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Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 516
| Posted 6/26/2001 6:07 PM (GMT -6) |   | Mephi2K
11/04/00 5:50 PM
Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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Dear Room,
Look at me, y'all. I get sidetracked so easily. LOL It's my bad. I love chatting and talking theology. BUT... We're still dealing primarily with the plausibility of Open View Theism. The topics of Jeremiah and the problem of evil are INDEED important, no doubt. But I think I want to refer back to what is the meat of the situation, at least in my mind.
In my response to Dr. Boyd's gracious response, I said this:
"As I perceive it, your main three things that are allowing you to hold to your view are these:
1) the so-called existence of "free will"
2) the non-determinism that results from free will
3) the philosophically problematic "necessary outworking" that results from determinism"
I then came up with these 3 conclusions (The challenges that are implicit there, I will make explicit in the brackets):
Conclusion: Unless CLEAR evidence that is consistent with Open View Theism's cosmological and theological presuppositions is forthcoming, the "free will" concept must be considered refuted.
[Challenge: Provide adequate definition and elaboration of "free will" that is consistent with an omniscient, time-based God]
Conclusion: Determinism is a fact of human existence. Human agency and self-efficacy are compatible with determinism. Therefore, my model is very appropriate and should be accepted, on those bases. Unless good reason can be given to show how determinism does NOT exist in human experience, any argumentation against determinism is considered refuted.
[Challenge: Provide any type of good evidence that shows that human agency cannot be considered deterministic in any context.]
Conclusion: As sufficient and necessary causation appears in determinism (which is allowable), the "necessary outworking" argument is very much refuted!
[Challenge: Provide any evidence that ONLY necessary causation is possible when speaking of God having exhaustive knowledge of the future]
I would like anyone or everyone here to answer these challenges. These are the "bolts" that, for me, make the Open View completely implausible. If I were you, I'd REALLY focus on the free will thing. That seems to be the most important cog here. Please note that the concept of human agency will be very important here. A good post to read for this would be my 11/02/00 8:17 AM post named "Dare I Say Check?" which is under the topic "It's VOTING time, Amigo" (Note to Beso: This would be a great place to apply that Taylor person. Any and all information you can bring to bear here will be appreciated.) Any information from the "Mental Exercise" and "Amigo" topics that you find useful to this task, please use at will.
Things to Remember:
1) The suppositions of God posited are that of Open View Theism: God in time who knows actuality and possibility exhaustively. Wipe the words "Classical theism" from your mind.
2) Free will is distinct from human agency. Note this in your answer.
3) Deal explicitly with the challenges, please. Let's try to be as concise as possible
4) If you need any clarification on individual terms, please email me and I'll send you that. I'd rather do that away from the board.
5) My arguments are not really biblically based. Therefore, there is no need to bring Scripture to bear here. If you want to mention Biblical themes tangentially from your MAIN thoughts, that's ok. But please don't use Scripture as the mainstay of your argumentation here.
This is my attempt to keep us all on the task at hand: judging the plausibility of Open View Theism, taking all things into consideration. As convinced as I am in my position, (remember how I said it had evaporated? ), I am honestly willing to listen to good, cogent argumentation in favor of your view. I hope this doesn't sound to impersonal or anything. I just wanted to keep the main thing the main thing here.
Warmest Regards,
Mephi2K
PS: The vote is STILL on...
Question for voting: Is Open View Theism philosophically untenable?
What makes something "philosophically untenable"?
1) internal inconsistency
2) violation of the laws of logic
3) At least one of the fundamental premises or assumptions is false.
(This is not an all-inclusive list)
Y'all already know what I'm thinking so far...
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
springs
(Forum Moderator)
11/04/00 10:15 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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Greetings,
Thanks to all for this stimulating discussion. It has been a good read.
Mephi wrote:
"[Challenge: Provide adequate definition and elaboration of "free will" that is consistent with an omniscient, time-based God]"
I think that's what they were doing.
"[Challenge: Provide any type of good evidence that shows that human agency cannot be considered deterministic in any context.]"
hmm there's that 'human agency'term again. Isn't comparing that to free will like comparing apples to oranges?
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
11/04/00 10:20 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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Several brief responses to Mephi. * What does LOL stand for?
* Note in your essay that you letting your philosophical convictions drive your theology, not Scripture. It's seems to me that "Sealed" was right in bringing Jeremiah 18 and other Scriptures into the discussion. Philosophy is important, but I'd hate to think that we got "sidetracked" by doing exegesis.
* You seem to think that the burden of proof lies on those of us who believe in free will to render it philosophically defensible, rather than folks like you who deny it. I disagree. We all EXPERIENCE ourselves as self-determining agents. We all ACT and DELIBERATE between decisions presupposing the conviction that we are free. And we all EXCUSE people of moral responsiblity if it can be shown that the ultimate cause for their behavior was outside themselves. (Hence defense attorney's, for example, try to show genetic or environmental factors that ASSUAGE the guilt of their clients. On this basis, we should ordinarily assume that if ALL is determined, NOONE is morally responsible for what they do). If you deny all of this, it seems to me that the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate how YOUR view is intelligible. I'll make it simple for you. Supply as with an analogy to help us understand how an agent could be exhaustively determined by forces outside of himself and yet be responsible for what he does? I grant that all agents are INFLUENCED by outside factors. But we need an analogy for understanding how an agent could be DETERMINED, and yet be responsible. Looking forward to your reply. Greg
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
beso
11/04/00 10:26 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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What's up with this "vote" stuff Mephi? A "vote" is needed when you want to reach a verdic. I thought this was a DISCUSSION room? I, like many people out there, am in process on this. I don't want "winners" and "losers." I want "contributors" to help me think through this stuff. I like you're contributions a lot. But don't ask me to vote for you.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Springs
11/04/00 10:41 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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Thanks for the contribution Doc. Wow. How do you do that?
I'm with Dr. Boyd and Sealed we need scripture to be a mainstay.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Springs
11/04/00 10:50 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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I agree with Beso. Discussion is the key. Although Sealed objected to generalizations I was surprised to see the words 'smacks' and 'half baked' early on.
