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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/17/2005 9:29 AM (GMT -6) |   | |
Hi Jeff-
To save you time, here is Matt’s first argument (Aquinas’ third way):
1. Corruptible beings exist.
2. Corruptible beings are possible beings. Their existence is not necessary.
3. If only possible beings existed, there could be no possible beings.
a. Possible beings require a cause of their existence.
b. Possible beings cannot be the cause of their own existence.
4. However, there are possible beings.
5. Therefore there must be a necessary being that is the cause of all possible beings.
6. This necessary being is God.
Later Matt added:
My view holds that there are two efficient causes of human action. So my view affirms:
1. God is completely soveriegn
2. God has exhaustive knowledge of the future
3. Man has the power of contrary choice
4. God is the cause of human action (Primary efficient)
5. Man is the cause of his own action (Secondary efficient)
Alan replied and made some good points. Let me repost what he said:
Thomas's terminology, especially his use of "possible", is very different from mainstream analytic metaphysics. It might help discussion to translate Aquinas-speak into more familiar terms, using "contingent" instead of "possible". It is also helpful to specify that Aquinas is arguing for God as a sustaining cause of creation, as opposed arguing that God is what we might call an originating cause of creation. That's the crucial difference between Thomistic-style cosmological arguments and the Kalam. While Aquinas believes as a matter of faith that time has a beginning, he does not believe this is philosophically demonstrable, so Kalam-style arguments are not an option for him. Finally, I think we can improve the argument by knocking off a couple unnecessary premises and by making the subargument more complete:
1. Contingent beings exist.
2. If all beings were contingent, then there could be no contingent beings.
a. Contingent beings require a sustaining cause of their existence.
b. Contingent beings cannot be the sustaining cause of their own existence.
c. Therefore, the sustaining cause of each contingent beings' existence must lie outside that being. (a,b)
d. The collection of all contingent beings is itself contingent.
e. Therefore, the collection of all contingent beings requires as a sustaining cause a non-contingent being. (c,d)
3. Therefore, there exists at least one non-contingent being that is a sustaining cause of the existence of the collection of all contingent beings. (1,2)
4. A being is non-contingent iff it's essence and it's existence are not distinct.
5. There can exist at most one being whose essence and existence are not distinct.
6. Therefore, there exists exactly one non-contingent being whose essence and existence are not distinct and who is the sustaining cause of the existence of the collection of all contingent beings. This being we call God. (3,4,5)
Now this seems to me to be a fairly decent argument. There are, of course, premises which require further elaboration and defense (esp. 2.d, 4, and 5), but I don't see any blatant howlers here. And if we grant the soundness of the argument, it is still a further question whether one can properly derive the rest of the Thomistic package of divine attributes (simplicity, pure actuality, aseity, immutability, atemporality, etc.).
Alan
Matt reposted in response:
Summary of argument:
1. beings that are composed in their being are contingent
2. there must be a being, that is not itself contingent, that is the cause of all that is contingent
3. this being must not itself be composed; otherwise it would be contingent and need a cause
4. therefore, this being must be uncomposed
NOTE: In Thomistic metaphysics, beings are composed of metaphysical principles. For example, beings are composed of act and potency, essence and the act of existence, form and matter, etc. A being that is uncomposed would be a being whose essence and act of existence are the same, who is without potency, and hence without matter. (since prime matter is potency and it is potential until it recieves form. However, when it recieves form it is composed of form and matter and hence composed.)
5. An uncomposed being has no potency
6. Potency (passive potency) is required for change
7. A being with no passive potency has not ability to change
8. Temporal becoming requires a change in a thing (whether intrinsic or extrinsic)
9. A being with no potency for change cannot change intrinsically or extrincally since it has no potency for change
10. Therefore an uncomposed being is not temporal
Alan responded with:
Let's grant 2. 3 follows from 1 and 2. And 4 is redundant, following trivially from 3. So that leaves premise 1. If that is true without qualification, then the doctrine of divine simplicitly follows.
Now, I understand the Thomistic view that beings are "composed" of metaphysical principles (act/potency; matter/form; essence/existence; etc.). It is important to note, however, that the word "composed" invokes a metaphor. Literally, something is "composed" if there are two or more discrete parts that are positioned together [cum + ponere, lit. "put together"]. Thus, a 'composer' takes several discrete musical notes and puts them together so as to form a 'composition'. But Aquinas doesn't think that beings are "composed" in that sort of way, for metaphysical principles aren't discrete things. For him there neither is nor could possibly be matter without form or existence without essence.
