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Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 516
| Posted 6/28/2001 10:50 AM (GMT -6) |   |
openjoe
02/16/01 4:40 PM
Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Hey all, I have been wrapped up in an interesting discussion of the modality of omniscience. I thought some of you might have some insights.
My opponent suggests that omniscience is categorical, not modal. In other words, it is not potential, but always actual.
But is it?
My opponent calls omnipotence modal, this is, (I think) because there is a doable thing somewhere that God is not doing. There is potentiality. God could do it, but may not be doing it, where as, in the case of omniscience, there is only actuality. God is always knowing.
Now, I am rather taken with the force of this argument. But I think I may see a crack in it, I thought some of you might help me one way or the other.
It occurred to me to use the same argument for omniscience that my opponent has used for omnipotence. What if there were something somewhere that God could be knowing, but is in fact not knowing. How could this come about? I thought, perhaps God chooses not to know something. If this were the case, would God still retain omniscience?
If omniscience were only defined as actual, I suppose one might argue that a God who chose not to know something would no longer be omniscient. But can this be right? Certainly he would still posses the ability to be omniscient, wouldn’t he? So are we defining him as omniscient only when he is exercising that ability?
If he were still omniscient at this point, what would that do to the categorical nature of omniscience for those who are inclined to define it in that way? Would it not then be modal? If at any time, omniscience were modal, wouldn’t it always then be modal. In fact, by definition, the ability to “switch” back and forth seems as though it would define it into the modal camp naturally.
Am I crazy?
Perhaps this is a long winded exercise in muddled thinking. I am prepared to accept that. But, perhaps not. Any assistance would be appreciated.
Joe
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
ModesofThought
02/16/01 6:17 PM
RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Hey openjoe,
Here's something I found on the EF listserve:
First an important distinction: that between metaphysical and covenantal limitations on God.
For Open Theists, there are no metaphysical limitations on God. This is the intuition which Justin stated well when he said, "Another fundamental part of open theism, as I understand it, is as follows: God cannot foreknow with certainty future free acts of his creatures, because God cannot know logical impossibilities. Just as God cannot know a four-sided triangle or a square circle, it is logically impossible for him to certainty (sic) foreknow future free acts." So then, logical impossibilities are not metaphysically possible, but that does not properly constitute a metaphysical limitation because it is simply meaningless.
The second type of limitation upon God is covenantal in nature. These are limitations that God imposes upon himself willingly for the sake of a higher good in relating to what is other than God. The decision to create at all involves such a limitation. The move here is from God being all that there is (pre-creational), to there now being something that is not God. One can say now "God and the Universe" and see that the two are distinct (unless one is a pantheist) but this distinction (and the Universe itself) is possible only because of God's self-limitation. Had God not decided to "make space" for that which is not God, then creation would not have been possible. Another more radical limitation is that which God experienced in the incarnation of Christ.
Our current debate involves the both distinctions:
Hopefully we can all agree that God has created something outside of
Godself. This involves a decision on God's part and also a contingent (as opposed to "a priori") limitation metaphysically. God and the world are not identical.
Open Theists believe that it is a logical contradiction to speak of there being definite knowledge of possible actions. Future free choices are such actions, therefore no definite knowledge of such choices is metaphysically plausible prior to their becoming definite. This is a logical limitation which classical theists often mistake for a contingent metaphysical limitation on God (akin to God deciding to create). God does not "decide" to be unable to know future free actions as definite, such knowledge (because of the nature of possibilities) simply cannot exist. Until definitely knowing possible actions can be made plausible, it should not be considered a limitation on God not to be able to know them.
Open Theists understand God's decision to create creatures that are capable of free choices as a covenantal limitation that God willfully entered into. This does not thereby qualify as a metaphysical limitation, only a covenantal one. This is precisely where Justin's question comes in: "Do open theists believe that God could certainly foreknow future free acts at one time, but then he limits himself so that he doesn't know them? I'm confused, ultimately, about the meaning of "divine self-limitation." As was seen above, Open Theists deny that it is meaningful to speak of knowing--in a definite way--that which is indefinite (namely future free acts). Once the indefinite is "defined" by the actor in question, it then moves into a class where speaking of it as definite is reasonable. This "limitation" is logical and is not actually a limitation at all but rather the only meaningful way to speak of knowledge of indefinite things (possibilities).