It will be interesting to see Mephi answer the professor instead of the other way around.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
11/05/00 9:40 AM
Analogies for Dr. Boyd
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To Beso and Springs:
Oh, my stars. I didn't know the voting thing was going to be such a sticking point. It was just a gimmick. The evangelical poll on the main page of Christus Victor spurned my imagination, so I did it. The chief thing about this IS discussion and group illumination, Beso. Sorry it's bothering you. And about Scripture. Hear what I'm saying. I'm not saying that Scripture is not important. Of course, it is. But the bottom line is that the open view uses biblical, scientific, and philosophical arguments for its plausibility as an option. Any of these things can be disputed, and I am disputing the philosophical stuff. Again, Scripture is important, as I said before, but for the purposes of this, it's not really that integral to these arguments.
To Dr Boyd:
Thanks for all your interaction, sir. I really appreciate your interest and input. So, the burden of proof is on ME, now is it? hmmm...no problem.
RESPONSES TO STATEMENTS:
Dr. Boyd says:
"We all EXPERIENCE ourselves as self-determining agents. We all ACT and DELIBERATE between decisions presupposing the conviction that we are free."
Mephi:
Sir, I will contend that this experience is human agency, and that human agency is within the sphere of determinism. This will be illustrated in the analogies.
Dr. Boyd says:
"On this basis, we should ordinarily assume that if ALL is determined, NO ONE is morally responsible for what they do). If you deny all of this, it seems to me that the burden of proof is on YOU to demonstrate how YOUR view is intelligible"
Mephi:
I've noticed something, sir. Your use of determinism is quite limited, in my opinion. It's obvious that you are talking about scientific determinism, which is only ONE distinction withing determinism qua determinism. This will be addressed in the analogies.
Dr. Boyd says:
"Supply us with an analogy to help us understand how an AGENT could be exhaustively determined by forces OUTSIDE OF HIMSELF and yet be responsible for what he does?" (emphases mine)
Mephi:
This is a wrong concept...and the one most classicalists try to defend. By definition, agency presumes self-efficacy. What does this mean? There is an INTERACTION between the self and the forces outside the self. In other words, the agent is seen to CAUSE events as well as be impacted by them. Quoting Tom Morris again,
"On this view of human freedom, our place in the universe is quite distinctive. We can in fact intiate wholly new chains of causal action...We are not puppets of fate, or of logic, or of science. We can choose our own destinies"
The issue is not about exhaustive determination of forces OUTSIDE the self. That sets up the whole thing for failure. The issue is exhaustive determination by ALL objects of causation without qualification. Thus I will do this:
"Supply you with an analogy to help you understand how an AGENT's acts could be exhaustively determined by ALL causative forces bearing upon him and yet be responsible for what he does"
MY PERSPECTIVE:
What I Deny:
I deny that human beings can have a thought, action, or any such thing that is not conditioned exhaustively by determining conditions in its immediate antecedents. These antecedents are twofold: 1)external factors 2) the ontological state of the human being.
So What Does My View Say:
Before the creative event, God was fully aware of all possibilities that can exist. God knew exhaustively all determining conditions of the initial creative event, and he also knew all possibilities that arise from those conditions. These conditions includes all factors external and INTERNAL to human beings, including the immaterial substance of humanity called the 'spirit' Because of this fact, God is able to perfectly predict, with NO error, what will occur from the interaction of all the determining conditions. Thus, creating an effect of exhaustively knowing the future. This prediction incorporates necessary AND sufficient causation.
THE ANALOGIES:
Each of these analogies will deal with the principle of Universal Causality which has two premises:
1) Every event has a cause
2) Every cause IS an event
Analogy 1:
You are sitting in your house on the couch. You've been sitting there for about 5 minutes. All of a sudden you begin singing a song in fluent Japanese. You just thought of a song that you learned in college. You had to learn it for your test in Japanese. Little did you know that this action was a NECESSARY action, set in motion millenia upon millenia ago in an infinite regress of causation. You could have NEVER have NOT learned that song. It was infinitely out of your control. From the standpoint of an ideal observer, this action was set into motion at in infinite regress NECESSARILY from antecedent causes. There were no other options at any time from the "beginning" until the time the song was sung.
This is an example of scientific determinism. It defines a free action as an event without causation. It strictly adheres to the view of Universal Causality, affirming both premises, thus eliminating all chances for free action.
Analogy 2:
You are sitting in your house on the couch. You've been sitting there for about 5 minutes. All of a sudden you begin singing a song in fluent Japanese. You don't know Japanese. You've never heard a Japanese song in your life, even peripherally. The only Japanese word you've ever heard in you life was "Synonara" There was no triggering of latent memory. No stimuli to promote the singing. From the perspective of an ideal observer, the act happened COMPLETELY without causation of ANY type, external or from the self. You had NOTHING AT ALL to do with your singing Japanese. A completely random and indeterminable act. From the standpoint of an ideal observer, this act was completely unpredictable. There were no clues whatsoever that this would or even COULD come about.
This is indeterminism. It defines a free action as an event without causation and posits that free actions truly CAN happen. Many philosophers find this an unacceptable alternative to scientific determinism. Though scientific determinism goes to far, to posit indeterminism is counterintuitive to what we generally experience. Moreover, without causality, any type of self-determination would be in jeopardy. It judges both the propositions of Universal Causality to be false.
Analogy 3:
You are sitting in your house on the couch. You've been sitting there for about 5 minutes. You turn on the TV and you hear a certain Japanese tune. All of a sudden, you think of a long distant Japanese song that you haven't thought of in quite some time. You begin to hum some bars of the song and then begin singing it. You genuinely think that you are singing it merely because you like the song and want to sing it. However, what you don't know is that, when you were a child, you were hypnotized over a period of 3 years. At a certain Japanese melody, you were to experience an irresistable urge to sing the Japanese song. The Japanese tune you heard on the TV was that exact tune. From the standpoint of an ideal observer, the tune you heard spurned the post-hypnotic suggestion that caused you to WANT to sing the song.
This is the case of compatibilitism. They hold that Universal Causality is completely true...yet at the same time affirm that humans are free. It defines a free act as one that has an inner cause. Thus a person's desire can constitute a cause. But as the analogy shows, this has problems. This inner cause can NEVER solely the person himself. Many philosophers have rejected this as untenable for various reasons.
