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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/26/2003 3:37 AM (GMT -6) |   | I'm doing an article for a book on Pinnock. I'm discussing his open view. I spend the first have praising his noteworthy achievements, laying out his position and defending its strengths. But then, as expected, I offer a critique of one weakness. I want to strength his way of resolving the alleged paradox of God being omniscient but NOT knowing future free acts. I choose NOT to reject bivalence in my alternative proposal. Here is the last half of (the first draft of) my article. I invite and encourage ardent critiques of it.
Openness and Omniscience: A Critique of Pinnock's View
Pinnock’s defense of the "most moved mover" view of God in general and of the open view of God and the future in particular has been increasingly strong throughout his career. He would be the first to admit, however, that it has not been without its shortcomings. I would like to conclude this essay by offering a critique of what I believe is the greatest shortcoming of Pinnock’s defense of the open view and suggest how it could be strengthened.
Pinnock has repeatedly defined omniscience as "knowing all that can be known." As a number of critics have pointed out, this is simply an inadequate definition of omniscience. It requires us to accept that there are things that exist that cannot be known, even by God. While I’m sympathetic to Pinnock’s concern to reconcile omniscience with an open future, I’m also convinced that this is not the way to do it.
Among other difficulties, the suggestion that there are things that cannot be known directly contradicts the meaning of omniscience. To say that God is all knowing (omniscient) says something about God’s knowledge and something about what God knows: namely, he knows all things. If an omnscient being exists, therefore, there simply can’t be things that are intrinsically unknowable.
To make matters worse, Pinnock has sometimes spoken of God limiting his omniscience – as though God could know all things if he wanted, including future free acts. Among other problems, it is not clear how God could know where to limit his omniscience unless he first exercised unlimited omniscience. He would have to first know what it is he doesn’t want to know in order to shield himself from knowing it! Moreover, even if this could be rendered intelligible, its not at all clear what it would accomplish. How would God choosing not to know something he could know ensure freedom? If the definiteness of future acts eternally exist, there are no possibilities for agents to transition from possibilities into definite actualities -- whether this eternal definitenss is known by God or not.
On a related note, Pinnock has at times contrasted the open view with the view that God possesses "limitless foreknowledge" or "exhaustive foreknowledge," thereby conceding that his view entails that God has limited and non-exhaustive foreknowledge. This too suggests that the future would be knowable if only God was not limited in what he knows. Other times Pinnock has referred to the classical view of omniscience that he opposes as "strong omniscience"– as though he and other openness theologians advocated "weak omniscience." Such ill-advised and unnecessary ways of speaking clearly play into the hands of openness detractors who are already inclined to believe that the God of openness theology is a weak and limited deity made in humanity’s own image.
Still other times Pinnock has referred to the classical view as embracing "total omniscience" – as though he was advocating a limited omniscience. But again, an "all" that is limited is no longer an "all," so an omniscience that is limited is no longer omniscience. And finally, Pinnock has sometimes spoken of God as a "learner" in the sense that he "enjoys continuing to get to know [the creation] in a love that never changes." This way of speaking reinforces the impression that God doesn’t know all things from the start, but has to slowly acquire his knowledge as he gets to know his creation through a learning process.
Now, people should in fairness cut Pinnock and other open theists a certain amount of slack in their phraseology. While defenders of the classical view have had centuries of discussion and debate to hammer out and fine tune their positions, open theists are at the very beginning of this process. The modern day openness movement is not yet two decades old, so it would be unreasonable to expect from us a fully developed, perfectly nuanced, position. At the same time, it is only by critiquing the way we open theists express ourselves that we will be able to fully develop and nuance our position. In this light, it has to be said that the above cited ways Pinnock espouses his position are unfortunate at best. It has made his otherwise strong position an easy target for opponents of the openness position.
Even more importantly, the attempt to preserve omniscience while affirming the openness of the future by speaking of it as "limited" or "weak" is altogether unnecessary. For, as I shall now show, there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that some of the future consists of possibilities, not settled realities, on the other.
The problem Pinnock wants to resolve can be most succinctly stated as follows:
PI: If God is omniscient, he must know the truth value of all propositions.
P2: Propositions about future free acts are either true or false (the principle of bivalence).
P3: God, being omniscient, knows the truth value of propositions about future free acts.
Conclusion: God possesses knowledge of all future free acts.
As we have seen, Pinnock attempts to avoid this conclusion by qualifying God’s omniscience, thus rejecting P1. A better approach, I submit, is to accept the validity of this argument but show how it doesn’t entail that God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge of all that shall come to pass.
To begin, it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will or will not do y" cover the whole of future. But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.
But if we don’t make this metaphysical assumption – an assumption, note, which is strictly about the nature of the contingent world God created, not about the nature or scope of God’s knowledge – then we immediately see that there’s no reason to assume that everything about the future can be expressed in this "will or will not" form. If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of things that "may" or "may not" happen. Propositions that express these "maybes" must be included as among the propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know.
In my estimation, one of most significant omissions in the classical tradition’s reflections on the nature of omniscience was that it never considered the distinctive set of what we might call "might-counterfactual" propositions. To be sure, Molinists considered the set of "would-counterfactual" propositions and thus held that God not only knows what will and will not happen, but also what would happen in every alternative possible world (God’s "middle knowledge"). Would-counterfactuals in this schema are essentially "will or will-not" propositions applied to counterfactual worlds. What classical Molinists failed to see, however, was that the set of would-counterfactual propositions logical requires the category of might-counterfactual propositions. For the negation of a would-counterfactual is not a would-not counterfactual, but a might-not counterfactual.
If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." This means that there is an entire set of counterfactual propositions the truth value of which an omniscient God must know but which have not been given serious consideration in the church’s theological tradition. If God knows would counterfactuals, he must by logical necessity know might-counterfactuals.
Now, one could conceivably argue that though would-counterfactuals entail might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals don’t constitute a distinct set of propositions God must know, precisely because they are already entailed by the would-counterfactuals. That is, if George would eat a cookie if offered, it is certainly the case that George might eat a cookie if offered. Hence, in knowing the truth-value of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered," God already knows the truth-value of the proposition "George might eat a cookie if offered." Hence there is no reason to suppose that God knows, or even could know, any of reality as a "maybe."
The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not imply "would-counterfactuals." To say George might eat a cookie if offered does not imply that George would eat a cookie if offered. And this is enough to establish that there is a non-empty set of might-counterfactual propositions possessing truth value that an omniscient being must know. There is simply no logical reason why we should assume that the set of independent might-counterfactuals– viz. might counterfactuals that aren’t logically encompassed by would-counterfactuals-- is empty. There is nothing logically incoherent in the conception of a world in which George might eat a cookie if offered but in which it’s not true that he would eat a cookie if offered. The essential uniqueness of the openness position lies in its claim that this is precisely the world that God has created.
It was simply a metaphysical assumption about the eternally settled nature of reality on the part of classical theologians that led them to assume that "will and will not" ( and, by extension to possible worlds, would and would-not) propositions fill out the set of propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know. Jettison this assumption – which again, is an assumption about the nature of the world God contingently created, not an assumption about the nature of omniscience – and one sees that P2 must include propositions about what "might" and "might not" happen.
This consideration establishes that there is no logical difficulty involved in affirming that an omniscient God knows some of the future as a "maybe." Indeed, unless God has contingently decided to falsify all independent might-counterfactuals by creating an eternally settled world, then an omniscient God must by logical necessity know some of the future as a "maybe". Indeed, even if God decided to create an eternally settled world, he would still have to know the true value of independent "might-counterfactuals": it’s just that he would in this case know them all as false. Whether or not God created a world in which some independent might-counterfactuals are true is the real issue between openness and classical theologians. But note, this is not a debate about omniscience, but about the nature of creation On the issue of omniscience, we are in total agreement with classical theists. And Pinnock was misguided in construing the issue otherwise.
