Post Edited (TGB) : 5/12/2005 10:17:10 PM (GMT-5)

Dr. Rhoda,

Thanks for joining in! I would be happy working off of the argument that you formulated. Thanks for the suggestions. Especially refering to possible beings as contingent beings. Tom, sorry if I was being too longwinded. Typically, in conversation, I like to take things slowly. I'll try to be more to the point.

Summary of argument: 

1. beings that are composed in their being are contingent
2. there must be a being, that is not itself contingent, that is the cause of all that is contingent
3. this being must not itself be composed; otherwise it would be contingent and need a cause
4. therefore, this being must be uncomposed

NOTE: In Thomistic metaphysics, beings are composed of metaphysical principles. For example, beings are composed of act and potency, essence and the act of existence, form and matter, etc. A being that is uncomposed would be a being whose essence and act of existence are the same, who is without potency, and hence without matter. (since prime matter is potency and it is potential until it recieves form. However, when it recieves form it is composed of form and matter and hence composed.)

Interesting piece here: http://pontifications.classicalanglican.net/?p=807

Perry Robinson offers this argument (http://pontifications.classicalanglican.net/docs/exiled.pdf) against divine simplicity:

If God is absolutely simple, the act of will to create is identical to his essence. Since his essence is had by him necessarily, it follows by transitivity that the act of will to create is necessary as well.

More formally:

1. If God is absolutely simple (P), then his act of will to create is identical with his essence (R).
2. If God's act of will to create is identical with his essence (R), then his act of will to create is necessary. (Q)
3. If God is absolutely simple (P), then his act of will to create is necessary. (Q) (From 1, 2 by Hypothetical Syllogism)
4. God is absolutely simple. (Premise S)
5. Therefore, God's act of will to create is necessary (R). (From 2,4, by modus ponens).

Matt, I thought it would be easier to just post snippets from arguments of others that I find convincing against divine simplicity and then point to the URLs. Is that OK?

An interesting review of Plantinga’s argument against divine simplicity:  http://www.quodlibet.net/plantinga.shtml

A couple of problems that I see with divine simplicity (in addition to Plantinga’s):

1) It seems difficult if not impossible to meaningfully predicate different attributes to God, such as “justice” or “mercy” if God is absolutely simple. If God is simple in the Aquinian sense, then when God has attribute A and B, God’s being A is ontologically identical with God’s being B. But then all normal meaning we (and scripture) give to these attributes is lost. It becomes meaningless to use such language about God.

2) An absolutely simple God would have no intrinsic contingent properties. An intrinsic contingent property would be a property that God would lack in some possible world. God has a least one non-contingent property, say, his goodness. But in this case we can make an ontological distinction between God’s having non-contingent property G (goodness), and contingent property B since G occurs in all possible worlds and B does not. So the problem (as others have pointed out) is that although God has created this world he might have created a different sort of world, or none at all. But to will one thing rather than another is an intrinsic property, and if God’s willing this world is contingent then it follows that God has a contingent intrinsic property.

A third problem might be that pointed out by Hartshorne, who proposed an argument against divine simplicity based on the contingency of created things. It went something like this (view it in the Stanford Encyclopedia on “Charles Hartshorne”):

(1) (a) "God knows that W exists" entails (b) "W exists"

(2) If (a) were necessary, (b) would be necessary.

(3) But (b) is contingent.

(4) Hence (a) is contingent.

The point made is that “we can totally exclude contingency from God only by denying God any knowledge of anything contingent." But not even Thomists want to say this.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 5/9/2005 12:14:43 AM (GMT-5)

Hi Matt,

Let's grant 2. 3 follows from 1 and 2. And 4 is redundant, following trivially from 3. So that leaves premise 1. If that is true without qualification, then the doctrine of divine simplicitly follows.

Now, I understand the Thomistic view that beings are "composed" of metaphysical principles (act/potency; matter/form; essence/existence; etc.). It is important to note, however, that the word "composed" invokes a metaphor. Literally, something is "composed" if there are two or more discrete parts that are positioned together [cum + ponere, lit. "put together"]. Thus, a 'composer' takes several discrete musical notes and puts them together so as to form a 'composition'. But Aquinas doesn't think that beings are "composed" in that sort of way, for metaphysical principles aren't discrete things. For him there neither is nor could possibly be matter without form or existence without essence.

