reason that "some are" does not entail "some are not".
Tom: I don't think this works because whereas “some are” doesn’t entail “some are not” because they may describe different parts of a whole, “might” and “might not” are co-extensive descriptions of the same event.
A = “some x are y”
B = “some x are not y”
Granted, A does not entail B. “Some grass is green” does not mean “Some grass is not green.” No problem.
But…
A = “x might do y in z”
B = “x might not do y in z”
These are different than “some” and “some are” propositions because “might” and “might not” truth-claims both describe the same “some” of grass. They both draw lines around the same indivisible event, that is, “doing y in z.” You’d have a point if you said, “x might paint some of the wall green” doesn’t entail “x might not paint some of the wall green.” These need not both be true. But “x might paint the room all green” and “x might not paint the room all green” appear to me to entail one another.
If this challenges the square of opposition, perhaps that’s because whereas “will” and “would” propositions describe events which are NOT contingent if the propositions are true, the events which “might” and “might not” propositions describe REMAIN contingent if the propositions are true.
Try this. “x will or will not do y in z.” This is a true proposition, right? (George will or will not choose a cookie if offered). The event, x’s doing y, is NOT contingent if z obtains. Same thing with the “would’s.” But try “x might or might not do y in z.” Let’s assume this is true. (George might or might not choose a cookie if offered.) The event, x’s doing y in z, IS contingent even IF z obtains.
Allan, can you make a pilgrimage to St. Paul (Mecca) in October? Would you if you could? Will you if you could? Might you if you could?
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 05/31/2003 03:03:37 AM
Edited by - TGB on 05/31/2003 06:31:44 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 5/31/2003 1:26 AM (GMT -6) | | Still just thinking out loud…
I don’t wanna scrap the square of opposites, so let me suggest that “might’s” and “might not’s” are both located on the same place on the square.
“x might do y in z” = “x might not do y in z” = “x might or might not do y in z” (where the “or” means “in other words” and is not an adversative).
Why? It has to do with the contingent vs. determinate (or definite) nature of the event being described. Here:
“x will do y in z” and “x will not do y in z” both possess two different places on the square of opposites (obviously) because “will” and “will not” both imply that x’s doing y in z is definite (or not contingent). Same is true of “would” and “would not.”
But since “might” and “might not” describe a contingent event, that is, since x’s doing y in z is not determinate/definite, “might” and “might not” together assert THIS ONE CONTINGENCY. Contingent outcomes are by definition a single might/might not matter. There is just one place on the square of opposites for propositions describing contingent outcomes: “might/might not”-counterfactuals.
I’m still working on this. Doc?
I don’t think it affects your article, Doc. Bivalence is what’s important, and Allan and I don’t disagree on that. We just disagree on which propositions are true or false in relation to other propositions.
I think we need to do some serious work (papers & responses, a conference) to hammer out a more consistent articulation of the open view. Just how might-counterfactuals fit into the equation would be a great place to start. How does this November in Atlanta sound, say, immediately preceding or following the AAR or ETS meetings? The theme could be something like “Articulating the Open View.”
Tom
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/31/2003 2:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom, I would welcome the opportunity to meet with you, Greg, and whoever else is interested for a conference of sorts on formulating the open view. Can't commit to anything specific right now. After my marriage and dissertation defense, say, sometime in the Spring of 2004, would probably work best for me. We'll have to stay in touch about it, though. Things can change--my schedule is not set in stone.
About our disagreement over the entailments between would and might-counterfactuals, it seems to me that we are defining our terms differently. Specifically, your concept of "might" is stronger (and thus narrower) than my concept of "might". Given the sense you attribute to the word, the entailments you describe follow. Given my weaker sense of the term, I am correct.
The difference between us parallels that between the inclusive and exclusive sense of the word "or":
- Tom: exclusive "might", i.e., "might" always excludes "would"
- Alan: inclusive "might", i.e., "might" is consistent with "would"
Pragmatically speaking, I think Greg and other open theists are better off employing the inclusive sense of "might" in academic discussions because it parallels the way logically trained academics (philosophers, logicians, mathematicians) are used to thinking and because it allows us to adopt standard logical apparatuses (like the square of opposition) in formulating our position. Your way of looking at things is not wrong, but I think it is less useful for communicating our position to logically trained academics.