Analogy 4:
You are sitting in your house on the couch. You've been sitting there for about 5 minutes. All of a sudden, you think of a long distant Japanese song that you haven't thought of in YEARS. You don't know why this song has come to your mind right now. You weren't thinking of anything that could jog the memory of this song. There was no external stimuli you are aware of that could have made you think of it. Nevertheless, you sing it. You could have just put it out of your mind, but you DECIDE to sing it. From the standpoint of an ideal observer, the something inside YOU triggered the resurgence of a memory and YOU decided to sing it on your own volition. Either it was a biological function (neurons firing, enzymes, whatever) OR it was the immaterial portion of the body spurning or receiving the thought. The action genuine arose from the essential YOU. (Note: As any agency theorist will tell you, dualism or idealism of some type must be posited for agency to work. If materialism is granted, then any and all agent acts, by definition, have to be relegated to interactions of biological and environmental function. Otherwise, it would end up being Freudian overdeterminism)
This is human agency theory. A free act is an event caused by an agent. It says, with regard to Univeral Causality:
1) Every event has a cause---True
2) Every cause IS an event---False
and proposes another 2nd premise
2') Every cause is either an event OR an agent
Who's responsible for the singing?
Analogy 1? Not you
Analogy 2? Not you
Analogy 3? Not really you
Analogy 4? You
The agency theory, unlike compatibilitism, allows for sufficient AND necessary causation, with regard to the human being. Now, let's continue the discussion positing God for analogy 4.
Before the creative event, God sees all the potential realities that can be actualized. He sees a line of causation that allows for analogy 4 to take place. For whatever reason, he chooses to actualize reality in such a way that that line of causation obtains. (IE from the actualization of the reality, God is able to predict exhaustively the future) How does he do this? God has omniscience regarding ALL objects of causation, events AND agents! This renders it "certain, though NOT necessary" that the scenario in Analogy 4 will take place. Note that Analogy 4 did NOT take place of necessity (as would be the case in Analogy 1), but it is CERTAIN to God that it will happen, because of his predictive power and omniscience. At this point, let me repost what I've said before about determinism:
"In soft determinism, cause and effect still apply, but human will
can act as an INTERMEDIARY - making deliberation over limited options possible. This compromise between hard determinism and free will is accepted by Albert Bandura In Soft Determinism, cognitions, emotions, sensations, perceptions, all mental events either partially or completely determine events. This viewpoint also allows for personal responsibility because choice amongst determined paths exists."
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ANALOGY 4:
Agency relies heavily upon soft determinism. Actually, there can be no agency without positing soft determinism. Also, I would like to mention that this is exactly the same philosophical construct that the agency theorists use. Exactly. Except for one difference: The positing of an omniscient, time-based God. Agency works because of the existence of sufficient causation, the fact that different options are genuinely available to the agent. In Analogy 4, your actions are COMPLETELY and EXAUSTIVELY determined (not merely influenced) by all causative factors, external AND internal. Yet, you are fully responsible for your actions. God didn't make you do anything. God didn't make it NECESSARY for you to do what you did. God actualized the reality where, by your own free choice, you WOULD actualize the situation (Analogy 4) that He saw back before the creative event.
I hope that this is sufficient for you, Dr. Boyd. I also hope this analogy renders my position intelligible. It shows how human beings can experience themselves as self-determining agents, and why we act and deliberate between decisions presupposing the conviction that we are free. The fact is that we ARE free to bring into existence our futures, futures that are already known to God to certainly (not necessarily) come to pass. Now, IF my position is intelligible, does this mean that we can truly say that agency (and not free will) exists? And if this is so, can we also understand how God CANNOT be ignorant of any future events? Well, we'll see. Thanks for all your attention, sir.
Warmest regards,
Mephi2K
PS:
LOL is chat talk for "Laughing Out Loud"
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
11/05/00 3:59 PM
RE: Analogies for Dr. Boyd
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Hi Mephi. I like your mind. Your fun to listen to. I also like your straightforward approach to things. Good stab at the analogies. First three make sense to me. Fourth one leaves questions. Since its the one you propose, let me ask on. * You say the agent himself may be the cause of their decision to sing. Factors outside the agent and factors inside the agent led to their singing. They didn't HAVE to sing, even with the exact same set of antecedent factors. Correct? Yet you are not an "indeterminist." I grant external causes (which, if they are not exhaustive, may be called "influences". So, was there antecedent causes that exhaustively account for the causes which led the agent to sing? OR, did the agent genuinely INITIATE a new line of causation? If the former, then you're analogy doesn't render intelligible how they can be morally responsible for their decision. Before they were born -- indeed, from the initial conditions of creation -- it was settled that they would sing. They had NOTHING to do with the initial conditions of creation, so how can they be responsible for their singing? You seem to reject this as "scientific" determinism, preferring "soft determinism." Yet I don't see how your agency theory differs from it once you work it back. On the other hand, if the agent genuinely initiated SOME of the causes that led to their singing, we agree with each other. But then I don't see how you can stand by your view that God knew what the agent would do at the moment of creation because God knows all the initial conditions. Given all the initial conditions, the agent could have done otherwise. Now, you may say that God knows this future action some other way. But, so far as I can see, you can't say God knows it because God knows all the initial conditions at creation. It comes down to this. Do agents have a piece of the freedom you seem to grant to God. The ability to make decisions that were not determined by antecedent conditions?
Respectfully, Greg
ps. You don't need to call me "sir." And thanks for defining LOL. This is the first discussion board I've ever participated in.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
11/05/00 4:55 PM
RE: RE: Analogies for Dr. Boyd
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Dear Dr. Boyd:
First of all, I want to thank you for your compliment. Coming from a person of your intellectual acumen and scholarly accomplishment, that means a WHOLE lot. Moving on...
"You say the agent himself may be the cause of their decision to sing. Factors outside the agent and factors inside the agent led to their singing. They didn't HAVE to sing, even with the exact same set of antecedent factors. Correct?"
Mephi:
Yes, this is correct. This is because the line of causation is NOT exclusively necessary causation.
"Yet you are not an "indeterminist."
Mephi: No way.
"So, was there antecedent causes that exhaustively account for the causes which led the agent to sing?"
Mephi:
Yes, there were. These antecedents are twofold: 1)external factors 2) the ontological state of the agent. To not take into account the ontological state of the agent BEFORE the act of agency is to implicitly posit indeterminism.
"OR, did the agent genuinely INITIATE a new line of causation?"
Mephi:
There is no "either/or" here. Yes, the agent initiated a new line of causation. What does this mean? It means that the agent intiated a new line of causation that would NOT have come into being without the agent. That's all. The agent's ability to initiate a new line of causation DOES NOT logically entail that there were no lines of causation before it. Keep this in mind.
"If the former, then you're analogy doesn't render intelligible how they can be morally responsible for their decision. Before they were born -- indeed, from the initial conditions of creation -- it was settled that they would sing. They had NOTHING to do with the initial conditions of creation, so how can they be responsible for their singing?"