In the alternative framework I am proposing, God is omniscient in the strongest (and really only) meaning of the term. God knows the truth value of all propositions. More specifically, the set of all propositions God knows to be true or false and the set of all propositions.about possible and actual reality are co-extensive sets.
Propositions of the form "x will or will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a settled feature of reality. If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say x will or will not occur, even if x ends up occurring. For at the time the proposition was uttered, the occurrence of x was not a settled aspect of the future – something that will or will not happen – but merely a possible occurrence of the future. The proposition "x will or will not occur" thus did not correspond to reality at the time the proposition was considered. If and when the occurrence of x becomes a settled aspect of the future, then it will be true to say "x will occur."
This proposal will undoubtedly strike some as paradoxical, for we are not accustomed to distinguish between "will and will not" propositions and "might and might not" propositions in this fashion. Conventional language rarely requires us to, on the one hand, and we are by tradition accustomed to assuming an exhaustively settled view of reality, on the other. I suspect this is why Pinnock fell into speaking about future free acts as unknowable realities – as though they in some sense already existed as settled facts, but were unknowable. Yet, if we grant that philosophy often has to make distinctions that conventional language isn’t accustomed to make, and if we see that the assumption that reality is exhaustively and eternally settled is a simply an assumption, not entailed by the omniscience of God, we will see that the distinction holds, and that it is important.
One may reject Pinnock’s open view of the future, but despite his own occasional ill-advised expressions to the contrary, they cannot do so on the grounds that his view undermines omniscience. The distinction between what will occur and what may occur is precisely the kind of a distinction an omniscient God would – and must – make.
Thanks, Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Eli
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Date Joined May 2003
Total Posts : 44
| Posted 5/26/2003 4:44 PM (GMT -6) | | Assuming this won't get in the way of any length restrictions the article is subject to, I think you should back this up:
quote:
In the alternative framework I am proposing, God is omniscient in the strongest (and really only) meaning of the term. God knows the truth value of all propositions. More specifically, the set of all propositions God knows to be true or false and the set of all propositions.about possible and actual reality are co-extensive sets.
By really stating the obvious, how people label the OV God as a weaker less intelligent God, but when you really think about it, knowing (and being prepared for) every possibility that can occur makes Him infinitely wiser than the God portrayed by the determined view. I know you touch on it in a few areas in your article (and I've seen you word what I just said much better), but I find it to be one of the more powerful points of the argument. It also (at least in my mind) settles any anthropomorphic objections. But that takes us off topic, doesn't it? 
"...it is fools, they say, who learn by experience. But since they do at least learn, let a fool bring his experience into the common stock that wiser men may profit by it." -C.S. Lewis
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Ladd
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Total Posts : 1
| Posted 5/26/2003 4:52 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Doc & friends,
You folks have excited me with your excellent discussion of this topic of 'open view'. I've read 4 or 5 different threads on this subject and am in awe of the logic abilities of you all. I come into this position of interest rather simply. The more I learned about Calvinism over the years, the more I questioned the basic idea of how God relates to us, His children, with joy when we walk close to Him or with sadness when we ignore or defy Him. I remember the loving picture of the Prodigal Son returning to his dad after failing him so thoroughly. So, the question, can God respond to us, interact with us in prayer, or be angry etc as is portrayed so often in scripture IF He KNOWS ALL FUTURE EVENTS. It just didn't fit.
So anyway, I'd like to just add a little bit that I haven't seen discussed.
My question can be posed in many ways and it may be that you've gone over this many times before, but here it is. "Would knowing the future be a POWER or a weakness or DETRIMENT."
Or, said another way, "If one knew the future, is there any way he could change it?" One other aspect, of the many possibilities, "Does God know His own future?"
Of course, my impression is that God will DO in the future anything He wants to and therefore Knows that part of the future.
Thanks for reading this! comments? Ladd
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Starkman
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 5/26/2003 5:33 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc,
Well written! Clear, concise and very readable. It's as if you've found the sum of all the discussions, and it makes clear sense.
On another note . . .
quote:
Propositions of the form "x will or will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a settled feature of reality. If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say x will or will not occur, even if x ends up occurring. For at the time the proposition was uttered, the occurrence of x was not a settled aspect of the future – something that will or will not happen – but merely a possible occurrence of the future. The proposition "x will or will not occur" thus did not correspond to reality at the time the proposition was considered. If and when the occurrence of x becomes a settled aspect of the future, then it will be true to say "x will occur."
The bold is SO hard for the average joe-blow (that's me) to figure, because if there are ONLY two alternatives (will or will not occur), then if x might occur, don't the two "will or will not" options insists it will or will not occur? (I've done left the critique. Sorry!) If, however, there is a different flavor that can be thrown in the mix--x might occur, but it might occur in a manner that isn't the same as it will or will not, as if the "will or will not" is one way or the other and x is, say, in-between.
My point: I can see how it's so easy for someone to want to migrate toward "Well, if it might or might not occur, but the only two options WITHIN the might or might not are that it will or will not occur, then it is true that it will or will not occur." But . . . that's just me!
Nicely done, Doc.
Starkman
Am I right? I say, am I right?
Charlie Brown
Edited by - Starkman on 05/26/2003 10:35:38 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 5/26/2003 6:26 PM (GMT -6) | | Greg, I'm very critical of you in many ways. This one might be of welcomed use, though -- or maybe not.
I'm reading your schrift, and quickly conclude that Pinnock is a Calvin in that Calvin searched for but couldn't find the forms to fit the meaning he intuited. That seems to be Pinnock. But then you come on the scene, and you seem by contrast to be constructivist. You expect all the parts you are working with to fit together. (Even in kids toys, the train tracks don't always meet.) But you expect that they will. Fine enough for that. But here's a portion that I would red-flag. It really defines you as hyphaloot'n:
quote:
..there are no possibilities for agents to transition from possibilities into definite actualities...
(from the "To make matters worse" paragraph)
I know what you are saying, but it definitely "says" that your thinking is trapped within the fabric of the thoughts and their logic, rather than being guided by something more overarching. (This may be true; but do you really want to show it?)
Were are the dramatic verbs? "..agents to transition..." = Vague noun engaged in vague action. "there are no possibilities" = passive voice. Get people to follow you.
Critically yours...
Edited by - PotOnWheel on 05/26/2003 11:32:04 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/27/2003 2:46 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
Good stuff. Defining “omniscience” is important and if I were critiquing Pinnock I’d start here too. “God knows all that can be known” is simply no good. But you respond to this definition (2nd paragraph) by claiming that it “requires us to accept that there are things that exist that cannot be known, even by God.” But it doesn’t seem to me that this is why Pinnock’s definition is inadequate. Believing that “God knows all that can be known” does NOT “require us to accept that there are things that exist that cannot be know.” On the contrary, it assumes that if something exists it can be known, and if it can be known God must know it. So your opening comment on why Pinnock’s definition is inadequate doesn’t even seem correct to me.
The reason why Pinnock’s definition is inadequate is because it a) begs the question of what exists, which is part of what is being debated (e.g., do possibilities exist and if so in what sense?), and b) because there are “things” that God doesn’t know (falsehoods for example; see next paragraph).
Your comment, “Among other difficulties, the suggestion that there are things that cannot be known directly contradicts the meaning of omniscience” (3rd paragraph), is I think not accurate either (maybe my brain isn't working today!). “Things”? Well, I can think of some “things” that God doesn’t know directly. He doesn’t know that I am now not writing this response to you. That’s a “thing” which God doesn’t know. So, the suggestion that there are things that cannot be known directly does NOT contradict the meaning of omniscience. In fact, if falsehoods are "things," then the claim "There's nothing God doesn't know" directly contradicts omniscience. Frankly, this is why “God knows all things” and “There’s nothing God doesn’t know” are both inadequat definitions and why a good definition of omniscience will state explicitly God's knowledge of truth-values, something about the "truths" and "falseshoods" God knows (more on this later).