"Divine self-limitation" then, in response to Justin's question, applies to God's covenantal decisions and (redundantly) then also to the logical implications of those divine decisions. Only in this sense, then, is it accurate to say that God, by choosing to create free agents, logically has created a class of knowledge that is indefinite until the agency is performed.
In Christ, Tyler De Armond
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
openjoe
02/17/01 12:46 PM
RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Hey Tyler, good to hear from you, and by the way, I got that e-mail from you on Polkinghorne, thanks much. I got similar response from a couple of others as well.
But, down to the matter at hand.
I don’t think that the distinction between metaphysical and covenantal limitations really addressees my question. I am certainly well aware of these distinctions, but I took them into account when formulating my thoughts.
Perhaps some background is in order here. I don’t think I have offered enough information. I am really dealing with how to define the omniscience of God. I am trying to work with a basic definition that states
(A) “God knows any and all true statements such that it is logically possible for God to know them.”
Or possibly
(B) “God does not definitely believe anything that is not objectively certain.”
The problem that has been trust upon me is the issue of bivalence. In this case, bivalence states that all propositions have a truth value that is eternal. If it is true that I will, I have, or am writing this essay on Feb 17 then it is true coeternally with God (once true always true). And, if it has always been true, and God always knows all truth statements, then God certainly knows the truth or falsity of this proposition. I suspect you are familiar with this argument so I won’t bore you further.
Now, most folks want to deny the reality of bivalence, it’s certainly counterintuitive, and we are all familiar with the grounding objection. But, I don’t want to do that. I am trying to develop a way of granting the theory of bivalence, and at the same time defeating it’s force against Open theism. Perhaps it cannot be done, but I suspect it can and I am willing to try. Don’t get me wrong, I don’t buy into bivalence for a moment, But I still want to see if it’s defeatable if we did grant it.
Clearly this offers me a bit of a problem given the parameters I am setting for myself. I am really trying to suggest there may be an existing proposition that God does not know the truth or falsity of, even if it has such a property, and yet, God remains omniscient.
One of the most difficult objections I have met so far is the suggestion that omniscience is a categorical notion, not modal like omnipotence. If this is true, it has been suggested, neither of the definitions of omniscience I have offered above are workable, because they both work with a modal idea of omniscience.
Does any of this help make things clearer?
Joseph S. Holt
Editor, Open Theism Information Site.
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
Mephi2K
02/17/01 2:14 PM
Just Random Nonsense from Meph
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Peeps,
If I may, I'd like to address what you're saying about "bivalence"
On Bivalence
First of all, it appears to me that bivalence, as I hear you describing it, Joe, is meant to deal more specifically with propositions that deal with properties or states that are stated to have at least a conceptual "existence", not necessarily with the potential acts of agents. In other words, bivalence would definitely apply to things like mathematical equations and such as they apply to our reality. These truths would be "coeternal" with God, more specifically within the mind of God. However, IF ONE POSITS LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL, this would not be possible for God to do with respect to the acts of agents, specifically within the open view theistic worldview. Let me illustrate my thinking...
1) It is true that you WILL write a letter to me exactly 2 weeks, five days, 30 mins, and 29 seconds from now.
We have to examine this statement to ascertain WHY and HOW it is true. As I see it, there are only three ways this can be true.
1. There exists a fatalistic existence such that by some mysterious decree, #1 WILL occur.
2. There exists a melioristic existence where libertarian free will does NOT exist and determinism is true. Based on his knowledge of possibilities, God perfectly predicts the action stated in #1
3. There exists an existence where libertarian free will is true, and God is ABOVE time. God witnesses what goes on in the timeline in the view of one everpresent now. God merely witnesses what has, for all intents and purposes, already occurred.
It is here that we must note something. If we posit a God WITHIN time in a system where libertarian free will is TRUE, then none of the ways above would be plausible. In other words, God would NEVER know #1 to be "true." Ever. There would be no way that any being, including God, could know with CERTAINTY that #1 would happen. Therefore, no being could know #1 to be true or false. (I think that this is what Modes and Doc have said before.)
