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|  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/23/2005 5:05 PM (GMT -6) |   | The contentions: 1) TWT 1 fails in light of the belief that the triune God possesses aseity, such that any non-God beauty truly is superfluous to God.
2) Eventual universal reconciliation is reasonable belief that follows from a belief in an unchangably loving, triune, self-sufficient, self-existent God who's disposition includes experiencing beauty via loving relationality
What is TWT 1? It is one of the 6 theses for the warfare worldview that says that "Love must be chosen". Long story short, this means that genuine love (ie that form of love which is most appreciated by God) can only be the product of a being who is genuine able NOT to love. This forms an important basis for the "free will argument"
Meaninglessness Discussion Recap: In looking at the idea of God's aseity in light of Doc's trinitarian reconstruction of Hartshornean dipolar theism, we have found that God has unsurpassably intense experience of beauty via loving sociality. God gets this aesthetic satisfaction with God's own triunity. The implication the followed was that all non-God beauty was relativized to meaningless, with respect to God's aesthetic appreciation of beauty. It was superfluous to God. It was only by God's FREE, GRACIOUS choice to genuinely esteem contingent reality that we have ANY sense of real "meaning" to God at all.
For our purposes, it should enough to note that the content of beautiful experience that "satisfied" God's dispositional telos was the loving sociality within Godself. Restated, God's own experience of God's UNCHANGABLE love formed the ground of God's unsurpassably intense aesthetic satisfaction.
God's Unchangable Loving Nature Why is God's loving nature unchangable? Is it primarily because God is a necessary being? Not really. What makes God's loving nature unchangable is God's dispositional reality. God's "DNA" is "wired" for experiencing beauty via loving sociality. As this dispositional reality comes to be, it is like into the human DNA in each dividing human cell. The cell unchangably does what the DNA tells it to do. Likewise, God's nature becomes according to the dispositional reality God has. What this means is that God's unchangably loving nature is NOT grounded in God's necessary nature, but in God's primordial reality and the grounding dispositional reality.
Emerging Thoughts TWT 1 has serious problems! It seems to me that the only ways that someone could argue that genuine love must arise from libertarian choice (AS A METPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE OF LOVE) would be to show undeniably that...
1) the ONLY form of loving activity God can accept as being "valuable" arises from libertarian choice
2) there is NO OTHER WAY that loving activity can come from the ontological center (spirit) of any being, necessary or contingent, other than from libertarian choice.
But...
#1 is pretty much demolished by the facticity of God's unsurpassably intense experience of God's own UNCHANGABLE loving sociality.
#2 is defeated because we can conceive of contingent beings who have a dispositional reality with an unchangable tendency towards loving sociality...just like God. Remember, the unchangability of God's loving nature is NOT based on God's necessary being, but in the "DNA" that God's becoming actualizes! We can even consider beings who are liberatarianly free on other areas, but unchangable with respect to loving sociality.
[To pre-empt some things. Some may try to say that God wouldn't be interacting with US but with HIS "PROGRAMMING" OF US (a reductionistic way of refering to the dispositional reality) and that God wants to interact with us. There's problems....
1) If this is true, then God's interaction with Godself can be defined the same way. God is related BY God's "programming" to another "programmed" being.
2) Unless one is willing to say that certain elements of our dispositional realities are ALL that there are to self-disposing contingent beings, this line of thinking doesn't work. That'd be like saying that God doesn't interact with MY humanness, but just with my pre-programmed human DNA. See the issue?]
If all this is workable, then we see that TWT 1 fails in light of the belief that God possesses aseity, such that any non-God beauty truly is superfluous to God.
Implications If TWT 1 falls, then the free will argument is lost to us. We have NO metaphysical reasons for...
--why God would create a MORALLY free world (not just libertarianly free, in the general sense)
--why God would allow evil come to be
and...
--why God would allow people to be lost eternally...
...if God didn't have to do so. It would end up being a matter of simply WILL by God that we could not discern behind. In the end, all we could say is "Obviously, God just wanted it this way by God's own FREE choice" Obviously, some people are going to have a problem with that. It "doesn't explain enough". Well, whatever explains this, it CAN'T be TWT 1...not if we hold to all the implications of God's aseity.