God bless,
Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 05/31/2003 7:22:30 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 6/1/2003 2:41 AM (GMT -6) | | Allan: After my marriage and dissertation defense, say, sometime in the Spring of 2004, would probably work best for me.
Tom: adiaphora? Doc? Spring 2004 Conference on Open View in St. Paul. I'm there.
Oh yeah, do you have to defend both your marriage and dissertation?
Peace,
Tom
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Tom
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| Posted 6/1/2003 4:21 AM (GMT -6) | | I’m digging in.
I would go with an "inclusive" defintion of "would" and "might" if you could show me a true "would" that "includes" a true "might." But how can a true “would” entail, or "include," a true “might” if “would’s” describe definite events and “might’s” describe contingent events? An event cannot be both contingent and not contingent. We agree on this. It cannot be true that x’s doing y in z is both contingent and definite. Therefore, true would’s cannot entail true might’s, square or no square! If this conflicts with the square, then let's dig deeper into the nature of contingency to fit it with the square.
One might argue that x’s doing y IS contingent in “x would do y in z.” Yes, "x's doing y" is contingent, but not x's doing y "in z." “x would do y in z” describes a contingency only IF z is contingent (which the proposition says nothing about). But let’s assume z is contingent: “x would do y if z obtains.” Now one might argue that x’s doing y IS contingent and that this "would" includes/entails it's corresponding "might." Not really. x's doing y may be contingent, but x's doing y "in z" is not. x's doing y is only contingent upon z’s obtaining. Assuming z obtains, however, x’s doing y is not contingent. This is important, because x’s doing y" IS contingent in "x might do y in z” or “x might do y if z obtains” EVEN IF z obtains.
P1 In "x would do y in z" x's doing y is not contingent if z obtains.
P2 In "x might do y in z" x's doing y is contingent if z obtains.
P3 The same event cannot be both contingent and not contingent.
P4 x's doing y in z cannot be both contingent and not contingent.
Therefore
P5 If "x would do y in z" is true, it follows that "x might do y in z" is false.
Therefore (barring examples to the contrary)...
P6 True "would" counterfactuals cannot entail true "might" counterfactuals.
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 06/01/2003 09:30:05 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 6/1/2003 6:22 AM (GMT -6) | | [Note: When I speak of "contingent" below I place it opposite "definite" or "non-contingent." Not sure what the fancy word is for the opposite of "contingent" but you'll get my drift. And Doc, your point in private about "ontological" vs "epistemological" contingent vs. definite events! What are we talking about if not the ontological status of reality? Friggin yeah!]
Doc and Allan-
Don’t stop digging. Let’s keep turning this over and over in our hands. I don’t have the smarts or degree, but I’m passionate about it!
Just some more thoughts.
It’s about the NATURE OF FRIGGIN CONTENCENCIES! Arghghgh!
Propositions about contingent events are double-barreled shotguns that simultaneously fire both “might” and “might not.” It’s that simple. That “might” entails “might not” is, I think, self-evident. “Would’s” and “will’s” are single-fire rifles. You can’t claim that event x both will and will not happen. Why? Because of the nature of reality: definite reality and contingent reality.
Now, it’s true as Doc says, that on the square of opposites, “x might not do y in z” is the logically least amount of truth required to falsify “x would do y in z.” But why is this? It is, I suggest, simple because “x might not do y in z” establishes the contingency of x’s doing y in z. It introduces contingency into the equation. And it’s the contingency of x’s doing y in z which falsifies “x would do y in z.” It’s not about word games. It’s about the nature of reality.
Doc, we might just as easily say “x might do y in z” falsifies “x would do y in z.” Both “might” and “might not” introduced and establish the contingency of x’s doing y in z and THAT is what falsifies the claim that x ‘would’ do y in z.