Mephi:
You say it later. This is scientific determinism.
"Yet I don't see how your agency theory differs from it once you work it back."
Mephi:
It differs in the areas of certainty versus NECESSITY. This presumes a good understanding of sufficient and necessary causation and the distinctives of each. I know that I keep bringing up the "certain, though not necessary" thing, and I do so for a reason. I would highly advise everyone who is confused with regard to this to read up on agency theory and types of causation.
"On the other hand, if the agent genuinely initiated SOME of the causes that led to their singing, we agree with each other. But then I don't see how you can stand by your view that God knew what the agent would do at the moment of creation because God knows all the initial conditions. Given all the initial conditions, the agent could have done otherwise."
Mephi:
Alrighty! This is easy. Remember, now. Before the creative event, God knew ALL possibilities that could become realities. God knows ALL the causative factors exhaustively, though he hasn't "experienced" them in time. Due to his predictive power, he can predict easily what factors will interact with WHICH agents and vice versa. Moreover, even though agents can genuinely create new lines of causation, those lines are STILL line of causation. For any given person, we know that God knows that person exhaustively from birth onward (Actually, from BEFORE birth according to Scripture) If God exhaustively knows ALL external factors and the AGENT himself, then it is nothing for God to predict his behavior under certain conditions. Bottom line: The power of an agent to create new lines of causation does not change the fact of determinism, thus doesn't make it hard for God to perfectly predict the behavior. I urge all readers to please ponder these subjects:
1) The difference between necessary and sufficient causation
2) The MEANING of an agent creating a new line of causation.
"Do agents have a piece of the freedom you seem to grant to God. The ability to make decisions that were not determined by antecedent conditions?"
Mephi:
Heh. Now that's comparing apples and oranges. Comparing a time based, finite, ORIGINATED being with an infinite, uncaused, Being who ANTEDATES reality itself? The aseity of God takes this one out easy. A uncaused being has NO cause, therefore no antecedent cause for it's being. Any creation, by defintion, DOES have an antecedent cause: the creator or the birthing organisms! Therefore, there is NO way that the freedom of God can be exactly the same freedom humans experience, with regard to causality.
Thanks for allowing me to be more informal with you, Dr. Boyd. I'll nix the "sir" stuff. Is my analogy more intelligible to you now?
Warmest regards,
Mephi2K
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
springs
(Forum Moderator)
11/05/00 5:30 PM
RE: Ain't Nuthin' Changed, People
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Hello again,
I want to start off by giving heartfelt thanks to Trosie. I was blessed when I read some of your stuff.
And to Ghost, I admire your intelligence and your compassion. I appreciate the way this can work
together with Sealed and Mephi’s knowledge to create new passions for God.
When I read Mephi’s word’s I go slow and try to see it from that position it doesn’t make sense to me.
Even my heart seems to find a difference.
Having said that I would like to add that I have learned from Mephi and that’s always a good thing.
Thanks.
Beso still rocks.
The thing that’s on my mind is ‘human agency’. I think the determinists are trying to explain the obvious
free will choices we make each day in a very convoluted way. To me it’s like saying yes we have free will
but it’s not really free will. Why go all that way just to contradict yourself?
I think God did limit himself. Like when he told Noah he wouldn’t flood the earth again. Now I think we
all agree that God could flood the earth again if he wanted to but he will not. God has always made
covenants. He always keeps his word. Meaning we have our part to play whether we keep our word or not.
When God decided to create beings with free will he limited himself to empower us. After church today
the members broke up into small groups to pray for the church. We prayed in an active way, that is having
faith that our prayers availeth much. I don’t believe we have all the ‘say so’ nor do I believe God has all
the ‘say so’. The beauty is in the mix. We get to work together with God. What an awesome responsibility.
Did you ever read Perelandra or Out of the Silent Planet by Lewis? I can relate to falling before God on
my knees overawed by the concept of free will. (I would be more specific here but I given away more
copies than I presently own so I can’t quote the passage).
I have seen mention of quantum mechanics.
I have never been very good at analogies so please forgive my simplicity. If I roll a die I know there are
six possibilities. I could roll the die all day and whatever possibility came up would be correct according to
the function of that die (regardless if it is being handled by a zealous gamer). Now just because I know the
possibilities it doesn’t mean I know the order in which they will occur (the gamer prays). I think God
knows where the quantum particles are in the ‘super position’. They are in their ‘actual positions’ when
he knows that. God knows all their possible actual positions because they have a function and are limited
by him. I believe that God has put limits on me and I am limited by this environment etc. but that doesn’t
mean I don’t have freedom within my sphere.
I believe that God is also blessing me which at times overcomes the meanest of limitations.
What a blessing it is to be involved in his work, seeing him move, hearing his voice, and feeling his
touch, reach myself and others. I also enjoy theological discussions and so I have been blessed by Dr. Boyd
and all of you who have taken part in this debate.
God is good
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
11/05/00 9:12 PM
Response to Mephi & Could God Have Created On Open World?
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Good response Mephi. I'll make my response in the format you make yours: peice by peice. And, like your responses, this means this one will be long. (LOL) I think your good responses warrant an extensive answer.
a) You say there are two categories of antecedent conditions that account for the agents decision: #1 external and #2 "the ontological state of the individual." I don't know what you mean by "ontological state" here, but whatever it means to you, it clearly is in your view exhaustively accounted for by antecedent causes. Since these causes are external to the individual, for they are prior to the individual, it seems to me that they collapse back into category #1. So what's the explanatory force of having TWO categories? I suspect you're making a distinction without a difference.
b) You say that what it means for an agent to "initiate" a "line of causation" is that the line of causation they bring about would not have been brought about without them. This "doesn't entail that there was not a line of causation before them." Presumably you mean that it doesn't entail that there was not a line of causation that is sufficient to explain their creative act of initiating a new line of causation. But then notice this Mephi. In this case the agent DOESN'T INITIATE a NEW line of causation. They just are the means by which previous lines of causation are carried forward. So far as I can tell, your understanding of agency is basically that they are conduits through which lines of causation move forward. It's just that these "lines" get imbedded in "the ontological state of the agent." Contra your claim in a previous message, this is NOT how we experience ourselves when we deliberate between decisions. We experience ourselves as SELF-DETERMINING agents. We CREATE the definiteness of our decisions. We turn indefinite possibilities into concrete actualities. We INITIATE (bring into being) new lines of causation -- not just continue on old ones.