More interesting, we'd have NO metaphysical reason to rule out any type of eventual universal reconciliation that employs a "rock-bottom experience"/dispositional reality element. The most that one could say is this...
"Well, just like God just chose to have God's contingent expression THIS way...God just chose to allow some people to choose their way into hell!"
This would be suspect if one held that God's dispositional telos really involved God experiencing beauty via loving sociality...AND if God's contingent expression really WAS based upon God's ad intra existence. It would seem that having every being in contingent reality end up having loving interaction with God would be the natural end goal for Creation, in this case. It would have to be very cogently argued why eventual universal reconciliation would NOT be compatible with an ad extra inexhaustible display of God's dispositional reality involving God experiencing beauty via loving sociality.
Otherwise, it appears to me that, given the idea that a unchangably loving, triune, self-sufficient, self-existent God who's disposition includes experiencing beauty via loving relationality, it is a reasonable inference that eventual universal reconciliation is plausible.
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Thoughts? Take your time. Especially YOU, Tom. I know yer tired...
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it. Post Edited (MephEternal) : 10/23/2005 5:59:38 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/23/2005 7:09 PM (GMT -6) |   | I feel like more has to be said on one point.
It is possible to conceive of an contingent, sentient being who has libertarian freedom (ie has relative ontological autonomy from God) but who is unchangably loving (via their dispositional reality set by God). What would be the result is a person who would always love, but would do so in unpredictable, nearly inexhaustible different ways that were uniquely influenced by that person's previous FREE choices.
For an example, let's fast forward. Let's assume LFW exists. Let's assume that I'm in post-Consummation glorified state. In this state, I cannot fail to love. Now, even though I am still contingent and I cannot fail to love, my particular loving acts could NEVER be exhaustively predicted or predictable to anyone, not even God. Why? Because I am a unique being in a unique situation because of my unique choices that I still make. I may not choose to show love by dancing, but by rapping. I may choose to show love by writing OR by speaking. See what I mean? JUST LIKE GOD, an unchangably loving nature would not hinder the unique creativity and near-inexhaustible responsiveness I can have because of my libertarian freedom.
See how the necessary/contingent argument misses the point?
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/23/2005 9:24 PM (GMT -6) |   | Let's do some deconstruction...
Got some old stuff from Tom. about TWT 1. The metaphysics of love..
"For a person to enter, engage in, and enjoy a personal and loving relationship with another person, she must be free to determine for herself whether or not she enters, engages in, and enjoys such a relationship."
That “the person” determines this is what makes the relationship “personal,” and that they do it in response to the worth and value of the other person, and in order to affirm that worth and value, is what makes it “loving.”
Meph's Restatement: If a person cannot freely self-determine one's interest in a loving relationship (from beginning to end), they cannot enjoy a personal, loving relationship.
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Process theism on Metaphysics and God (emphasis mine)
"That which is best described, in process theism, as the ultimate reality, is God. For Whitehead and Hartshorne, God should not be treated as the exception to metaphysical principles; otherwise, there can be no reasoned discourse about the divine (that is, no theology). Ideally, God is to be the chief exemplification of metaphysical principles, and it is this ideal that Whitehead and Hartshorne strive to realize. In process theism, the divine or eminent form of creativity provides the basis for cosmic order and achieved value. In Whitehead's words, God is “the poet of the world,” leading it with tender patience by the divine vision of truth, beauty, and goodness (Whitehead 1978, 346)."
plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-theism/#1
Doc accepts this premise when he reconstructs Hartshorne's theology. I accept this premise as well.
----------------------------
Some thoughts:
1) If what Whitehead, Hartshorne, and other process theologians are saying is taken as true, a metaphysical priniciple MUST be exemplified by God to be such. This implies that if there is a metaphysical principle dealing with love, it CANNOT exclude God.
2) God's moral nature is a product of God's continual actualization of God's disposition towards experiencing beauty (in part via loving sociality.) This ends up that God cannot refrain from loving others.