At any rate, let's grant that the essence of a contingent being (its whatness) doesn't guarantee its existence (its thatness). With the above qualification in place, it follows that contingent beings are, in some sense, "composed" of essence and existence. Hence, all contingent beings are metaphysically composed in at least that respect. But premise 1 says something more. It says that all beings that are metaphysically composed in any respect are contingent. This is not at all obvious. So my question to you, Matt, is this: Why should we think that all beings that metaphysically composed in any respect are invariably contingent?

Why, for example, can't we suppose that, as a metaphysically necessary being, God's essence guarantees his existence, while at the same time supposing that God is "composed" in some other respect? Indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity seems to entail that God is "composed" (in some sense, bear in mind the metaphorical nature of the word) of three distinct persons. Why must a metaphysically necessary being be absolutely simple (uncomposed) in all respects?

Regards,

Alan

Ah what the heck, let’s throw tensed-facts into the discussion. It’s impossible to ignore.

                 GOD

L ----|----|----------|----------|------->

      t5  t10        t20      t30

L represents our timeline, each tiny hyphen represents the flow of time, and t5, t10, etc., represent specific moments and the events that occur at that moment. In God’s atemporal experience of and atemporal knowledge of the events of our temporal world, God would experience the events of t5, t10, t20, etc., in their actuality in one timeless act of knowing. So as I mentioned before (and as this argument goes) God would know the truth “The War of 1812 occurs in 1812.” God would know this because God comprehends the War of 1812 in its actuality. Similarly, God knows the truth “JFK is assassinated in 1963” because he equally comprehends this event in its actuality. And so God knows all the events of our temporal world. But assuming the flow of time is real (A-theory), God would not know “Now it is t20” when in fact t20 is present and “Now it is not t20” when in fact t20 is past. In other words:

God could never put his finger so to speak on the timeline and say “This is where the 'now' of the temporal world is.” And in not knowing THIS God would not know all truths.

Whatever other way you suppose God might apprehend the events of t20, it would not include this sort of tensed-knowledge. God would know that 1963 occurs later than 1812, but he would not know “It is not now 1963 in the temporal world” when it is in fact, say, 2004. God could not know truths that express irreducibly temporal conditions and relations relative to the flow of time along the timeline. Since all is known timelessly, 1812 and 1963 would to a timeless knower be equally actual, equally “now.” Each point along our timeline would be one and the same “now” to God, in which case God would not know which “now” (t5, t10, or t20) is THE “now” being experienced by temporal beings. Every now would be one and the same for God, shutting out to him the knowledge of tensed-facts.

For those who haven’t read Craig’s argument, it goes like this:

Gotta run.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 5/9/2005 6:52:03 AM (GMT-5)

Tom,

Divine Simplicity; a mistake? He's just misunderstood.  Simplicity is nice once you start to cuddle up with it.

Man, where to start??? I'd first like to make some prelimary comments. I think it's important to address some issues since we are clearly coming from different metaphysical positions.

That Gods attributes are ontologically one is precisely what simplicity claims. However, I don't think that our meaning is lost when describing God. Aquinas relies on the analogy of intrinsic attribution and proper proportionality when formulating a method of "God Talk". Are you familiar with Scotus' objection to analogy? If so, the Thomistic view of analogy is not that our concepts of God are analogous, but rather our judgments are analogous. Aquinas' doctrine of analogy is an analogy of predication, not of concepts. I am assuming that you are familiar with this doctrine and that you are familiar with it as a response to your above claim. If not, let me know.

Your second point, that God must have intrinsic contingent properties because He has a will and is able to create or not create is, I think, a more difficult problem. I think I remember Dr. Keith Yandell arguing for this once. But I think this is a problem for Neo-Platonists, not for Thomists. I could be wrong, but I don't think you realize how different our metaphysical positions are. To say, for example, that the logical consequence of simplicity is a necessary world, leads me to believe that you do not make the same metaphysical distinctions that I do. For example, Thomists still affirm God's absolute freedom even though He has no potency because God has no "passive" potency. However, God may act freely because He has "active" potency or power.