I’m glad you caught Pinnock’s claim that God “limits his knowledge.” I think this is incoherent. It has really confused the other side who tend to assume that Pinnock’s views ARE the open view, but it’s not correct. I understand that Dallas Willard adopts this view, however. Do you know differently re: Willard?
Pinnock refers to the classical view as adopting “exhaustive foreknowledge,” and you catch this too. Super! I hope he makes these needed adjustments in his articulation of the view.
It’s no biggie, but in the 13th paragraph, in the sentence, “What classical Molinists failed to see, however, was that the set of would-counterfactual propositions…” I would change “failed” to “fail.” And in the same paragraph, “…the set of would-counterfactual propositions logical requires…” should read “logically.” But you’re gonna have somebody check it, right? 
In this same paragraph, you have “What classical Molinists failed to see, however, was that the set of would-counterfactual propositions logical requires the category of might-counterfactual propositions.” I know what you mean, but this could be understood as affirming the belief that all true might-counterfactuals point necessarily to the truth of their corresponding would-counterfactuals, which is the opposite of what you're arguing. There is a “may” which makes every true “would-counterfactual" possible, but there are some “may's” which do not contribute to making their corresponding “would-counterfactual” true. I’m not explaining myself well! Actually, I think we HAVE to do something to differentiate between so-called “might-counterfactuals” entailed in all true “would-counterfactuals” and true “might-counterfactuals” not entailed in “would-counterfactuals.” This is confusing, because as you point out, the moment a “would-counterfactual” becomes TRUE, the corresponding “might-counterfactual” becomes FALSE. The two cannot be true at the same time, which is why saying all true “would-counterfactuals” entail true “might-counterfactuals” is confusing. What all true “would-counterfactuals” entail is a PREVIOUSLY TRUE corresponding “might-counterfactual.” If a “would-counterfactual” is TRUE, then it’s only true that the corresponding “might-counterfactual” was ONCE TRUE. This is tricky. I hope you don’t lose any readers here! Arghghgh.
In the 14th paragraph you have “If God knows that it is false that ‘George would eat a cookie if offered,’ God knows that ‘George might not eat a cookie if offered,’ not that ‘George would not eat a cookie if offered.’” I know the logical antithesis of “George would eat a cookie” is “George might not eat a cookie,” but logical antitheses aren’t the only avenue God has for knowing “George would eat a cookie” is false. It just might be true in George’s case that “George would NOT eat a cookie if offered” is what is true. It depends on the circumstances (say, George hates cookies and is allergic to them). So it’s not true that if God knows “George would eat a cookie” is false that God necessarily knows “George might not eat a cookie” is true. Both these may be false. God may know “George would not eat a cookie” is true. Granted, "George would eat a cookie if offered one" is false if the logical antithesis "George may not eat a cookie" if true. But this is not the only way "George would eat a cookie if offered one" may be false. That is, it doesn't follow that if "George would eat a cookie if offered" is false that the logical antithesis is what is true. There is another claim on the square of opposition that is incompatible with both "x would do y in situation z" and it's antithesis "X may not do y in situation Z." And that is "x would not do y in situation z."
In the 16th paragraph you have “The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not imply "would-counterfactuals.” Just wondering. When we discussed this back on the “Bivalence” thread did we conclude that some might-counterfactuals imply would-counterfactuals? Just wondering. Might this need to read “…not all might-counterfactuals imply ‘would-counterfactuals.’” And in the same paragraph, there is “There is nothing logically incoherent in the conception of a world in which George might eat a cookie…” Did you want to say “conception” here or “concept”?
In the 17th paragraph, there’s “Jettison this assumption – which again, is an assumption about the nature of the world God contingently created.” I’d lose the word “contingently” here. It doesn’t contribute to the debate (though it’s true) and it might be misunderstood by some to be saying something about the contingent nature of the might-counterfactuals you’re discussing. Same thing in the immediately following paragraph, par. 18, where you say, “Indeed, unless God has contingently decided to falsify all….” What’s the point in “contingently” here?
End of the 18th paragraph, you have, “On the issue of omniscience, we are in total agreement with classical theists. And Pinnock was misguided in construing the issue otherwise.” I agree. But you nowhere actually state what this supposedly shared definition is. You ought to state for the record what you believe to be this orthodox definition of omniscience. Actually you do this. You say, “God knows the truth value of all propositions.” OK. I’d suggest beginning with Craig’s (since he’s NOT an open theist). Craig says omniscience is defined as: “For any agent x, x is omniscient if for every statement s, if s is true, then x knows that s and does not believe that not-s.” This can be simplified (and you have often stated on the discussion site) as: “A being is omniscient if and only if that being knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” Even better, “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” THAT works for everybody I think (since it comes from somebody whose defintion of omniscience is accepted. The other side in this debate should be made to see that we do in fact affirm an orthodox definition of omniscience. "God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods" is basically the same as your “God knows the truth-value of all propositions,” but it does a better job perhaps of recognizing the positive and negative truth-values that God knows. It unpacks things a bit more, which won't hurt your argument.
Ooops. In the 4th paragraph from the end, you say, “More specifically, the set of all propositions God knows to be true or false and the set of all propositions about possible and actual reality are co-extensive sets.” Can this be said better? I know what you mean by “possible and actual reality,” but your readers may understand this to mean “possibilities are less than ‘real’ or not a part of reality.” I know your whole article argues against this, but still, can it be said more unambiguously? How about something like “...the set of all propositions God knows to be true or false and the set of all propositions describing what ‘will’, ‘would,’ and ‘might’ be are co-extensive sets.” Just a suggestion.
Peace,
Tom 
Edited by - TGB on 05/27/2003 3:31:32 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 5/27/2003 6:41 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/27/2003 9:43 AM (GMT -6) | | Yeah, but YOU'RE the five-star Superstar!
Tom
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 5/27/2003 10:19 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: Yeah, but YOU'RE the five-star Superstar!
No, I'm a F _ _ _ S _ _ _ Pain in the B _ _ _ . | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 5/27/2003 3:12 PM (GMT -6) | | Overall, I like your response, Greg. I have a few comments that, hopefully, will add to Tom's very insightful analysis. In quoting your article, the initial number in parentheses is the paragraph # of your piece.
(2): Pinnock has repeatedly defined omniscience as "knowing all that can be known." As a number of critics have pointed out, this is simply an inadequate definition of omniscience. It requires us to accept that there are things that exist that cannot be known, even by God.
Alan: Pinnock's definition doesn't "require" that there are things that exist that cannot be known by God. At most it leaves the possibility open that there might be some things (i.e., true propositions) that are intrinsically unknowable. As you point out, Pinnock plays into the hands of openness detractors precisely because he doesn't exclude that possibility and in fact positively embraces it.
Re (4): I like your critique of the view that God limits his omniscience. One somewhat tangential question: How does your criticism fit with the kenotic christology that you have espoused? Does God the Son limit his omniscience in the incarnation?
(8): ... there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that some of the future consists of possibilities, not settled realities, on the other.
Alan: I suggest refrasing the last line to read "affirming that some of the future consists of unsettled possibilities". My reason is that "possibilities" and "settled realities" are not, as your wording implies, opposities. All settled realities are possibilities, but not all possibilities are settled realities.
(11): it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will or will not do y" cover the whole of future.
(12): there’s no reason to assume that everything about the future can be expressed in this "will or will not" form.