3) God's unchangable moral nature does NOT have to do with God's NECESSARY being. It is grounded on the continual actualization of God's disposition.
4) Tom's "metaphysics of love" cannot be applied to God, because God cannot freely self-determine one's interest in a loving relationship. If this is true, then (with Hartshorne and Whitehead), we can affirm that Tom's idea should NOT be considered a binding metaphysical principle.
5) If it's true that a metaphysical principle has God as it's chief exemplification, then we can look at God's love relationships for hints are what a metaphysical principle about love can look like. Following this idea, we can say that WHATEVER love is, it doesn't necessarily require the ability to self-determine one's interest in a love relationship.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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  |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/23/2005 10:40 PM (GMT -6) |   | Sahid: Why must we believe that God's love is his "DNA?" Why can't I believe that it's his choice? I believe that God has always chosen to love and is not controlled by any power (nature, DNA) stronger than his will.
Has God always "chosen" to be internally related as a triunity, too? God's triunity is inseparable from God's love, if it is the case that the unifying link is love. Why? Because it's God's dispositional reality and it's outplay that grounds the triunity. Remember, God is not a monad.
For your view to work, you'd have to claim that the triunity of God is a logically contingent affair such that the Father could CHOOSE not to love the Son, etc.
I don't think you want to do that.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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  |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 7:35 AM (GMT -6) |   | Sahid: Sure I do. Could but didn't. I don't see the problem.
So, you want to say that it was logically possible for the Father to NOT love the Son, etc, such that God's triunity is contingent?
Hmmm...
Then the Triune God cannot be a necessary being...and we are fundmentally dealing with TRITHEISM. We are dealing with 3 GODS who, by CHOICE, so integrate their lives in love that they effectively "become" one being.
Well, I don't need to tell you this is heresy. But let's skip that.
Next, you'd either have to say that God's dispositional reality (or the 3 Gods rather) has a "blank state" morally speaking...or that God can "self-dispose" God's morally such that God's volitional decision DETERMINES God's loving nature at all times. With one suggestion, God's fundamentally amoral. With another, God can in NO way be a necessary being.
And unfortunately, there's NO PHILOSOPHICALLY SOUND way to affirm what you do. You'd just have to take in on faith. But it's weird. If you admit that God can do acts of evil by choice, you have absolutely NO REASON to say that this won't happen at least in the future. What are you going to do? Just take God's word for it?? "God said it, I believe it, That settles it"?? I could just as easily say that God may be lying on a situation and all you could do is say "No, he's not." without any real justification.
It's amazing to me what ends we will go to to preserve the idea of God's love being purely an act of FREE CHOICE. It leads to all types of logical absurdities. Why go through all that for the idea?
But let's spell things out. If a person really wants to hold a voluntaristic view of God (ie where God's freely made decision creates God's disposition towards love...and God continuously holds this disposition by SHEER will)
--One must deny that God is a necessary being --One must deny that God is necessarily a triune being. --One must affirm a solid tritheism. --One must admit the genuine, logical possibility that God can become evil or do evil acts --One must admit that the 3 persons of the Godhead could, at any time, choose not to love one another.
If that's what you want, cool. As for me, I'll stay away from that. Insofar as I do, I affirm that God's is unchangably loving and that from God's primordial reality and the actualization of God's disposition.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
Post Edited (MephEternal) : 10/24/2005 7:40:12 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 7:59 AM (GMT -6) |   | I do thank you, Sahid. You bring up something very important.
My ideas will only work IF one assumes these things...
1) God is a necessary being, meaning all of the characteristics God displays, God does so necessarily.
2) God is a triune being; a being of internal relationality where love, life, and power are perichoretically shared eternally.
3) God's triunity is at outworking of the constant actualization of God's dispositional reality towards experiencing beauty via loving sociality.
4) 1-3 means that God is NECESSARILY, UNCHANGABLY triune, that is internally-experienced loving relationality
If you believe that... --God is a monad
--A relational view of tritheism is true --God is not a necessary being --God is logically capable of NOT being internally related ala triunity
or... --God can "self-dispose" with respect to moral activity
then my stuff won't work with you.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
Post Edited (MephEternal) : 10/24/2005 8:11:49 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 10:48 AM (GMT -6) |   | One of Plantinga's claims with the free will defense is that...