It is becoming more and more clear to me that critiques of simplicity stem from the notion that simplicity makes God less than personal. On the contrary, He is trans-personal. His attributes, for example, are just barely like the qualities that we ascribe to Him. We cannot contradict ourselves in describing Him, but our descriptions of Him must fall far short of what He really is. And I would expect as much. We have a very difficult time describing the quantium world let alone God. Since God is infinitely more difficult to understand than the quantium world, it would make sense that understanding God is at least slightly more difficult.

I think the critique by Hartshorne is answered by the active / passive potency distinction. Again, to my knowledge, God is not a set of necessary and non-necessary properties. I think this is why Plantinga concludes that simplicity ends in God being a property. Not because simplicity entails that, but because Plaintinga has a more Platonic metaphysic.

There are other arguments for why God cannot have passive potency, that God is not composed of substance and accidents, etc.. For example, when talking about the possibility of God's temporal becoming, we may refer to God's lack of passive potency. If potency in a creature is what accounts for "becoming", and God does not have that, then it seems that "becoming" is not something that God does. Should I post a separate argument for this?

Tom, I may have spoken too quickly about God's knowledge of tensed facts. You asked if God had knowledge of tensed facts. I answered, yes. But that might be misleading. On my account, God does not have this storehouse of tensed propositions in His mind. Nor does God (on my account or Craigs) "look" out at the world to determine what will happen. God's knowledge is self contained. On my account, not Craigs, the world preexisted (ontologically) in the mind of God. God knew what He would do, through Himself. So the ground of God's knowledge is not like the ground of our knowledge. We have knowledge through observation and logical inference. God knows everything intuitively, not by way of anything else. So God would never eternally formulate the proposition "It is now 8:00." To suppose that He must do this it similar to supposing that God must create a rock so big that He can't lift it.

I understand that I have not given you an argument the way you like it. But I have to do some explaining of my position. I would love to hear your thoughts! I am enjoying our conversation very much.

God Bless!

Matt

Post Edited (Matt) : 5/9/2005 4:22:07 PM (GMT-5)

Tom,

I appreciate your continuing correspondance.

Tom said...

Folks here want to challenge the beliefs about perfection that are assumed, which is why we're asking "Why believe that perfection requires simplicity?"

I am glad that you want to challenge simplicity. That is why I am discussing this issue with you. I get the arguments for simplicity at school, and I get some of the arguments against it from you.

Matt-

I’ll let Alan, who is far more knowledgeable of Aquinas, engage you on Aquinas. I just don’t have the time bro. Don’t have it.

Matt: I am rejecting the claim that God cannot be atemporal because He would not be able to know tensed facts.

Tom: Right. I just didn’t see at all how this was like rejecting the claim that God cannot be omnipotent if he was unable to create a rock he couldn’t life. I agree that the “rock” approach to defeating omnipotence assumes what it seeks to prove and is no real objection. But an atemporal God’s being ignorant of some truths (irreducibly tensed truths) is not at all like the “rock” objection. It does not assume what it wants to prove. It only assumes that a) God is atemporal, that b) God is omniscient (which I take to mean: God knows all and only truths), and that c) there are tensed truths. It concludes (rightly) that d) an atemporal God would necessarily be ignorant of tensed truths. So either God is atemporal and not omniscient, or God is omniscient and temporal.

Matt: If God is atemporal, He could not hold that "it is now 8:00" because that would not be true of Him.

Tom: Quite so. But omniscience isn’t defined as knowledge of what’s true “of the knower.” It’s knowledge of what’s true, period. That “It’s now 8 AM” (assuming the claim is made by somebody for whom it is 8 AM) not true of God is just stating the problem, not arguing that it doesn’t undermine omniscience.

Matt: Being atemporal, He is not in time.

Tom: Which accounts for his not knowing tensed truths. Right.