Now, if we make another statement: a<>~a (basis of law of non-contradiction), we could say that bivalence could apply. Why? Because the verity of the law of non-contradiction, as we conceive of it, would ALWAYS hold true. It is not merely possibility because it operates on such a high level with being itself. Conversely, if I said a=~a we could also say the bivalence applies such that, as we conceive of it, a=~a would ALWAYS be false. Notice how positing the open view of God would not change this in the least.
I say all this to point out that "bivalence" could never be possible for the Open View concept of God with respect to the acts of sentient beings, because of the presuppositions of libertarian free will. However, bivalence could exist for some more theoretical concepts and ideas. Therefore, IF one says that omniscience is based on bivalence in all matters, the OVT cannot called it's view of God omniscient. If I were you, I would just say that I don't think human agency is a proper object of the concept of bivalence and leave it at that. Just my opinion.
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My Take on the Open View of Omniscience
Larger problem. Because sentient beings can cause events and inanimate objects to do things, then all things that may interact with human agency could NOT be known by the Open View Theism god. There is absolutely NO way, outside of outright STRICT micromanagement, that the open view theism concept of God could know "settled realities" I want to make that abundantly clear. And because human beings truly can thwart God's working and plans, the settled realities would have to be micromanaged to the Nth degree. As I see it, in the open view conception, omniscience could only mean this.
God's omniscience consists of his having knowledge of all things actual and possible at any given time
Note that this is NOT saying that God knows the future. Indeed as I've alluded before, God CANNOT know the future, with respect to what WILL and WILL not happen. As you can see this ends up being a very "ignorant" omniscience which is basically superfluous. Here, you have a being who is claimed to be omniscient who doesn't know if I'm going to go to the bathroom in the next 2 mins or eat some pizza. Hmmm... Now what some people will say is that this was due to God's self-limitation so that we could have real freedom. Of course this assumes libertarian free will without need, in my view, but whatever...
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My View of Omniscience
To me, the best way to deal with the situation is to primarily posit God's omniscience mainly in the terms of His exhaustive knowledge of any and all possible realities at any given time. This set of knowledge includes all possible states, acts, events, agents, and their interactions. Atheistic philosophers have done a pretty good job of crippling the idea of omniscience defined some other ways. (See Michael Martin on the problem of knowing what one CANNOT know. I believe it's called Zeno's problem or something) Here's where things get interesting. Do we consider mental images of possibilities, no matter how vast, "knowledge"? It depends. If you basically state that knowledge qua knowledge can only be tied things that possess reality (some people consider this synonomous with actuality), then it would not. I believe that's how you described the "categorical" understanding of omniscience. I think the only way that we can truly make omniscience apply to God in a meaningful way is to say that "knowledge" incorporates both possibility and actuality.
Example. At the state of reality where all was a monism that consisted of God, what would be the objects of knowledge, with respect to God?
1) Possibility=the set of nigh-infinite possible existences composed of God's information about any and all possible acts, events, states, agents, and interactions of the preceding.
2) Actuality=God himself
Hopefully, you see what I'm getting at here. God's corpus of knowledge would consist of possibilities and actualities. At this point, I would agree with the open view concept, as I understand it.
Notice something. If one does NOT posit libertarian free will and it's problematic bases, then that one REALLY doesn't have that much of a problem. Why? Because this would produce the effect of predetermination wherein God, based upon his knowledge of all possibilities, the initial setup of the creative act, and his knowledge of his OWN actions within history, would have complete predictive ability of everything that could and would occur in existence. There would be 0 uncertainty from God's perspective. The chance that something could happen outside of God's predictive plan would be 0%. Thus, it could be reasonably stated that because God had exhaustive knowledge of all possibilities, the initial setup of the creative act, and knowledge of his OWN anticipated actions within history per his predetermined plan, his predictive ability has the PRACTICAL effect of being "factual" Kind of like "money in the bank" type thinking. A person who doesn't affirm libertarian free will can legitimately make the following statement:
God's omniscience consists of his having knowledge of all things actual and possible at any given time such that there is NOTHING that can emerge or occur of which God would not be exhaustively aware.
To me, my thinking above allows particular prophecy, providence, self-efficacy, and agency to make much more sense than omniscience qua the open view. Again, this is just my opinion.
Sorry so long...again...