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more morally good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all.
In other words, a world containing beings who can "self-dispose" with respect to loving intentionality is inherently WORTH MORE, all else being equal, than a world that doesn't contain such beings.
I'm wondering where did this idea come from? Is this assumed? What?
Moreover, if what we've been saying in the previous threads is true, this assumption doesn't amount to a hill of beans, if we are talking INHERENT worth.
Does anyone know exactly how this idea is justified?
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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  |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 10/24/2005 11:44 AM (GMT -6) |   | Meph, there are certain points I still don't agree with.
--One must deny that God is a necessary being
Alright. Necessity has been discussed elsewhere but no one has yet been able (to my humble satisfaction) to answer the problems with it. First, humans are in no position to endow God (or any other thing) with this label. We have no way of knowing we are correct. Second, it doesn't matter. What is lost by only saying 'God is eternal' rather than saying 'God by necessity must be eternal'? Maybe our peace of mind, but if we accept that God could have been otherwise but chose still to love, that makes him praiseworthy. (A God who is uncontrollably good should not be praised any more than my shoes which uncontrollably keep my feet warm or my DNA which uncontrollably keeps my body functioning and preserve my life.
--One must deny that God is necessarily a triune being.
Same thing. That's fine.
--One must affirm a solid tritheism.
No, I disagree. God is loving even if he is not necessarily so. Same with the trinity. God is one, a trinity even if he is not necessarily so.
--One must admit the genuine, logical possibility that God can become evil or do evil acts
Yup. Just makes it more praiseworthy (or actual praiseworthy at all) for God to love us.
--One must admit that the 3 persons of the Godhead could, at any time, choose not to love one another.
Yup. Amazing that they don't. Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 11:50 AM (GMT -6) |   | Corey: I've got all of Plantinga's books... when I get a little time I'll review that.
GREAT! I was hoping that you would...
*******************
Sahid: Among other stuff in his post... A God who is uncontrollably good should not be praised any more than my shoes which uncontrollably keep my feet warm or my DNA which uncontrollably keeps my body functioning and preserve my life.
Well, it seems that none of my stuff will be persuasive to you, then. Oh, well.
Wondering something though. The sun cannot help being what it is: a source of life-giving heat and light. Is it wrong to laud the magnificence of the sun, or testify to our perceptions of it's beauty because it does what it does uncontrollably?
Again, just wondering. Where do you get and justify the idea that moral freedom is inherently worth more than not having it?
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 10/24/2005 12:17 PM (GMT -6) |   | | Ok, sure we can praise the sun. We can say the sun is good. But when we say that Mother Teresa was good, that's something else. The sun is good because the one (or three) who created it is good. It is not good itself. It only uncontrollably reflects God's love. Mother Teresa too only reflects God's love, but she had the choice to do otherwise.
Imagine two managers of two nuclear power plant sitting at the controls. The warming bells and lights are going off everywhere. At the first plant a calculator rolls of the desk, hit's the man on his knee, and out of reflex he kicks the place on the underside of the control panel that actually stops the disaster. The second man understands the situation and because of his careful preparation he knows to crawl under the controls and smack the panel with his hand.
In the case of the first man we can praise biology, physics, luck, whatever, but the man? I don't see how.
In the case of the second man we praise him.
I happen to believe that God is personal and therefore there is something about his personality to be praised. Your view seems to me to make God into a force of nature. Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 1:50 PM (GMT -6) |   | Sahid: I happen to believe that God is personal and therefore there is something about his personality to be praised. Your view seems to me to make God into a force of nature.
So, if God had the genuine ability to...
--freely deliberate between ranges of possible subjective aims. (exhibiting rationality and volition)
--freely choose between various ways of displaying love (rationality and volition)
--freely choose whether or not to create (rationality and volition)
--experience Godself and contingent reality(exhibiting consciousness)
--evaluate God's own experience (consciousness)
--proactively plan things according to God's anticipation of future events (All 3)
--react deliberately to God's experience of self and contingent reality (all 3)
...BUT...