Matt: However, He does know all that has happened, is happening, and will happen…

Tom: Coming from an atemporalist, this can only be equivalent to “God knows all the events on our timeline,” experienced BY US as “what has, is, and will happen.” But it’s not really accurate to say GOD knows these events as “what has, is, and will happen” since these temporal distinctions are not made by God. I don’t think there’s any way to know “what has, is, and will happen” as “what has, is, and will happen” in any OTHER way than a temporal one by a temporal being in the temporal world, and you’re admitting that an atemporal God would not know tensed truths highlights this as the problem. Knowing what “has, is, and will happen”—making and knowing THIS distinction—is what knowledge of tensed facts amounts to. The best you can argue an atemporal God knows about our past, present, and future is that God knows it all timelessly, all comprehended in its actuality. But if God can never put his finger on the timeline and say “This is where the ‘now’ of the temporal world is,” then he “lacks” knowledge. There is no sense in which God knows that JFK’s assassination “has happened,” though THIS state of affairs serves as the truth conditions for a true proposition (unknown by God). God would know only that people on the timeline after 1963 relate to JFK’s assassination from a “later than” position on the timeline. But he could not know what 1963’s relation is to the actual “now” of the temporal world, since all is present to God. I can understand your needing this not to pose a threat to divine atemporality, but hey, it’s a problem.

Matt: If I am right, then God's inability to hold as true tensed facts is not an imperfection.

Tom: On the contrary. All you’ve claimed essentially is that a) God timelessly knows all the events of our timeline, and b) God is ignorant of tensed truths. How do these not constitute an imperfection with respect to God's knowledge?

I’m hogging the thread. It’s Alan’s turn.

Take care,

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 5/11/2005 12:48:42 AM (GMT-5)

Post Edited (TGB) : 5/12/2005 10:22:26 PM (GMT-5)

Ross,

Glad to see your post! I always enjoy reading your thoughts. :) Hope you are able to post more often.

Tom,

Thanks again for your endurance. You are that man!

Alan if far better at this than I am, Matt. I’m sorry you have to deal with me! But I’ll offer a bit more and leave it at that I suppose. I’m gonna be mad busy for weeks after today.

Matt: I could be wrong about this, but I really do think that your puzzle assumes a temporalist view of God in order to prove a temporalist God.

Tom: Not at all. I haven’t been trying to prove a temporal God the last few posts. I’m proving that an atemporal God can’t be an omniscient God given the existence of tensed facts. So I’m just assuming a) God exists, b) God is omniscient, c) omniscience entails God’s knowing all and only truths, d) an A-theory of time and the existence of tensed facts. If these assumptions are true, an atemporal God could not know tensed facts. If I’m wrong about the A-theory of time and the existence of tensed facts, then time and change are unreal, all events are equally actual, and an atemporal God would be omniscient.

Matt: You seem to rely one two lines of reasoning: First, you claim that an atemporal God would be ignorant of what time it is because He would be unable to put His finger on when "now" is. Second, God's omniscience is challenged. For if God is atemporal, He would then be required to hold all truths (including irreducibly tensed truths) all at the same time, which is contradictory.

Tom: The first claim is unquestionably true. The second is not. I’m not claiming that an atemporal God would hold irreducibly tensed truths all simultaneously. I’m claiming God wouldn’t know tensed truths, period.

Matt: When you say that "God could never know when now is" you realize that you have not offered an argument for this, rather it appears that you take this as a given. Even assuming an A theory of time, why couldn't an atemporal God know what time it is?

Tom: Because it’s not always the same time. On the A-theory, time and change are real. To know what time it is is to have changing beliefs about the world, to not always believe the same thing. The semantic content of what God knows is constantly changing with an ever changing world.

Matt: The only reason I can think of for this conclusion is that you think God must experience the world in order to know the world. I think this supposition is false. On my view, God does not know the world by observing it. Are you presupposing that God must observe the world to know it?