c) You argue that your view can distinguished from "scientific determinism" because of the distinction between "necessary" and "sufficient" causation and the distinction between "necessity" and "certainty." You encouraged me and other readers to read up on Agency theory to grasp the distinction. The distinction is not hard to grasp, Mephi (though as you know from the literature, there are different forms of "necessity" [e.g. logical/ physical] and different understandings of "sufficiency" [e.g. sufficient for one outcome/ sufficient for multiple outcomes]) What is difficult is grasping the use you try to make of this distinction. I grant that there are "sufficient" antecedent grounds of causation to render intelligible the choices of agents -- if you mean by this that the choice is retroactively intelligible in the light of the antecedent grounds. But if "sufficient" here is distinct from "necessity," it means that while the antecedent causes COULD have brought about one set of actions, they also could NOT have. Hence it ISN'T CERTAIN that the antecedent causes which lead to the "ontological state of the agent" will lead them to do x or y. Now, you can nevertheless argue that its certain to God. But if so, it must be by some means OTHER than his knowing the antecedent causes -- unless you grant that the antecedent causes are determinative. Yet you consistently want to gound God's knowledge of future decisions in his "exhaustive knowledge of causative factors."
d) You say that its "easy" to respond to my claim that God could not have known future agents decisions on the basis of knowing antecedent causes because "God knows all the causative factors exhaustively." I grant that God knows all the causative factors exhaustively," but this only yields the conclusion that God knows all the OUTCOMES of these causative factors if these causative factors determine their outcomes. If they are not strictly determinative, as you seem to want to contend, then God's exhaustive knowledge would only imply that God knows all outcomes that COULD come as a result of them. The trouble with your view, as I see it Mephi, is that you want singular certain outcomes while denying that the causative factors that bring them about are determinative. OR, maybe you'd grant that the caustive factors ARE determinative, but agents are nevertheless morally response because their choices flow from their "ontological state." But the ontological state itself flows from the antecedent causative factors. So I don't see that this would be of much help to you.
e) You say "God knows all causative factors exhaustively, though he hasn't 'experienced' them in time." Follow this Mephi. Your statement implies that there is a difference between God's knowledge of x and God's "experience" of x. Now what is this difference? The "experience" must ADD SOMETHING to the knowledge, must it not? And is not this SOMETHING, this experience, a piece of knowledge? I may "know" what will happen in a movie, but when I watch it I come to "know" the movie experientially. And the experience is RICHER than the mere knowledge. It's the difference between "knowing THAT" and "knowing IN," if you will. So, Mephi, (brace yourself) it seems to me that you are yourself a wee bit of an Open Theist after all (LOL). The passage of time gives God an experience -- the highest form of knowledge -- he otherwise would not have had.
f) RE: my question about whether we agents have a bit of God's creativity by which we can initiate new lines of causation that aren't decided by antecedent factors. You once again pronounce that this is "easy" and point us to the "aseity of God." Don't be so quick with "easy" Meph. The aseity of God distinguish God's BEING from our being. But it doesn't address the question I raise. The problem I'm raising with your system is this: You seem to have no trouble with the concept that God initiated a new line of causation that was undetermined by antecedent factors. He REALLY INITIATES it. He's not simply the conduit through which antecedent lines of causation move forward. But why then does the concept all of a sudden become unintelligible to you when it is applied to humans? The CONCEPT of creative freedom -- self-determination, libertarian freedom -- you grant. You can't argue against Open Theists, or Arminians, that its unintelligible. (This problem applies to Calvinists who also ascribe libertarian freedom to God in creating and saving the world, but then ridicule Open Theists and Arminians for speaking nonsense when we ascribe it to humans). If you grant that the concept IS intelligible (and your dialogue presupposes that you do), the only point we disagree on is that Open Theists and Arminians think that God gracious gave us a restricted version of this freedom to humans and angels while you do not.
g) This leads to my last question : do you think God COULD HAVE given creatures this kind of freedom -- HIS kind of freedom (in a restricted way) if he wanted to? Or do you think that the idea of agents possessing self-determining or libertarian freedom is a metaphysical contradiction? Another way of asking this -- and I'd like to address this to all non-Open theists out there (if you're still reading this overly-long discourse) -- is to ask: Could God have created an open universe if he wanted to? Could he have created a world in which the future is partly open, to be "filled in" by the decisions of free agents, if he wanted to? Could God have created a world in which even he occasionally changes his mind, sees and speaks about the future in terms of "maybes" and "perhaps", and experiences a bit of novelty, spontaneity, suprise, disappointment, even regret? If not, then aren't you limiting God? If so, then why isn't the biblical material about God changing his mind, speaking of the future in terms of "maybes" and "perhaps," experiencing suprise,disappointment, and regret enough to convince you that THIS IS, in fact, the kind of world he created? (on the biblical material, see the "Open Theism" section of this website. I'll sign off for now. Nice playing theological chess with you, Mephi. I wish I had more time to do this, but alas. I probably won't have a chance to counter-move for a week or more. I invite others to join in. Companion in warfare and wonder.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
11/12/00 10:09 PM
Could God Have Created On Open World?
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I'm still looking for any "takers" on my last question to Mephi. I'll repeat: For all who deny the Open View of the future, do you think that God COULD have created this kind of world if he wanted to? If not, aren't you limiting God? If yes, then why isn't the biblical material which Open Theists marshal in favor of their position (see "Open Theism" on this site) enough to convince you that this is, in fact, the kind of world God chose to create? If God explicitly telling us he "regrets," "changes his mind," says "perhaps" about the future, etc. isn't enough to convince you that God CAN sometimes regret decisions, change his mind, and wonder about the future, what WOULD convince you? Look'n forward to any responses.
Greg
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
trosie
11/12/00 11:40 PM
RE: Could God Have Created On Open World?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hello Greg (and everyone reading this):
Aren't the people who oppose the Open view basically saying that it is IMPOSSIBLE for God to NOT know the future because of the fact of Him being omniscient,(knowing all things?) Don't you think that anyone who argues against the Open view is doing so because they have an internal belief system that says that it is not feasible for an omniscient God to not know the future, even it He chose not to, simply because of who He is? To me it appears that a persons accepting or not accepting the Open view is dependent upon the persons interpretation of the word "omniscient". I guess what I am REALLY interested to see is how people will respond to the second part of your inquiry. How do they account for the biblical references where God uses words like "regrets", "perhaps", "if"... I am truly perplexed by this! I too look forward to the responses.