God was NOT able to ever fail having loving intentionality...
then, according to you, Sahid, God is NOT a personal being?
Can you please explain this to me, Sahid. This seems to be very reductionistic about what it means to be a personal being. As if moral freedom is the ONLY freedom that determines personality. If this is what you believe, could you please give me some reason to justify such a claim. Please help me see what you are seeing.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  Corey Five with a Four-wing

Date Joined Feb 2003 Total Posts : 1893 | Posted 10/24/2005 4:03 PM (GMT -6) |   |
MephEternal said...Corey: I've got all of Plantinga's books... when I get a little time I'll review that.GREAT! I was hoping that you would...  I've scanned in the section on "Free Will Defense" from God, Freedom and Evil by Alvin Plantinga here.
Note that Plantinga draws a distinction between a Free Will Defense and a Free Will Theodicy. This particular passage is not intended to build a full-orbed theodicy, but does play a part in that broader project.
Context: this argument is in response to critics' attacks regarding the Problem of Evil.
Post Edited (Corey) : 10/24/2005 4:10:11 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 10/24/2005 6:30 PM (GMT -6) |   | | I think a personal being exhibits freedom in many ways. But if God is robotic when it comes to choosing between good and evil, he is less personal (and/or less free) than I.
then, according to you, Sahid, God is NOT a personal being?
No, according to me the God you are describing is not a personal being. I believe that God can choose between good and evil, love and hate. God has defied so many expectations that until I hear a reason justifing otherwise, I will believe that he can. Whenever anyone says "God can't do____," the burden of proof is on them (in my opinion). I won't put it past God to have the ability to do anything, until I know of a reason to the contrary.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 10/24/2005 6:33:31 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
  |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 6:49 PM (GMT -6) |   | Sahid: I just think it's the safer assumption (given past experience and testimony) to think he can do anything, and then work from there. If it is discovered that that claim is illogical or if he denies it, then we can drop it.
With this view of God's omnipotence (God can do ABSOLUTELY anything), then...
1) J. L. Mackie and Michael Martin are right and the problem of evil is intractable. There is NO logical reason that evil should exist, given an all-good God.
2) God can cease to exist; God can create a perfect circle with 10 straight lines; and other random interesting things.
3) God can be NOT-God at the same time and in the same respect...and the laws of identity and non-contradiction don't exist.
Um...well. Hey, we all have our perspectives. I just can't jive with that. But, that's me. Do you, though.

The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 7:03 PM (GMT -6) |   | Corey,
Thanks for the stuff, man. But I haven't found what I'm looking for.
Plantinga says: A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more morally good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all.
But gives NO justification for this belief. I checked your stuff and it doesn't say.
I've not see ANYTHING that truly justifies the thought. This is the closest thing that I've come to...
To begin with, (MSR1) presupposes the view of free will known as 'libertarianism': 22) Libertarianism=df the view that a person is free with respect to a given action if and only if that person is both free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing that action; in other words, that person is not determined to perform or refrain from that action by any prior causal forces. Although the term 'libertarianism' isn’t exactly a household name, the view it expresses is commonly taken to be the average person’s view of free will. It is the view that causal determinism is false, that—unlike robots or other machines—we can make choices that are genuinely free.
According to Plantinga, libertarian free will is a morally significant kind of free will. An action is morally significant just when it is appropriate to evaluate that action from a moral perspective (e.g., by ascribing moral praise or blame). Persons have morally significant free will if they are able to perform actions that are morally significant. Imagine a possible world where God creates creatures with a very limited kind of freedom. Suppose that the persons in this world can only choose good options and are incapable of choosing bad options. So, if one of them were faced with three possible courses of action—two of which were morally good and one of which was morally bad—this person would not be free with respect to the morally bad option. That is, that person would not be able to choose any bad option even if they wanted to. Our hypothetical person does, however, have complete freedom to decide which of the two good courses of action to take. Plantinga would deny that any such person has morally significant free will. People in this world always perform morally good actions, but they deserve no credit for doing so. It is impossible for them to do wrong. So, when they do perform right actions, they should not be praised. It would be ridiculous to give moral praise to a robot for putting your soda can in the recycle bin rather than the trash can, if that is what it was programmed to do. Given the program running inside the robot and its exposure to an empty soda can, it's going to take the can to the recycle bin. It has no choice about the matter. Similarly, the people in the possible world under consideration have no choice about being good. Since they are pre-programmed to be good, they deserve no praise for it.