(13): Would-counterfactuals in this schema are essentially "will or will-not" propositions applied to counterfactual worlds.
(17): ... that led them to assume that "will and will not" ...
(20): Propositions of the form "x will or will not occur" ...
(21): ... we are not accustomed to distinguish between "will and will not" propositions and "might and might not" propositions in this fashion.
Alan: Split these into two propositions, e.g., "will" and "will not", not "will and will not". The quotes shouldn't be around the disjunction, but around the disjuncts.
(14): If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered."
Alan: As Tom, I believe, pointed out, it's not being the case that "George would eat a cookie if offered" does not imply that God does not know that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." The falsity of the first proposition implies the truth of "George might not eat a cookie if offered", but leaves the truth of "George would not eat a cookie if offered" undetermined. Perhaps you should say that God does not necessarily know that "George would not ...".
(18): "independent might-counterfactuals"
Alan: I understand what you mean by this expression, but I think it would be helpful for you to explicitly define what you mean. For example, "independent might-counterfactual" = "a might-counterfactual the truth value of which is not fixed by the truth value of the corresponding would-counterfactual" or "a true might-counterfactual that is not implied by a true would-counterfactual."
Hope that helps, Doc
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/27/2003 5:30 PM (GMT -6) | | This is why I LOVE this board.
Tom, Alan and co. VERY insightful comments that definitely sharpen the points. Mucho gracias. Other comments anyone?
Also, do you agree that this approach -- which leaves bivalence intact -- is better than an approach that calls it into question? I'm not sold on the universality of bivalence, but it seems to me that its rejection on this issue is not necessary.
With much appreciation
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 5/27/2003 5:33 PM (GMT -6) | | Oh yes, Alan, on my critique vis-a-vis the "limited omniscience" idea and kenotic christology: The difference, as I see it, is that kenotic christologists don't hold that the Son took on selective omniscience -- as Pinnock's language suggests. Rather, God took on human (hence limited) knowledge. God changed modes of knowiing from divine to human: he didn't qualify his (unqualifiable) omniscient mode of knowing. It thus avoids the problem of God first exercising unlimited omniscience in order to "know what he doesn't want to know."
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Paul5388
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| Posted 5/27/2003 6:26 PM (GMT -6) | | GregBoyd,
Much of what I have read here is far too abstract for the average reader. It is very difficult to follow the argument(s) without some "for example" or "i.e", something to transfer the idea from the theoretical to the everyday situation. I think it has been pointed out that if George can't eat a cookie (maybe his jaws are wired shut) then George would not eat a cookie if offered, not just might not eat it.
One can know things with the mind that may not be known experientially, i.e God knows what a lie is but does not know how to lie.
God knows the mathematical process of division, but He doesn't know how to divide a number by zero or infinity. Therefore, in this case, He doesn't know what can't be known.
When the 12 spies made their report, is the question "will Israel enter the promised land" or is it really "will Israel enter the promised land now"? Maybe what I'm asking is this, is the question "will" or "will not" all inclusive or should "will at a later date" be included as a possibility?
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Tom
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| Posted 5/27/2003 11:54 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Doc: ... there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that some of the future consists of possibilities, not settled realities, on the other.
Alan: I suggest refrasing the last line to read "affirming that some of the future consists of unsettled possibilities". My reason is that "possibilities" and "settled realities" are not, as your wording implies, opposites. All settled realities are possibilities, but not all possibilities are settled realities.
This is were we need to work on agreeing on how we articulate things. I think Allan’s rephrasing is a bit ambiguous too. “Unsettled possibilities”? Are they “unsettled” because it is not certain whether or not they are “possibilities”? Or are they “unsettled” because how they’ll be resolved is not certain? Obviously the latter. But just calling them “unsettled possibilities” leaves this question unanswered. I’d sew up as many loose ends as possible, Doc. Some people WANT to misunderstand you and will look for ways to construe even your grammar against you. Don’t let ‘em do it!
There is ONE reality about the future, right? Truth is singular. So, true “will be” and true “would be” statements are not more “real” or “settled” than true “might be” statements. See what I’m saying? Are you, Doc, using “settled” to describe the truth-value, or content, of a proposition? If so, then true “will be,” “would be,” and “might be” statements are all equally a “settled” part of future reality. But if “settled” refers to the contingent vs. necessary nature of a future event (i.e., how possibilities will resolve themselves) then only true “will be” statements are a “settled” part of reality. I don’t like this latter use of “settled” because it may suggest to some that possibilities are less than REAL, which works to undermine your argument.
So, I wouldn’t go with either Doc’s “some of the future consists of possibilities, not settled realities” because I prefer to think of possibilities as realities. Nor would I go with Allan’s “affirming that some of the future consists of unsettled possibilities” because since possibilities are real they’re a “settled” part of reality (or better yet, a part of settled reality). Whatever IS real is by definition “settled” in terms of what it really is (it’s ontology).
Am I making any sense guys? Am I just nit-picking? I’m really trying to zero in on the most helpful and unambiguous articulation of this thing. So far all I’m not coming up with much positive help, eh? Oh well.
Doc, how about: “... there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that future reality consists of both possibilities and certainties” (forget the “settled’ thing) or “…consists of what ‘will,’ ‘would,’ and ‘may’ be” or “…is constituted in its entirety by the combined truth-value of all ‘will be,’ ‘would be,’ and ‘may be’ propositions.”
Tom
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 5/28/2003 12:40 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Oh yes, Alan, on my critique vis-a-vis the "limited omniscience" idea and kenotic christology: The difference, as I see it, is that kenotic christologists don't hold that the Son took on selective omniscience -- as Pinnock's language suggests. Rather, God took on human (hence limited) knowledge. God changed modes of knowiing from divine to human: he didn't qualify his (unqualifiable) omniscient mode of knowing. It thus avoids the problem of God first exercising unlimited omniscience in order to "know what he doesn't want to know."
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.
PoW: Pinnock has horrible Christology here!
See this: www.ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF2-07/Npnf2-07-45.htm#P4479_1410500
quote:
XV. Their tenth objection is the ignorance, and the statement that Of the last day and hour knoweth no man, not even the Son Himself, but the Father.80 And yet how can Wisdom be ignorant of anything-that is, Wisdom Who made the worlds, Who perfects them, Who remodels them, Who is the Limit of all things that were made, Who knoweth the things of God as the spirit of a man knows the things that are in him?81 For what can be more perfect than this knowledge? How then can you say that all things before that hour He knows accurately, and all things that are to happen about the time of the end, but of the hour itself He is ignorant? For such a thing would be like a riddle; as if one were to say that he knew accurately all that was in front of the wall, but did not know the wall itself; or that, knowing the end of the day, he did not know the beginning of the night-where knowledge of the one necessarily brings in the other. Thus everyone must see that He knows as God, and knows not as Man;-if one may separate the visible from that which is discerned by thought alone. For the absolute and unconditioned use of the Name "The Son" in this passage, without the addition of whose Son, gives us this thought, that we are to understand the ignorance in the most reverent sense, by attributing it to the Manhood, and not to the Godhead.
followed by...
quote:
XVI. If then this argument is sufficient, let us stop here, and not enquire further. But if not, our second argument is as follows:-Just as we do in all other instances, so let us refer His knowledge of the greatest events, in honour of the Father, to The Cause. And I think that anyone, even if he did not read it in the way that one of our own Students82 did, would soon perceive that not even the Son knows the day or hour otherwise than as the Father does. For what do we conclude from this? That since the Father knows, therefore also does the Son, as it is evident that this cannot be known or comprehended by any but the First Nature. There remains for us to interpret the passage about His receiving commandment,83 and having kept His Commandments, and done always those things that please Him; and further concerning His being made perfect,84 and His exaltation,85 and His learning obedience by the things which He suffered; and also His High Priesthood, and His Oblation, and His Betrayal, and His prayer to Him That was able to save Him from death, and His Agony and Bloody Sweat and Prayer,86 and such like things; if it were not evident to every one that such words are concerned, not with That Nature Which is unchangeable and above all capacity of suffering, but with the passible Humanity. This, then, is the argument concerning these objections, so far as to be a sort of foundation and memorandum for the use of those who are better able to conduct the enquiry to a more complete working out. It may, however, be worth while, and will be consistent with what has been already said, instead of passing over without remark the actual Titles of the Son (there are many of them, and they are concerned with many of His Attributes), to set before you the meaning of each of them, and to point out the mystical meaning of the names.