At any rate, let's grant that the essence of a contingent being (its whatness) doesn't guarantee its existence (its thatness). With the above qualification in place, it follows that contingent beings are, in some sense, "composed" of essence and existence. Hence, all contingent beings are metaphysically composed in at least that respect. But premise 1 says something more. It says that all beings that are metaphysically composed in any respect are contingent. This is not at all obvious. So my question to you, Matt, is this: Why should we think that all beings that metaphysically composed in any respect are invariably contingent?
Why, for example, can't we suppose that, as a metaphysically necessary being, God's essence guarantees his existence, while at the same time supposing that God is "composed" in some other respect? Indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity seems to entail that God is "composed" (in some sense, bear in mind the metaphorical nature of the word) of three distinct persons. Why must a metaphysically necessary being be absolutely simple (uncomposed) in all respects?
To my knowledge Matt has not answered Alan. Matt did admit that the Trinity posed the greatest problem for the doctrine of simplicity and that he had no satisfactory answer to this. Why wouldn't this encourage Matt to doubt the doctrine of simplicity? I don't know.
I left Aquinas to Alan and focused instead on what I thought was one unacceptable consequence of divine atemporality—God’s ignorance of tensed facts. Assuming an A-theory of time and the existence of tensed facts, an atemporal God could not know tensed facts. You can read the last page to see if you think Matt has escaped this criticism. I don’t think he has. Moreover, though I’m sure that Matt and I have (as Matt says) different starting points and somewhat different methodologies in how we do theology, I don’t see that my criticisms can be dismissed on the grounds that we differ in this regard, unless his starting point means dismissing such criticisms, in which case that’s the point of debate.
Have fun!
Tom Post Edited (TGB) : 5/17/2005 9:35:31 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Nathan Straub
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Date Joined May 2005
Total Posts : 50
| Posted 5/17/2005 11:32 AM (GMT -6) | | | Note that Aquinas had his own analogy of the trinity. (I read it in his Compendium) It is very similar to Jonathan Edwards' view... that the Word proceeds from the Father as God's knowledge of himself, and the Spirit proceeds from both as God loves himself. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 5/17/2005 12:53 PM (GMT -6) | | | Matt, to my simple mind, both time and space are kinds of frames of reference. They are not technically substances like matter or spirit. All substances are said to exist. But "exist" is a verb with a TENSE. And rightly so. To even think of some being, A, as existing, we have to think of A existing with some time relation to our thinking of it. I.e., we think it existed BEFORE we thought of it's existence, SIMULTANEOUS with our thought of it's existence, or AFTER our thought of it's existence. Thus, to say time exists as a substance is to think circularly, for existence implies a time relation.
The fact that we speak of time and space as nouns is not due to their being actual substances, but rather to the impotence of our language. Much like we sometimes speak of existence as an attribute, although existence is not technically an attribute. Something must exist to even HAVE an attribute.
That's how I see it. So back to you, Matt. What problem does atemporality sovle?
wjsPost Edited (jefscott) : 5/17/2005 1:00:29 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
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Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 5/17/2005 4:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey jefscott,
I am not entirely sure what you were talking about in your last post. Perhaps we could talk about it more. Concerning your question, "What problem does atemporality solve?" I have not offered atemporality as a solution to any problem. I hold to an atemporal view because I think the arguments for atemporality are good arguments. I then work out various problems given an atemporal view.
If, for example, I run across an argument that shows atemporality to be contradictory or incoherent, then I would have to re-examine my position. However, as of now, I don't think I have heard any solid arguments that show atemporality to be contradictory or incoherent. Tom offered some arguments, but I think those arguments contain some false presuppositions about what an atemporal God must be like.
Tom, I did respond to Alan.
Matt said...
According to Aquinas, any composition in a being requires that that being have a cause of its existence. If a being is composed of act and potency, that being requires a Composer. If it is composed of form and matter, it requires a Composer. So the reason God cannot be composed in any way is because He would then need a Composer. Essence and the act of existence are just one set of metaphysical principles of which we are composed. However, if we are composed of act and potency, the two principles would have to be joined by something not composed. Perhaps you didn't accept it, but it was a response.
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -Pascal | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/17/2005 10:19 PM (GMT -6) | |
Matt: I hold to an atemporal view because I think the arguments for atemporality are good arguments.
Jeff: What ARE those arguments? Are there some web articles you could refer me to?