Tom: I’m assuming with you that God’s knowledge of the world either comes from himself or from the world. The former entails, I think, theological determinism, which I don’t believe. So I think God gets his knowledge of the world from the world. Truths about the world have truth conditions that obtain in the world. To know all obtaining truth conditions is to know all truths. God is everywhere present in the world and by virtue of his presence embraces all obtaining state of affairs and so knows the world’s truth conditions.

Matt: Even your second supposition, that if God is atemporal, He must hold contradictory propositions at the same time seems to presuppose that God thinks discursively and knows the world via His encounter with the world.

Tom: I don’t think so, Matt. I’m not suggesting how precisely God “does” knowledge in his head. He doesn’t have a head. I don’t wanna lay him up on the operating table to cut him open. If your atemporal view is really true, it’s not true in a way human beings can affirm meaningfully without contradicting themselves. Whatever might be the case about how God processes his knowledge, whatever might be the case about the word, certainly WE can never meaningfully affirm what is contradictory. We’re hardwired to reject contradictions as false. To affirm them as true is not to affirm anything meaningful at all.

Now, since I think one of the jobs of theology is to determine what can ‘meaningfully’ be said about God and not what can ‘meaninglessly’ be predicated to him, the atemporal view doesn’t work for me because it entails contradictions (from my very amateurish point of view at least).

Matt: It also supposes that God holds all true propostions in His mind. I think, however, that this view leads to absurdities. For example, you admitted that God does NOT have first hand subjective experience of what it is like to sin. You also believe that this does not compromise His omniscience. That being the case, must God hold the true proposition that "I have sinned"?

Tom: It only leads to absurdities if you assume God’s knowing all truths means God thinks he’s the subject of all truths. But God isn’t the subject of all truth claims. Now, I’m not claiming to know where God stores his knowledge. I don’t think we need to psychoanalyze God to that extent. “I have sinned” can be truthfully affirmed by God about himself only if it’s true about God. Has God sinned? If not, then God doesn’t hold true the proposition “I, God, have sinned,” To say that God knows all true propositions, Matt, doesn’t mean God believes he’s the subject of all true propositions. If you’ve sinned, then God knows “Matt has sinned.”

Matt: That proposition is true if I say it, but if God were to hold that proposition as true, God would hold a false belief since He has not sinned. The proposition "I have sinned" is objectively true if I say it, but if God were to hold that proposition, it would be false. If God holds true propositions, He would hold that "Matt sinned" not "I have sinned."

Tom: Obviously.

Matt: In this case, God would lack the true proposition, "I have sinned." Would this compromise His omniscience?

Tom: God would not “lack” knowledge of the true proposition “I have sinned,” since the words “I have sinned” spoken by God are a different proposition than when spoken by you. The former is a false proposition, since God has not sinned. God knows it’s false. The latter words spoken by you form a true proposition that God does not lack knowledge of. Again, to say God knows all and only truths doesn’t mean God holds all truths to be true of himself. Omniscience doesn’t make God the subject of first-person truth claims uttered by persons other than God. “I have sinned” is not a proposition floating around waiting to land on somebody’s head. It’s not a proposition until it’s uttered by some “I.”

Matt: If I say, it is now 11:00, I make a true statement. But if God says it is 11:00, it is false because He is not in time.

Tom: OK, I see where you’re going. If YOU say “I have sinned,” this is true. But “I have sinned” as a propositions doesn’t float around without the “I” referring to some sentient being. God would know “Matt has sinned” because he’s the subject of the proposition. God wouldn’t know “I (God) have sinned” because “I have sinned” is a different proposition when you, or God, or I say it. Now, you think this is an analogy of your saying, truthfully, “It is now 11:00” and this being true FOR YOU but not needing to be true FOR GOD. I don’t think this will fly, Matt. Even on your view, “It’s now 11:00 AM” is spoken by some subject—you, which entails “I, Matt, am at 11:00 AM.” Again, on your view this would mean it’s true fore God that “Matt is at 11:00 AM,” something you assume does not entail God’s being temporal (just as God’s knowing “Matt has sinned” doesn’t entail God’s being a sinner. You’re equating “sin” with “time.” Very strange. But these are metaphysically dissimilar.