With Allan, we may find this difficult to imagine, but we CAN conceive of it, eh? | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 5/28/2003 2:46 AM (GMT -6) | | GregBoyd
quote:
In my estimation, one of most significant omissions in the classical tradition’s reflections on the nature of omniscience was that it never considered the distinctive set of what we might call "might-counterfactual" propositions.
First thing I thought of when I saw this was "fuzzy logic". Have you studied fuzzy logic (the field of A.I.) any?
To me, the "will", "will not" is akin to boolean logic whereas your "might-counterfactuals" are akin to fuzzy logic.
Classic two-valued sets and logic (boolean) map a set of propositions to the set [0,1], either false or true. "all or nothing"
Fuzzy sets and logic map a set of propositions to a continuous range of truth values in the interval [0,1], a "weight". This models real life where we speak thus, "George might eat a cookie", "George almost always naps on Sunday", "George sometimes walks the dog".
quote:
The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not imply "would-counterfactuals." To say George might eat a cookie if offered does not imply that George would eat a cookie if offered. And this is enough to establish that there is a non-empty set of might-counterfactual propositions possessing truth value that an omniscient being must know. There is simply no logical reason why we should assume that the set of independent might-counterfactuals– viz. might counterfactuals that aren’t logically encompassed by would-counterfactuals-- is empty. There is nothing logically incoherent in the conception of a world in which George might eat a cookie if offered but in which it’s not true that he would eat a cookie if offered. The essential uniqueness of the openness position lies in its claim that this is precisely the world that God has created.
Fuzzy logic is a superset of boolean logic, it contains any boolean propositions.
Here's an example. Here is a set, S, of things George could do on Sunday.
"eat a cookie", "walk the dog", "get up", "nap", "watch TV", "shave his legs". We'll assign each a truth value from the range [0,1].
S: { ("eat a cookie", 0.85), ("walk the dog", 0.5), ("get up", 1.0), ("nap", 0.75), ("watch TV", 0.2), ("shave his legs", 0.0) }
George usually eats a cookie on Sunday.
George sometimes walks the dog on Sunday.
George always gets up on Sunday.
George usually naps on Sunday.
George almost never watchs TV on Sunday.
George never shaves his legs on Sunday.
Note, the traditional boolean propositions, "George always(will) gets up on Sunday" and "George never (will not) shaves his legs", are contained in the fuzzy set. Your would/will-counterfactuals are contained within the set of might-counterfactuals.
http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/project/ai-repository/ai/html/faqs/ai/fuzzy/part1/faq-doc-2.html
What's interesing is how fuzzy logic took off in Japan more than in the west, due, many think, to the Japanese cultural view of the "vagueness of human nature (all concepts belonging partially to contradictory sets)".
Even though the skies are blue, don't they let the sunshine through?
Edited by - Laika on 05/28/2003 09:16:50 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 5/28/2003 5:23 PM (GMT -6) | |
TGB: Doc, how about: “... there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that future reality consists of both possibilities and certainties” (forget the “settled’ thing) or “…consists of what ‘will,’ ‘would,’ and ‘may’ be” or “…is constituted in its entirety by the combined truth-value of all ‘will be,’ ‘would be,’ and ‘may be’ propositions.”
Doc: I used to contrast "possibilities" and 'certainties", but it was pointed out to me that I'm comparing a logical modality with a psychological state, and in such a way that I'm begging the conclusion I want to establish. But I also can't distinguish "possibilities" with "actualities" since I don't want to say that part of the future is ACTUAL. (In point of fact, all the "settled" parts of the future are ALSO somewhat "unsettled" in-so-far as no individual thing or event is what it is in vacum. It's identity is its RELATION to the whole, so if the whole is somewhat "unsettled", so is each future individual thing -- even if its sheer FACTICITY is settled. In other words, you're right in pointing out the weakness of the contrast between "possibilities" and "settled.") Maybe your suggestion to just stick with "will" "will not" "would" "would not" "may" or "maynot" is the best approach.
Now Laika, I don't know much about "Fuzzy logic." I looked into it a little bit a few years back with initial excitement and hopefulness. But, while I found myself agreeing with its basic thrust -- indeed, I think you're right in pointing out that talk about "might counterfactuals" involves "fuzzy logic" -- I also quickly came to see that by itself it didn't answer any of the problems I was asking. More specifically, it didn't help me solve the problem of reconciling omniscience with an open future.
What it DID do was cause me to question the universal applicability of bivalence... a "solution" to the problem I've not totally disregarded. But I think reconciling omniscience without abandoning bivalence is a more conservative and more appealing approach. Hence this is what I'm trying to do.
Blessings
Greg
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 5/28/2003 6:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Okay TGB, Alan et al... Here's the second draft. I've tired to incorporate the criticisms and suggestions. What do you think?
thanks again for all your help.
A Critique
Pinnock’s defense of the "most moved mover" view of God in general and of the open view of God and the future in particular has been increasingly strong throughout his career. He would be the first to admit, however, that it has not been without its shortcomings. I would like to conclude this essay by offering a critique of what I believe is the greatest shortcoming of Pinnock’s defense of the open view and suggest how it could be strengthened.
Qualifying Omniscience. Pinnock has repeatedly defined omniscience as "knowing all that can be known." As a number of critics have pointed out, this is simply an inadequate definition of omniscience. It leaves open the possibility that there are things that exist (including propositions) that cannot be known, even by God. While I’m sympathetic to Pinnock’s concern to reconcile omniscience with an open future, I’m also convinced that this is not the way to do it.
Among other difficulties, the suggestion that there are things that cannot be known directly contradicts the meaning of omniscience. To say that God is all knowing (omniscient) says something about God’s knowledge and something about what God knows: namely, he knows all things. God is omniscient if and only if he knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. If an omnscient being exists, therefore, there simply can’t be things that are intrinsically unknowable or propositions the truth value of which is unknowable.
To make matters worse, Pinnock has sometimes spoken of God limiting his omniscience – as though God could know all things if he wanted, including future free acts. Among other problems, it is not clear how God could know where to limit his omniscience unless he first exercised unlimited omniscience. He would have to first know what it is he doesn’t want to know in order to shield himself from knowing it! Moreover, even if this could be rendered intelligible, its not at all clear what it would accomplish. How would God choosing not to know something he could know ensure freedom? If the definiteness of future acts eternally exist, there are no open possibilities for agents to transition from possibilities into definite actualities -- whether this eternal definitenss is known by God or not.
On a related note, Pinnock has at times contrasted the open view with the view that God possesses "limitless foreknowledge" or "exhaustive foreknowledge," thereby conceding that his view entails that God has limited and non-exhaustive foreknowledge. This too suggests that the future would be knowable if only God was not limited in what he knows. Other times Pinnock has referred to the classical view of omniscience that he opposes as "strong omniscience"– as though he and other openness theologians advocated "weak omniscience." Such ill-advised and unnecessary ways of speaking clearly play into the hands of openness detractors who are already inclined to believe that the God of openness theology is a weak and limited deity made in humanity’s own image.
