Hi all, I'm new here!  Pleasure to be with you folks.  Just thought I'd offer a few words in support of Matt's defense of atemporality.

That Jesus qua humanity is temporal while Jesus qua divinity is atemporal certainly has a counterintuitive ring to it.  But then again, much of the metaphysics of the incarnation sounds counterintuitive (The definition of Chalcedon, after describing the union of Christ's natures as existing "...without separation without division, without confusion, and without change.." still leaves the union as a wonderful mystery).  Think about it--Jesus qua humanity is a contingent being but yet is one and the same Person as the Son, a necessary being.  Or Jesus qua humanity is finite, but qua divinity infinite; qua humanity He is limited by space but qua divinity, not only does He not exist "in" space, but there is no point in space that is not in His presence; qua humanity He is mortal but qua divinity immortal...I could go on and on.  It seems to me then that we are not in as strange a territory as we might think when we speak of Christ incarnate and the temporal/atemporal distinctions.

I should also like to add that the very notion of atemporality is quite reasonable a proposal for undersanding God's relationship to time.  Boethius for example gives us a splendid definition of eternity that (I think) does the trick.       

Muz and Laika, are you guys interested in taking up this conversation again? If so, do you want to continue on this thread??

Matt

Tom,

I am not sure what you mean when you say that atemporality solves nothing. Are you saying it has no explanatory power? That it is unable to help you develop a model for how God can relate to the world? It can't solve any problems?

Actually, I am not sure how important that is. Whether or not atemporality is the key to solving certain questions about God's relation to time seems to me to be secondary. The first question, to me, is whether or not it is true. If atemporality can be shown to be true, then it is a matter of working out how an atemporal God relates to the world. If it is not true, (for example, if it is incoherent or contradictory) then we should probably move on with our theology. If it is possibly true, then appeal to atemporality if it is a helpful hypothesis, and reject it when it is not. I would suspect that you treat atemporality in either the second or third way. (Judging from the thread on Christian Logic)

Matt

Post Edited (Matt) : 5/3/2005 7:31:04 AM (GMT-5)

Tom,

Glad to hear from you. Also glad you liked my site! Now that I have finished my metaphysics class I'll have more time to work on it.

Tom: Show me how such a God would relate to the world.

I can only make affirmations about the relationship between God and the world. I can affirm that God is related to the world as cause is related to effect. On my view, what we see of God is the acts of God or the effects of God. We don't see God. So we know Him through His effects.

I know you are tempted to object with: "An atemporal God cannot act, since acting is a characteristic of temporal things, not atemporal things." But I would ask if we could come back to that. The reason for this is as I mentioned before. This is a secondary issue. First it seems prudent to evaluate, based on the arguments for atemporality, whether or not it is a sound doctrine. I think this is very important because the Thomist (and I consider myself a very amateur Thomist) conception of God is different than others of His time. When answering questions about the helpfulness of atemporality, one must have in mind what atemporality means. You mentioned Boethius and (in other places) maximal being or perfect being theology. However, Aquinas' view of God differs from Anselm and I believe it differs from Boethius. So to refute Boethuis or Anselm is not to refute Aquinas.

The question then, is whether or not God is atemporal and what atemporality entails. For the Thomist, one affirms true things about God, often without knowing "how" it is the case, merely "that" it is the case. For example, it would be argued that we know "that" God is atemporal even if we don't know "how" (specifically) He relates to a temporal world. So would it be agreeable to you to start with arguments for Gods atemporality?

P.S. I am more than a bit disappointed that my smiley face didn't show up!

God Bless!
Matt

Post Edited (TGB) : 5/3/2005 10:34:00 PM (GMT-5)

Tom,

I hold that that the relation between God and the world is not a mutual relation. The world is wholly dependent on God, while God is not dependent or acted on by the world. So to answer your question, I hold that the world does not cause anything in God.

I understand that Craig portrays Aquinas as having no relation with the world. However, this is not true. Aquinas does believe there is a relation between God and the world. I have a friend who brought this to the attention of Craig not too long ago. He delivered his critique of Craig with Craig present. Unfortunately I don't think I can get you a copy of that paper since my friend is trying to get it published. But I'll ask him if he minds my bringing these points up on the forum. He may, he's kind of touchy about that kind of stuff.

I'll have to post an argument when I get home. Later!

Matt

Tom,

I re-read Craigs article on leaderu. If there is one thing I like about Craig, it is his clearly outlined arguments. Thomist's typically are not as concise.

I believe that the relation between God and the world is not mutual because I believe God is simple and therefore timeless. Of course this requires me to interpret the above mentioned scriptures anthropomorphically.

TOM: Where did you go to conclude this must be the case with God? It can’t be scripture, so what’s motivating you to believe this?

MATT: I get it from natual theology. There are arguments from the Exodus account where God's says of Himself, "I AM", but that is not where I get it. You don't rule out the use of natural theology to come to conclusions about God do you?

I agree about not getting into the Molinism issue, especially not on this thread. Thanks for trying to keep things focused. I'll try to respond to your last post and then offer a brief beginning argument for God's necessity and hence atemporality.