Blessings,
trosie
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
11/13/00 3:37 AM
RE: Could God Have Created On Open World?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Dr. Boyd:
Howdy, Doc. I pop by to see what's going on with the room...and what do I find? You've posted a wonderful post right after I sign off. LOL Well, as it just so happens, I have a tad of a break in my extremely hectic schedule. And this urge to respond has proven far too irresistible for me to pass up. Here goes nuthin...
*********************************************************
BEFORE I REALLY BEGIN:
I've got some websites for those of you who like to read a lot in your spare time:
On Free Will
http://skepdic.com/freewill.html
Against incompatibilitism (look particularly at Agent-Causation):
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/
Moderate indeterminism proponent (libertarian):
http://www.radicalacademy.com/critfreewill1.htm
[Note: Whoever did this did a pretty good job trying to argue for libertarian free will. The author's suppositions of Scottish "common sense" realism come across loud and clear. But nonetheless, a lot of thought was obviously put into this.]
Albert Bandura and Reciprocal determinism:
http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/bandura.html
Self-Efficacy:
http://www.es.emory.edu/mfp/giooutline.html
*************************************************************
RESPONSES TO DR BOYD
A)
You said:
"Since these causes are external to the individual, for they are prior to the individual, it seems to me that they collapse back into category #1. So what's the explanatory force of having TWO categories? I suspect you're making a distinction without a difference."
Mephi:
Actually the distinction is a very important one. Human agency (and libertarian free will, by the way) stands or falls on the concept of not ALL causes being external. The entire impetus of the "self-determinism" concept is the idea of the agent himself, in some way, being a cause. This could not take place if ALL factors were relegated to externality. Self-determinism, in any sense would be lost and radical behaviorism would be the rule of the day. By the way, I think that it's not necessarily correct to "collapse" the two back into category one. To explain this, I would strongly encourage all to read the Bandura thing about reciprocal determinism and the social-learning theory. A cursory introduction should be supplied in one of the websites above. Bandura's theory affirms that the self interacts with the environment in a reciprocal way that cannot be ignored. (The key of self-determinism is that the self can actually DETERMINE actions, which assumes causality and self-efficacy) So let me emphasize this again: BOTH categories are indispensible in this discussion due to the nature of libertarian free will itself.
B)
You said:
"But then notice this Mephi. In this case the agent DOESN'T INITIATE a NEW line of causation. They just are the means by which previous lines of causation are carried forward. So far as I can tell, your understanding of agency is basically that they are conduits through which lines of causation move forward. It's just that these "lines" get imbedded in "the ontological state of the agent." Contra your claim in a previous message, this is NOT how we experience ourselves when we deliberate between decisions. We experience ourselves as SELF-DETERMINING agents. We CREATE the definiteness of our decisions. We turn indefinite possibilities into concrete actualities. We INITIATE (bring into being) new lines of causation -- not just continue on old ones."
Mephi:
Hmmm...if I am to take what you are saying at face value, you seem to be saying that agents can actually initiate new lines of causations EX NIHILO from ANY types of antecedents causes or states. I ask you to provide ONE (just ONE) example where this can occur in real life. LOL When agency theorists mention agents "initiating" new lines of causation, they are NOT posting ex nihilo action. They are positing that different lines of causation can emerge from agents THAN THOSE that would have occured had the agent not been involved Example from Tom Morris and "Philosophy for Dummies" again (P. 146)
"We initiate new causal chains for which we have responsibility. A tree branch falls and hits your new car. If lightning hit the tree branch and cracked it loose, then that was the cause of its falling on the car. But meteorologists assure us that the lightning itself had a cause, and so on. You can blame the lightning only in a metaphorical sense. But if there was really no storm at all and the tree limb fell because Bob sawed it off, then we have a very different sort of scenerio on our hands. Bob is responsible in a unique way. He can be blamed in a literal sense. We assume that he initiated a new sequence of events THAT WASN'T ALREADY IN THE CARDS, and the agency theorist tries to capture our assumptions here." (emphasis mine)
I think this is pretty straight forward. The "initiation" of new causal chains is a RELATIONAL, not an ontological, concern. Agency theorists would NEVER say that old Bob here sawed the branch for absolutely NO reason at all, whether biological, emotional, or psychical (the ex-nihilo stuff you posit) Indeed, they would assume that SOMETHING was behind his behavior. But what they would also say is that actions of agents are different from strictly natural phenomena (ie the lightning), therefore responsibility and accountability can be assigned.
Just so we can hit home the absurdity here....check this out.
You say:
"Contra your claim in a previous message, this is NOT how we experience ourselves when we deliberate between decisions. We experience ourselves as SELF-DETERMINING agents. We CREATE the definiteness of our decisions."
Decisions ALWAYS have a context. In other words, decisions by us time-bound rational beings are made in RESPONSE to some type of antecedent actions or states. Answers do not exist without questions. Similarly, decisions don't exist without OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHOICE. There, by necessity, HAS to be some type of line of causality before us just so we can have the context in which to USE our wills in decision. So, how in the world could a human being initiate a causal chain ex-nihilo as a self-determining, decision-making individual? Answer: They cannot. It's a logical absurdity. Ya feel me, Doc?
C)
You said:
"What is difficult is grasping the use you try to make of this distinction. I grant that there are "sufficient" antecedent grounds of causation to render intelligible the choices of agents -- if you mean by this that the choice is retroactively intelligible in the light of the antecedent grounds. But if "sufficient" here is distinct from "necessity," it means that while the antecedent causes COULD have brought about one set of actions, they also could NOT have. Hence it ISN'T CERTAIN that the antecedent causes which lead to the "ontological state of the agent" will lead them to do x or y. Now, you can nevertheless argue that its certain to God. But if so, it must be by some means OTHER than his knowing the antecedent causes -- unless you grant that the antecedent causes are determinative. Yet you consistently want to gound God's knowledge of future decisions in his "exhaustive knowledge of causative factors."
Mephi:
hmmmm...AHA. I've got it! I just thought of something that will illustrate EXACTLY what I am saying about the distinction between necessity and certainty.
Ahem...
Questions: Was it POSSIBLE for Jesus Christ to sin? Were the temptations of Christ genuine? For both questions, if so, why? If not, why not?
Dear reader, before you think this question irrelevant to the topic, I ask you to just think about it for a second. I GUARANTEE you that the paradigms behind this question above and the entire "certain, but NOT necessary" thing with regard to free will that I kept bringing up are one and the same. If you want to, check out William Hasker's answer to this question on the Open Theism page (http://www.opentheism.org/jesus_free_will.htm#The Question) Hasker was half right in his last statement. These ARE deep theological waters. But he was half wrong as well, in my view...