Still other times Pinnock has referred to the classical view as embracing "total omniscience" – as though he was advocating a limited omniscience. But again, an "all" that is limited is no longer an "all," so an omniscience that is limited is no longer omniscience. And finally, Pinnock has sometimes spoken of God as a "learner" in the sense that he "enjoys continuing to get to know [the creation] in a love that never changes." This way of speaking reinforces the impression that God doesn’t know all things from the start, but has to slowly acquire his knowledge as he gets to know his creation through a learning process.
Now, people should in fairness cut Pinnock and other open theists a certain amount of slack in their phraseology. While defenders of the classical view have had centuries of discussion to hammer out and fine tune their positions, open theists are at the very beginning of this process. The modern day openness movement is not yet two decades old, so it would be unreasonable to expect from us a fully developed, perfectly nuanced, position. At the same time, it is only by critiquing the way we open theists express ourselves that we will be able to fully develop and nuance our position. In this light, it has to be said that the above cited ways Pinnock espouses his position are unfortunate at best. It has made his otherwise strong position an easy target for opponents of the openness position.
Omniscience and Might-Counterfactuals. Even more importantly, the attempt to preserve omniscience while affirming the openness of the future by speaking of it as "limited" or "weak" is altogether unnecessary. For, as I shall now show, there is absolutely no incompatibility between affirming that God is all knowing in the strongest sense of the term, on the one hand, and affirming that God knows some of the future as what "might" happen rather than what "will" happen, on the other. Indeed, I shall argue that affirming omniscience logically requires us to affirm that he knows the truth value of all propositions expressing what may and may not take place.
The problem Pinnock wants to resolve can be most succinctly stated as follows:
PI: If God is omniscient, he must know the truth value of all propositions.
P2: Propositions about future free acts are either true or false (the principle of bivalence).
P3: God, being omniscient, knows the truth value of propositions about future free acts.
Conclusion: God possesses knowledge of all future free acts.
As we have seen, Pinnock attempts to avoid this conclusion by qualifying God’s omniscience, thus rejecting P1. A better approach, I submit, is to accept the validity of this argument but show how it doesn’t entail that God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge of all that shall come to pass.
To begin, it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will do y" or "x will not do y" cover the whole of future. But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally and exhaustively definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.
But if we don’t make this metaphysical assumption – an assumption, note, which is strictly about the nature of the world God created, not about the scope of God’s knowledge – then we immediately see that there’s no reason to assume that everything about the future can be expressed in this "will" or "will not" form. If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of things that "may" or "may not" happen. Propositions that express these "maybes" must be included as among the propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know.
In my estimation, one of most significant omissions in the classical tradition’s reflections on the nature of omniscience was that it never considered the distinctive set of what we might call "might-counterfactual" propositions. To be sure, Molinists considered the set of "would-counterfactual" propositions and thus held that God not only knows what will and will not happen, but also what would happen in every alternative possible world (God’s "middle knowledge"). Would-counterfactuals in this schema are essentially "will" and "will-not" propositions applied to counterfactual worlds. What classical Molinists fail to see, however, is that the set of would-counterfactual propositions logically requires the category of might-counterfactual propositions. For the negation of a would-counterfactual is not a would-not counterfactual, but a might-not counterfactual.
If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." God may of course also know that George would not eat a cookie if offered, but if he does so, this knowledge is distinct from his simply knowing the falsity of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered."
The ramifications of this insight are significant. For it means that there is a set of counterfactual propositions the truth value of which an omniscient God must know but which have not been given serious consideration in the church’s theological tradition. If God knows would counterfactuals, he must by logical necessity know might-counterfactuals.
Independent Might-Counterfactuals. Now, one could argue that though would-counterfactuals entail might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals don’t constitute a distinct set of propositions God must know, precisely because they are already entailed by the would-counterfactuals. That is, if George would eat a cookie if offered, it is certainly the case that George might eat a cookie if offered. Hence, in knowing the truth-value of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered," God already knows the truth-value of the proposition "George might eat a cookie if offered." Hence, it could be argued, there is no reason to suppose that God knows, or even could know, any of reality as a "maybe."
The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals necessarily imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not necessarily imply would-counterfactuals. To say George might eat a cookie if offered does not necessarily imply that George would eat a cookie if offered. We might call these might-counterfactual propositions whose truth value is not fixed by corresponding would-counterfactuals "independent might-counterfactuals."
There is nothing intrinsically incoherent about this class of independent might-counterfactuals. No contradiction is generated by postulating a state of affairs in which God knows George might eat a cookie if offered but not that George would eat a cookie if offered. And, this being the case, we must grant that independent might-counterfactuals constitute a distinct set of propositions the truth value of which an omniscient being must know.
It was simply a metaphysical assumption about the eternally and exhaustively definite nature of reality on the part of classical theologians that led them to assume that "will" and "will not" ( and, by extension to possible worlds, would and would-not) propositions exhaust the set of propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know. Jettison this assumption – which again, is an assumption about the nature of the world God created, not an assumption about the scope of omniscience – and one sees that P2 must include propositions about what "might" and "might not" happen.
This consideration establishes that there is no logical difficulty involved in affirming that an omniscient God knows some of the future as a "maybe." Indeed, unless God has contingently decided to falsify all independent might-counterfactuals by creating an eternally and exhaustively definite world, then an omniscient God must by logical necessity know some of the future as a "maybe". Indeed, even if God decided to create an eternally and exhaustively definite world, he would still have to know the true value of independent "might-counterfactuals." It’s just that he would in this case know them all as false.
Whether or not God created a world in which some independent might-counterfactuals are true is the real issue between openness and classical theologians. But note, this is not a debate about omniscience, but about the nature of creation On the issue of omniscience, we are in total agreement with classical theists. Pinnock was simply misguided in construing the issue otherwise.
What "Will" and "Might" Be True. In the alternative framework I am proposing, God is omniscient in the strongest (and really only) meaning of the term. God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. The set of all propositions God knows to be true and the set of propositions that correspond to reality are identical sets.
Propositions of the form "x will "or "x will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a definite feature of reality. If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say "x will occur" or "will not occur," even if x ends up occurring. For at the time the proposition was uttered, the occurrence of x was not a definite aspect of the future – something that will or will not happen – but merely a possible occurrence (hence, possible non-occurrence) of the future. The propositions "x will occur" or "x will not occur" thus did not correspond to reality at the time the proposition was considered. If and when the occurrence of x becomes a definite aspect of the future, then it will be true to say "x will occur."
This proposal will undoubtedly strike some as paradoxical, for we are not accustomed to distinguishing between "will" and "will not" propositions and "might" and "might not" propositions in this fashion. Conventional language rarely requires us to, on the one hand, and we are by tradition accustomed to assuming an exhaustively definite view of reality, on the other. I suspect this is why Pinnock fell into speaking about future free acts as unknowable realities – as though the definite facticity of these future acts in some sense already existed, but was unknowable. Yet, if we grant that philosophy often has to make distinctions that conventional language isn’t accustomed to make, and if we see that the assumption that reality is exhaustively and eternally definite is a simply an assumption, not entailed by the omniscience of God, we will see that the distinction holds, and that it is important.
One may reject Pinnock’s open view of the future, but despite his own occasional ill-advised expressions to the contrary, they cannot do so on the grounds that his view undermines omniscience. The distinction between what will occur and what may occur is precisely the kind of a distinction an omniscient God would – and must – make.
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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¡Que Payaso!
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| Posted 5/28/2003 10:38 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc,
Are you interested in correcting typos or is that for later? Here are a few that caught my eye.
(11)
To begin, it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will do y" or "x will not do y" cover the whole of [the] future. But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally and exhaustively definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.