Craig's first point about an atemporal God not being able to relate to a temporal world is not really argued for in that article. I'll have to read his book "God and Time". I regret to say that I have not yet read it. But even his argument from omniscience appears to me to beg the question. I'll read up on this tomorrow evening so that I am better able to respond to his particular arguments. Also, what would be your argument for the claim, "an atemporal deity cannot be personally related to us"?

Definition: atemporal - not temporal. By atemporal, I merely mean the negation of a temporal existence. Are you looking for more of a description of what atemporality entails or are you just asking for my definition of what atemporality means?

Finally, let me offer my summary of Aquinas' third way to get us off the ground. The thing to keep in mind is that this argument, without unpacking it, only gives you a necessary being. In the process of arguing for a necessary being, it becomes more apparent what this necessary being must be like.

1. Corruptible beings exist.
2. Corruptible beings are possible beings. Their existence is not necessary.
3. If only possible beings existed, there could be no possible beings.
a. Possible beings require a cause of their existence.
b. Possible beings cannot be the cause of their own existence.
4. However, there are possible beings.
5. Therefore there must be a necessary being that is the cause of all possible beings.
6. This necessary being is God.

The critical premise here is the 3rd premise. Possible beings require a cause of their existence, and they cannot be the cause of their own existence. I'll wait to see what premises you agree with and which ones you disagree with before I respond to objections. I look forward to your criticisms, comments, etc.

Matt

Not at all. I like philosophical theology and believe it has a lot to contribute. We have brains. Let’s use ‘em! I just don’t think natural theology necessarily entails divine atemporality (assuming God exists, of course). I can think of some reasons for thinking such a God to be temporal.

about being ‘personal’. We could turn just this one issue into a separate thread I suppose. Vincent Brummer (one of my favorites) has a great book entitled [i]Speaking of a Personal God[/i] and goes into what properties constitute a “personal relationship.” To begin with, a personal relationship can only obtain between two or more “persons.” One person can’t have a personal relationship with a blanket or a rock. That much isn’t so problematic. But more is required of two ‘persons’ to have a ‘personal relationship’ than that they are persons and co-exist. They have to relate or course! I don’t have a personal relationship with George Bush, for example. So at the very least the two have to know each other, and not just information about each other (thought it follows that they’d information is involved). Some additional properties come to mind: mutuality and freedom to begin with.

In affirming “mutuality” as a necessary condition of personal relationships, Brummer argues against unconditional determinism. If person A exhaustively determines person B, then A and B can’t be said to have a “personal” relationship. All B would amount to is a reflection of the will and power of A. B is just objectified. To the extent to which one person “determines” another, to that extent the relationship ceases to be a “personal” one (i.e., a relation that affirms the ‘personhood’ of each person as opposed to one person objectifying the other, which I think determinism does). We can get into this too if you want. The point is that relationships that are personal and not objectifying is one in which the persons involved possess freedom to determine themselves with respect that the relationship (i.e., whether they enter into a relationship or not). There’s an exchange of life and experience that’s required. But none of this can be had between an atemporal person and a temporal person. Of course, God being the most maximally personal being there is (God’s own Trinitarian experience and enjoyment of himself), I find it impossible to conceive of him as atemporally (immobile, impassible) personal. Craig doesn’t have a problem with atemporal personhood, but he doesn’t convince. In his book he actually defends atemporal personhood by comparing God “as a person” to a stone pillar. Ooo, that’s warm and personal. ;o)

I thought this was interesting… (http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliMayd.htm)

Aquinas' Third Way Modalized

Robert E. Maydole
Davidson College
bomaydole@davidson.edu

ABSTRACT: The Third Way is the most interesting and insightful of Aquinas' five arguments for the existence of God, even though it is invalid and has some false premises. With the help of a somewhat weak modal logic, however, the Third Way can be transformed into a argument which is certainly valid and plausibly sound. Much of what Aquinas asserted in the Third Way is possibly true even if it is not actually true. Instead of assuming, for example, that things which are contingent fail to exist at some time, we need only assume that contingent things possibly fail to exist at some time. Likewise, we can replace the assumption that if all things fail to exist at some time then there is a time when nothing exists, with the corresponding assumption that if all things possibly fail to exist at some time then possibly there is a time when nothing exists. These and other similar replacements suffice to produce a cogent cosmological argument. 

Tom

Tom,

I guess I have a lot to respond to. I'll have to do it in at least two posts. I apologize if I am scatter right now. I am installing software on several machines while trying to respond.

First, I completely agree that the notion of self-causality is nonsense. One would have to exist before it existed to cause its own existence. However, this is not Aquinas' claim. God is not self-caused, rather He is uncaused. This is a common misrepresentation of Aquinas' argument. Even in the article you linked to "Aquinas' Third Way Modalized" the author makes this mistake. He claims, "If, as Aquinas argues, there is a first cause, and everything has a cause, then the first cause must be self-caused."