www.iep.utm.edu/e/evil-log.htm
This is generally all I've been seeing.
1) Rhetoric dealing with "robots", "programming", "puppets" or other such things.
2) The idea of what's praiseworthy.
But I don't have ANY solid grounding for why these people believe that having moral freedom is INHERENTLY better than not. They constantly REFUSE to acknowledge all the aspects of personality that exist in the human being...and that moral deliberation is only ONE thing among those!
Moreover, they don't seem to consider what it means to say that God CANNOT sin or that Jesus COULD NOT sin! How come it's a "perfection" when God does this, but it's a blight on personhood when it's not??
I'm smellin' a skunk.
I want a SOLID discussion on WHY possessing moral freedom (not just relative ontological autonomy or LFW) is inherently worth more than having LFW without moral freedom.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
Post Edited (MephEternal) : 10/24/2005 7:37:02 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 8:00 PM (GMT -6) |   | Tom? Got ANYTHING here?
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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  |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 10/24/2005 10:49 PM (GMT -6) |   | Mephi: I want a SOLID discussion on WHY possessing moral freedom (not just relative ontological autonomy or LFW) is inherently worth more than having LFW without moral freedom.
Tom: Haven't read any of this thread, but glancing through it just now this sentence of Mephi's jumped out at me.
I don't understand it. What is "moral freedom" if not "libertarian" freedom? I equate them, at least in those instances where LFW is excercised with regard to morally accountable things (not with regard to say, LFW in choosing chocolate over vanilla). But in morally signficant instances, LFW just IS moral freedom, or in other words, freedom with respect to morality. So with regard to what Mephi wants a solid discussion on, I have no idea what "LFW without moral freedom" is.
(1) I know what LFW is: Power to the contrary (for short). (2) I know what moral freedom is: Power to the contrary (or LFW) in moral situations. (3) I know what relative ontological autonomy is: We are contingently ontologically independent beings.
I have no idea what it even means to possess moral freedom without LFW. To be 'free with respect to love" is to be "libertarianly free with respect to love" (for us here and now--not compatibilistically free with respect to love in heaven if indeed we shall be that; if we shall, we will have libertarianly chosen our way into such a state). I think Mephi and I disagree a bit on all this.
What's worth more? Having moral freedom (or being a moral agent) is worth more than JUST posssessing LFW and being a non-moral agent because those who possess the former are human beings and those who possess the latter are amoral beings of a sort I admit to never having met at all. I don't know that there are any such beings (unless animals are sometimes libertarianly free in their choices).
Anyhow, I think human being is worth more than non-human contingent being. I think humans are worth more than whales or ducks. Inherently so. Why? Because the image of God inheres in us and not in them. End of story. Why is being a contingent but libertarianly free moral agent worth more than being a contingent but libertarianly free non-moral agent? The only answer I can think of is: because there are existing examples of the former and none of the latter? If there were examples of the latter, then I'd say the former mode of contingent existence is worth more because its uniqueness is found in the image of God that inheres within while there is not such quality in the latter. God has decided to value us more than rats and worms. Is anybody really in doubt about this?
Mephi and I disagree on TWT1. Just disagree. He thinks God could have created contingent beings with a loving DNA that turned out perfectly loving humans beings. I don't think that's possible even for God. If his subjective aims include our loving him at all, God's gotta endow us with LFW.