Blessings to all,
Sir Mephistopheles 2K
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
ModesofThought
02/17/01 2:14 PM
RE: RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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openjoe,
Tyler's response to Justin is perhaps mor relevent than you grant. Several points:
1. You shold reject the validity of the claim of bivalence if it intails that: "bivalence states that all propositions have a truth value that is eternal." Unless the truth value can be stated subjunctively. You will be interested in the thread on subjunctives back a ways on this board. Check it out. It need not be that proposition A is either true or false, it may be simply "possible" (which entails that proposition A is "possibly true" or "possibly false" and this is the WAY that God knows proposition A).
2. You ask: "It occurred to me to use the same argument for omniscience that my opponent has used for omnipotence. What if there were something somewhere that God could be knowing, but is in fact not knowing. How could this come about? I thought, perhaps God chooses not to know something. If this were the case, would God still retain omniscience?"
If God enforces this lack of knowledge upon Godself omnipotently, with omnipotent resolve so to speak (in the same sense that God can not now "deincarnate" Godself), then one could not properly claim that God is omniscient. If in fact, there were something knowable which God does not know.
3. you offer:
(A) "God knows any and all true statements such that it is logically possible for God to know them."
Or possibly
(B) "God does not definitely believe anything that is not objectively certain."
Modes suggests:
A. God knows all things perfectly
or
B. God knows all things precisely as they are: definites as definite and indefinites as indefinite.
openjoe says:
Now, most folks want to deny the reality of bivalence, it’s certainly counterintuitive, and we are all familiar with the grounding objection. But, I don’t want to do that. I am trying to develop a way of granting the theory of bivalence, and at the same time defeating it’s force against Open theism. Perhaps it cannot be done, but I suspect it can and I am willing to try. Don’t get me wrong, I don’t buy into bivalence for a moment, But I still want to see if it’s defeatable if we did grant it.
Clearly this offers me a bit of a problem given the parameters I am setting for myself. I am really trying to suggest there may be an existing proposition that God does not know the truth or falsity of, even if it has such a property, and yet, God remains omniscient.
One of the most difficult objections I have met so far is the suggestion that omniscience is a categorical notion, not modal like omnipotence. If this is true, it has been suggested, neither of the definitions of omniscience I have offered above are workable, because they both work with a modal idea of omniscience.
Modes says:
I agree with those who are telling you that your project is not workable. May ask I ask you why this is an important project to you? What gives?
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Shine150
02/18/01 8:57 PM
RE: RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Hello OpenJoe.
In my opinion, the way to affirm bivalence without denying open theism is NOT to suppose that God can limit his omniscience. How would he know what he doesn't want to know? Plus, there is no metaphysical or theological advantage gained by having God choose not to know something. This would be self-inflicted ignorance for which he would still be responsible.
The way to affirm bivalence without denying open theims is rather to simply affirm the reality of subjunctives. From all eternity it is either true or false that agent x may or may not do y in situation z (where z is any particular possible world). God knows all reality perfectly: settled realities as settled realities; counterfactuals as counterfactuals, and subjunctives as subjunctives.
For what its worth
GB
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
02/18/01 10:29 PM
WTH?????
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Say, Doc. Why does this post with your "GB" signature have "Shine 150" as the signon name? This signature was used in the post right before this one on another thread by you...and the "counterfactuals" stuff is COMPLETELY yours. PLEASE don't tell me that YOU are Shine 150! Please tell me that some technological snafu happened at Coolboard or something. If you are Shine...LOL...I've never seen anyone bust themselves like THIS! A little alter-ego to express the id, maybe? LOL Oooh, nasty...
Meph
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
02/18/01 10:36 PM
How Busted Can One Person Be?
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Uh, heck, no. Something this cool deserves its own thread. LOL
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
openjoe
02/19/01 7:15 AM
RE: RE: RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Ya, Shine, I've considered that option, but it really denies bivalence all together. Bivalence is able to make such a strong argument based on the fact that it simply denies the existence of subjunctives. It's "Bivalent", One or the other. All propositions are either true or false, never maybe.
This is why most folks simply deny the reality of bivalence, which is really a pretty reasonable thing to do.
Joseph S. Holt
Editor, Open Theism Information Site
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
openjoe
02/19/01 8:09 AM
RE: RE: RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Thanks for the input Modes, I appreciate all I can get.