Actually, Matt, God’s knowing “Matt has sinned” is, as far as I can tell, a tensed fact. There are times when it’s false that “Matt has sinned,” like the first moment of your birth. Assuming an A-theory of time, then, in which time and change are real and objective features of the world, there are times when “Matt has sinned” is true and times when it’s false (precisely because they’re times when the state of affairs “Matt’s having sinned” is actual and times when it’s not). But for God both states of affairs are simultaneously equally actual, and we can’t affirm that without affirming a contradiction.

Matt: In order to maintain that God must hold the true proposition "It is 11:00", you must presuppose that God is in time. This is the very thing you are trying to prove.

Tom: You’re familiar with reductio ad absurdum, Matt. That’s what I’m constructing. I’m assuming God is NOT temporal; that he’s atemporal. I’m assuming secondly that time and change are real and objective features of the world (i.e., A-theory and the existence of tensed facts). Assuming these two things, we are reduced to the conclusion that God cannot know tensed facts. Now I’m not claiming this itself proves God is temporal. You’re misunderstanding me. All I’m claiming is that God can’t be omniscient if God is atemporal and there exist tensed facts. If I add to this the fact that God is omniscient, THEN I have a proof for God’s being temporal. But the logic doesn’t begin by assuming this. It begins by assuming God is atemporal.

Matt: Why can't God know all truths without holding the particular proposition "It is 11:00"? Surely God can know all truths without holding the paricular truth claim "I have sinned".

Tom: Because entailment applies to belief states, that is, knowing A means knowing, being, and believing what knowing A entails. Knowing “Matt has sinned” does not entail being a sinner. It just doesn’t. We all know that. But doesn’t follow from this that knowing “It’s 11:00 AM for Matt” doesn’t entail being temporal. “Sinfullness” and “temporality” are not the same thing. They’re quite different animals in fact.

Let’s try this. You’ve already agreed that your truthfully saying “I have sinned” entails God’s knowing not “I have sinned” but “Matt has sinned.” Fine. Quite right. How are we to understand you’re saying “It is 11:00 AM”? This can be expressed as your believing “I am at 11:00 AM.” By your logic then, on the stinkin A-theory, God knows “Matt is actually at 11:00 AM.” On the A-theory there is no other ACTUAL Matt. OK? But this proposition entails God’s being temporal. It’s the knowledge of this fact itself which is possible only by means of temporal existence since, assuming the A-theory of time, it’s being 11:00 AM for you is not always actual. Sometimes it’s 11:30 AM. But on your view, an atemporal God would believe both “Matt is actually at 11:00 AM” and “Matt is actually at 11:30 AM.” You end up attributing “actuality” to what on the A-theory cannot be simultaneously actual.

Tom

Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/15/2005 10:41:02 AM (GMT-5)

How simple is a God composed of attributes (some whose meanings are contrary to each other, destroyer:creator, mercy:justice) whose meanings come from the composition of analogous actual actions?

Post Edited (Laika) : 5/16/2005 9:14:16 AM (GMT-5)

Tom,

I have enjoyed our conversation very much! Thanks for your time. I suspect that both of us knew that neither one of us were going to change our mind very quickly. One thing I would like to point out. Of course I could be wrong, but I don't think you realize how different our starting points are. Also, our methods for approaching theological and philosophical questions are very different. Thanks for the discussion. I'd be up for more conversation sometime. Perhaps there are some topics that we are not so clearly divided on.

jefscott,

Early in our conversation, I was asked about the "problems" that atemporality was supposed to solve. I am seeing this more and more. That is interesting to me, because my first question is not "what problem does this solve?" It is "Is this doctrine true"? I have offered something resembling an argument for my position, but it has not been responded to. I tend to think that this is because very few people understand the metaphysics behind it.

Anyway, I would strongly disagree that to hold an "atemporal" view of God is to be anti-intellectual. No serious atemporalists believes their view to be contradictory. They would argue that the temporal view is metaphysically problematic. Some would even say that it's metaphysically incoherent. They might go so far as to accuse you of being anti-intellectual. If you are interested in conversing more about it, I would enjoy that.

Matt