Tom
Post Edited (TGB) : 10/24/2005 11:08:53 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 11:09 PM (GMT -6) |   | Tom: I don't understand it. What is "moral freedom" if not "libertarian" freedom? I equate them, at least in those instances where LFW is excercised with regard to morally accountable things (not with regard to say, LFW in choosing chocolate over vanilla). But in morally signficant instances, LFW just IS moral freedom, or in other words, freedom with respect to morality. So with regard to what Mephi wants a solid discussion on, I have no idea what "LFW without moral freedom" is.
(1) I know what LFW is: Power to the contrary (for short). (2) I know what moral freedom is: Power to the contrary (or LFW) in moral situations. (3) I know what relative ontological autonomy is: We are contingently ontologically independent beings.
I have no idea what it even means to possess moral freedom without LFW. To be 'free with respect to love" is to be "libertarianly free with respect to love."
It's extremely simple. To possess LFW without moral freedom would be living like Jesus. Being contingently ontologically independent beings who have power to the contrary on things OTHER THAN morality...who always has loving intentionality.
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Tom: What's worth more? Having moral freedom (or being a moral agent) is worth more than JUST posssessing LFW and being a non-moral agent because those who possess the former are human beings and those who possess the latter are amoral beings of a sort I admit to never having met at all. I don't know that there are any such beings (unless animals are sometimes libertarianly free in their choices).
All we are talking about is a contingent, sentient being with power to the contrary on things OTHER THAN morality such that they never fail to have loving intentionality. We are not talking about completely AMORAL beings.
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Tom: Anyhow, I think human being is worth more than non-human contingent being. I think humans are worth more than whales or ducks. Inherently so. Why? Because the image of God inheres in us and not in them. End of story. Why is being a contingent but libertarianly free moral agent worth more than being a contingent but libertarianly free non-moral agent? The only answer I can think of is: because there are existing examples of the former and none of the latter? If there were examples of the latter, then I'd say the former mode of contingent existence is worth more because its uniqueness is found in the image of God that inheres within while there is not such quality in the latter. God has decided to value us more than rats and worms. Is anybody really in doubt about this?
If the Image of God is truly seen in it's fulness in Jesus (Jesus is NOT only God, but also the human most fully alive!)...and we say that Jesus never failed to have loving intention...then there should be no problem.
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 10/24/2005 11:15 PM (GMT -6) |   | Tom: Mephi and I disagree on TWT1. Just disagree. He thinks God could have created contingent beings with a loving DNA that turned out perfectly loving humans beings. I don't think that's possible even for God. If his subjective aims include our loving him at all, God's gotta endow us with LFW.
We disagree on TWT 1 because you hold that...
"For a person to enter, engage in, and enjoy a personal and loving relationship with another person, she must be free to determine for herself whether or not she enters, engages in, and enjoys such a relationship. That “the person” determines this is what makes the relationship “personal,” and that they do it in response to the worth and value of the other person, and in order to affirm that worth and value, is what makes it “loving.”
In other words, if a person cannot freely self-determine one's interest in a loving relationship (from beginning to end), they cannot enjoy a personal, loving relationship.
But, Tom, you don't seem to catch that it's a BIG DEAL that this "metaphysical principle" doesn't hold to God. And it has nothing to do with the necessary/contingent thing either. God and Jesus give tacit examples that it's possible for sentient beings to have UNCHANGABLE loving natures while enjoying genuine love relationship.
See the post where I challenge that TWT 1 is even a valid "metaphysical principle"
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 10/24/2005 11:17 PM (GMT -6) |   | Mephi: What is TWT 1? It is one of the 6 theses for the warfare worldview that says that "Love must be chosen". Long story short, this means that genuine love (ie that form of love which is most appreciated by God) can only be the product of a being who is genuine able NOT to love. This forms an important basis for the "free will argument"
Tom: This is not MY understanding of TWT1. And I don’t think Doc would express it this way. I mean, I don’t think it was ever Doc’s intention to INCLUDE God in the scope of TWT1. So the fact that God doesn’t have to be libertarianly free with respect to being loving, and so isn’t an example of the rule, means nothing to TWT1. It regards contingent love only.
Just wanted to point that out. Can’t say more now. Late. Gotta go to sleep.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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