"...and the open view of God doesn't stand or fall on the views I've expressed here being correct."
hmmm..I wouldn't say all that. We are caught between a HUGE rock and hard place here. a) If we say that it was NECESSARY and, therefore certain, that Jesus wouldn't sin, causatively speaking, then we cannot claim that Jesus had any type of "free will." b) If we say that Jesus' ESSENCE, in whatever manner, made it certain, though not necessary that he would not sin, then the paradigm of "certain, but not necessary" per antecedent external events and/or internal states is a valid one, and that MUST be recognizable as an intelligible concept for our discussion. c) If we say that is was NOT certain OR necessary that Jesus wouldn't sin, then we have to explain some things:
1) If not by ontological means, by WHAT mechanism was Jesus able to be completely without sin?
2) Wasn't the said mechanism determined by Jesus' intellect and cognitive processes, which obviously falls under the social-learning theory of Bandura?
and the whammie...
3) Doesn't this mean that God wasn't absolutely certain that Jesus wouldn't sin???? (Whoa!)
Remember how I made the distinctions of antecedent cause into TWO categories. This is a big reason why that's the case. Millard Erickson, and other evangelical theologians, affirm that the antecedent state of who Jesus was made it such that it was certain, though not necessary that Jesus wouldn't sin. What say you, Dr. Boyd? Again, this is VERY germane to the topic at hand. You essentially have 3 choices here. If you answer this question the way I think you will, then you have JUST gotten a hold of the importance of and distinction between sufficient and necessary causation with regard to human will. Moreover, you will be affirming that it, indeed, IS possible for a "free being" to be EXHAUSTIVELY determined by antecedent external and/or ontological states.
D)
Dr. Boyd says:
"OR, maybe you'd grant that the caustive factors ARE determinative, but agents are nevertheless morally response because their choices flow from their "ontological state." But the ontological state itself flows from the antecedent causative factors. So I don't see that this would be of much help to you."
Mephi:
Check out the Agent-Causation section of the incompatibilitism paper.
E)
Dr. Boyd says:
"Follow this Mephi. Your statement implies that there is a difference between God's knowledge of x and God's "experience" of x. Now what is this difference? The "experience" must ADD SOMETHING to the knowledge, must it not? And is not this SOMETHING, this experience, a piece of knowledge? I may "know" what will happen in a movie, but when I watch it I come to "know" the movie experientially. And the experience is RICHER than the mere knowledge. It's the difference between "knowing THAT" and "knowing IN," if you will. So, Mephi, (brace yourself) it seems to me that you are yourself a wee bit of an Open Theist after all (LOL). The passage of time gives God an experience -- the highest form of knowledge -- he otherwise would not have had."
Mephi:
I'm sorry, Doc, but this just doesn't wash with me. As you probably noticed, I put the word "experiences" in quotations. I did so because I don't truly see a distinction between God's predictive knowledge and his experience in time. I can't get over how you so use human experience of "experience" and the richness that we get from it and so EASILY attribute the same to God. Can we say apples and oranges? Let's see the difference...
Why do human beings find experience of something to be so much richer than mere knowledge (no matter how exhaustive of it)? Because our reactions under different experiential terms are NOT completely predictable to us. I can know the script to a movie exhaustively along with every line and movement. But I cannot, based on that, predict exactly HOW I will reac to the movie when I SEE it. Why? Because I don't exhaustively know MYSELF. I can guess how I'm going to act at a certain part, but I don't know what latent memory a certain scene may drudge up or whatever. But if I'm not mistaken, God doesn't have that problem. He is COMPLETELY self-aware. He doesn't have unknown subconscious, doubts, or fears that he has to deal with at certain times. We HAVE to remember something. A person's knowledge consists basically of two functions: 1)knowledge of SELF and 2) knowledge of things OUTSIDE the self. Moreover, that knowledge deals with the interplay of the two functions. Experience would always be "richer" for any beings who don't know themselves exhaustively. But what about one who does? Theoretically, any person who knew themselves EXHAUSTIVELY would be able to predict what they would do in any given situation of which they could conceive. In other words, if you were to give this person enough detail about situation X and the events that led to that situation, they should be able to answer you with NO regard to concern about self-deception or unknown psychological impulses. Now, imagine a person who is like the "grand chess player" we so like to talk about who truly knows ALL possible moves for any given agent in any given situation. (Remember, the God we posit had had comtemplative knowledge of ALL possible realities before creation.) Could this person really be in any way "illuminated" by experiencing an event he knew as a genuine possibility? Heck, no. The only "higher" knowledge that God could get out of it is exactly what scientists get out of experimentation: VERIFICATION. "Aha. So my prediction WAS correct!" or "Hmmm, I guess back to the drawing board..." This would be equivalent to what you call the "uncertainty becoming certain", implying that certainty can only happen after the existential and temporal fact, not before.
So, let's sum up the issue here. IF we wanted to say that God's experience added anything to his knowledge...it would ONLY be verification or disproval of God's predictive ability. No aesthetic "richness" or any such thing. But that brings me back to something I said long ago... If God's predictive ability is as vast as I believe it is, then the verification is pretty much unnecessary. In other words, God's predictive ability combined with his knowledge of self (this includes his agenda for history), would be just as complete as actual occurance to him.
F)
Dr. Boyd says:
"Don't be so quick with "easy" Meph. The aseity of God distinguish God's BEING from our being. But it doesn't address the question I raise. The problem I'm raising with your system is this: You seem to have no trouble with the concept that God initiated a new line of causation that was undetermined by antecedent factors. He REALLY INITIATES it. He's not simply the conduit through which antecedent lines of causation move forward. But why then does the concept all of a sudden become unintelligible to you when it is applied to humans? "
Mephi:
I'll be honest. I was quite surprised to see this one. What does the aseity of God entail? God's "self-existence" and COMPLETE independence, right? In other words, he relies on nothing. As a matter of fact, being ITSELF relies upon Him. Aseity of a being implies a LACK of causation for said being. Now, if there is no line of causation before God, due to His aseity, it's simply logic that tells us that ANY line of causation that exists must come FROM, not lead TO, God. Hence, God is the Initiator, par excellence in the true sense of the word "initiate" (unlike what we saw in Section B) Bottom line: In the beginning, God. There is NO existential context that humans can ever experience where there is absolutely no lines of causation before them, from conception to decomposition of the flesh after death. Thus, the concept of ex-nihilo initiation of causation is necessarily unintelligible to human beings and ONLY intelligible when speaking of God, the ONLY being who has aseity.