Now, I’m aware that this doesn’t “fit” so well on the square of opposities. The square seems well-suited for propositions describing non-contingent, or definite, events, but ill-suited for describing contingencies. I don’t know. All I know is that contingency matters. It’s real. As well, definite, or non-contincency, is real. And these are mutually exclusive. An event cannot be both contingent and definite. If “would’s” and “would not’s” describe definite events, they cannot entail that those same events are not definite (i.e., that they’re contingent). Can’t be done. Whatever entailment means, it can’t mean this.
Let me suggest a way to be “exclusive” about contingency vs. definiteness (since these DO exclude each other) on the square of opposites. Since I’m arguing that “might” and “might not” entail one another (because the reality of contingency demands this), and since the square of opposites is sensitive to language (especially where you stick “not” into a sentence), let’s try this:
1. Let’s combine “might” and “might not” and make one indivisible truth claim (which IS the case given the nature of contingency). This one word will be “might/might not.” “Might/might not” is now a single word. We’ll use it do describe contingent events.
2. To make our way around the square of opposites IN RELATION TO “would” and “would not” claims (which canNOT both be true), let’s agree to turn “might/might not” around to “might not/might.” Hold on. Don’t leave yet. I think this exchange is linguistically important because a) “would” and “would not” occupy separate positions on the square and b) there must be propositions which logically/linguistically counter “would” and “would not” propositions.
3. So, to falsify “x would do y in z” we would require “x ‘might not/might’ do y in z” (where “might not” precedes “might” to show that “might not” is the linguistically required falsifier and that “might” is entailed) while to falsify “x would not do y in z” we would require “x ‘might/might not’ do y in z” (where “might” now precedes “might not” to show that “might” is the linguistically required falsifier and that “might not” is simply entailed).
It’s awkward and it’ll never fly in academic journals (so crucify me on the square!), but hey, since when has truth had an easy time in journals?
Contingencies are real. Because the events they describe are not settled, it logically follows that they “might” or “might not” happen. If there is NO way to account for this reality (or the propositions describing this reality) on the square of opposites, then toss the square. Give me bivalence. That’s enough to do battle with Craig.
Later,
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 06/01/2003 11:24:29 AM
Edited by - TGB on 06/01/2003 11:33:51 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 6/1/2003 6:51 AM (GMT -6) | | Does Peirce's concept of "prescission" have anything to do with this?
quote:
Prescission is the process in which blue, green, and red balls are all recognized as spherical, and German Shepherds and Chihuahuas are both recognized as dogs. We prescind from the color, say, and, considering only the shapes, recognize the sameness of all balls in this regard.
A decrease in supposed information may have the effect of diminishing the depth of a term without increasing its information. This is often called abstraction; but it is far better to call it prescission; for the word abstraction is wanted as the designation of an even far more important procedure, whereby a transitive element of thought is made substantive, as in the grammatical change of an adjective into an abstract noun. This may be called the chief engine of mathematical thought. (2.364)
It feels to me like would and might are in a "prescission" relationship to each other. In other words we prescind "would" from "might". "Would" has its "being" in "might".
So, is "might" similar to firstness? - sheer possibility.
And "would" similar to thirdness? - law.
And "will" similar to secondness? - actual occurrence.
Is the problem then that to talk of "might" as though it is in the realm of thirdness (law) gets us all confused with the "might" that exists in the realm of firstness (sheer possibility)?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 06/01/2003 11:51:44 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 6/1/2003 6:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom
So, to falsify “x would do y in z” we would require “x ‘might not/might’ do y in z” (where “might not” precedes “might” to show that “might not” is the linguistically required falsifier and that “might” is entailed) while to falsify “x would not do y in z” we would require “x ‘might/might not’ do y in z” (where “might” now precedes “might not” to show that “might” is the linguistically required falsifier and that “might not” is simply entailed).
Iconoclast
Nice Tom. This seems like a more than reasonable way to "fit" the thirdness requirements that the square of opposites seems to require of "might".
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 06/01/2003 11:59:05 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 6/1/2003 7:26 AM (GMT -6) | | Icon: So, is "might" similar to firstness? - sheer possibility.