Arghghgh!  Jeff, those arguments are on the summary page I posted for you. Here's Matt's argument for believing God is atemporal: 1. beings that are composed in their being are contingent 2. there must be a being, that is not itself contingent, that is the cause of all that is contingent 3. this being must not itself be composed; otherwise it would be contingent and need a cause 4. therefore, this being must be uncomposed 5. An uncomposed being has no potency 6. Potency (passive potency) is required for change 7. A being with no passive potency has not ability to change 8. Temporal becoming requires a change in a thing (whether intrinsic or extrinsic) 9. A being with no potency for change cannot change intrinsically or extrincally since it has no potency for change 10. Therefore an uncomposed being is not temporal So, Jeff, for Matt believing God is atemporal DOES solve a very BIG problem, the problem of God's being a CONTINGENT being were he to be a temporal being. None of us wants to say God is a contingent being. God is a necessary being. Therefore, Matt argues, God must not be temporal. For Aquinas (and Matt), temporal being is contingent being. Sweet dreams Jeff!  Tom Post Edited (TGB) : 5/17/2005 10:22:46 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 5/18/2005 9:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Sorry, Tom. I see where he's going now. I have trouble with many of the numbered assertions, of course. It's one thing to say God is not simple; it's another to say He is composed. For the verb "composed" could imply He was "put together" by another agent. But the former does not imply the latter. God is not simple, and yet He was NOT put together by another agent. A self-existent being is simply that - self-existent. It's nature (simple, or not) has to be accepted as a given.
A contingent being can be contingent for one of two reasons, I would think. First, it's continued existence may depend on outside conditions or causes. In this view of contingency, a contingent being may have existed from eternity, perhaps, as long as God was "there" to KEEP it in existence all the while. Now, I'm not totally sure of this, but I don't know how to prove otherwise, either.
Second, a contingent being's very existence may have BEGAN at a point in time, which means it was brought INTO being by something outside itself. For all I know, fundamental physical particles might exist eternally independent of outside causal agency NOW that God has created them. But they are still contingent in the sense that they only exist BECAUSE God created them. And it may be true that God could annihilate them if He CHOOSES to. But that would entail the generation of a causal agency that is not inevitable.
I'm not sure what potency means in this context. I suspect the assertions about potency, too, would be objectionable to me for the same reason as stated above. Whatever "potency" means, if a self-existent being has it, it simply is a fact to be accepted. As one philosopher once said:
"In both finite and infinite, there is a common mystery, which cannot be overcome, and that is the mystery of self-existence. It does not relieve this mystery, to accept the fact of self-evolved and self-evolving forces and laws; nor does it increase it, to accept the fact of a self-existent creating intelligence whom we assume to explain the order and thought of the finite universe."
Similarly, the nature of a self-existent being (e.g., simple or not) doesn't increase or relieve the mystery. The mystery is self-existence, itself.
wjsPost Edited (jefscott) : 5/18/2005 10:09:16 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/18/2005 10:20 AM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: I see where he's going now. I have trouble with many of the numbered assertions, of course. It's one thing to say God is not simple; it's another to say He is composed. For the verb "composed" could imply He was "put together" by another agent. But the former does not imply the latter. God is not simple, and yet He was NOT put together by another agent.
Tom: Right. I think this was what Alan was looking for from Matt, too. But Matt’s response, again, seems to assume the point to be proved.
Jeff: A contingent being can be contingent for one of two reasons, I would think. First, its continued existence may depend on outside conditions or causes. In this view of contingency, a contingent being may have existed from eternity, perhaps, as long as God was "there" to KEEP it in existence all the while. Now, I'm not totally sure of this, but I don't know how to prove otherwise, either.
Tom: As far as I can tell, a contingent being HAS to begin to exist (your second way of being a contingent being). A being who has no beginning of its existence would exist necessarily.
Jeff: Second, a contingent being's very existence may have BEGAN at a point in time, which means it was brought INTO being by something outside itself. For all I know, fundamental physical particles might exist eternally independent of outside causal agency NOW that God has created them. But they are still contingent in the sense that they only exist BECAUSE God created them. And it may be true that God could annihilate them if He CHOOSES to.
Tom: I’m feeling ya.
Jeff: I'm not sure what potency means in this context. I suspect the assertions about potency, too, would be objectionable to me for the same reason as stated above.
Tom: I’m not an Aquinas buff, but my guess is that by “potency” he means “unactualized potential.” Of course, you’ve got “passive” and “active” potency with Aquinas.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 5/18/2005 10:53 AM (GMT -6) | |
Tom said...
Jeff: A contingent being can be contingent for one of two reasons, I would think. First, its continued existence may depend on outside conditions or causes. In this view of contingency, a contingent being may have existed from eternity, perhaps, as long as God was "there" to KEEP it in existence all the while. Now, I'm not totally sure of this, but I don't know how to prove otherwise, either.
Tom: As far as I can tell, a contingent being HAS to begin to exist (your second way of being a contingent being). A being who has no beginning of its existence would exist necessarily.