************************************************************
THE MAIN EVENT:
Now, we come to the main question I want to answer:
"Could God have created an open world?"
The answer to the question above is the same as the answer to this question:
"Can God cease to BE?"
The answer is "HECK, NO." LOL We may as well ask the "Can God create a rock he can't lift" question. OF COURSE, there are certain things God can't do. We deal with these things by delineating the proper objects of God's sovereignty, right? Speaking of which, let me take you back to my "squares" thing:
"There exists a large square that is composed of 1000 little squares. Each of the little squares has either a "1" or a "0" on it. There is no particular order to the distribution of the 1s and 0s. There also exists a person, Ms. X, who knows exhaustively the positions of all the 0s in the large square. She knows the positions of the 0s exhaustively because, before seeing the actual square, she has memorized a map that details exactly where all the 0s are to be placed. The map ONLY shows the 0 squares.
Question:
Is it possible for Ms. X to claim ignorance about the location of the 1s in the cube? If so, why?
If not, why not?"
Many people got the correct answer. There is no way that Ms. X can claim ignorance, simply by the process of elimination. Now let's put this in perspective. You said, in the Question of the Week thing:
"In the Open View, God knew and perfectly anticipated every possible future story-line before creation. Since possibilities are eternal, and since God is omniscient, God knew every possible future decision every possible future person could ever possibly make. And because his intelligence is infinite, it was not “spent” by any one of these possibilities. He knew and anticipated each and every of these possible future story-lines as thoroughly as if it were the only future story-line he had to consider."
Every possible story line for existence. Hmm...that's a LOT of knowledge. This necessarily includes ALL possible choices that any agent can make as well as any effects that those choices have on their respective environments at any given point in time. Now, knowing ALL this, is there truly any respect in which God can claim "ignorance" about ANY decision that's ever made by human beings? Nope. God knows where all the 1s are, as it were, and can't help but deduce the rest.
So, what do I say? For God to create an open world as you define it, He would have to COMPLETELY erase his own memory after creating existence, binding himself to learn through experience as He goes along. Moreover, he would have to severely limit his knowledge of reality (definitely beyond the quantum level) That way, he could truly react to any and all human activities and be genuinely surprised when humans do something (at least ONE thing) he COULDN'T in any way anticipate. I don't know about you but I find this avenue highly unacceptable.
So what could God do if he couldn't create an open world, you ask? The very thing that I think he DID do. He created a melioristic universe where sentient agents (human and otherwise) have a reciprocally determining relationship with their environments. In other words, they act upon their environments AND their environments act upon them in a never-ending interpenetrating cycle. The agents are able to be 'self-determining' beings in the fact that they are able to actualize their OWN futures (i.e. self-efficacy and causality exists whereas fatalism is soundly negated) Because of the framework of reality, the decisions of the agents are TRUE decisions made from their TRUE selves. However, because of God's knowledge of self and the potential realities, these decisions were predictable from the creative event, and thus God has exhaustive knowledge.
End result? Humans are NOT puppets or computers. They are agents who can love and hate, obey and rebel. Correspondingly, God does NOT micromanage all things or "cause" all things. God interacts with these agents PER his plan for history that he chose to actualize at the beginning of time. (Theism) He does so in a manner that they can somewhat comprehend him, chronologically and emotionally, and THUS know His intents, purposes, and dispositions. This is how we can account for God seemingly "changing his mind" and God virtually mourning over His people's constant rejection of His love...WHILE at the same time affirming God's complete omniscience and predictive power. Because human agents do actualize their own futures, prophecies CAN be conditional based on what humans decide to do. Because agents ARE the efficacious ones, they CAN be held responsible for their own actions or inactions. Because God is omniscient, with regard to knowing all potential realities, it is possible for God to know with absolute CERTAINTY that Jesus, a Jew from Galilee would be executed on a cross, by the ACTIVE decisions of his own people. Genuine warfare IS possible, while in no way given a contrived view of God's sovereignty over all.
Whew. That was long. LOL I wanted to be a comprehensive as possible, as I won't be able to answer for a long while. (I barely did this one, to be honest. I have so much work to do. ) So, don't consider this a comeback per se. But I just had to get something in. Have fun with this one, Doc.
Peace to all,
Mephi2K
PS: I really want to put some special emphasis again on the sinlessness of Jesus thing. We all want to talk about genuineness of God's response to us with regard to Hezekiah and all that, but HERE'S where the rubber meets the road. Was the fully human Jesus, the Son of God, "genuinely" tempted in all manners as WE were if it was CERTAIN, for whatever ontological or psychological reason, that he would not sin? If genuineness EVER mattered in any type of doctrine, I think it's this one, y'all. Choose your answer wisely, readers. LOL
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
11/13/00 6:21 PM
RE: RE: Could God Have Created On Open World?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Welcome back Mephi. Thanks for taking the time to peek in. Do it from time to time. I can only respond to a few of the most important points you made.
1) Mephi, I have no problem "grasping" the distinction between "certain" and "necessary." I'm certain I shall wake up tomorrow a male, though there's no strictly logically "necessary" reason why I should do so. My problem is that you HAVE NO GROUNDS FOR POSITING ETERNAL CERTAINTY in God's foreknowledge when you deny eternal necessity, either of a logical or empirical sort, and when you deny that God is timeless.
2) You say that the view that agents in some sense create new lines of causation is logically absurd. Do you therefore deny the traditional view that God initiated (viz. his act can't be exhaustively accounted for by antecedent conditions) new lines of causation when he created the world or became incarnate? 3) Mephi, you deny any distinction between God's foreknowledge and God's EXPERIENCE of what he foreknows. If his foreknowledge is eternal, then his EXPERIENCE must be eternal. But then, notice, you can't say God experiences the passage of time. Yet, unless I'm mistaken, you WANT to affirm that God experiences the passage of time. My question: if God's experience adds nothing to his eternal knowlege, how does God know what time it is? 4) You say God COULD NOT create a world with a partly open future. God is eternally LOCKED into sameness. I grant God "can't" sin, but why think it sin -- or in any sense logically impossible -- for God to create a world where he can experience novelty, adventure,surprise or regret? An eternity without nothing but sheer sameness seems more like hell than heaven. Honestly, Mephi, it seems like your God is locked into a metaphysical eternal prison. Thanks for the feedback. See ya later.
Greg
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
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