Tom: Firstness, yes. Before it can be true that an event "will" or "would" take place, it must first be true that it "might" (or "might not") take place; thus, "wills" and "woulds" are born out of mights. But--and this is where I seem to stand absolutely alone--once a "might" gives birth to a "will" or a "would" it dies (so to speak). I mean, of course, that both "might" and "might not" are false.
Tom
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 6/1/2003 7:50 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom
But--and this is where I seem to stand absolutely alone--once a "might" gives birth to a "will" or a "would" it dies (so to speak). I mean, of course, that both "might" and "might not" are false.
Iconoclast
I totally agree with you here Tom. I actually find it easier to conceptualize what you are saying than to conceptualize this idea that "might not" has independent meaning from "might". I think the problem is in what "'ness" one is talking from. It is only in firstness that some form of logical entailment occurs and I think the only form is "prescission". The square of opposites is NOT a firstness sort of thing. It is speaking from thirdness. Clearly from secondness the "might" dies when the "will" happens. It seems to me that the question is what does it mean to speak from thirdness or the logical rules. This is where the ambiguity seems to happen. Thirdness can be viewed from the direction of firstness or from the direction of secondness in which case we get the differing views. Personally, I think your proposal of "might not/might" and "might/might not" clears up the ambiguity of which direction one approaches the square of opposites. It seems to me that this works when viewing it from either firstness or secondness.
You do not stand alone Tom!
Of course, Alan also has a good point in that students of logic would typically approach things from the direction of thirdness. My question would be, who is the audience? Do students of logic have a difficult time with the Open View?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 06/01/2003 12:57:00 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
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| Posted 6/2/2003 5:42 AM (GMT -6) | | Ma man, Tom:
quote:
Before it can be true that an event "will" or "would" take place, it must first be true that it "might" (or "might not") take place; thus, "wills" and "woulds" are born out of mights.
Except for those "wills" that are eternally settled ("You shall-will have no other gods before Me." Stated late in the game, but eternally settled)? There was never room for a preceeding "might."
Starkman
Am I right? I say, am I right?
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Tom
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| Posted 6/2/2003 9:14 AM (GMT -6) | | Starkman: Except for those "wills" that are eternally settled ("You shall-will have no other gods before Me." Stated late in the game, but eternally settled)? There was never room for a preceeding "might."
Tom: Cherrie O my good fellow!
Well, if you're talking about "will's" which describe events, like "x will do y," then even if God unilaterally determines that x do y, it was still true first that "x might do y in z" if you want to maintian that God's predetermining x's doing y was a determination God was free not to make. Right? Before it can be true that God freely predetermines that x do y, it must first be true that God might freely predetermine that x do y.
But "You shall/will have no other gods before me" looks to me to be a different thing altogether. This looks like a moral command and not even in the same class of "will/will not" props about the future. "You will have no other gods before you" isn't a proposition describing some future event that "will" take place; it's a proposition (a command really, though in the indicative mood) about what "ought" to be the case.
How's that van driving?
Tom
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Chris Grant
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Total Posts : 151
| Posted 6/5/2003 5:44 AM (GMT -6) | |
Speaking of Pinnock, but not, I think, about the particular issues you addressed when opening up this topic, would you [Greg] care to comment on the extent of your agreement with the position on divine embodiment that Pinnock takes in _The Most Moved Mover_?
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The Huguenot
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Date Joined May 2003
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| Posted 6/5/2003 12:44 PM (GMT -6) | | Y'all need to go out and pick up some Lev Shestov...
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geebob
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 94
| Posted 6/6/2003 5:18 PM (GMT -6) | | I think there is something lacking in the presentation of the view of omniscience as that which is logically knowable that Doc gives and that might reflect that Pinnock has not presented it fully. It is Hasker's view and the reason that it is not logically possible for God to know the truth value of "X will occur" statements is because supposedly, God's knowledge cannot fail, and Hasker suggests that the propositions about future free will choices are soft facts meaning that it is within someone's power to change their truth values and it may very well turn out that someone does in fact change the truth values. And it doesn't seem that this is such an unreasonable adjustment of omniscience any more than the adjustment to God's omnipotence placing actions such as lieing out of his power, due to the fact that it is logically incompatible with his character.