You may be right, but I don't know how to prove it. For me, it's a bit difficult to get my mind "around" the idea of a contingent being existing without beginning. But I suspect that's for the same reason it's hard for me to get my mind "around" God having always existed. Thinking about existing into the infinite FUTURE seems easier because annihilation is a bit hard to grasp, too. Some people think annihilation is counter-intuitive.
wjs | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 5/18/2005 12:01 PM (GMT -6) | | Matt: Tom, I did respond to Alan. I said:
According to Aquinas, any composition in a being requires that that being have a cause of its existence. If a being is composed of act and potency, that being requires a Composer. If it is composed of form and matter, it requires a Composer. So the reason God cannot be composed in any way is because He would then need a Composer. Essence and the act of existence are just one set of metaphysical principles of which we are composed. However, if we are composed of act and potency, the two principles would have to be joined by something not composed.
Perhaps you didn't accept it, but it was a response.
Tom: It looks like you’re just begging the question, Matt. I could be wrong. But it looks like your reply just assumes that “any composition in a being requires that that being have a cause of its existence.” Yes, according to Aquinas this is so. But Alan’s question was why believe this? Do you have any independent reasons for believing this?
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/18/2005 12:58 PM (GMT -6) | | Matt, I can see why it is tempting to make the leap from composite to composed (in the verbal sense). I believe we intuitively connect events under the relation of means to ends. Even young children will ask about nature such questions as "what is that for?" So I think space, time, and God are the correlates of the universe. Infinite time and space are the correlates of finite time and space. And God is the correlate insomuch as He is the ultimate first cause of all the causal chains of the universe, Who constitutes the sufficient ground of the intelligible world.
It is, then, tempting to try to apply to God, as composite, that same kind of causal reasoning that led to recognizing Him as the first cause of the universe in the first place. For since many of the composite beings in the world are explained in terms of means and ends, it is natural to want to assume the same must hold true of any non-simple being. But if God is known as the CORRELATE of the cause-and-effect, contingent universe, it is not technically appropriate to analyze Him in a way completely analogous to a designed (=caused), CONTINGENT being. So, if God is both composite AND self-existent, we have to accept His composite-ness as self-existent and without need of a means-to-ends explanation. Perhaps the causal relations between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit independent of creation are only direct and immediate - i.e., there may be no intermediate means to accomplish ends. In which case the relation of means to ends may not exist except in a world like ours. In which case the analogy of composite=designed fails with respect to the Godhead. For we must distinguish between designed=intended and designed=MEANStoEnds.
And if that is the case, then the only question that remains is, Why should we think God is simple? If God is simple, can He still be the sufficient ground of the universe? Is it conceivable to think of a designing God who does not have intellect, sensibilities and will? Wouldn't these three, alone, imply compositeness or non-simplicity?
wjsPost Edited (jefscott) : 5/18/2005 9:04:25 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 5/18/2005 7:03 PM (GMT -6) | | | Sahid: But chaos and freedom are two sides of the same coin.
Jeff: Unfortunately!! 
wjs | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
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Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 5/18/2005 8:18 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
I believe Alan's question was more along the lines of, Why must God (whose essence and existence are identical) be absolutely simple? Couldn't God be uncomposed of essence and existence but be composed in some other way?
I think that was the essence of his question. I responded that a being that has any composition requires a cause. I could offer some arguments if you like, but it sounded like you were done with this conversation.
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -Pascal | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 5/19/2005 8:25 AM (GMT -6) | | I'm still in the business of trying to show how we can be coherent without jumping to the counter-intuitive notion of atemporality. And I'm thinking it is counter-intuitive to claim that "existence" is part of one's essence. One must exist to HAVE an essence or attributes at all. The essence is just the set of attributes that ESSENTIALLY defines the being and distinguishes it from all other essences. ALL beings exist. Thus, existence, even if it were an attribute, could not be a unique or distinguishing attribute.
wjsPost Edited (jefscott) : 5/19/2005 8:41:00 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
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Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 5/22/2005 2:43 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
Here is Alan's question:
"Why, for example, can't we suppose that, as a metaphysically necessary being, God's essence guarantees his existence, (i.e. His essence is His existence) while at the same time supposing that God is "composed" in some other respect?... Why must a metaphysically necessary being be absolutely simple (uncomposed) in all respects?" (emphasis mine)
So I don't think he was asking about essence and existence per se. He seemed to be asking, 'Even if God is uncomposed of essence and existence, why must we assume that God is absolutely simple? (i.e. absolutely uncomposed) My response to this was that if God is composed of any metaphysical principles, His being would be, in some way, contingent on something other than Himself.
jefscott,
What would you think about starting a new thread? Perhaps we could have a thread on "Thomistic Metaphysics" Something like that? Potency is that which is capible of recieving act. Act and potency are correlative principles. That probably does not help you much, which is why it might be good to start a whole thread on this.
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -Pascal | | Back to Top | | |
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