(19)
It was simply a metaphysical assumption about the eternally and exhaustively definite nature of reality on the part of classical theologians that led them to assume that "will" and "will not" ( and, by extension to possible worlds, would and would-not) propositions exhaust the set of propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know. Jettison this assumption – which again, is an assumption about the nature of the world God created, not an assumption about the scope of omniscience – and one sees that P2 must include propositions about what "might" and "might not" happen.
(20)
This consideration establishes that there is no logical difficulty involved in affirming that an omniscient God knows some of the future as a "maybe." Indeed, unless God has contingently decided to falsify all independent might-counterfactuals by creating an eternally and exhaustively definite world, then an omniscient God must by logical necessity know some of the future as a "maybe". Indeed, even if God decided to create an eternally and exhaustively definite world, he would still have to know the true value of independent "might-counterfactuals." It’s just that he would in this case know them all as false.
(21)
Whether or not God created a world in which some independent might-counterfactuals are true is the real issue between openness and classical theologians. But note, this is not a debate about omniscience, but about the nature of creation On the issue of omniscience, we are in total agreement with classical theists. Pinnock was simply misguided in construing the issue otherwise.
(23)
Propositions of the form "x will "or "x will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a definite feature of reality. If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say "x will occur" or "will not occur," even if x ends up occurring. For at the time the proposition was uttered, the occurrence of x was not a definite aspect of the future – something that will or will not happen – but merely a possible occurrence (hence, possible non-occurrence) of the future. The propositions "x will occur" or "x will not occur" thus did not correspond to reality at the time the proposition was considered. If and when the occurrence of x becomes a definite aspect of the future, then it will be true to say "x will occur."
(24)
This proposal will undoubtedly strike some as paradoxical, for we are not accustomed to distinguishing between "will" and "will not" propositions and "might" and "might not" propositions in this fashion. Conventional language rarely requires us to, on the one hand, and we are by tradition accustomed to assuming an exhaustively definite view of reality, on the other. I suspect this is why Pinnock fell into speaking about future free acts as unknowable realities – as though the definite facticity of these future acts in some sense already existed, but was unknowable. Yet, if we grant that philosophy often has to make distinctions that conventional language isn’t accustomed to make, and if we see that the assumption that reality is exhaustively and eternally definite is a simply an assumption, not entailed by the omniscience of God, we will see that the distinction holds, and that it is important.
El Payaso 
"I don't know half of you half as well as I should like; and I like less than half of you half as well as you deserve." - Bilbo Baggins
Edited by - payaso on 05/29/2003 03:39:14 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/29/2003 2:13 AM (GMT -6) | | I must need a break. I sat and read and re-read. Then every time I had a thought and started to write, I’d lose it. Who knows whether or not I’m making sense now?
Paragraph 2: Doc: “It leaves open the possibility that there are things that exist (including propositions) that cannot be known, even by God.”
Tom: I just don’t see that Pinnock’s “God knows everything that is knowable” leaves open this possibility. Show me. It rather excludes this possibility. The problem is that though it excludes this possibility it leaves unanswered the question of what is knowable.
Paragraph 11: Doc: “But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally and exhaustively definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.”
Tom: The two “definitely’s” in parentheses might be understood as confusing psychological categories with logical ones. “Definitely” is superfluous anyway here, right? If something “will” happen, by definition it will definitely happen. That’s what “will happen” means. I’d definitely (Ha! I used it!) remove “definite” from “…to these definite realities are either….” It’s clear enough and makes your point to simply say, “…propositions that correspond to these realities are either true or false.” This is simply the Principal of Bivalence.
Paragraph 12: Doc: “If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of…”
Tom: As open theists and OTHERS claim. We’re not the only people arguing the dynamic theory of time, for example. We just reason (we think) more consistently from this view of the world to what must be true about God’s relationship to the world. But we’re not the only one’s arguing that the world is what we think it is. For example, Craig would agree with our view of the “world” (creation, time, true becoming, libertarian free will, etc.), he just disagrees that this view of the world logically requires the open view.
I don’t know. I’d hate to pass up an opportunity to point out that there are others who are considered orthodox who agree with us on the nature of creation (even if they are less consistent in their conclusions about what this means for the God-world relationship). So I’d say something like, “If the world is as open theists (and many others who affirm the dynamic theory of time) claim, then it follows logically that the future in part consists of….” Not sure, but that’s just a thought.
Paragraph 14: Doc: If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." God may of course also know that George would not eat a cookie if offered, but if he does so, this knowledge is distinct from his simply knowing the falsity of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered.
Tom: This still needs help. I’m having trouble following how this supports you. I don’t see how if “George would eat a cookie if offered” is false one must logically conclude anything regarding the truth-value of “George might not eat a cookie if offered.”
Paragraph 17: Doc: “The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals necessarily imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not necessarily imply would-counterfactuals.”
Tom: But might-counterfactuals DO imply would-counterfactuals. This may be the problem with trying to establish two sets of might-counterfactuals: one entailed in would-counterfactuals and one independent.
For every might-counterfactual there is a corresponding would-counterfactual. It’s the relative truth-values that you’re arguing about. All true might-counterfactuals necessarily require a set of would-counterfactuals, it just requires that those would-counterfactuals be false. And a false might-counterfactual logically requires a would-counterfactual (which may be either true or false, but which exists nonetheless and the truth-value of which God knows). So, true might-counterfactuals are “independent,” yes, but not independent of implying or requiring a corresponding set of would-counterfactuals. What true might-counterfactuals are independent of is the need to imply, or more accurately, to TURN INTO true-would counterfactuals.
Fourth paragraph from the end: Doc: “The set of all propositions God knows to be true and the set of propositions that correspond to reality are identical sets.”
Tom: It’s not only the set of propositions God knows to be “true” which is identical with the set of propositions that corresponds to reality; it’s the set of ALL propositions God knows, both true AND false, which is identical to the set of propositions that correspond to reality that are identical.
Third paragraph from the end: Doc: “Propositions of the form "x will "or "x will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a definite feature of reality.”
Tom: Ooooo. I’d change this to “…is a determined feature of reality.” Possibilities are a definite feature of reality too.
Third paragraph from the end: Doc: “….the occurrence of x was not a definite aspect of the future…”
Tom: This too. I’d change it to “…was not a determined aspect of the future.”
Tom
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GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/29/2003 10:03 AM (GMT -6) | | Thanks Tom. It's getting there. You're being extremely helpful in this.
Paragraph 2: Doc: “It leaves open the possibility that there are things that exist (including propositions) that cannot be known, even by God.”
Tom: I just don’t see that Pinnock’s “God knows everything that is knowable” leaves open this possibility. Show me. It rather excludes this possibility. The problem is that though it excludes this possibility it leaves unanswered the question of what is knowable.
Doc The meaning of any concept is contingent upon the meaningfulness of its contrast. To say "God knows ALL THAT IS KNOWABLE" presupposes the meaningfulness of there being things, or truths, that are NOT knowable. If all things ARE knowlable, saying God knows all that is knowable is redundant.
Paragraph 11: Doc: “But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally and exhaustively definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.”
Tom: The two “definitely’s” in parentheses might be understood as confusing psychological categories with logical ones. “Definitely” is superfluous anyway here, right?
Doc[/b[]. Certainly is psychological. Definitely is not. It IS superfluous, except for the fact that many miss the implicit definiteness of "will" and "will not." I want to contrast the exhaustively definite view of reality with the partially indefinite (open possibilities) view of reality.
Tom: As open theists and OTHERS claim. We’re not the only people arguing the dynamic theory of time, for example. We just reason (we think) more consistently from this view of the world to what must be true about God’s relationship to the world.