But I don't see much harm in saying that God does in fact know the truth values of soft facts and if and when they are changed, it's due to no failure in God's knowledge, though his knowledge turned out to be wrong, but rather it is simply due to the feature in soft facts, the way they can change truth values. nothing in God can be faulted for knowing the thing as it is.
But there is also the problem of the grounding of soft facts. In virtue of what is it that makes it true that I will have toast and eggs tomarrow and not oatmeal? Well it could be so in my intentions, and this does resonate with some of our normal discourse. I may have oatmeal tomorrow and my brother may come along at that time and say "I thought you were going to have eggs today," and I may reply "It is true that I was going to have eggs today but I changed my mind." But that would not explain the truth of the matter before I initially decided to have eggs over oatmeal (the choice of eggs over oatmeal, that is, and not eggs on top of oatmeal).
So I don't really like soft facts. I respect Hasker's approach and I think it's fairly coherent, (and definitely something to keep on the table of options) but no sir... I don't like it.
I have always prefered a picture very close to the one Doc presents here, if it is not essentially the same. For some future proposositions, both "this will occur" and "this will not occur" statments are false in favor of the truth of "may or may not".
Bivalence here is maintained, but a concern I have that I haven't seen dealt with goes beyond just bivalence. Hasker says he prefers his approach because he can continue to use some of the basic rules of propositional logic, and many of the other methods might require a rewritting of the rules.
A most obvious example would be the Double Negation rule. In this rule P entails ~~P and ~~P entails P. It seem to me that the statment "it is false that x will not occur" is a double negative and as such implies that it is true that x will occur. If it can be shown that that statement is not a double negative, then we have no problem, but I don't see that working.
So short of chucking bivalence or going to a fuzzy logic (all of which are still compatible with "might" counterfactuals, as is haskers view, as far as I know), or some other fixer that Doc would suggest, I would make a suggestion of adding a new category to modal logic (although that could cause mayhem as far as I know as I haven't studied modal logic very far).
We have to remember that modal logic was invented because the terms like "necessarily" and "possibility" were causing mayhem for our lower order logics, thus modal logic was invented, which at first was kind of wishy washy until possible worlds ontology was invented. I think with the current discussion of open theism and the issue of truly accessible possibilities, we may have reached another such point where an innovation is required. My suggestion would be to introduce the term "certainty" into our vocabulary in modal logic. A certainty would be a single possibility that describes a single detail that excludes other possibilities from describing that detail in the actual world (or some other particular possible world). Thus, all of the past and present and determined details of the future are described in terms certainties, and for details that have yet to be settled, they are called uncertainties.
So how might this help? all of the old rules such as double negation apply to propositions that describe certainties, and when there is a difference between certainties and uncertainties, we are dealin with a higher order logic. I do believe it would be modal logic.
quote:
Doc: I used to contrast "possibilities" and 'certainties", but it was pointed out to me that I'm comparing a logical modality with a psychological state, and in such a way that I'm begging the conclusion I want to establish.
Blah! that way of using certainty and the way I'm suggesting are well within the bounds of normal discourse, and as a matter of fact, Webster's considers certainty as describing things as settled to be the primary definition, and the mental state as the least common usage. And naturally, when the mental state matches the reality, we have knowledge.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
-Wimpy
Edited by - geebob on 06/07/2003 11:29:45 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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geebob
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| Posted 6/7/2003 6:28 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
And it doesn't seem that this is such an unreasonable adjustment of free will any more than the adjustment to God's omnipotence placing actions such as lieing out of his power, due to the fact that it is logically incompatible with his character.