Secondly, the claim that an atemporal being could not be personal... You are right, we could do another post on that topic alone so I will try to stay away from it as much as possible. However, you said that "a personal relationship can only obtain between two or more “persons.”" I am sure that you know that atemporalists believe God to be three persons. Hence we would hold that He is personal. In fact the "most maximal" Person, if you want to put it that way.

Maybe I am not understanding your point, but you seem to be arguing that an atemporal God could not be personal because that kind of God necessitates the destruction of free will. Since free will is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for personal relationships, an atemporal God (and all determining God) could not be personal.

I am sorry..... people are talking to me. I can't do this and that. I'll be back soon.

Matt

Tom,

Sorry, I was cut off there. Is my framing of your argument accurate? (about God not being personal if He is atemporal?) If so, my response is that while God is the cause of all things, our free will is not negated. I affirm both God's complete exhaustive knowledge of the future and free will. I do not affirm both of these by appealing to the Molinistic hypothesis. I appeal to primary and secondary efficient causality. You mentioned that "If person A exhaustively determines person B, then A and B can’t be said to have a “personal” relationship." I agree if what you mean by this is that A is the efficient cause of the action and B is the instrumental cause. But that is not my view. My view holds that there are two efficient causes of human action. So my view affirms:

1. God is completely soveriegn
2. God has exhaustive knowledge of the future
3. Man has the power of contrary choice
4. God is the cause of human action (Primary efficient)
5. Man is the cause of his own action (Secondary efficient)

TOM: "It would be nice if you explained a bit what you thought atemporal existence entailed. I don’t think people realize what a radical idea ‘atemporal existence’ is."

Post Edited (Matt) : 5/5/2005 7:03:32 PM (GMT-5)

Just some thoughts from the first page.

Matt: If I have framed your [Laika] argument incorrectly, please let me know. The problem with this, in my view, is that God may hold that 2004 is the year that George Bush will be, is, was re-elected and the war of 1812 will be, is, was fought in 1812. In this way, God may know all truths without holding contradictory statements to be true. God's knowledge is not contradictory, yet He still knows all truths. He simply does not know them in the same way we know them. He does not know them as one going through time. Only creatures that are in time say, "It is now 11:00", and then later say "It is not now 11:00". It would be the case that a creature in time could not hold both of those claims to be true at the same time, but it is not clear to me that an atemporal being must be in this situation.

Tom: This is the problem. Since an atemporal God is NOT in this (temporal) situation, the sort of tensed-facts you’ve just pointed out that temporal beings would know BECAUSE they’re temporal could not be known by an atemporal God. A temporal being, as you say, would know the truth “It’s now 11:00 AM” and “It’s no longer 10:30 AM,” etc. These truths could not be known by an atemporal God.

True, an atemporal God would see our whole timeline symulataneously, in one timeless act of knowing. But this is the problem. He would know that on the timeline indexed to 2004 Bush is re-elected, and he’d know that this occurs at a place later along the timelines than the War of 1812. He just couldn’t know which point in time along that timeline was being experienced by its inhabitants as “now.” You could go with the B-Theory of time of course, in which Caesar “is” actually crossing the Rubicon, just at some other time.

Matt: William Lane Craig argues for this in a slightly different way. He argues that if God is atemporal, then God could not be all-knowing. For He could not know what time it is now. In other words, an atemporal God could not know tensed facts. His argument seems to rely on reducing the atemporal view to the absurd conclusion that God would not know what time it is. My contention is that God may know all truths eternally.

Tom: Again, that’s the problem. Craig hasn’t been answered yet.

Matt: It is only a contradiction for God to hold contradictory beliefs at the same TIME if He is in TIME.

Tom: Personally I don’t think the problem is as much (as Laika holds) that atemporality entails God’s holding contradictory beliefs as it is God’s simply not knowing tensed-facts.

Matt: Also, why must God "NOW" believe that it is 8:00, and at the same time believe that it is not "NOW" 8:00?

Tom: Well, it’s not that God would believe it’s “now” 1812 and also “now” 2004. It’s that God would not have a “now,” he wouldn’t know where on the timeline our A-time (assuming the A-theory of time) is. Knowing THAT would entail his being temporal. If that’s the same thing Laika has been trying to say, then OK.

Matt: It is contradictory for us to say it is now 2005 and not 2005 at the same time. God, being outside of time, has eternal knowledge of temporal events.

Tom: But this isn’t really an escape. God would timelessly know the War of 1812 is occurring and the election of 2004 is occurring, comprehending both in their actuality in one seemless, sequentialess, timeless act of knowing. Again, this is the problem. There’s no way God would know tensed-facts.

Matt: God does not go through time so as to be able to affirm contradictory statements at the same TIME.

Tom: Nor would he know what time it is.

Matt, do me a favor. Minus Aquinas’ Ways and all the lingo (we can get into that later if we need too), just lay out your reasons for believing God is atemporal. You know, I believe God is atemporal because 1, 2, 3, and 4. Can you do that?

Tom

Post Edited (Alan Rhoda) : 5/6/2005 12:10:08 AM (GMT-5)