Doc But anyone who holds to exhaustively definite foreknowledge holds that reality is exhaustively and eternally definite (definitely this way and definitely not that way), and hence denies that God knows any of reality in terms of "maybe."
Paragraph 14: Doc: If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." God may of course also know that George would not eat a cookie if offered, but if he does so, this knowledge is distinct from his simply knowing the falsity of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered.
Tom: This still needs help. I’m having trouble following how this supports you. I don’t see how if “George would eat a cookie if offered” is false one must logically conclude anything regarding the truth-value of “George might not eat a cookie if offered.”
Doc Because "George might not eat a cookie" is the logical antithesis of "George would eat a cookie" and hence the minimal amount God must know in knowing the falsity of "George would eat a cookie."
Paragraph 17: Doc: “The argument fails, however. For while would-counterfactuals necessarily imply might-counterfactuals, might-counterfactuals do not necessarily imply would-counterfactuals.”
Tom: But might-counterfactuals DO imply would-counterfactuals. This may be the problem with trying to establish two sets of might-counterfactuals: one entailed in would-counterfactuals and one independent.
Doc As I noted in the counterfactual thread, I think you're right about this. Which means that the case for Neo-Molinism is even stronger. Mights stand on the same logical footting as woulds.
Fourth paragraph from the end: Doc: “The set of all propositions God knows to be true and the set of propositions that correspond to reality are identical sets.”
Tom: It’s not only the set of propositions God knows to be “true” which is identical with the set of propositions that corresponds to reality; it’s the set of ALL propositions God knows, both true AND false, which is identical to the set of propositions that correspond to reality that are identical.
Doc I originally had true and false, but decided to abbreviate it to just truth, emphasizing the correspondence theory of truth. I mean, it is a bit odd to see false propositions corresponding to reality... though logically, they do. I think you're right, however. It is more accurate to say "true and false."
Third paragraph from the end: Doc: “Propositions of the form "x will "or "x will not occur" are true if and only if the occurrence or non-occurrence of x is a definite feature of reality.”
Tom: Ooooo. I’d change this to “…is a determined feature of reality.” Possibilities are a definite feature of reality too.
Doc I wouldn't. To say "determined" now opens the door for all the Arminian objections. It introduces causation into a point that is strictly logical. The issue is definiteness, settledness, facticity... how it GOT that way is not the point.
Third paragraph from the end: Doc: “….the occurrence of x was not a definite aspect of the future…”
Tom: This too. I’d change it to “…was not a determined aspect of the future.”
Doc I think this is ill-advised, for the above stated reasons.
VERY HELPFUL MY FRIEND. We're doing some cutting edge stuff here ya know bro. The ramifications of all this are HUGE.
Greg
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Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 5/30/2003 4:11 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Mights stand on the same logical footing as woulds.
Are there ever any false might-counterfactuals?
http://www.gregboyd.org/gbfront/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=2130
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 6:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika: Are there ever any false might-counterfactuals?
Tom: Tons of 'em. Turn over every true "will" (and "will not") and "would" (and "would not") and you'll find a false might-counterfactual.
Tom
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Ochuk
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 102
| Posted 5/30/2003 8:45 AM (GMT -6) | | Hi Greg! I'm an intermediate reader of of theology. I know the rest of the people on this baord are really smart, but I'm like the average person who reads your books (God at War, Saten & PoE, God ofthe Possible.) I think you have been the clearest of all the OV theist scholars out there and I really admire your work.
However this part of your article lost me:
quote:
To begin, it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will or will not do y" cover the whole of future. But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.
Now I can't say you weren't making sense here, but it was a little to over my head. If you want more people to see the clarity of the OV position, you need to communicate in a way that people can understand.
Great article! This really helped me understand some of the problems with Pinnocks work.
Ps, if you've already edited this, I'm sorry.
Thanks Greg!
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 5/30/2003 2:50 PM (GMT -6) | | It's looking better, Greg, but I still see some room for improvement.
quote:
If the definiteness of future acts eternally exist, there are no open possibilities for agents to transition from possibilities into definite actualities--whether this eternal definitenss is known by God or not.
I'm wondering if there might not be a better way to say this. It also seems to need some unpacking. What, for example, does "definiteness of future acts" mean?
I suggest something like "If propositions describing the future choices that agents actually make are eternally true, then it seems that the future is eternally and exhausitively settled. And it is difficult to reconcile that with free will.[footnote to a source that argues that EDF implies fatalism, e.g., Hick]"?
quote:
And finally, Pinnock has sometimes spoken of God as a "learner" in the sense that he "enjoys continuing to get to know [the creation] in a love that never changes." This way of speaking reinforces the impression that God doesn’t know all things from the start, but has to slowly acquire his knowledge as he gets to know his creation through a learning process.
Isn't Pinnock right here? After all, the open view is committed to the notions that temporal becoming is real (not just a matter of perspective) and that the way in which things become is not entirely settled in advance. A consequence is that God learns in the sense that as time advances and choices are made what He foreknew as a "maybe" he comes to know as a settled "is".
quote:
The problem Pinnock wants to resolve can be most succinctly stated as follows:
PI: If God is omniscient, he must know the truth value of all propositions.
P2: Propositions about future free acts are either true or false (the principle of bivalence).
P3: God, being omniscient, knows the truth value of propositions about future free acts.
Conclusion: God possesses knowledge of all future free acts.
I think you need to refine this. For starters, P2 isn't doing any work here. P3 follows from P1 alone. Furthermore, without some unpacking there is nothing obviously problematic about the conclusion, so it is not clear why Pinnock would be concerned to "solve" this problem.
I suggest you rewrite the syllogism as follows:
P1: The propositions (A) "agent x will do y in z" and (A*) "agent x will not do y in z" are logical contradictories.
P2: For any pair of logical contradictories, one is true and the other is false. (law of non-contradiction)
C1: Therefore, either (A) is true or (A*) is true. (P1 and P2)
P3: Being omniscient, God knows the truth value of all propositions.
C2: Therefore, God has exhaustive knowledge of what any agent x will do in the future. (C1 and P3)
P4: If God knows what an agent will do, then that agent is not free.
C3: Therefore, there are no free agents other than God. (C2 and P4)
This is more elaborate, but also much more exact and logically tight. On this construal, Pinnock wants to deny P3, you want to deny P1, and Craig et al. want to deny P4.
quote:
If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of things that "may" or "may not" happen.
You need to qualify this further since everyone (including Craig, Helm, etc.) affirms that the future consists of things that may or may not happen. The departure of open theism lies in the claim that there are genuine "maybes" that do not follow from true "will bes". I suggest "If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of things that "may" or "may not" happen, where it is not the case that they either definitely will or will not happen."
quote:
If God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." God may of course also know that George would not eat a cookie if offered, but if he does so, this knowledge is distinct from his simply knowing the falsity of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered."
I suggest rewriting this as follows:
The logical contradictory of "George would eat a cookie if offered" is not "George would not eat a cookie if offered" but "George might not eat a cookie if offered." So if God knows the falsity of "George would eat ..." it does not follow that he knows the truth of "George would not eat ..." Both may be false, for they are contraries, not contradictories.
quote:
The set of all propositions God knows to be true and the set of propositions that correspond to reality are identical sets.
Perhaps "coextensive sets" rather than "identical sets".
quote:
If in reality x may or may not occur, it is, strictly speaking, false to say "x will occur" or "will not occur," even if x ends up occurring.
Not so. It does not follow from the truth of the "may" or "may not" claim that "will" and "will not" are false. If that were so, then "will" could not imply "may" as you state above. Given the truth of "may" or "may not", the corresponding "will" and "will not" claims are logically indeterminate, i.e., they may be true and the may be false--we just don't have enough information to infer one or other if all we know is "may" or "may not".
Hope that helps,
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