I'm correcting an error here for anyone who already read my post. I meant that it is an adjustment to omniscience. Not free will.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
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Chris Grant
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Total Posts : 151
| Posted 6/18/2003 4:00 AM (GMT -6) | | I wrote:
quote:
Speaking of Pinnock, but not, I think, about the particular issues you addressed when opening up this topic, would you [Greg] care to comment on the extent of your agreement with the position on divine embodiment that Pinnock takes in _The Most Moved Mover_?
Okay, so I didn't get any nibbles on that. Let me broaden the question: What do the rest of you proponents of open theism think about Pinnock's position on divine embodiment? Does that position place him in the mainstream of open theist thought?
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geebob
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 94
| Posted 6/18/2003 4:44 AM (GMT -6) | | I thought it was kind of off topic as the focus was on Pinnock's view of omniscience. I wasn't ignoring your comment.
I don't know what specifically he says about embodyment, but I have two veiws of my own that would seem to be in line with this. First of all, Terrence freitheim makes a convincing biblical case to the effect that the Jews did not know of a God who wasn't incarnate. Divine revelations often come from the angel of the Lord who is interchangebly referred to as the Lord, or there may be a cloud shrouding a figure. I must admit though that I am not preparred to reproduce Fretheim's arguements.
my opinion is that this figure is the third person of the trinity. I have no commitment to an embodied notion of the father, except for the following explanation:
whether or not you agree with platonism, it is in the distinction between abstract "unversals" and concrete "particulars" where you might find some notion of the father and spirit as embodied. I would reject that God is an abstract entity (though I think plato may have made him into precisely that). God is a particular. He is concrete. To call him physical is a bit of a jump there, but you might say we are almost in the same ball park.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
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Christian
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Total Posts : 78
| Posted 6/19/2003 11:39 AM (GMT -6) | | Chris Grant said, "Okay, so I didn't get any nibbles on that. Let me broaden the question: What do the rest of you proponents of open theism think about Pinnock's position on divine embodiment? Does that position place him in the mainstream of open theist thought?" I'd also be interested in what OV proponents think on thi. Particularly whether he is considered to be in the mainstream of OV thoughts.
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 6/19/2003 3:26 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Chris Grant said, "Okay, so I didn't get any nibbles on that. Let me broaden the question: What do the rest of you proponents of open theism think about Pinnock's position on divine embodiment? Does that position place him in the mainstream of open theist thought?" I'd also be interested in what OV proponents think on thi. Particularly whether he is considered to be in the mainstream of OV thoughts.
Does anyone know what Pinnock's position on divine embodiment is? If he means to say something like "the world is God's body" (like Marjorie Suchocki and others have proposed) then I think Pinnock would be definitely outside the mainstream of open theist thought. While most open theists will argue (along with many non-open theists) that God experiences temporal succession, it is my sense that most open theists, just like classical theists, would affirm that God is not spatially extended.
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 6/19/2003 3:43 PM (GMT -6) | | Geebob wrote:quote:
It seem to me that the statement "it is false that x will not occur" is a double negative and as such implies that it is true that x will occur. If it can be shown that that statement is not a double negative, then we have no problem, but I don't see that working.
It only works out to a double negative if you start with the idea that "will" and "will not" are contradictories, not contraries. And this is to reject the very idea of underdetermined-but-determinable possibilities, viz. "mights", at the outset. On Doc's view, and mine, "It is false that x will not occur" is equivalent to "It is true that x might occur".
quote:
I think with the current discussion of open theism and the issue of truly accessible possibilities, we may have reached another such point where an innovation is required. My suggestion would be to introduce the term "certainty" into our vocabulary in modal logic. A certainty would be a single possibility that describes a single detail that excludes other possibilities from describing that detail in the actual world (or some other particular possible world). Thus, all of the past and present and determined details of the future are described in terms certainties, and for details that have yet to be settled, they are called uncertainties.
Interesting suggestion. Can you flesh this idea out with some concrete examples that illustrate the logical relations between "necessary", "certain", and "possible"? My guess is that standard modal logic can accommodate certainties by talking about world-relativized or conditional necessities. In other words, we can say that X is unconditionally necessary if it holds for all possible worlds. And we can say that X is conditionally necessary in all possible worlds in which condition Y holds.
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