I realize that the obvious thing to do is reject bivalence in this case, but for strictly academic purposes I am trying very hard to assume it and still win.
As for why I am pursing this project, well, that's a rather long story I'd rather not get into right at this point. Perhaps after I have done more research and decide if I have a leg to stand on.
Joe
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
Shine150
02/19/01 8:37 AM
Prof skater
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S'up ya'll. Down with ya meph. busted as can be. you got my alter ego. it let me reveal my rank/skater/ex-druggie/ playful/ tactless/ in your face/ gen-exer/ anti-authoratarian juvinille alter other self. shoot. that was fun. let me be unguarded and freer than i'd otherwise be. SHOOT.
Now I've got to stick wth my normal boring Greg Boyd persona.
Back to the issue:
The problem, openjoe, is not with eternal truths. If a proposition is true, it is eternally so. So an omniscient being, like God, would HAVE to, by definition, know this. The trouble is that the classical tradition worked with exclusive ors. Either its true that agent x WILL or WILL not, or WOULD or WOULD NOT, do action y in situation z. They left out the possibility that POSSIBILITIES are eternally true. Agent x MAY or MAY not do action y in situation z. If one holds to libertarian freedom, it seems one HAS to concede that subjunctives are true in this manner.
Classical Molinism, so far as I can see, is inconsistent in affirming libertarian freedom, but denying the eternal truth value of subjunctives.
Dig it? check it out? gett'n jiggy with it. down with ya'll on the rap, but hat'n the fact that now i gotsta be my educated self.
GB
i DO love TO WATCH skate boarders. tried it a couple of times and almost died.
there is meaning to SHINE150, but THAT secret stays with me.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Shine150
02/19/01 8:45 AM
RE: Prof skater
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Follow up.
Dudes, don't you just wonder who some of the OTHER real people behind our psuedonyms are? Who are you Meph? Who is Lion Lamb? And Ghost-Dog? And... so on. The anonymity is nice, for all the reasons I enjoyed it. (Maybe I'll assume a different one... but I only have a SPLIT personality, not a MULTIPLE personality). But it does make one curious.
Anyway, if you see Shine again... and you way... don't treat him any different just cuz ya'll know he's me. he be way not wanting to disappear, cuz its so dang fun being him.
skater
who shines at 150
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
might-be-don
02/19/01 11:58 AM
RE: Prof skater
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shine had to say:
there is meaning to SHINE150, but THAT secret stays with me.
No big mystery... it's all that 150 proof (moon)shine that inspired these OV ideas!
don
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
CHF
02/19/01 2:34 PM
RE: RE: Prof skater
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Don said:
". No big mystery... it's all that 150 proof (moon)shine that inspired these OV ideas!"
Craig says:
"WORD!"
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
openjoe
02/20/01 9:36 AM
RE: RE: RE: RE: Catagorical vs. Modal Omniscience
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Ya Greg, I really like this but it seems that it simply denies bivalence. If we grant subjunctives we have just tossed bivalenc out, haven't we? I mean, isn't that their whole deal, there are no subjunctives?
Joe
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
openjoe
02/21/01 5:37 PM
RE: Prof skater
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Ok, Shine, I think I like it. I will admitt it is certainly cleaner and easier to defend then my rather "voluptuous" (can a Baptist use that term?) defense using infinites and actuality. What you have really done is affirmed bivalence but won the game by suggesting they have ill defined it. Hmmm. . . so that's why your the PH d.
Let me spend so time on it. See, now I'm glad I asked.
Joe
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
GregBoyd
02/21/01 6:29 PM
RE: RE: Prof skater
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Senior Openjoe:
One of the reasons I am very averse to the suggestion that God chooses not to know something is that, not only is it an incoherent notion, but it seems to be the most common way classicalist misconstrue the open view. They think that we think that God limits his knowledge the way God self-limits his power in Arminianism. Now, Adam Clarke may have held this position. Gilbert Bilizekian, in personal conversation, suggests something similar. But it is not what Open Theists to date have argued -- fortunately, in my view, because the view is rather easy to refute.
Glad the discussion helped clarify things.
Preciate ya, as Mephi says,
Greg Boyd
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